Lussier v. Subaru of N.E., et al.

2001 DNH 143

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: August 3, 2001
• Docket: CV-99-109-B
• Status: Published

Opinion

Lussier v. Subaru of N.E., et a l . CV-99-109-B 08/03/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

George Lussier Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Lussier Subaru, et a l .

v. Civil No. 99-109-B Opinion No. 2001 DNH 143 Subaru of New England, Inc., et a l .

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

A number of current and former New England Subaru dealers

bring this class action against their distributor, Subaru of New

England, Inc. ("SNE"), its sole shareholder and President, Ernest

Boch, and its Executive Vice President and General Manager,

Joseph Appelbe. The dealers allege that Boch, Appelbe, and SNE

have engaged in an "option-packing scheme," by which they used

their power to allocate or withhold certain desirable vehicles to

coerce the dealers to purchase unwanted accessories. The dealers

claim that this practice breaches their dealer contracts and

violates federal antitrust laws, the federal RICO statute, the

federal Automobile Dealer Day in Court Act, and various state

dealer protection statutes. The dealers now move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to certify a class of

approximately 75 current and former New England Subaru dealers,

(Doc. No. 168). For the reasons discussed below, I grant in

part, and deny in part, plaintiffs' motion for class

certification.

I. BACKGROUND

SNE is the exclusive distributor of Subaru vehicles in New

England. In this capacity, it has entered into franchise

agreements with all of the region's Subaru dealers. The

franchise agreements contain or incorporate by reference certain

standard provisions dictated by Subaru's national distributor,

Subaru of America, Inc. One such provision states that, "[i]t is

understood and agreed that [SNE] will allocate all affected

Subaru products equitably, using appropriate factors such as the

respective inventory levels and sales performance of [its]

dealers during a representative period of time immediately prior

to such allocation." SNE Dealership Agreement and Standard

Provisions, Ex. F to Defs.' Surreply Memo, in Opposition to Pis.'

Mot. for Class Certification (hereinafter "Defs.' Surreply"),

(Doc. No. 187), 5 11.3.

- 2 - SNE implemented a vehicle distribution plan on February 1 ,

1987, dubbed "Fair Share II." See Fair Share II Distribution

System (hereinafter "Fair Share II"), Ex. 1 to Aff. of Phillip L.

Lustbader (hereinafter "Lustbader Aff."), submitted with Defs.'

Objection to Pis.' Motion for Class Certification (hereinafter

"Defs.' Objection"), (Doc. No. 180). Under this plan, SNE

allocates 90% of its vehicles to dealerships based upon a formula

tied to the number of vehicles each dealership sells during a

given allocation period. The plan specifies that SNE may

withhold the remaining "discretionary vehicles" and use them for

"executive vehicles and discretionary purposes such as market

action vehicles."1 Fair Share II at 000012.

The dealers allege that at some point after they had

incurred substantial costs to develop their dealerships, SNE

began to: (1) condition a dealer's access to discretionary

vehicles on the dealer's agreement to purchase non-discretionary

vehicles with unwanted accessories, such as leather seats and

1 The plan elsewhere defines "discretionary vehicles" as "[vjehicles to be used as demonstrators by [SNE]; vehicles to be used for maj or auto shows; vehicles set aside to assist dealers who, at the sole discretion of [SNE], need assistance and vehicles delivered to VIPs." Fair Share II at 000027.

- 3 - keyless entry systems; and (2) accessorize discretionary vehicles

before offering them to dealers, thereby effectively conditioning

a dealer's purchase of a discretionary vehicle on the purchase of

the pre-installed accessories. The dealers characterize this

practice as an "option-packing scheme."

Because SNE withholds a disproportionate number of Subaru's

most popular vehicles as discretionary vehicles, the dealers

contend that they have little choice but to accede to SNE's

demands. The discretionary vehicles are essential to the

financial well-being of many dealers because of SNE's concerted

effort to make dealers financially dependent on SNE by, among

other things, conditioning franchise renewal on an agreement not

to sell vehicles other than Subarus.

