Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District

412 F. Supp. 310, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17358
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJanuary 1, 1976
DocketC-71-2130 RFP
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 412 F. Supp. 310 (Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District, 412 F. Supp. 310, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17358 (N.D. Cal. 1976).

Opinion

OPINION

PECKHAM, District Judge.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs, parents of Spanish-surnamed American children attending public school in the San Jose Unified School District, bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. They charge that defendants, the San Jose Unified School District, its Superintendent, and members of its Board of Education, have purposefully operated and maintained a segregated public school system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants admit the existing racial imbalance in the school system, but argue that ethnic imbalance results not from defendants’ intentional conduct but from demographic and residential patterns over which they have no control. Jurisdiction is vested in this court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), 1343(4) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On November 4, 1971, plaintiffs instituted this action and sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to restrain defendants from completing construction of the following schools until the court could determine the merits of this case:

College Park Elementary
Anne Darling Elementary
Gardner Elementary
Hester Elementary
Jefferson Elementary
Lincoln Glen Elementary 1
Longfellow-Edison
(combined elementary/continuation) 2
Lowell Elementary
Mann Elementary
Olinder Elementary
Washington Elementary
Roosevelt Junior High
Wilson Junior High

On November 4, this court denied plaintiffs’ ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and issued an order to show cause. After a hearing on November 10, 1971, the court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting construction of almost all 3 of the schools slated for reconstruction pending a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.

After extensive oral argument on December 17, 1971, this court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. In the opinion dated January 12, 1972, the court concluded that on the record presently available:

. [t]his Court does not believe that such [ethnic] imbalance alone constitutes a violation of plaintiffs’ civil rights. As the Sixth Circuit recently pointed out in Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac, Inc., 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3192 [404 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. 233, 30 L.Ed.2d 186] (1971), ‘a school district has no affirmative obligation to achieve a balance of the races in the *312 schools when the existing imbalance is not attributable to school policies or practices and is the result of housing patterns and other forces over which the school administration had no control.’ 443 F.2d at 575.

Plaintiffs cannot hope to succeed on the merits, then, unless they can demonstrate how the defendant School District has acted to create ethnic imbalance in the San Jose schools. After examining the evidence plaintiffs have offered in support of a preliminary injunction this ' Court can find no instances where defendant School District has acted impermissibly. The evidence shows that defendant School District has adhered to a ‘neighborhood school policy,’ with the result that ethnic composition of the schools merely reflects residential patterns. This is not a case like Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Education, 311 F.Supp. 501 (D.Colo.1970); Keyes v. School District Number 1, Denver, Colo., 313 F.Supp. 61 (D.Colo.1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971); or Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac, Inc., supra, where the defendant school districts claimed to be following a neighborhood school policy, but conveniently refrained from strict adherence to that policy when it appeared to be leading to increased integration.

Accordingly, the Court finds that given the evidence available at this stage in the litigation, there is an insufficient likelihood that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction; and plaintiffs’ motion is hereby DENIED.

Trial on the merits was held on July 16, 18 — 19, 23 — 25 and August 6, 8 — 9, 16 and 20, 1974. A transcript was prepared and the parties were ordered to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court heard oral argument on April 30, May 1 and May 13, 1975.

II. THE PARTIES

Plaintiffs in this action are Arnulfo M. Diaz and Socorro Diaz, as parents and next friends of Fernando Diaz, Miguel A. Diaz and Juan F. Diaz; Jose Vasquez, as parent and next friend of David Vasquez, Susan Vasquez and Jody-Lynn Vasquez.

When this action was filed in November, 1971, each of the six named minor plaintiffs attended either junior high school or high school within defendant San Jose Unified School District. By 1973, when the trial commenced, two of the student plaintiffs attended either junior high school, high school, or continuation schools, and both were expected to enroll and continue in San Jose high schools for the school year 1974r-1975.

Defendants are the San Jose Unified School District (“school district”), a political subdivision and school district of the State of California; Charles Knight, individually and as District Superintendent of the San Jose Unified School District; Neil H. Geier, Jr.; Elizabeth J. Allen; Edwin P. Jones, Jr.; Mary K. McCreath; and Donald L. Raimondi, individually and as members of the Board of Education of the San Jose Unified School District (“board”) as of November, 1971, when this action commenced. During the pendency of this action, Phillip L. Hammer replaced Edwin P. Jones, Jr. as a board member, effective July 1, 1973, and having appeared as a party herein through counsel of record is hereby substituted as a party in place of Mr. Jones.

This is a class action brought pursuant to Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the class consisting of all Spanishsurnamed students enrolled in the San Jose Unified School District and their parents. Spanish-surnamed Americans are the only substantial minority group in the district.

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Related

Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District
633 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. California, 1986)
Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District
612 F.2d 411 (Ninth Circuit, 1979)
Penick v. Columbus Board of Education
429 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ohio, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
412 F. Supp. 310, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17358, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diaz-v-san-jose-unified-school-district-cand-1976.