Danny R. Smith v. Pyro Mining Company

827 F.2d 1081

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: November 18, 1987
• Docket: 85-6063
• Status: Published

Opinions

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.

The defendant in this employment discrimination case appeals from a judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff for discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)(1982). Because we find no error in the district court’s disposition of this case, we affirm.

The plaintiff, Danny R. Smith, was hired by Pyro Mining Company on June 19,1981, as a mechanic in an underground coal mine. Pyro employs over 1,000 persons who work underground and another 150 surface employees. During the time of his employment at Pyro, Smith was a member of the Independent General Baptist Church located in Ceder Hill, Kentucky. Smith also held the church offices of Treasurer and Trustee at the time. He subsequently became a Sunday School teacher. The official doctrine of the church precluded all officers and teachers in the church from working on Sundays, although individuals could work on Sunday and remain church members. Based on the teachings, of his church, Smith believed that it was morally wrong to work on Sundays in the absence of a life threatening situation.

During his initial employment interview, Smith informed Varney Coleman, Mine Superintendent for Pyro, that he had religious convictions against working on Sundays. Despite his convictions, Smith worked for a time on Pyro’s third shift, which required him to report for work at 11:00 p.m. on Sundays. Aside from these occasions, Smith was not required to work on Sundays during the first year of his employment.

On July 11, 1982, Pyro altered its work schedule and implemented an eight-day work week for employees stationed at the mine where Smith worked. The eight-day work week was instituted to improve mining efficiency. Under the new schedule, employees were assigned to work four consecutive ten-hour days and then have four consecutive days off. Each employee was required to work approximately twenty-six Sundays per year.

Prior to implementing the new schedule, Pyro publicized through a video presentation its policy of allowing employees who objected to working on Sundays to trade scheduled shifts with another qualified employee who was not scheduled to work the same shift.¹ Pyro also had a representative on hand to answer questions following the presentations. Under Pyro’s policy of attempting to accommodate those unable to work on Sundays due to religious reasons, an employee was first required to attempt to arrange a shift swap with another qualified employee. If the employee was unsuccessful in that effort, he was then required to exhaust the opportunities afforded by Pyro’s “Open Door Policy” to resolve the problem. The “Open Door Policy” was designed to allow an employee who had a work-related grievance or other problem to personally present the matter first to his supervisor and then up the chain of command to the president of Pyro, if necessary, to resolve the problem. All employees were given a handbook setting forth this policy prior to the implementation of the eight-day work week.

Smith was scheduled to work on the first Sunday that the new schedule went into effect. All employees were required to report to work on that Sunday, July 11, 1982. The entire company had been on a two-week vacation and prior to the vacation, Smith had informed his immediate supervisor, David Dunbar, that he would not be reporting for work on Sunday, July 11, 1982, due to his religious convictions. Smith called the office on Sunday and left word that he would not be reporting to work since he was going to church. He was subsequently given an unexcused absence for missing work that day.

Smith was again scheduled to work on Sunday, August 15, 1982. Once again he informed his supervisor that he would be absent from work due to his religious convictions. He was given a second unexcused absence. After his second unexcused absence, Smith talked with David Dunbar, who in turn talked to mine superintendent Don Ramsey, who said that the unexcused absences would stand. Dunbar promised Smith that he would ask his son to swap work days with Smith, but this swap never took place. Smith also asked two other mechanics if they would swap with him and both declined. Smith then decided that it was wrong for him personally to ask someone to swap with him since he was, in effect, asking that person to sin. Smith, however, was willing to work in a swap arranged by the company.

After Smith’s second unexcused absence, the Mine Manager, Danny Griffin, talked with him about his absences and was told by Smith that he did not believe in working on Sundays. Griffin told Smith to try and arrange a swap and to come back if nothing could be worked out. Griffin was aware that Smith considered it to be morally wrong to ask someone to work for him on a Sunday.

Smith was again scheduled to work on Sunday, August 22, 1982. He again notified his supervisor that he would not be reporting to work. He was given a third unexcused absence for missing work. Pyro had a company policy of automatically terminating any employee who accumulated three unexcused absences within a six-month period. In accordance with this policy, Smith was discharged on Monday, August 23, 1982, when he reported to work after his third unexcused Sunday absence.