As a result of the defendants' practices, the dealers

allegedly have been forced to purchase an average of $480 in

unwanted accessories on each vehicle SNE has allocated and sold

to the dealers. Pis.' Second Amended Complaint ("Cplt."), (Doc.

No. 147), 26, 30, 34, 69. Since many customers did not want

these accessories and the accessories themselves were priced by

SNE at above-market rates, many dealers were forced to sell these

accessorized vehicles at a loss.

- 4 - After the dealers raised these concerns, SNE responded by

stating that: (1) it does pre-accessorize "demonstrator" vehicles

"and any discretionary vehicles determined in accordance with

current allocation procedures;" (2) it accessorizes "one or two

of the first new models delivered to each dealer" so that dealers

and customer "have an opportunity to see the choices that are

available" for each new model; and (3) while it recognized that

SNE's District Service Managers ("DSM's") may become somewhat

aggressive in selling accessories to dealers, SNE instructs DSM's

never to coerce dealers into buying unwanted accessories. SNE's

Responses to Dealer Proposals (hereinafter the "SNE Response"),

Ex. 2 to Pis.' Mot. for Class Certification (hereinafter "Pis.'

Motion"), (Doc. No. 168), at 7.

The named plaintiffs subsequently brought this action,

asserting claims based upon defendants alleged "option packing"

scheme. Plaintiffs contend that defendants' conduct constitutes

a tying arrangement prohibited by Section 1 of the Sherman Act

and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 14. They also

allege that defendants violated: (1) the Automobile Dealer Day

in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1221 _et se q .; (2) the automobile dealer

protection statutes of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New

- 5 - Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont; and (3) the dealer

agreements entered into between SNE and dealers. Lastly,

plaintiffs contend that defendants furthered their scheme through

a pattern of extortion and mail fraud, in violation of the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18

U.S.C. § 1962 (c) .2

Plaintiffs now seek to certify as a class "those entities or

individuals who own or owned a New England Subaru dealership

between January 1, 1995 and the present." Cplt. 5 44.

II . CLASS CERTIFICATION STANDARDS

To certify a proposed class, plaintiffs first must satisfy

the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) by showing that:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims

2 I described many of plaintiffs' factual allegations and legal claims in more detail in two previous orders. See George Lussier Enters., Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., Civil No. C-99-109-B, 2000 DNH 013, 2000 WL 1466132 (D.N.H. Jan. 13, 2000) (granting motion to dismiss prior RICO claims against SNE; granting in part and denying in part motion to dismiss prior RICO claim against Boch); George Lussier Enters., Inc. v. Subaru of New England. Inc., Civil No. C-99-109-B, 1999 WL 1327396 (D.N.H. Dec. 13, 1999) (denying motion to dismiss antitrust claim against SNE) .

- 6 - or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). If the plaintiffs satisfy those

requirements, they must then show that the proposed class also

meets the characteristics of at least one of the three categories

provided in Rule 23 (b) . The plaintiffs bear the burden of

establishing all of the requirements for class certification.

See Makuc v. American Honda Motor Co., 835 F.2d 389, 394 (1st

C i r . 1987) .

In evaluating a motion for class certification, a court must

undertake a rigorous analysis of the factual and legal issues

comprising the plaintiffs' cause of action in order to determine

whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met. See General

Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982);

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesav, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978). A court

should also consider the defendant's proposed defenses. See

Waste M q m t . Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 295 (1st

Cir. 2000). While a court may not decide the merits of a case at

the class certification stage, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacauelin,

417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974), a court may "formulate some

- 7 - prediction as to how specific issues will play out in order to

determine" whether class certification is appropriate. Mowbray,

208 F.3d at 298.

With these principles in mind, I analyze plaintiffs' motion

for class certification.

Ill. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs contend that their complaint satisfies the Rule

2 3 (a) prerequisites and is eligible for class action treatment

under either Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 2 3 ( b ) (3). I examine each

contention in turn.

