Opinion
BAXTER, J.
Section 847 of the Civil Code1 provides that in certain circumstances an owner of any estate or other interest in real property shall not be liable for injuries that occur upon the property during or after the injured person’s commission of any one of 25 felonies listed in the statute. (§ 847, subds. (a)-(e).) Explicitly, however, section 847 “does not limit the [718]*718liability of an owner or an owner’s agent which otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct, or for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.” (Id., subd. (f).)
In this case, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis that section 847 barred the action. The evidence showed that one of the defendants intentionally fired a handgun at one of several men exiting their store after an armed robbery attempt and that plaintiff Salvador Calvillo-Silva, rendered a paraplegic from the shooting, was later convicted of the felony of attempted grand theft in connection with the criminal episode. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that section 847 does not limit liability for intentional shootings. We granted review to determine the scope of the statutory immunity, and in particular to consider whether section 847 protects the intentional use of deadly force when a statutorily enumerated felony has been committed.2
Application of settled rules of statutory construction leads us to conclude that when the statutory predicates have been established, an owner is entitled to immunity pursuant to section 847 unless, as mentioned in subdivision (f) of the statute, liability “otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct, or for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.” Consistent with established principles of tort law, we find that the statutory reference to willful or wanton conduct relates to intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to another will probably result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results. So construed, the immunity granted by section 847 extends not only to negligent conduct, but also to intentionally injurious acts that are justifiable under the circumstances (see § 50 [codifying the privileges of self-defense, defense of others and defense of property]) and hence not wrongful.
Although we disagree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the intentional use of deadly force is categorically excepted from the scope of section 847’s immunity, we affirm that court’s decision to reverse the grant [719]*719of summary judgment because the evidence in the record gives rise to conflicting inferences as to whether defendants’ use of force was justified under the circumstances.
Factual and Procedural History
On October 11, 1991, plaintiffs Salvador and Bertha Calvillo-Silva filed a complaint against Home Grocery, its owners (John Pacheco and Ramon Block), its employees (Don Pacheco and Robert Sharp III), and the lessor of the premises (Daniel Dieguez), seeking compensatory and punitive damages for injuries inflicted upon plaintiff Salvador Calvillo-Silva on the premises where Home Grocery was located.3 The complaint alleged causes of action for assault and battery, general negligence, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, premises liability and loss of consortium. In their answers, defendants asserted several affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence,' self-defense and defense of property, but they did not rely on the immunity provisions of section 847.
In September of 1993, defendant Dieguez moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that as merely the owner and lessor of the premises, he had no duty to protect plaintiff. The superior court, on its own initiative, requested briefing on the applicability of section 847 and subsequently granted Dieguez’s summary judgment motion.4 Thereafter, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment based upon section 847.
In support of their motion, defendants contended the following facts, among others, were not subject to dispute. From 1972 through October of 1990, Block and John Pacheco, individually and doing business as Home Grocery, owned a leasehold interest in the property where they operated their store. Plaintiff incurred injuries upon the subject property. Plaintiff was charged by information on the following criminal counts arising out of the events occurring at Home Grocery at the time of plaintiff’s injury: burglary (Pen. Code, § 459); attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§664, 211); false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236); assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)); and attempted grand theft (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 487, former subd. 2). The information also alleged that plaintiff personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)) and that he acted with knowledge that another principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (d)). Pursuant to a plea bargain, plaintiff pleaded nolo contendere to one count of felony attempted grand theft (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 487, former subd. 2) and the remaining counts were dismissed. None of the defendants herein was ever arrested or criminally charged for the shooting of plaintiff.
[720]*720In opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff offered his own declaration and deposition testimony attesting to the following facts. Plaintiff entered Home Grocery on October 12, 1990, without a knife or any other weapon, to purchase a soda. As plaintiff started to pay for the soda at the front counter, three men unknown to him entered the store and attempted a robbery. Fearing for his safety, plaintiff tried to exit the store. He was then shot in the back by one or more persons. At all times during the attempted robbery, plaintiff was unarmed, took no part in the crime and did nothing to provoke the action against him.
