OPINION OF THE COURT
VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge.
Dale Bogus, a speech pathologist and member of the American Speech and Hearing Association (ASHA), brought suit on April 2, 1974, in the district court challenging ASHA’s rule requiring the maintenance of membership in ASHA as a prerequisite
to applying for, receiving, and retaining a Certificate of Clinical Competence (CCC) which ASHA issues to qualifying members. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that ASHA’s membership prerequisite rule for a CCC constitutes an unlawful tying arrangement in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976), and of the common law. The complaint, as amended, requests an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), barring ASHA’s membership prerequisite rule and requiring ASHA to give appropriate notice of the abolishment of its rule. The complaint also seeks to recover under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), treble damages in the amount of membership fees and dues paid during the four years preceding the filing of the complaint and reasonable attorney’s fees. Finally, the plaintiff sought certification of her action under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and the class of all ASHA members.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, by order of August 7, 1975 (51a), denied plaintiff’s motion for class action certification on the ground that the prerequisites for certification specified in Rule 23(a)(4) and (b)(3) had not been satisfied. See
Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass’n,
20 F.R.Serv.2d 859 (E.D.Pa.1975). Nearly a year later, on June 17, 1976, three audiologists filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs, intending to ask for reconsideration of the class action request. After discovery, each party filed a motion for summary judgment. By order of March 24, 1977 (209a), the district court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because of the existence of numerous factual disputes in connection with her claim. By memorandum and order dated May 5, 1977 (210-19a), the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiff’s claims under the federal antitrust laws and dismissed the remaining common law claim for lack of pendent jurisdiction. The district court held, on the basis of the record before it, that plaintiff’s employment experience and prospects were such as to deny her standing to seek either damages or an injunction under the antitrust laws. The district court did not formally act on the intervention application.
Mrs. Bogus appeals from each of the aforementioned district court orders, as well as its failure to act on the motion to intervene. We first consider plaintiff’s standing to sue under the federal antitrust laws. We address each of the other district court orders in turn.
I.
A.
ASHA is a non-profit professional association of speech pathologists and audiologists
formed in 1925 and incorporated in 1947. In 1974, when plaintiff’s complaint was filed, ASHA boasted membership of over 20,000 professionals (125a). ASHA’s members are employed principally in schools, universities, clinics, hospitals, laboratories, and rehabilitation centers. Others pursue private practice. Among other activities, ASHA publishes several journals, accredits college and clinical programs, sponsors education and recruitment programs for its members, represents its membership before legislatures and government agencies, and promulgates a code of professional ethics (lll-16a). ASHA’s activity which is at the center of this case is the association’s professional certification program. ASHA awards its CCC to members who meet specified requirements of academic training, clinical experience and performance on a national examination. Certification may be obtained in either audiology or speech pathology or both fields. While ASHA does not require its members to seek a CCC, its Code of Ethics, § A(l)(c), admonishes that “the Member who is uncertified must not engage in private practice” (101a).
Moreover, professionals who engage in clinical work are expected to meet the qualifications of the certification program.
Id.
§ A(l).
Many employers specify the CCC as a job prerequisite or as a preferred credential.
The district court, in its opinion granting summary judgment for the defendant, found that “the CCC is a professional necessity in some employment submarkets of the speech pathology profession and that it is a recognized symbol of competence within the profession.”
Bogus v. American Speech and Hearing Ass’n,
Civil No. 74-849, slip op. at 2 (E.D.Pa., May 5, 1977) (211a). This statement fairly assesses the significance of the CCC to the speech pathology profession on the basis of this record.
ASHA certifies only dues paying members. In fact, ASHA will consider initial applications for a CCC only from members of the association.
See
“Requirements for the Certificates of Clinical Competence,” ASHA brochure effective March 1, 1975, plaintiff’s Exhibit P-3 (103-04a). Members may formally apply after completing their required academic training, which includes a prescribed curriculum and a clinical practicum involving supervised clinical experi- • ence. In addition to joining ASHA and completing the education requirements, applicants for a CCC must serve a “clinical fellowship year” in their specialty and pass the national examination in that field before finally receiving their certification.