A. Rule 23(a) Standards

1. Numerositv

Plaintiffs must first demonstrate that the proposed class

"is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (1); see General Tel. Co. of the Northwest

v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) ("The numerosity requirement

requires examination of the specific facts of each case and

imposes no absolute limitations."). A court should consider both

the number of members in the proposed class and their geographical distribution in determining whether the proposed

class satisfies the numerosity requirement. See Andrews v.

Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 131-32 (1st Cir. 1985). Since

the proposed class includes approximately seventy-five present

and former Subaru dealers scattered throughout New England, I

find that the proposed class satisfies the numerosity

requirement. See 1 Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberq on

Class Actions § 3.05, at 3-25 (3d ed. 1992) (observing that it is

generally impracticable to join 40 plaintiffs and therefore a

class of 40 should normally satisfy the numerosity requirement)

(hereinafter "Newberq").

2. Commonality

To establish the commonality prerequisite, the plaintiffs

must show that "there are questions of law or fact common to the

class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (2) . Because the class need share

only a single legal or factual issue at this stage of the

analysis, the commonality requirement ordinarily is easily

satisfied. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d

620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S.Ct. 1169 (2000); 1

Newberq § 3.10, at 3-50. The reality that differing fact

patterns underlie the claims of individual class members will not

- 9 - necessarily prevent a finding of commonality, so long as the

class members have at least one issue in common. See Hart v.

Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1999); Curtis v. Comm'r,

Maine Dept, of Human Servs., 159 F.R.D. 339, 341 (D. Me. 1994).

The record reveals numerous questions of law and fact common

to the class, including: (1) whether SNE installed accessories on

discretionary vehicles prior to offering those vehicles to

dealers; (2) whether SNE conditioned the purchase of

discretionary or non-discretionary vehicles on the purchase of

accessories; and (3) whether SNE has the contractual right to

pre-accessorize vehicles. Accordingly, I find that the proposed

class satisfies the commonality requirement.

3. Typicality

To satisfy the typicality requirement, the class

representatives' injuries must arise from the same event or

course of conduct as the injuries of other class members, and

their claims must be based on the same legal theories. See

Modell v. Eliot Sav. Bank, 139 F.R.D. 17, 22 (D. Mass. 1991) . In

this case, the named plaintiffs allege the same injury as each

member of the plaintiff class: they allege that they suffered

financial harm because SNE forced them to purchase expensive,

- 10 - unwanted accessories as a condition of purchasing discretionary

and non-discretionary vehicles. Thus, in trying their case, the

named plaintiffs will necessarily present the claims of the

absent plaintiffs. See Priest v. Zavre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552,

555 (D. Mass. 1988). Accordingly, I find that the proposed class

satisfies the typicality requirement.

4. Adequacy

The fourth and final prerequisite of Rule 2 3 (a) is that the

representative parties must "fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4) . To satisfy

this prerequisite, plaintiffs must show: (1) "that the interests

of the representative party will not conflict with the interests

of any of the class members;" and (2) that the counsel chosen by

the representative party is "qualified, experienced[,] and able

to vigorously conduct the proposed litigation." Andrews, 780

F.2d at 130.

Defendants advance two reasons why the named plaintiffs can

not adequately represent the class. First, defendants argue that

while those dealers who do not receive discretionary vehicles are

harmed by SNE's alleged practice of option-packing, those dealers

who do receive coveted discretionary vehicles actually benefit

- 11 - from SNE's practices. According to defendants, such a class of

"winners and losers" is not appropriate for class certification.

See Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584,

598 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming denial of certification where some

class members benefitted from disputed settlement agreement and

"those benefits would evaporate if the class action succeeded").

I reject this argument because it ignores the fact that, if

plaintiffs' allegations are true, even those dealers who were

"winners" because they received discretionary vehicles, were

still "losers" because they made less profit on those vehicles

than they would have made on non-accessorized vehicles.

Second, defendants argue that the named plaintiffs can not

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class because

the class consists of both former and current dealers. According

to defendants, former dealers will be interested only in money

damages, while current dealers will be more concerned with the

financial stability of SNE and will therefore be more interested

in obtaining injunctive relief. See Broussard v. Meineke Disc.

Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 337-39 (4th Cir. 1998).