Robert Sharp III gave the following statement to the San Mateo County Sheriff’s office. He and Don Pacheco were working at Home Grocery when four males entered the premises and attempted to commit a robbery. One of the intruders pointed a large black pistol at Pacheco and demanded money. Another intruder (later identified as plaintiff) picked up- a knife from behind the “deli area” and held it against Sharp’s throat. Pacheco made several attempts to open the cash register but failed. The longer the intruders were in the store, the more nervous they appeared to become and at one point the man with the pistol slapped Pacheco in the face. Two of the intruders then left the store through the front door. The man with the pistol also moved toward the front door while the man with the knife released Sharp and headed toward the front door. As soon as the man with the pistol exited the door, Pacheco grabbed a gun from under the counter and shot at plaintiff as plaintiff was running out of the store.5 Sharp took the gun from Pacheco, jumped over the counter and went to the door. Sharp saw the man with the pistol still pointing the pistol at the store. He then saw plaintiff lying wounded in the parking lot. He pointed the gun at plaintiff and yelled at him not to move.
Although Sharp claimed that plaintiff had held a knife to his throat during the incident, plaintiff offered evidence that Don Pacheco never saw plaintiff with a knife and never saw a knife being used on Sharp. Despite searches of plaintiff and the premises by law enforcement officers, no knife was ever found.
Plaintiff was the only person ever identified and apprehended for the attempted robbery at the Home Grocery premises. Plaintiff offered his own sworn declaration explaining that he entered a nolo contendere plea to the attempted grand theft count in order to avoid a trial and a long prison term. [721]*721Plaintiff thought he would not receive a fair trial because of his “ethnic background” and the circumstances of the crime. At the time he entered his plea, plaintiff believed it would not affect his rights to recover compensation for his injuries; he was not informed otherwise.
The superior court granted summary judgment, finding no triable issue of fact as to the availability of section 847 as a complete defense for all defendants. As part of its ruling, the court determined it was unlikely that plaintiffs could adduce evidence of any willful, wanton, or criminal conduct so as to bring the case within subdivision (f) of section 847.
The Court of Appeal overturned the summary judgment. Although the court unanimously rejected plaintiffs’ argument that section 847 applies only with respect to dangerous conditions or uses of an owner’s land, it ultimately determined by a split vote that the statute immunized only negligent conduct and did not protect the intentional use of deadly or injurious force. Nonetheless, the court explained, defendants were free to defend the lawsuit on the basis that they acted reasonably in self-defense during the events of October 12, 1990. (See § 50.) The dissenting justice concluded that the statutory immunity extended to intentional acts, but nevertheless found that summary judgment was inappropriate because of a potential triable issue of material fact as to whether the injurious conduct was “willful” within his understanding of section 847. We granted defendants’ petition for review.
Discussion
A. Background
The general policy of California with respect to tort liability is set forth in section 1714. For well over 100 years, section 1714 has provided in relevant part: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.” (§ 1714, subd. (a) [first enacted 1872, amended by Stats. 1978, ch. 929, § 2, p. 2904].)
Three decades ago, Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496] relied upon the basic policy articulated in section 1714 to hold that a possessor of land generally owes a duty of care to all persons who enter the possessor’s premises, whether the person is an invitee (business visitor), a licensee (social guest), or a trespasser. That decision disapproved of the former common law rule recognizing that, although a possessor of land owed licensees and trespassers the [722]*722duty to refrain from willful or wanton injury, such persons were obliged to take the premises as found with regard to any alleged defective condition. In eliminating the rule of limited liability for defective conditions of land, Rowland v. Christian concluded that “[a] man’s life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the law because he has come upon the land of another without permission or with permission but without a business purpose.” (69 Cal.2d at p. 118.)
When the Legislature considered enactment of section 847 in 1985, it heard arguments from proponents of the measure that immunity was needed “to address the increasing number of attempts by criminals injured in the course of their crimes to demand compensation from their intended victims” and to provide a means to “facilitate the early dismissal of lawsuits of this type.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 8, 1985, pp. 9-10; see Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 30, 1985, pp. 2-3.) In evaluating the matter, the Legislature specifically considered two controversial cases in which plaintiffs had sought substantial sums for injuries they incurred while trespassing on the property of others. In one case involving public property, a plaintiff sued a school district for $3 million after he fell through a skylight during an attempt to illegally remove floodlights from the roof of a school gymnasium. The plaintiff, who was rendered a quadriplegic from the fall, obtained a settlement of $260,000 plus monthly payments of $1,200 for life. In another case, a motorcycle thief who trespassed and went joyriding across a farmer’s field received nearly $500,000 in damages from the farmer for injuries he sustained after hitting a pothole in the field.6 (See Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Republican Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 30, 1985; see also Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 4, 1985, p. 3.) The bill to enact section 847 was viewed as proposing a partial reversal of Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, which in effect had permitted such lawsuits to be maintained. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Republican Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 30, 1985.) As noted by various legislative committees, the sentiment providing the impetus for the legislation was reflected in the following statements of the bill’s author: “[Wjhatever may be said in defense of the alleged right of a trespasser to sue a [723]*723landowner for the trespasser’s injuries sustained while trespassing, there is almost nothing to be said on behalf of the thief, a cattle rustler or other felon who is injured in the course of his felony. Such a wrongdoer should not be allowed by the law to add still more injury to insult.”7 (Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 4, 1985, p. 2; see Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended on May 30, 1985, p. 2; Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 30, 1985, p. 2.)