On the day of his discharge, Smith appealed his termination to Coleman. At this time Smith proposed that the company allow him to work additional days in excess of the regular shift without overtime pay to make up for the Sunday absences. He also proposed that he be transferred to a surface job that did not require Sunday work. Both requests were refused by Pyro. At the time of the discharge, Coleman told Smith that he would look into the matter to see if anything could be done. Coleman subsequently turned the matter over to the Assistant Manager of Employee Relations, Paul Hill. Hill conducted a cursory examination of the matter and concluded that Smith had been properly terminated.

Following his discharge, Smith filed a complaint against Pyro in federal district court alleging that Pyro had violated the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII by discharging him because of his religious beliefs. Pyro’s answer denied Smith’s allegations and claimed that Smith had refused to cooperate with Pyro’s effort to accommodate his religious needs. Following a one day bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Smith, finding that Pyro had made no effort to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs. The court further found that Pyro had not shown any undue hardship to justify its failure to accommodate Smith. On appeal Pyro challenges the following findings of the district court: (1) that Smith’s religious beliefs were sincerely held; (2) that Pyro failed to reasonably accommodate Smith’s religious beliefs; and (3) that Pyro failed to establish that accommodation would pose an undue hardship.

I.

Title VII provides in part that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to ... discharge any individual ... because of such individual’s ... religion____” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)(1982). When Congress amended Title VII in 1972, it added the following definition of religion:

The term “religion” includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employees’ ... religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.

42 U.S.C. 2000e(j)(1982). “The intent and effect of this ... was to make it an unlawful employment practice ... for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of its employees and prospective employees.” TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977). The obligation to accommodate includes efforts to accommodate those employees who refuse to work on particular days of the week because of their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Murphy v. Edge Memorial Hospital, 550 F.Supp. 1185 (M.D.Ala.1982). “[A]ny reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation.” Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 367, 372, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). “[W]here the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship.” Id.

The analysis of any religious accommodation case begins with the question of whether the employee has established a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Such a case is established when an employee shows that: (1) he holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he has informed the employer about the conflicts; and (3) he was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir.1984). Once the employee has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it cannot reasonably accommodate the employee without incurring undue hardship. See, e.g., id.; Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division, 589 F.2d 397, 401 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921, 99 S.Ct. 2848, 61 L.Ed.2d 290 (1979).

Although the burden is on the employer to accommodate the employee’s religious needs, the employee must make some effort to cooperate with an employer’s attempt at accommodation.

An employee cannot shirk his duties to try to accommodate himself or to cooperate with his employer in reaching an accommodation by a mere recalcitrant citation of religious precepts. Nor can he thereby shift all responsibility for accommodation to his employer. Where an employee refuses to attempt to accommodate his own beliefs or to cooperate with his employer’s attempt to reach a reasonable accommodation, he may render an accommodation impossible.

Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039, 98 S.Ct. 778, 54 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978). See also Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F.2d 141, 145-46 (5th Cir.1982) (“bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s business”).

[3,4} The reasonableness of an employer’s attempt at accommodation cannot be determined in a vacuum. Instead, it must be determined on a case-by-case basis; what may be a reasonable accommodation for one employee may not be reasonable for another. In Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 902-03 (7th Cir.1978), the Seventh Circuit noted that:

The term “reasonable accommodation” is a relative term and cannot be given a hard and fast meaning. Each case involving such a determination necessarily depends upon its own facts and circumstances, and comes down to a determination of “reasonableness” under the unique circumstances of the individual employer-employee relationship. The trier of fact is in the best position to weigh these considerations.

Accord United States v. Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110, 114 (10th Cir.1976). If the employer’s efforts fail to eliminate the employee’s religious conflict, the burden remains on the employer to establish that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs without incurring undue hardship. American Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster General, 781 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir.1986); McDaniel v. Essex Intern., Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 341 (6th Cir.1978). This court has noted that:

[A]n employer does not sustain his burden of proof merely by showing that an accommodation would be bothersome to administer or disruptive of the operating routine. In addition, we are somewhat skeptical of hypothetical hardships that an employer thinks might be caused by an accommodation that never has been put into practice. The employer is on stronger ground when he has attempted various methods of accommodation and can point to hardships that actually resulted.

Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.1975). An employer may nonetheless establish undue hardship without actually putting an accommodation into effect. Id. An employer must still, however, present evidence of undue hardship; it cannot rely merely on speculation. See, e.g., Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1979). With this legal framework in mind, we turn to an analysis of Pyro’s claims of error.