I disagree. The current group of named plaintiffs includes

both current dealers, e.g., Sullivan County Motors, Inc., and

- 12 - former dealers, e.g., George Lussier Enterprises, Inc.

Accordingly, they should be able to decide among themselves what

remedy would adequately and fairly represent the interests of

both groups within the class. See McMahon Books, Inc. v. Willow

Grove Assocs., 108 F.R.D. 32, 36-37 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (certifying a

class consisting of current and former mall tenants despite

potential differences regarding damages). Moreover, in the event

of a finding of liability, I will be able to resolve any conflict

within the class regarding damages by the formation of subclasses

at the relief stage. See i d . at 36; 1 Newberq § 3.25, at 3-136-

38 ("Many courts have held that speculative conflict should be

disregarded at the class certification stage;" and that such

conflicts are properly dealt with at the relief stage.).

As to the second half of the adequacy analysis, I conclude,

after reviewing the affidavits and declarations submitted by the

named plaintiffs' counsel, that plaintiffs' counsel are

experienced in the conduct of complex commercial litigation,

including class actions. These affidavits and declarations,

along with their conduct in this litigation thus far, give me no

reason to doubt their competence or ability to vigorously conduct

this litigation. See Andrews, 780 F.2d at 130. Accordingly, I

- 13 - find that the named plaintiffs are represented by competent,

experienced counsel who will vigorously conduct this litigation.

In sum, I find that the named plaintiffs will fairly and

adequately represent the class.

Since plaintiffs satisfy all of the Rule 2 3 (a)

prerequisites, they must now show that a class action is an

appropriate procedural method for maintaining this suit under one

of the Rule 23(b) categories.

B. Rule 23(b)(2) Standards

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that SNE does not

have the right to pre-accessorize discretionary vehicles. They

also seek an injunction preventing SNE from pre-accessorizing

discretionary vehicles in the future. Therefore, plaintiffs

contend that class certification is appropriate under Rule

2 3 ( b ) (2), which provides that an action may be maintainable as a

class action if "the party opposing the class has acted or

refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,

thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or

corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a

whole." F e d . R . C i v . P . 2 3(b)(2).

The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23(b) (2), however,

- 14 - provides that Rule 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which

the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly

to money damages." Rules Advisory Comm. Note to Amended Rule 23,

39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1996). Accordingly, a court may certify a

class under Rule 23(b)(2) only if injunctive or declaratory

relief is the predominant remedy sought by the class. See Barnes

v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 142 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing

1 Newberq § 4.11, at 4-39); Allison v. Citqo Petroleum Corp., 151

F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases); Rothwell v.

Chubb Life Ins. Co. of A m . . 191 F.R.D. 25, 29 (D.N.H. 1998).

Plaintiffs assert that their claims for injunctive and

declaratory relief are equally as important to them as their

claims for monetary damages. After reviewing plaintiffs'

complaint and the record as a whole, however, it is apparent that

plaintiffs' primary goal is to obtain monetary damages: they

assert a number of federal and state law claims seeking

compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and

costs. See Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 978 (5th

Cir. 2000) ("The mere recitation of a request for [equitable]

relief cannot transform damages claims into a Rule 23(b) (2) class

action."); Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 (holding that "monetary

- 15 - relief predominates in (b)(2) class actions unless it is

incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief.").

Although plaintiffs also seek injunctive and declaratory relief,

any such relief is clearly secondary to their multiple claims for

monetary relief. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 415; Rothwell, 191

F.R.D. at 29. Consequently, I find that certification under Rule

2 3 ( b ) (2) is not appropriate.

C. Rule 23(b)(3) Standards

Rule 23 (b) (3) establishes two criteria for class

certification. First, common questions of law or fact must

predominate over questions affecting individual class members.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 3 (b)(3). Second, a class action must be

"superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of the controversy." Id. These two requirements

ensure that class certification is granted "only where the

adjudication of common issues in a single action will achieve

judicial economies and practical advantages without jeopardizing

procedural fairness." Rothwell, 191 F.R.D. at 29 (citations

omitted).

