Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc.

309 F. Supp. 734, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12808
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedFebruary 17, 1970
DocketCiv. A. 32392
StatusPublished
Cited by53 cases

This text of 309 F. Supp. 734 (Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 734, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12808 (E.D. Mich. 1970).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KEITH, District Judge.

Plaintiffs in this action, Negro children of the state of Michigan and residents of the City of Pontiac, bring this action, through their next friends and parents pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 17(c) as a class action as prescribed by F.R.Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b) (2) (3), against defendants School District of the City of Pontiac, its Superintendent and Assistant Superintendents and the seven members of the Pontiac Board of Education. Plaintiffs complain that defendants individually and in concert have been and are discriminating against them and denying and will continue to deny plaintiffs and the class they represent the right to be educated in the Pontiac-School System under the same and equal terms as white minor residents. Plaintiffs further complain that defendants have discriminated in their hiring and assignment policies of teachers and administrators, and have invidiously considered race in assigning personnel to schools. It is the contention of plaintiffs that the above enumerated practices deprive plaintiffs of rights and privileges secured by the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3) (4); the cause of action is brought pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.

CONTENTION OF PARTIES

It is the contention of plaintiffs in this matter that defendants “have drawn the zone attendance lines for elementary schools which have as their purpose and/or effect the maintenance of separate schools for Negro children.” (Plaintiffs’ complaint.) Plaintiffs contend that the elementary, secondary and high schools within the City of Pontiac operal. under a system of de facto segregation which has resulted from defendants’ policy of shifting boundary lines and locating new schools in such a manner as to minimize the prospect of achieving maximum integrated schools. Plaintiffs assert that the racial integration policies adopted by the Pontiac Board of Education have not been pursued in good faith by the' administration, but rather that the actual policy of the board has been and is knowingly to permit the existence of segregated facilities when such could have been and could be avoided. Plaintiffs further assert that it was and continues to be the policy of the Board intentionally to place Negro instructional personnel and principals mainly in pre *736 dominately Negro schools and, in addition, to limit the number of Negro employees in proportion to the existing demand for personnel in predominately Negro schools.

It is the position of defendants in this matter that historically the policy of the Board of Education has been that all pupils in the school district should attend the school which services the attendance area in which they live i. e., the “neighborhood school concept” without regard to race or color. This policy became expressed and was reaffirmed by a writ-. ten resolution of the Board of Education on March 10, 1960. It is the contention of the defendants that the criteria for establishing attendance areas includes the nearness of the pupils to the schools, the safety of access routes, and the capacity of the schools. In 1964, an additional factor was added to these criteria, namely that “when possible” the attendance areas would be drawn so as to provide integration of the student bodies, and that integration would be a factor considered in the selection of sites for the location of new schools.

In regard to the faculties of the various schools, the defendants state that under the provisions of the negotiated contract between the Board of Education and the Pontiac Educational Association (which latter organization is exclusive bargaining representative for all teachers in the school district) transfers and changes in teaching assignments are on a voluntary basis whenever possible. In making involuntary assignments and transfers, the convenience and wishes of the individual teacher are to be considered and only after notification to the teacher, and an opportunity for the teacher to be consulted regarding the transfer may an involuntary assignment and transfer be ordered by the Board.

It is the position of defendants that school activities have always been open to all students irrespective of race, color or creed. Defendants admit the existence of a racial imbalance, but argue that such imbalance results not because of defendants policies or actions, but in spite of them — a direct result of the segregated housing pattern within the City of Pontiac. Defendants contend that true de facto segregation exists in certain of the elementary schools in Pontiac but that the defendants are under' no Constitutional duty to undo that which it has not caused.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

FINDINGS OF FACT

The defendants in this action admit that segregation and racial imbalance exists in the Pontiac School System, and that such a situation is directly harmful to the development of those Negro children who suffer thereunder. The Court begins its decision in this matter confronted with the undisputed fact that Negro children are being deprived of quality education in the Pontiac School System and that early deprivation of innocent young children culminates in permanent, devastating, irreparable harm— harm incapable of subsequent correction. Officials of the Pontiac School System admit that these Black children are being given an inferior education, psychologically damaging to their self-image and economically damaging to their ability to perform in an adult world. To a child, segregation “reinforces the idea that he is different, separate and inferior” * * * and the cause of that segregation is irrelevant “as it would make no difference whether it be de jure or whether it be by circumstance * * * de facto”, (Mr. Perdue P. 128) * the harm remains. And so, we observe a generation of children being injured by an admittedly segregated school situation — another generation receiving inferior educations and being deprived of the technical and intellectual skills that will enable them upon graduation to perform in significant positions competent *737 ly and confidently. No expert need explain that frustrations such as these are often manifésted in new forms of both anti-social and self-destructive behavior.

Defendants deny any responsibility for the segregated character of their schools, and argue that they have no affirmative duty to rectify a condition which they neither created nor advanced.

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95 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. Michigan, 2000)
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412 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. California, 1976)
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395 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1975)
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Bluebook (online)
309 F. Supp. 734, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12808, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-school-district-of-the-city-of-pontiac-inc-mied-1970.