B. Scope of Immunity under Section 847
As enacted, section 847 limits the liability of an owner of any estate or other interest in real property for injuries that occur upon the property during or after the injured person’s commission of any one of 25 enumerated felonies.8 (§ 847, subds. (a), (b).) By its own terms, however, section 847 “does not limit the liability of an owner or an owner’s agent which otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct, or for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.” (Id., subd. (f).)
The principal question we must decide is this: Does section 847 provide immunity for the intentional use of deadly force against one who is later convicted of a statutorily enumerated felony? Plaintiffs answer this question in the negative, reading section 847 to confer immunity solely for negligent conduct relating to dangerous or defective conditions and uses of land. Conversely, defendants assert section 847 also immunizes unpremeditated actions taken in response to any of the enumerated felonies. The issue is one of legislative intent and statutory construction.
[724]*724We begin our analysis by acknowledging that “[t]he goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1152 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 947 P.2d 291].) Ordinarily, the language of the statute provides the most reliable indication of legislative intent. {Ibid.) But when the statutory language is ambiguous, “the court may examine the context in which the language appears, adopting the construction that best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes.” {Ibid.) In such cases, a court may consider both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment to ascertain the legislative intent. (Ibid.; Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 896 P.2d 807].)
Section 847 states in relevant part:
“(a) An owner ... of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, shall not be liable to any person for any injury or death that occurs upon that property during the course of or after the commission of any of the felonies set forth in subdivision (b) by the injured or deceased person.
“(b) The felonies to which the provisions of this section apply are the following: . . . (18) burglary; (19) robbery; . . . (22) any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; . . . (24) grand theft as defined in Sections 487 and 487a of the Penal Code; and (25) any attempt to commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than an assault.
“(c) The limitation on liability conferred by this section arises at the moment the injured or deceased person commences the felony or attempted felony and extends to the moment the injured or deceased person is no longer upon the property.
“(d) The limitation on liability conferred by this section applies only when the injured or deceased person’s conduct in furtherance of the commission of a felony specified in subdivision (b) proximately or legally causes the injury or death.
“(e) The limitation on liability conferred by this section arises only upon the charge of a felony listed in subdivision (b) and the subsequent conviction of that felony or a lesser included felony or misdemeanor arising from a charge of a felony listed in subdivision (b). During the pendency of any such criminal action, a civil action alleging this liability shall be abated and the statute of limitations on the civil cause of action shall be tolled.
[725]*725“(f) This section does not limit the liability of an owner or an owner’s agent which otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct, or for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.
“(g) The limitation on liability provided by this section shall be in addition to any other available defense.”
Thus, an owner of “any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory” (§ 847, subd. (a)) must establish the following elements as a precondition to immunity under section 847: (1) the plaintiff’s injury or death must occur upon the owner’s property “during the course of or after the commission of’ any of the statutorily enumerated felonies by the plaintiff (id., subds. (a), (b)); (2) the plaintiff’s injury or death must be “proximately or legally” caused by the plaintiff’s “conduct in furtherance of the commission” of the felony (id., subd. (d)); and (3) the plaintiff must have been charged with an enumerated felony and subsequently convicted of “that felony or a lesser included felony or misdemeanor arising from [the] charge”9 (§ 847, subd. (e)).