II.

The first issue we address is whether Smith established a prima facie case of discrimination. The necessary elements of Smith’s prima facie case are that: (1) he had a sincere belief that working on Sunday was contrary to his religious beliefs; (2) he informed Pyro about his religious beliefs and the conflict they created with his job; and (3) he was discharged because of his refusal to work on Sundays. After reviewing the evidence, the district court concluded that Smith had established a prima facie case.

On appeal Pyro’s challenge focuses on the first element of Smith’s prima facie case; there is no dispute about the other elements. Pyro argues that since Smith had at one point worked from 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. on Sunday while he was on the third shift, his belief that it was morally wrong to work on Sundays was not sincerely held. The district court considered this fact in its opinion and concluded that it did not detract from Smith’s sincerity.

A district court’s “[fjindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 52(a). Factual findings will be deemed clearly erroneous on review only if, after reviewing the entire record, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Additionally, when, as was the case here, “findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52 demands even greater deference to the trial court’s findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.” Id. 105 S.Ct. at 1512.

Under this standard, we are easily convinced that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. Smith testified at great length about his commitment to his religion. He also testified that the reason he went to work on the last hour of some Sundays was because by 11:00 p.m. on Sunday night, all church services had been concluded and, for all intents and purposes, the Sabbath was over. There is little doubt but that Smith was heavily involved with his church; he served as both an officer and a Sunday School teacher. Finally, no evidence was introduced by Pyro to show that Smith was engaged in anything other than religious activities on the Sundays he was absent from work. Accordingly, we reject Pyro’s challenge to the prima facie determination.

III.

Having found that Smith established a prima facie case of discrimination, our analysis now shifts to the question of whether Pyro reasonably accommodated Smith’s religious beliefs as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982). Pyro argued before the district court that its consent to shift swapping, supplemented by its “Open Door Policy,” was sufficient to satisfy its duty to reasonably accommodate Smith’s religious beliefs. The district court rejected this assertion and held, in effect, that Pyro had to make an affirmative effort to reasonably accommodate Smith by arranging a swap for him. On appeal Pyro argues that the trial court’s conclusion that Title VII required it to solicit replacements for Smith is reversible error. Pyro contends that since it allowed its employees to trade shifts it thereby satisfied its obligations under Title VII. In Pyro’s view, Smith’s refusal to personally solicit a replacement constituted a failure on his part to cooperate with its efforts to accommodate him.

In Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689, 91 S.Ct. 2186, 29 L.Ed.2d 267 (1971),² this court held that an employer did not violate Title VII by discharging an employee who refused to work on Sunday and also refused to arrange a shift swap on the grounds that to do so would have been a sin. The court concluded that to accede to Dewey’s demands that he neither be required to work on Sundays nor find a replacement would require the employer to impermissibly discriminate against other employees.³

The facts of Dewey and the instant case are quite similar, and at first glance it would appear that, as Pyro suggests, Dewey should control the disposition of this appeal. However, we believe that there is good reason for us not to follow Dewey in this instance. Dewey was decided by this court in 1970 and affirmed by a divided Supreme Court the following year. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII, and added subsection (j), which provides that employers must attempt to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of their employees, absent undue hardship. Prior to the enactment of this subsection, Title VII itself contained no requirement that employers make such an attempt. Title VII, as enacted in 1964, prohibited religious discrimination in employment, but went no further. The question of the necessity for accommodation was left to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In its original regulations the EEOC stated that an employer had an obligation to accommodate the religious practices of its employees unless such an accommodation would create “a serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business.” 29 C.F.R. § 1605.-1(a)(2)(1967). However, the regulations also allowed an employer to adopt any work week schedule generally applicable to all employees, without regard to or accommodation of an employee’s religious needs. Id. §§ 1605.1(a)(3), (b)(3). The EEOC subsequently revised these regulations and stated that Title VII included “an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees ... where such an accommodation can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1605.1(b), (c) (1968).⁴

Some courts, including this one, were doubtful about whether the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII’s requirements with regard to accommodation comported with Congress’ intent.⁵ However, when Congress amended Title VII in 1972, it added the reasonable accommodation requirement, thereby explicitly adopting the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII.⁶ Following the 1972 amendment, courts could no longer dispute that Title VII mandated reasonable accommodation. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 74, 97 S.Ct. at 2271. Therefore, given the significant change in the law since our decision in Dewey, we consider the issue now before us anew.⁷