Id.
Given this application and certification sequence, ASHA encourages prospective speech pathologists to apply for association membership while still in school and prior to their filing of an application for the CCC. “Certification Questions and Answers,” ASHA brochure dated January 1973, plaintiff’s Exhibit P-16 (136-37a).
Satisfaction of all the professional standards, coupled with membership in ASHA, entitles a speech pathologist to receive a CCC. However, retention of the CCC is dependent on the holder’s remaining a dues paying member- in good standing of ASHA. Delinquency in paying dues cancels certification and requires the former holder to reapply for a CCC. ASHA By-Laws, 1975, Art. IX, § 2, plaintiff’s Exhibit P-1 (98a).
Dale Bogus attended Syracuse University, where she received a B.S. degree in Speech Pathology and Audiology in 1972 and a M.S. degree in Speech Pathology in December 1973. The same month that she earned her Master’s degree, she applied for her CCC. In February 1974 she received from ASHA acknowledgment of receipt of her application for a CCC, as well as notice that it would not be processed until she submitted a membership application fee and annual dues. Plaintiff’s Exhibit P-19 (142a). Mrs. Bogus paid the required fees and dues,
and in April 1974 she was in
formed that ASHA approved her academic course work and supervised clinical practicum and that she had only to pass the national examination and to complete her clinical fellowship year to qualify for a CCC. Plaintiff’s Exhibit P-20 (143a). On June 20,1975, Mrs. Bogus was notified that she had passed the national exam and that her CCC was granted and would remain valid “as long as [she] remain an ASHA member in good standing.” Letter from Chairman, Clinical Certification Board of ASHA, to Mrs. Bogus dated June 20, 1975, plaintiff’s Exhibit P-21 (144a). Mrs. Bogus has maintained her membership by annually paying her dues, which in 1978 are $95.00. Plaintiff’s Exhibit P-147 (167a). Her CCC remains valid.
From July 1973 until August 1975, when she took maternity leave, plaintiff worked part-time as a speech therapist at the Bryn Mawr Hospital Rehabilitation Center in Malvern, Pa. According to her supervisor at the Rehabilitation Center, Mrs. Bogus was not required to have a CCC to work as a part-time speech therapist. Affidavit of Ranee McIntyre, ¶ 5, Sept. 25, 1975 (89a). Nevertheless, Mrs. Bogus inquired of the supervisor on accepting the position as to whether she would be able to satisfy the clinical fellowship requirements for her CCC by working at the Rehabilitation Center.
Id.
¶ 6.
While working part-time at the Rehabilitation Center, Mrs. Bogus also began working part-time at the Broomall Nursing Home. However, Mrs. Bogus left the employ of the Home because she was unsupervised while working there and, therefore, could not satisfy the clinical fellowship supervision requirement for her CCC. Deposition of Dale S. Bogus, Oct. 21, 1975, N.T. 12-13.
Mrs. Bogus has not returned to work at the Rehabilitation Center since taking maternity leave in August 1975. As evidence of her future employment plans, Mrs. Bogus filed the following affidavit on July 12, 1976:
“I am the plaintiff in the above-styled action. Since giving birth to a daughter in October of last year, I have devoted all of my time to caring for her and I have not worked in my profession. However, I have never intended to abandon my profession of speech pathology and I have always intended to return to clinical practice. I presently specifically intend to develop a part-time, private practice beginning this fall, and I have so intended for a number of weeks. I hope to see patients referred to me by physicians, hospitals, extended care facilities, or other speech pathologists, and particularly hope to see patients suffering from aphasia. Some weeks ago I made inquiries concerning use of an office for this purpose.”
B.