Because the issue potentially is dispositive, we shall first address whether section 847’s limitation on liability applies to conduct that is unrelated to the physical conditions or uses of an owner’s property. Starting with the statutory language, we observe there is no provision explicitly stating that immunity is available for conduct that does not relate to conditions or uses of property. Subdivision (a), however, declares that an owner “shall not be liable . . . for any injury or death that occurs upon that property during the course of or after the commission of’ any of the listed felonies by the plaintiff. (§ 847, subd. (a), italics added.) Subdivision (f) further specifies that section 847 does not limit the liability of an owner or an owner’s agent “which otherwise exists [1] for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct, or [2] for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.” (Italics added.)
By delineating only two conduct-based exceptions to its provision limiting liability “for any injury or death that occurs upon [the] property,” section 847 necessarily implies that conduct not falling within those two exceptions is immunized when the statutory elements have been shown. (See White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870, 881-882, fn. 4 [221 Cal.Rptr. [726]*726509, 710 P.2d 309] [when a statute expresses certain exceptions to a general rule, other exceptions are necessarily excluded]; Building Profit Corp. v. Mortgage & Realty Trust (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 533].) These two exceptions are stated in the alternative, and it is only the exception regarding the failure to guard or warn that makes direct reference to “a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.” (§ 847, subd. (f).) As structured, then, subdivision (f) makes reasonably clear that the other exception for “willful, wanton, or criminal conduct” need not relate specifically to dangerous conditions, uses, structures, or activities on an owner’s land. (Ibid.) In sum, section 847 confers immunity for any “failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity” that is not “willful or malicious” and for any other type of “conduct” that is not “willful, wanton, or criminal,” so long as the statutory predicates for the immunity have been established.
This reading is entirely consistent with section 847’s underlying purpose “to protect landowners and possessors from lawsuits brought by persons injured on the property during the commission of a crime.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 8, 1985, p. 3; see Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 30, 1985, pp. 2-3.) As the legislative history discloses, section 847 was enacted to correct a perceived injustice in the law that had allowed lawbreakers to indirectly benefit from their crimes at the expense of the victimized owners and possessors. Such purpose is more fully effectuated by not implying a sweeping exception for lawbreakers whose injuries do not involve physical conditions or uses of property.
To support their narrower construction of the statutory immunity, plaintiffs rely upon a press release in which the legislation’s author, Assemblyman Alister. McAlister, responded to criticisms by the California Trial Lawyers Association and labor groups that his bill would sanction hidden spring guns and violent attacks upon hapless trespassers. In that public statement McAlister undertook to explain that “the bill’s clear purpose is not to immunize anyone from liability for deliberate or reckless and irresponsible assaults, but is solely aimed at preventing landowners’ liability to felonious trespassers for alleged defective conditions of real estate.” (Press release, Jan. 9, 1985, italics added.) According to plaintiffs, McAlister’s statement furnishes persuasive evidence that the Legislature intended to confine its grant of immunity to instances of alleged premises liability.
In construing a statute we do not consider the objective of an authoring legislator when there is no reliable indication that the Legislature [727]*727as a whole was aware of that objective and believed the language of the proposal would accomplish it. (See Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744, 764-765, fn. 10 [274 Cal.Rptr. 787, 799 P.2d 1220]; In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 589-590 [128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371].) In this case, no such indication appears. While many of the legislative analyses did refer to the author’s explanations of the proposed law (see ante, fn. 7), none suggested that the “sole” purpose of the legislation was to preclude liability for defective conditions or uses of property. Nor did any of the legislative analyses or reports describe the author as having taken such a position. In any case, even assuming other legislators were aware of the author’s press release, restriction of the immunity to cases of alleged premises liability cannot be reconciled with the plain meaning of the statutory language.
Plaintiffs appear to also contend that the placement of section 847 in the “Real or Immovable Property” part of the Civil Code, in a chapter entitled Obligations of Owners, strongly suggests that the Legislature viewed the statute as one pertaining solely to issues of premises liability. They are mistaken. Although consideration may be given to chapter and section headings in codes in interpreting the various sections (see People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 820 P.2d 1036]; American Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 829, 836 [166 Cal.Rptr. 89]), the particular language of section 847 fails to support such a view.
Having determined that the immunity conferred by section 847 is not restricted to conduct relating solely to physical conditions or uses of land, we next consider whether the statute limits liability only for negligence or whether its protection further extends to the intentional use of deadly force where, as here, the person injured by such force is later convicted of one of the statutorily enumerated felonies. To resolve this issue, we must examine section 847’s proviso that it does not limit liability “which otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct.” (§ 847, subd. (f).)