Undoubtedly, one means of accommodating an employee who is unable to work on a particular day due to religious convictions is to allow the employee to trade work shifts with another qualified employee. Other circuits have held that when an employer allows such a trade, it has reasonably accommodated its employee. See, e.g., Brener, 671 F.2d at 146; Albuquerque, 545 F.2d at 114. Pyro urges us to follow Brener and Albuquerque and hold that its policy of allowing its employees to trade shifts was a reasonable accommodation of Smith’s religious beliefs. We decline to do so because the instant case is readily distinguishable from Brener and Albuquerque. Neither of the employees in those cases had any religious objection to arranging a shift swap for himself. In the instant case, however, Smith clearly believes that it would be a sin to ask someone to work for him on Sunday. Therefore, the question now before us is whether an employer reasonably accommodates an employee by allowing the employee to arrange a shift trade himself when the employee considers it a sin to arrange such a swap.

We think it clear that if Smith had no religious qualms about asking others to work the Sundays he was scheduled to work, then Pyro’s proposed accommodation would have been reasonable. However, where an employee sincerely believes that working on Sunday is morally wrong and that it is a sin to try to induce another to work in his stead, then an employer’s attempt at accommodation that requires the employee to seek his own replacement is not reasonable. We therefore agree with the district court that Pyro has not met its obligation under Title VII.⁸ Since the accommodation proposed originally by Pyro was not reasonable, Pyro was obligated to make further attempts at accommodating Smith, unless such attempts would pose an undue hardship.⁹ We now turn to the question of whether alternate attempts at accommodating Smith would have constituted undue hardship for Pyro.¹⁰

IY.

In the district court, Pyro argued that any further attempt at accommodating Smith beyond allowing him to arrange a shift swap would present undue hardship. The court rejected this claim and found that arranging a shift swap for Smith would not have constituted undue hardship for Pyro. The court concluded that:

It was the testimony at trial that there were twenty men that could have swapped with the plaintiff. The company had a monthly newspaper that was distributed to the men. Bulletin boards were available in the bathhouses and in the mine offices and the employer handbook admonished the men to read and scan these boards daily for important notices. The company had a personnel department. Surely there would have been no undue hardship to the company had it simply posted a notice on the bulletin boards or in the company paper that the company was looking for someone willing to swap shifts with the plaintiff. It was apparent to this Court that from the testimony and demeanor of the defendant’s witnesses at trial that Pyro had no real desire to accommodate Smith’s religious beliefs and flat out refused to lend him any significant assistance.

App. at 204. On appeal Pyro asserts that the district court’s conclusion that it failed to establish undue hardship is clearly erroneous. We disagree. We find it difficult to see why soliciting replacements for Smith would have been an undue hardship for Pyro. The record indicates that prior to switching to the new eight-day work week, Pyro had a policy of communicating or advertising the fact that an employee needed to trade shifts, and the company took an active role in contacting employees to participate in shift trades. Pyro had the mechanism in place for soliciting replacements — namely the monthly newspaper and the bulletin boards. Pyro could have reasonably accommodated Smith by simply placing a notice in the newspaper or on a bulletin board that a replacement was needed for him. Pyro failed to meet its burden of establishing that such an accommodation of Smith’s religious convictions would be an undue hardship.¹¹

V.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

1 . The district court discribed the video presentation in the following manner. "Prior to the implementation of the eight-day work week, Pyro, through crude language and a format that had to be an insult to the intelligence of the great majority of those who viewed it, publicized its policy of allowing employees who objected to Sabbath work to trade shifts with other qualified employees. The sum of this publication consisted of quick references toward the end of the video between two persons portraying miners. The crux of the exchange comes when the miners are discussing the new eight-day week and Sunday work. One employee asked, ‘What about preachers?' The other one replies, ‘Hell, if they let us swap off to go fishing, I reckon they’ll let the preachers swap off.’ ” App. at 189.

2 . An affirmance by an equally divided court is not entitled to precedential weight. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192, 93 S.Ct. 375, 378, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972).

3 . Judge Combs filed a strong dissent in which he noted that Dewey’s refusal to seek a replacement himself "was grounded in his belief that working on Sunday is inherently wrong and that it would be a sin for him to induce another to work in his place. The replacement system was therefore no solution to Dewey's problem.” 429 F.2d at 333.