The district court held that Mrs. Bogus suffered no injuries by reason of ASHA’s membership prerequisite rule and hence that she lacked standing to sue for damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 4 authorizes private treble damage suits by “[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . .” The doctrine of standing as applied to antitrust cases limits the apparent breadth of this provision by elaborating a concept of proximate causation between defendant’s unlawful act and plaintiff’s out-of-pocket losses.
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
561 F.2d 434, 447 n.6 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086, 98 S.Ct. 1280, 55 L.Ed.2d 791 (1978).
See generally
2 P. Areeda & D. Turner,
Antitrust Law
§§ 333-34 (1978); L. Sullivan,
Antitrust
§ 247 (1977). A court’s task under the rubric of standing is not to determine whether a business practice violates the antitrust laws but whether a particular plaintiff may recover damages from the effects of the arguably unlawful practice on him or her. In this case the complaint alleges as an unlawful practice ASHA’s
membership prerequisite rule for obtaining and retaining a CCC. The standing issue raised by defendant’s motion for summary judgment is not whether ASHA’s membership prerequisite rule is an illegal tie-in. The issue is properly framed as whether, on the basis of the Rule 56 submissions in this ease, the plaintiff has shown on the record sufficient injury in fact to her business or property by reason of ASHA’s membership prerequisite rule to maintain standing to challenge the legality of the rule.
Plaintiff’s complaint seeks as damages her expenditures to become and remain a member of ASHA. There is no dispute on this record as to either the fact of payment of membership fees and dues or their amount. Such out-of-pocket expenditures paid directly to the defendant clearly constitute an injury in fact. In general, the purchase of the “tied product,” ASHA membership, in conjunction with the purchase of the “tying product,” the CCC, satisfies the injury-in-fact component of the purchaser’s standing to challenge the tie-in.
Plaintiff purchased both of her CCC and membership in ASHA in the furtherance of her professional career. The cost of the CCC represents a business-related cost and, under plaintiff’s theory of an illegal tie-in, ASHA’s membership prerequisite rule increased the cost of obtaining and retaining the CCC. Increases in the cost of doing business, or, as in this ease, increases in the cost of practising a profession, qualify as injury to “business or property” within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act.
See Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
555 F.2d 3, 12 n.7 (1st Cir. 1977),
aff’d,
- U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 2923, 57 L.Ed.2d 932 (1978).
See also Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta,
203 U.S. 390, 396, 27 S.Ct. 65, 51 L.Ed. 241 (1906);
Cleary v. Chalk,
159 U.S.App.D.C. 415, 488 F.2d 1315, 1319 n.17 (1973),
cert. denied,
416 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 1940, 40 L.Ed.2d 289 (1974); L. Sullivan,
supra
771 n.3.
The crux of this case is whether plaintiff’s expenditures for membership in ASHA are “by reason of” ASHA’s allegedly unlawful tie-in as contained in its membership prerequisite rule. The district court implicitly construed the statutory requirement that plaintiff’s injury be caused by the alleged violation of the antitrust laws as demanding in this case record evidence that plaintiff “ ‘ha[s] been coerced into membership in ASHA by the professional necessity of having a Certificate of Clinical Competence.’ ”
Bogus v. ASHA,
Civil No. 74-849, slip op. at 4 (E.D.Pa., May 5, 1977).
The district court found no record evidence that Mrs. Bogus had either sought jobs requiring a CCC or been offered employment contingent upon her holding a CCC. Thus, the district court inferred that plaintiff had
no professional necessity for a CCC and that her dues-paying association with ASHA was entirely voluntary. The district court concluded:
“Since plaintiff Dale Bogus was not herself coerced into ASHA membership by the professional necessity of having a CCC, her out-of-pocket losses [membership dues and the initiation fee] were not sustained ‘by reason of’ ASHA’s membership practices, and accordingly she lacks standing to challenge these practices.”
ffio]) We believe that the plaintiff in this-eaSe need not demonstrate a professional necessity for the CCC in her own prior work experience in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment and to maintain standing to challenge the legality of ASHA’s membership prerequisite rule. A direct purchaser who demonstrates a legitimate economic or business interest in purchasing a desirable or unique tying product or service and who is thereby compelled to purchase as well a tied product or service has standing to challenge the legality of the tie-in. On this record there is sufficient material evidence that plaintiff had a legitimate professional interest in acquiring a CCC at the time she applied for it and first joined ASHA.