Although section 847 does not define what it means by the terms “willful” or “wanton,” the concept of liability for willful behavior is a familiar one that has appeared in a variety of statutory and common law contexts. (E.g., Williams v. Carr (1968) 68 Cal.2d 579 [68 Cal.Rptr. 305, 440 P.2d 505] [action for willful misconduct under automobile guest statute];10 Emery v. Emery (1955) 45 Cal.2d 421 [289 P.2d 218] [recognizing right of unemancipated minor to sue parent for a willful or malicious tort]; Mercer-Fraser [728]*728Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 102 [251 P.2d 955] [workers’ compensation statute authorizing increased compensation for serious and willful misconduct of the employer]; Cope v. Davison (1947) 30 Cal.2d 193 [180 P.2d 873, 171 A.L.R. 667] [automobile guest statute]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1225 [244 Cal.Rptr. 714] [indemnity action against a public utility under tariff provisions not limiting liability for willful misconduct, fraudulent conduct or violations of law]; New v. Consolidated Rock Products Co. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 681, 687 [217 Cal.Rptr. 522] [action against a landowner under the “willful or malicious failure to guard or warn” exception to a recreational use immunity statute]; O’Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 903 [159 Cal.Rptr. 125] [same]; Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 923 [158 Cal.Rptr. 463] [workers’ compensation statute]; Simmons v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 341 [133 Cal.Rptr. 42] [action for willful misconduct against a railroad company]; Morgan v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1006 [112 Cal.Rptr. 695] [same].)
While it bears emphasis that legislative use of the term “willful” may not be precisely the same for all purposes (see generally, Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 371]), it has been generally recognized in the context of tort liability that the usual meaning assigned to “willful,” as well as to “wanton” and to other similar terms, is that “ ‘ “the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” (Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 34, p. 185.)’ ” (New v. Consolidated Rock Products Co., supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 689, citing Morgan v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 1011.) One common description of willful misconduct is that it refers to “intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results.” (E.g., Reuther v. Viall (1965) 62 Cal.2d 470, 475 [42 Cal.Rptr. 456, 398 P.2d 792] [automobile guest statute]; Meyer v. Blackman (1963) 59 Cal.2d 668, 677 [31 Cal.Rptr. 36, 381 P.2d [729]*729916] [same]; Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 916, 918 [26 Cal.Rptr. 769, 376 P.2d 833] [same]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242; see also Williams v. Carr, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 584; Emery v. Emery, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 426; Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 120.) More recently, that same description has been used to define “willful or wanton misconduct,” a phrase which in turn has been utilized to explain when a failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition has been “willful or malicious” for purposes of the recreational use immunity statute codified at section 846. (Charpentier v. Von Geldem (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 101, 113 [236 Cal.Rptr. 233]; Nazar v. Rodeffer (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 546, 552 [229 Cal.Rptr. 209]; New v. Consolidated Rock Products Co., supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 689; O’Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co., supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 912.)
Though the decisions addressing the issue of liability for willful or wanton behavior vary somewhat in their emphasis, the case law appears relatively uniform on the following points. First, it is generally recognized that willful or wanton misconduct is separate and distinct from negligence, involving different principles of liability and different defenses. (Shepardson v. McLellan (1963) 59 Cal.2d 83, 89 [27 Cal.Rptr. 884, 378 P.2d 108] [willful misconduct]; Palazzi v. Air Cargo Terminals, Inc. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 190, 195 [52 Cal.Rptr. 817] [wanton misconduct].) Unlike negligence, which implies a failure to use ordinary care, and even gross negligence, which connotes such a lack of care as may be presumed to indicate a passive and indifferent attitude toward results, willful misconduct is not marked by a mere absence of care. Rather, it “ ‘ “involves a more positive intent actually to harm another or to do an act with a positive, active and absolute disregard of its consequences.” ’ ” (Cope v. Davison, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 201, citing Meek v. Fowler (1935) 3 Cal.2d 420, 425 [45 P.2d 194]; accord, Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 120.) So, for example, a person who commits an assault and battery may be guilty of willful misconduct (see Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 116; Mahoney v. Corralejo (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 966, 972 [112 Cal.Rptr. 61]), but a person who fails to perform a statutory duty, without more, is not guilty. (Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 117; Meek v. Fowler, supra, 3 Cal.2d at p. 425; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242.) While the word “willful” implies an intent, the intention must relate to the misconduct and not merely to the fact that some act was intentionally done. (Cope v. Davison, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 201, relying upon Meek v. Fowler, supra, 3 Cal.2d at p. 425; accord, Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 118.) Thus, even though some cases of negligence may involve intentional actions, the mere intent to do an act which constitutes [730]*730negligence is not enough to establish willful misconduct. (Cope v. Davison, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 201, relying upon Meek v. Fowler, supra, 3 Cal.2d at pp. 425-426; accord, Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 118.)