4 . Although the Dewey panel did consider this regulation in its opinion, it strongly indicated its belief that the regulation was unauthorized by Congress:

It should be observed that it is regulation 1605.1(b) and not the statute (§ 2000e-2(a)) that requires an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of its employees. As we have pointed out, the gravamen of an offense under the statute is only discrimination. The authority of EEOC to adopt a regulation interfering with the internal affairs of an employer, absent discrimination, may well be doubted.

429 F.2d at 331 n. 1 (emphasis in original).

5 . In denying a petition for rehearing en banc in Dewey, the panel wrote that:

Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act do we find any Congressional intent to coerce or compel one person to accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs of another. The requirement of accommodation to religious beliefs is contained only in the EEOC Regulations, which in our judgment are not consistent with the Act.

To construe the Act as authorizing the adoption of Regulations which would coerce or compel an employer to accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs of all his employees would raise grave constitutional questions of violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

429 F.2d at 334. Clearly, the panel was of the view that to require an employer to accommodate the religious needs of its employees would be contrary to the law. However, reasonable accommodation is now precisely what the law requires. As Justice White noted in writing for the majority in Hardison, "[c]learly, any suggestion in Dewey that an employer may not be required to make reasonable accommodation for the religious needs of its employees was disapproved by § 701(j)____” 432 U.S. at 75 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. at 2272 n. 9 (emphasis in original).

6 . Some courts have expressed the view that the 1972 amendment defining religion was added as a direct response to this court’s decision in Dewey. See Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir.1976); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (5th Cir.1972) (discussing legislative history of the amendment). The relevant legislative history supports this conclusion. See 118 Cong.Rec., §§ 227-53 (1972).

7 . The dissent contends that the majority opinion "summarily overrules the precedent of Dewe/’ and ignores this circuit’s tradition that reported panel opinions are binding upon subsequent panels. We disagree with these characterizations of the majority opinion. We neither overrule binding precedent nor ignore circuit tradition. The binding effect of Dewey was undermined by Congress, not by this panel. As a court of law we are bound to interpret and apply the law that exists when we decide a case. When intervening changes in the law have proved prior precedent to be incorrect, a subsequent panel is not bound to continue following the disapproved precedent. Such blind allegience is both unwise and unwarranted.

Congress has spoken, and in doing so it has signalled that our decision in Dewey seventeen years ago is no longer good law. We are bound to follow the dictates of Congress. We do not overrule binding precedent in doing so. Instead, we merely revisit the issue considered in Dewey and resolve it in accordance with current law.

8 . We note parenthetically that Pyro obviously did not attempt a reasonable accommodation of Smith’s religious beliefs on the first Sunday of its new schedule because all employees were required to report to work on that day. Therefore, a shift swap would have been difficult or impossible to arrange.

9 . Contrary to the assertion in the dissent, the majority opinion does not impose the entire burden of accommodation on the employer. A cursory examination of the majority opinion clearly indicates that it is entirely in tune with current law which requires the employee to bear some of the burden of accommodation. Nowhere do we suggest that the entire burden of accommodation may be placed on the employer. Indeed, we agree with the dissent’s statement that “it is well established that an employee is not invested with an absolute right to demand an accommodation on his own terms.” All that the law allows an employee to demand is a reasonable accommodation.

10 . The dissent claims that our consideration of this issue is misconceived. This contention would be accurate only if Pyro had attempted to reasonably accommodate Smith’s religious beliefs. The Supreme Court has noted that "the extent of undue hardship on the employer's business is at issue only where the employer claims that it is unable to offer any reasonable accommodation without such hardship." Phil-brook, 107 S.Ct. at 372. The record supports the district court’s finding that Pyro did not offer Smith a reasonable accommodation. Consequently, the issue of undue hardship is properly joined.

11 . Because we conclude that by attempting to arrange a shift swap for Smith Pyro would have reasonably accommodated his religious needs without incurring undue hardship, we need not decide whether other means of accommodation, such as transferring Smith to a surface job, running the Sunday shifts he was scheduled to work shorthanded, or allowing him to work additional days in excess of his regular shift without overtime pay to make up the Sunday absences, would pose undue hardship. We do note, however, that the Supreme Court in Phil-brook explicitly states that any reasonable accommodation satisfies an employer’s obligation. 107 S.Ct. at 372. Thus, an employer faced with more than one means of reasonably accommodating an employee is free to choose amongst these means and select the one that poses the least hardship.