Berry v. School District of City of Benton Harbor

467 F. Supp. 630
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedAugust 7, 1978
DocketC.A. 9
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 467 F. Supp. 630 (Berry v. School District of City of Benton Harbor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Berry v. School District of City of Benton Harbor, 467 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Mich. 1978).

Opinion

OPINION

FOX, Chief Judge.

This opinion marks the conclusion of Phase II of these lengthy school desegregation proceedings. In an opinion issued August 23, 1977, at the end of Phase I of this action on remand from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, this court ruled that the Benton Harbor Area School District had failed to rebut the prima facie case of de jure segregation established against it during an earlier trial.

The present opinion is concerned with the liability of those parties who have been referred to as the “added defendants” during the course of these proceedings: William G. Milliken, Governor of the State of Michigan; Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of the State of Michigan; John W. Porter, Superintendent of Public Instruction of the State of Michigan; the State Board of Education; the Berrien County Intermediate School District and its Superintendent; the Eau Claire School District and its Superintendent, Donald McAlvey; and the Coloma Community School District and its Superintendent, William Barrett. The Phase I opinion may be looked to for an examination of the procedural history of this litigation, a discussion of the segregation problem, and the applicable legal principles. Berry v. School District of City of *633 Benton Harbor, 442 F.Supp. 1280, 1283-95 (W.D.Mich.1977). The following opinion constitutes the court’s combined Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the issues raised in Phase II. The liability of the various parties will be separately considered.

I. The State Defendants. 1

The claims against the State defendants are based essentially upon two grounds. First, the intentional actions or inactions of the State defendants perpetrated de jure segregated conditions of the Benton Harbor Area School District (BHASD) because of the total racial impact upon the entire district. Second, that the State Board of Education (SBE) acted improperly in the approval of two petitions for the transfer of property out of the BHASD, thereby further increasing de jure segregation in the district. These two grounds will be examined in order.

A. Action and Inaction of State Defendants.

As noted above, a previous opinion of this court found the BHASD Board of Education guilty of the de jure segregation of the Benton Harbor public schools. The opinion detailed constitutional violations in almost every area of school administration and found that their segregative effects pervaded the entire school district. Among the violations established were the assignment of teachers upon the basis of race, discriminatory “tracking” programs at one junior high, disparate conditions of facilities and educational supplies, intact busing, segregative feeder patterns, discriminatory placement of portable classrooms and temporary facilities, and the inconsistent application of a neighborhood schools policy.

The plaintiffs must show, in order to prevail against the state defendants, that those defendants, to a substantial degree, contributed to the creation or the maintenance of the segregated schools in Benton Harbor. “[W]here state officials, purporting to act under state authority, invade rights secured by the Federal Constitution, they are subject to the process of the federal courts in order that the persons injured may have appropriate relief.” Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 393, 53 S.Ct. 190, 193, 77 L.Ed. 375 (1932). The Governor and the Attorney General are proper parties in litigation of this nature. Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 905 (6th Cir. 1970). As this court has previously stated:

“The State of Michigan cannot parcel out its jurisdiction and deliberately achieve by bits and pieces what it could not do directly by statute. When such a situation is alleged to exist, the court must look closely at the actions of each agency to determine whether it has met its constitutional responsibilities. To allow each agency to plead constitutional violations of other agencies in exculpation of its own, would be to mock the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Michigan.” Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, 368 F.Supp. 143, 185 (W.D.Mich.1973), affirmed, 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963, 95 S.Ct. 1950, 44 L.Ed.2d 449 (1975).

In addition to the guarantees of the United States Constitution, the Michigan Constitution provides that: “Every school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin.” (Emphasis added.) Michigan Const, art. VIII, § 2. The official Constitutional Convention Comment states that: “The anti-discrimination clause is placed in this section as a declaration which leaves no doubt as to where Michigan stands on this question.” (Emphasis added.)

This clear, precise constitutional declaration of educational policy mandates all *634 state and school authorities to eliminate discrimination wherever it exists in the school system. It mandates the Governor as the chief executive officer, and the Attorney General. The language “without discrimination” is simple, affirmative language, and is not limited to intent. Discrimination in the school system must be eradicated, root and branch.

The executive power of the State of Michigan is vested in the Governor. Mich. Const, art. V, § 2. The Governor “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed” and may initiate proceedings in the name of the state to restrain constitutional violations, Mich.Const. art. V, § 8. In addition to being the chief executive of the State, he is an ex officio member of the State Board of Education with a voice but without a vote. The voice of the chief executive of the State can contribute to the enforcement of the State’s duty to support the United States’ and the State of Michigan’s constitutional obligations, which he has sworn to do. His action or inaction in words and deeds effects support or denial of constitutionally guaranteed rights. At final argument, the plaintiffs requested the Governor be dismissed as a defendant. That motion is denied.

The Attorney General, as chief law enforcement officer of the State, swears to support the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Michigan. Mich. Const. art. XI, § 1; M.C.L.A. § 168.80. The Attorney General, however, has not taken any action to fulfill his constitutional duties in the face of the pervasive segregation of the Benton Harbor Public Schools. 2

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Bluebook (online)
467 F. Supp. 630, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berry-v-school-district-of-city-of-benton-harbor-miwd-1978.