This court has repeatedly eschewed formulation of a generally applicable conceptual test for the antitrust standing requirement that plaintiff’s injury be caused “by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.” Rather, we have consistently adverted to the variety and variability of factors which may be relevant in the factual situation of each particular case.
Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Inds., Inc.,
552 F.2d 90, 96-100 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied,
434 U.S. 823, 98 S.Ct. 69, 54 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977);
Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equipment Corp.,
543 F.2d 501, 505-10 (3d Cir. 1976). This court’s precedents counsel consideration of such factors as plaintiff’s reíationship to defendant, the directness of injury, plaintiff’s position in the area of the economy threatened by the alleged unlawful acts, and congressional policies underlying the treble damage and liability provisions of the antitrust laws.
Bravman, supra
at 99-100;
Cromar, supra
at 508-09.
Plaintiff in this case directly purchased both the CCC and membership rights from the defendant, ASHA. Plaintiff’s injury in the sense of higher costs to obtain a CCC was direct. Plaintiff was situated in the center of the area of the economy in which ASHA’s alleged unlawful acts operated. In short, Mrs. Bogus stands as a purchaser of a tying product, CCC, and a tied product, ASHA membership, from the defendant. The remaining factor to consider in this case is whether Mrs. Bogus’ standing is consistent with the substantive law of tie-ins. We undertake this consideration not to prejudge the evidence of defendant’s liability but rather to insure that the standing decision is consistent with liability standards that would be applied at trial.
The Supreme Court in
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958), prescribed the elements of a
per se
unreasonable tie-in which violates the Sherman Act. First, the tie itself must be established by reference to an agreement conditioning the sale of the tied product to separate purchase of the tying product.
Id.
at 5, 78 S.Ct. 514. Second, a “not insubstantial” amount of commerce must be affected.
Id.
at 6, 78 S.Ct. 514, 518. Third, the seller must have “sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product.”
Id.
These three elements of
per se
illegal tie-ins are well established in subsequent Supreme Court decisions, as well as within this circuit.
See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495, 498-99, 89 S.Ct. 1252, 22 L.Ed.2d 495 (1969);
United States v. Loew’s Inc.,
371 U.S. 38, 45, 83 S.Ct. 97, 9 L.Ed.2d 11 (1962);
Bogosian, supra
at 449;
Ungar
v.
Dunkin’ Donuts of America, Inc.,
531 F.2d 1211, 1223-24 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied,
429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 74, 50 L.Ed. 2d 84 (1976). Even if a plaintiff fails to meet the standards of
per se
illegality, she or he may prevail on the merits by providing that a tie-in unreasonably restrains competition in violation of the more general standards of the Sherman Act.
Fortner Enterprises, supra,
394 U.S. at 500, 89 S.Ct. 1252.
The district court in this case proceeded on the premise that for standing purposes the plaintiff must demonstrate a necessity for purchase of the tying product and coercion into purchase of the tied product. Such requirements imposed under the rubric of standing would constrict the aforementioned well settled standards governing the legality of tie-ins. Consequently, we believe the district court erred in applying its test for standing in this factual context.
Bogosian,
which was decided by this court after the district court granted summary judgment in this case, explicitly rejected a liability rule requiring that every plaintiff prove coercion of his purchase of the tied product.
Bogosian
held that a plaintiff need prove coercion of his or her purchase of the tied product only if there is no evidence of the existence of an express tie-in. Proof that a seller expressly conditioned the sale of one product upon the purchase of another suffices as proof of the existence of a tie-in without further evidence of coercion. In the absence of proof of such an express condition, however, the existence of a tie-in may be deduced from evidence of coercion or leverage in the tied product market. 561 F.2d at 449-51.