Second, willfulness generally is marked by three characteristics: (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the peril to be apprehended; (2) actual or constructive knowledge that injury is a probable, as opposed to a possible, result of the danger; and (3) conscious failure to act to avoid the peril. (Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison.Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 859 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 16] [recreational use immunity statute]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242; New v. Consolidated Rock Products Co., supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at pp. 689-690; Morgan v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 1012.) As the foregoing suggests, willful misconduct does not invariably entail a subjective intent to injure. It is sufficient that a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances would be aware of the highly dangerous character of his or her conduct. (Pelletti v. Membrila (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 606, 611 [44 Cal.Rptr. 588] [automobile guest statute], relying upon Rest. Torts § 500, com. c, p. 1295; New v. Consolidated Rock Products Co., supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 690; accord, Cope v. Davison, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 199; Palazzi v. Air Cargo Terminals, Inc., supra, 244 Cal.App.2d at pp. 195-196.)
Third, acts that are intended or likely to cause serious injury are not categorically wrongful in character and do not inevitably result in liability. For instance, a person is privileged to use “[a]ny necessary force” to protect or defend oneself or one’s property from “wrongful injury.” (§ 50;11 see also Pen. Code, § 197.12) The right to use force against another has long been limited by the condition that the force be no more than “ ‘that which reasonably appears necessary, in view of all the circumstances of the case, to prevent the impending injury.’ ” (Vaughn v. Jonas (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586, 600 [191 P.2d 432]; Boyer v. Waples (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [24 Cal.Rptr. 192]; Fraguglia v. Sala (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 738, 745 [62 P.2d 783].) When the amount of force used is justifiable under the circumstances, it is not willful and the actor may escape liability for intentionally injurious conduct that is otherwise actionable. (See Haeussler v. De Loretto (1952) [731]*731109 Cal.App.2d 363, 364-365 [240 P.2d 654].) But if force is applied in excess of that which is justified, the actor remains subject to liability for the damages resulting from the excessive use of force. (See Townsend v. Briggs (1893) 99 Cal. 481, 483 [34 P. 116]; Fraguglia v. Sala, supra, 17 Cal.App.2d at p. 745; see also Stowell v. Evans (1931) 211 Cal. 565 [296 P. 278].) This is consonant with the general principle that an actor is subject to liability for an intentionally injurious act only if his or her conduct “is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 870; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 17, pp. 77-79.) When an alleged act of self-defense or defense of property is at issue, the question of what force was reasonable and justified is peculiarly one for determination by the trier of fact. (Fawkes v. Reynolds (1922) 190 Cal. 204, 212-213 [211 P. 449]; McLean v. Colf (1918) 179 Cal. 237, 239 [176 P. 169]; Boyer v. Waples, supra, 206 Cal.App.2d at p. 730.)
If these well-established principles of tort law are what the Legislature had in mind when it provided that section 847 does not limit the liability “which otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct” (italics added), then it would appear that section 847 does not provide protection for intentional wrongful acts committed either with a knowledge that serious injury to another will probably result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results.13 So construed, section 847 necessarily implies that when the statutory predicates have been established, immunity is available not only for negligence, but also for acts that are intentionally injurious but justifiable under the circumstances. (See White v. Western Title Ins. Co., supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 881-882, fn. 4; Building Profit Corp. v. Mortgage & Realty Trust, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 689.)
In the proceedings below, the Court of Appeal determined by a split vote that while section 847 provides immunity for negligent acts, it does not purport to restrict liability for intentionally injurious conduct. Noting that Penal Code section 7 defines “willfully” as “simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the omission referred to” (Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1), the court construed the term “willful” in section 847 to mean “simply intentionality or purposefulness.” The court made special note that the proposed legislation was viewed by one legislative committee as partially resurrecting the “all-or-nothing” defense of “contributory negligence” that had been abrogated by Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393], in favor of a system of comparative fault. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 [732]*732(1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 8, 1985, pp. 6-7.) After observing that contributory negligence was never a defense to intentionally injurious conduct, the court concluded that interpreting section 847 to immunize intentional acts would “go far beyond the limited restoration of the doctrine of contributory negligence that the Legislature had in mind.” This analysis fails to persuade.