See also Ungar, supra
at 1224. In this case there is no dispute as to the fact that ASHA expressly conditioned the award and purchase of a CCC on the purchase of a tied product, ASHA membership. No additional proof of coercion over the tied product market would be necessary to prove the existence of a tie-in for liability purposes; consequently no such proof is necessary for standing purposes.
The district court’s ruling on standing was not drawn from the liability standard that a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce be affected. We believe that plaintiff has standing to prove this element of liability in further proceedings. The third element of a
per se
illegal tie-in concerns the sufficiency of the seller’s economic power over the tying product. The district court in this case in effect imposed a liability requirement under the guise of standing that plaintiff demonstrate a necessity for the purchase of the tying product, the CCC. Such a standing threshold conflicts with the Supreme Court’s lower liability standard that extends to sellers who exercise merely “sufficient economic power” in the tying product market. The Court in
Fortner Enterprises
elaborated this liability prerequisite:
“The standard of ‘sufficient economic power’ does not . . . require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for the tying product. Our tie-in cases have made unmistakably clear that the economic power over the tying product can be sufficient even though the power falls far short of dominance and even though the power exists only with respect to some of the buyers in the market.
See, e. g., International Salt [International Salt v. U. S.,
332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12, 92 L.Ed. 20];
Northern Pacific; United States
v.
Loew’s Inc.,
371 U.S. 38, 83 S.Ct. 97, 9 L.Ed.2d 11 (1962). As we said in the
Loew’s case,
371 U.S., at 45, 83 S.Ct. 97: ‘Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying product’s desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes.’ ”
394 U.S. at 502-03, 89 S.Ct. at 1258.
For standing purposes in a tie-in case, the plaintiff need not prove the necessity of her purchase of the tying product. Rather, to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff need only show that
there is a genuine issue as to the material fact of the desirability or uniqueness of the tying product to her. Such a standing inquiry does not predetermine the issue of liability because, for standing purposes, a plaintiff need show only the personal demand for, or uniqueness of, the tying product. To establish liability, the plaintiff must prove the defendant exercised sufficient economic power in the market as a whole for the tying product.
On this record there is sufficient evidence that Mrs. Bogus viewed the CCC as a desirable and unique product when she applied for it and, therefore, she should not be denied standing on a motion for summary judgment. Only ASHA awards a CCC. Moreover, alternative credentials of professional competence are not widely recognized. While all jobs in the speech pathology profession may not require a CCC, young professionals entering the job market could reasonably expect possession of the CCC to be uniquely valuable at some time in their career. The record in this case reveals that ASHA encourages all degree candidates in speech pathology and audiology to apply for their CCC on completion of their degree requirements. Mrs. Bogus applied for a CCC and the required membership in ASHA promptly on obtaining her Master’s degree. She did so believing that “[f]ull professional recognition in my field requires certification by the American Speech and Hearing Association . . .” Affidavit of Dale S. Bogus, May 19, 1975, ¶4 (27a). ASHA’s own Code of Ethics, which required clinical and private practitioners to hold the CCC, may have reinforced Mrs. Bogus’ desire to obtain a CCC. Once she received her CCC, even if she did not currently need it to retain particular jobs, the plaintiff would not have desired the CCC to lapse for her failure to pay dues. In that event, if Mrs. Bogus were in the future to need a CCC as an employment prerequisite, she would have to reapply for the CCC. In short, at the time of her application, with a potential lifelong career as an active professional ahead of her, Mrs. Bogus legitimately and reasonably believed the CCC was desirable and unique.
We conclude that to deny Mrs. Bogus standing on the record in this case would unduly constrict the liability standards enunciated in
Northern Pacific, Fortner Enterprises
and
Bogosian.
We do not presage acceptance of plaintiff’s theory or proof of liability or her entitlement to damages as prayed for in her complaint. We hold only that where, as in this case, there is record evidence of a purchaser’s reasonable and legitimate economic interest in a product or service which is expressly tied to another product, the purchaser has standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act to challenge the legality of the tie-in.