Logic and common sense support the conclusion that when the Legislature provided that section 847 “does not limit the liability of an owner or an owner’s agent which otherwise exists for willful . . . conduct,” it was referring to principles of law pertaining to civil liability for willful behavior, rather than the criminal definition of “willfully” that governs for purposes of the Penal Code. Moreover, if the Legislature had actually wanted to categorically exclude all “intentional” or “purposeful” conduct from the scope of the statutory immunity, it could easily have used such phraseology instead of declaring that the statute “does not limit the liability . . . which otherwise exists” for conduct that has long been understood to imply wrongfulness as well as intentionality. (See Reuther v. Viall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 475 [describing willful misconduct as “intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results” (italics added)]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1242; Charpentier v. Von Geldern, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 113; Nazar v. Rodeffer, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 552.) In any event, even if we were to accept the Court of Appeal’s position that the statutory term “willful . . . conduct” is intended to refer to all injurious conduct that is intentional or purposeful, regardless of wrongfulness, we would not be free to ignore the “liability . . . which otherwise exists for” language which precedes it. (§ 847, subd. (f).) Thus, even employing that court’s definition of willful conduct, we still would find that immunity is the rule under section 847 unless liability otherwise exists for the intentionally or purposefully injurious conduct at issue. As discussed above, a person is not necessarily liable for injuries caused by the intentional use of deadly or injurious force; the question of liability turns upon the circumstances of the particular case. (See Vaughn v. Jonas, supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 600; Boyer v. Waples, supra, 206 Cal.App.2d at p. 727; Fraguglia v. Sala, supra, 17 Cal.App.2d at p. 745.)
The legislative analysis identified by the Court of Appeal fails to support its narrow view of the statute’s application. (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 200 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 8, 1985, pp. 6-7.) True, the analysis shows legislative contemplation that the proposed immunity would effectively resurrect the contributory negligence doctrine in those cases where negligence forms the basis of liability. But [733]*733there is nothing in the analysis to support the additional inference that the proposed immunity is intended to apply exclusively to claims of negligence. Instead, consistent with the statutory language, the various legislative committees repeatedly described the types of actions covered by the proposed immunity simply as actions for “any injury” or “injuries” or as actions on behalf of “injured persons” for “injury or death.” Conspicuously absent from the legislative history is any mention of the notion that the only actions affected by the proposed immunity are those based upon negligence. Accordingly, we find no basis for implying such a restriction.
In advocating a far broader scope of immunity, defendants contend that section 847’s reference to “willful, wanton, or criminal conduct” should be construed to mean intentional conduct that is “premeditated” and “outside the context of a reaction to a criminal attack.” Under their construction, the exception would preclude immunity for the affirmative use of such mechanisms as spring guns, land mines and “tiger pits,” which may result in indiscriminate violence to any person entering the property, but would bar liability whenever an owner intentionally injures a person in response to a statutorily enumerated crime. Defendants reason essentially as follows. When á perpetrator commits any of the felonies listed in subdivision (b) of section 847, it is reasonably foreseeable that intentional, violent, and injurious force by the victim may occur and, in fact, such force may be expected. Because the enumerated felonies “presuppose that a victim would be in a position to struggle, fight and respond violently to an already violent situation,” an owner is entitled to immunity under section 847 without having to litigate the issues of reasonableness and justification for acts of alleged self-defense, so long as the fact of a plaintiff’s conviction is established.
We have no doubt that the use of spring guns, land mines or tiger pits may constitute conduct that is “willful, wanton, or criminal” (see People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470 [116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241]) and therefore outside the intended scope of immunity. But there is nothing in section 847’s language or history that indicates any legislative intent to confine the meaning of that phrase to the use of such mechanisms.
Furthermore, defendants do not explain what they mean exactly by conduct that is “premeditated”14 and “outside the context of a reaction to a criminal attack,” and it is unclear whether they intend to imply something [734]*734different than the commonly understood meaning of conduct that is “willful” or “wanton” in the civil liability context. But even if defendants’ terms have their own distinct meaning, it is unlikely they accurately reflect the Legislature’s intent, given section 847’s more generalized reference to “willful, wanton, or criminal conduct.” (§ 847, subd. (f).)