C.
(ff7,igy Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 TITS.C. § 26, authorizes injunctive relief for any person who demonstrates “threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws.” This provision imposes a lower threshold standing requirement than § 4 of the Clayton Act. L. Sullivan,
supra
at 772. Section 16 has been applied more expansively, both because its language is less restrictive than that of § 4,
see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251, 260-61, 92
S.Ct. 885, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972), and because the injunctive remedy is a more flexible and adaptable tool for enforcing the antitrust laws than the damage remedy, see
id.
at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. 885;
Zenith Corp.
v.
Hazeltine,
395 U.S. 100, 131, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969). A party with standing under § 4 ordinarily will have standing under § 16.
Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co.,
534 F.2d 1172, 1174 (5th Cir. 1976); P. Areeda & D. Turner,
supra,
§ 335e. In this case, the plaintiff has alleged an existing violation of the antitrust laws which is likely to continue with continued resulting injury to her, and she, therefore, has standing to assert claims for injunctive relief under § 16, as well as for damages under § 4.
II.
Having determined that the plaintiff has standing under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act to seek individual relief in the district court from the antitrust violations asserted in the complaint, we turn to consideration of the plaintiff’s contention that the district court erred in denying her motion for class action certification.
In order to maintain a class action, the plaintiff must meet the mandatory requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and, in addition, the requirements of at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b).
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
508 F.2d 239, 245, 248 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011, 95 S.Ct. 2415, 44 L.Ed.2d 679 (1975);
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,
496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied,
419 U.S. 885, 95 S.Ct. 152, 42 L.Ed.2d 125 (1974). In reviewing the district court’s denial of class action status, we are largely limited to a consideration of whether the court identified and applied the appropriate criteria in arriving at its decision.
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra
at 245;
Katz
v.
Carte Blanche Corp., supra
at 756-57. If we find that the court considered the relevant factors, the scope of our review becomes whether the court abused its discretion.
Paton v. La Prade,
524 F.2d 862, 875 (3d Cir. 1975);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra
at 245.
The plaintiff requested designation under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) as the representative of a class of plaintiffs defined as “[a]ll those who have paid membership dues, membership application fees, spouse dues, or membership reinstatement fees to the American Speech and Hearing Association within the past four years and who have received, applied for, or indicated an intention to apply for a Certificate of Clinical Competence.” The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiff had not satisfied the requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) that the named plaintiff adequately represent the interests of members of the class, and (2) that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate, as is required under Rule 23(b)(3),
the superiority of a class action over other available methods of adjudicating the controversy.
We conclude that the district court properly identified and considered the relevant legal criteria and did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the superiority of a class action over other available means of adjudicating the controversy. Since we do not disturb the district court’s denial of class action certification under Rule 23(b)(3), we do not reach the issues raised by the plaintiff with regard to the district court’s rationale under Rule 23(a).
The district court gave the following reasons for its Rule 23(b)(3) determination: 1) the absence of litigation by other members of the proposed class, 2) the plaintiff’s intention, expressed prior to the denial of class certification, to continue to press her claims regardless of the fate of the class action motion, 3) the existence of “a serious question” as to the adequacy of the named plaintiff and her counsel to represent the class, and 4) the burden which a “class action of this size” will impose on the judicial system.
Setting to one side the question of the adequacy of the plaintiff’s representation, which we do not find it necessary to consider, the remaining factors cited by the district court in combination sufficiently support the exercise of discretion to deny class certification. In view of the plaintiff’s manifested intention to continue her litigation even in the face of a denial of class certification, the district court was presented with a clear choice between a “test case” and a class action.
See Katz
v.
Carte Blanche Corp.,
496 F.2d 747, 758-62 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied,
419 U.S. 885, 95 S.Ct. 152, 42 L.Ed.2d 125 (1974). Since the complaint requested injunctive relief, the plaintiff’s success on the merits would obtain for the potential class members the prospective relief available through a class action mechanism as well as eliminating any violation of the antitrust laws. And the
res judicata
effect of a finding that defendant’s conduct is illegal would leave the potential class members in a position to avail themselves of a damage remedy.