More significantly, there is nothing in the statutory language or history that suggests a legislative intent to bypass, rather than incorporate, the large and established body of law recognizing liability when unjustifiable force is used against a lawbreaker.15 To the contrary, the language of the statute expressly provides it “does not limit the liability . . . which otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct.” (§ 847, subd. (f), italics added.) The most straightforward and natural implication of that language is that section 847 contemplates the application of preexisting rules to determine liability for conduct that is willful, wanton, or criminal.
Defendants further contend that because section 847 affirmatively states that its limitation on liability “shall be in addition to any other available defense” (id., subd. (g)), the statute must be read liberally to immunize conduct beyond the justifiable use of force in order to avoid a construction that merely duplicates the protections already afforded by section 50’s privilege relating to necessary force. The argument is not convincing. The quoted language is typical of that used by the Legislature when enacting new rights and immunities in order to avoid the suggestion that the new legislation is intended to supplant existing ones. In any case, it can hardly be concluded that section 847’s protections are redundant in light of section 50. [735]*735As demonstrated above, section 847 provides broad protection against liability for negligence and is not restricted to acts of self-defense.16
To summarize our conclusions, section 847 limits the liability of an owner of any estate or other interest in real property for any injury or death that occurs upon that property during the course of or after the commission of any of the statutorily enumerated felonies by the injured person when the statutory predicates for the immunity have been established. (§ 847, subds. (a)-(e).) The statute does not limit the liability which otherwise exists for “willful” or “wanton” conduct, that is, intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to another will probably result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results.17 (§ 847, subd. (f).) Thus, when the statutory predicates have been met, immunity is available not only for negligence, whether or not related to conditions, uses, structures, or activities of the property, but also for the intentional use of deadly or injurious force when such force is justifiable.
We now turn to the record in this case to determine whether defendants’ motion for summary judgment was properly granted on the basis of section 847. Here, plaintiffs’ complaint placed in issue the question of defendants’ willful conduct. Consequently, once defendants offered evidence showing the applicability of section 847 and the absence of “willful, wanton, or criminal conduct” as contemplated under the statute, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to produce evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact. (Cf. Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 859 [affirming a grant of summary judgment on the basis of § 846 where the evidence at most established owner’s negligence]; Charpentier v. Von Geldern, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 113 [same where no evidence tended to show willful or malicious conduct]; O’Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co., supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 913 [same].) For the summary judgment motion to have properly succeeded, the evidence must have left no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts. “[S]ummary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, if contradicted by other inferences or evidence, which raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) On this appeal, we review the record de novo to determine whether [736]*736defendants have conclusively negated a necessary element of plaintiffs’ case or demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of trial. (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673-674 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207].)
The record discloses that defendants supported their motion with the following evidence. Plaintiff was injured upon property leased to defendants John Pacheco and Ramon Block. Plaintiff had been charged by information with several statutorily enumerated felonies as a result of the events leading •up to his injuries and was ultimately convicted of attempted grand theft. To establish the absence of “willful, wanton, or criminal conduct,” defendants offered evidence showing that they used deadly force against plaintiff in reaction to an attempted armed robbery by plaintiff and three others.
While defendants’ evidence certainly tends to support the conclusion that their use of force was justified in self-defense, other evidence cited by plaintiffs tends to refute that conclusion. In .particular, defendant Robert Sharp III reported to the San Mateo County Sheriff’s office that defendant Don Pacheco waited until three of the four alleged robbers, including the one with a pistol, exited the store before he grabbed a gun and shot at plaintiff as plaintiff ran out of the store. Plaintiff was shot in the back and rendered a paraplegic. And though Sharp claimed that plaintiff wielded a knife during the attempted robbery, Don Pacheco said he never saw plaintiff with a knife and the alleged knife was never found despite searches of plaintiff and the premises by law enforcement officers.18
[737]*737On this record, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the force used by defendants “ ‘reasonably appear[ed] necessary, in view of all the circumstances of the case, to prevent [an] impending injury.’ ”19 (Vaughn v. Jonas, supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 600.) We therefore agree with the Court of Appeal’s unanimous determination that summary judgment was inappropriate.
Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. The matter is remanded to that court with directions to remand to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
George, C. J., Mosk, J., Kennard, J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.