See Katz, supra.
Moreover, given the availability of statutory attorneys’ fees, and the relatively uncomplicated nature of the facts at issue, there is no reason to doubt the feasibility of plaintiff’s avowed intention of continuing her suit with full vigor.
The interests of the potential class members thus do not counsel so strongly in favor of class certification as to compel reversal.
On the other side of the balance, as the district judge noted, maintenance of an action on behalf of the putative plaintiff class, numbering 20,000 members, would impose significant costs and burdens on the judicial system, as well as the defendant. And, while the issue is not determinative, there is no indication that a class action is necessary to effect a consolidation of a rash of vexatious or duplicative law suits brought by ASHA members.
Given the clear availability of an alternative method for resolving the claims at issue, which has many of the advantages of a class action both for the plaintiff class and for the accomplishment of the purposes of the antitrust law, yet spares much of the expense and procedural complexity, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification.
III.
Although we hold that plaintiff Bogus has standing to challenge the legality
of ASHA’s membership prerequisite rule, we do not believe that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this record. Factual questions relevant to the various theories of liability remain concerning,
inter alia,
the sufficiency of ASHA’s economic power in the market as a whole for CCCs, the anticompetitive purpose and effect of the challenged tie-in, questions of monopoly intent and power, and relevant product and geographic markets. Moreover, through further proceedings ASHA may be able to develop a factual basis for not automatically applying in this case liability concepts developed in the context of for-profit businesses. The Supreme Court has twice expressed the view that ip certain circumstances a professional association’s practices may be judged differently from other businesses.
We need not decide on this record whether ASHA’s membership prerequisite rule may be treated differently under the Sherman Act than the ordinary commercial tie-in. It suffices for purposes of this appeal from a grant of summary judgment to note that material issues of fact remain to be developed in further proceedings.
See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting,
368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). To the extent that facts are disputed, all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579, 582, 96 S.Ct. 3110, 49 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1976);
Fortner Enterprises, supra,
394 U.S. at 505, 89 S.Ct. 1252.
IV.
By a motion filed June 17, 1976, three practicing audiologists sought permission under Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene as party plaintiffs in the district court proceedings. Were their motion granted, the would-be intervenors intended to seek a rehearing of the district court’s denial of class action certification. The plaintiff asserts on her appeal that the district court erred in failing to act upon the intervention motion prior to entering its order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Plaintiff’s attorney concedes that the would-be intervenors have not taken an appeal from the district court’s inaction in regard to their motion. The plaintiff, not being aggrieved by the district court’s failure to act in this matter, does not have standing to raise the issue.
See Cobb v. Aytch,
539 F.2d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1130, 51 L.Ed.2d 554 (1977);
In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation,
521 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1975). There being no proper party who has raised the question of the denial of intervention, it is not properly before us. Moreover, the question is rendered moot by our ruling set forth in part I of this opinion, which requires the reinstatement of the complaint. On remand the district court will have an opportunity to consider, in its discretion, the application for intervention under Rule 24(b).
V.
ASHA has moved this court to strike the portion of the appellant’s brief containing her statement of the facts on the ground that the same statement was submitted to the district court in support of her unsuccessful motion for summary judgment. We believe the appellant is entitled to present her version of the facts in her brief on appeal, whether in the form of a reproduction of a statement submitted to the district court or of a new presentation for purposes of the appeal. We therefore will deny the motion to strike portions of the appellant’s brief.
VI.
The district court’s order of August 7, 1975, denying class action certification will be affirmed. The appellee’s motion to strike portions of the appellant’s brief will be denied. The district court’s order of May 5, 1977, granting summary judgment to the defendant with respect to plaintiff’s claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and dismissing her common law claim, will be reversed and the case will be, accordingly, remanded to the district court for further proceedings.