I begin by examining the second Rule 23 (b) (3) factor,

superiority, which requires a comparative evaluation of the

- 16 - alternatives to class certification to determine whether a class

action is more or less fair, practical, and efficient than the

other available means of adjudication. See 1 Newberq § 4.27, at

4-106. The obvious alternative to class certification in this

case would be for the dealers to bring individual suits against

the defendants. Such individual litigation would be grossly

inefficient as the parties, witnesses, and courts would be forced

to endure duplicative litigation. See i d . § 4.30, at 4-121 ("A

class action will ordinarily be superior to repetitive individual

suits."). Individual litigation would be costly, time consuming,

and could potentially result in inconsistent judgments.

Defendants contend, however, that individual dealers have a

strong interest in "controlling the prosecution of . . . separate

actions" against them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23( b ) (3)(A). I note,

however, that no putative class members have opposed

certification. See Riordan v. Smith Barney, 113 F.R.D. 60, 66

(N.D. 111. 1986). Moreover, not all dealers have the financial

resources necessary to bring individual suits against SNE. Other

dealers might be unwilling to do so, out of concern that such

litigation would jeopardize their important, ongoing relationship

with SNE. Thus, I find that the advantages of class treatment

- 17 - outweigh any potential interest in individual litigation. See 1

Newberq § 4.29, at 4-119.

In addition, I note that the proposed class is relatively

small, consisting of approximately seventy-five former and

current dealers, and is confined to the states of New England.

These factors suggest that trying this case as a class action

would be manageable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D); 1 Newberq

§ 4.33, at 4-135-36. Moreover, given the court's familiarity

with the legal issues raised by this case, it is desirable to

concentrate the litigation of plaintiffs' claims in this court.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C); Riordan, 113 F.R.D. at 66.

I next address the issue of predominance. No precise,

mechanical test exists to determine whether common issues

predominate in a proposed class. See Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 296;

Rothwell, 191 F.R.D. at 29. Instead, courts look for "a

sufficient constellation of common issues [that] binds class

members together." Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 296. The predominance

requirement is satisfied when "the issues in the class action

that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the

class as a whole, predominate over those issues that are subject

only to individualized proof." Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Svs.,

- 18 - Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 121

S.Ct. 1354 (2001) (quoting Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875

F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1989)); see Lockwood Motors, Inc. v.

General Motors Corp., 162 F.R.D. 569, 580 (D. Minn. 1995)

(observing that simultaneous, class-wide proof "obviates the need

to examine each class member's individual position"); see also 1

Newberq § 4.25, at 4-86.

Plaintiffs claim that they suffered financial losses as a

result of defendants' policy of option-packing. While each

dealer made his or her own decision about whether or not to

purchase particular vehicles and accessories, plaintiffs claim

that defendants forced all dealers to purchase unwanted,

expensive accessories through a standardized, company-wide

policy. Plaintiffs contend that they can offer common proof that

SNE adopted and implemented this policy. Defendants argue,

however, that because of the nature of plaintiffs' claims,

individual questions, such as the question of whether a dealer

wanted to purchase a particular vehicle or accessory or whether

he was coerced into doing so, will predominate over questions

common to the class. I examine each of plaintiffs' claims in

turn. I limit my initial analysis to questions of liability and

- 19 - discuss the issue of damages in Section D infra.

1. The "Announced" Tying Claim

_____ Plaintiffs allege that defendants conditioned dealers'

access to discretionary vehicles (the tying product) on their

purchase of accessories (the tied product) for those

discretionary vehicles. Dealers needed the discretionary

vehicles to maintain their Subaru franchises (the lock-in

product) in which they had already invested substantial capital.

See generally Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,

504 U.S. 451, 461-80 (1992) (discussing "lock-in" tying claims);

Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of N. A m . , 23 F.3d 14, 16-20 (1st Cir. 1994)

(same).

In order to prevail on a tying claim, plaintiffs must show:

(1) that the tying and tied products are actually two distinct

products; (2) that the seller conditioned the right to purchase

the tying product on the purchase of the tied product; (3) that

the seller has sufficient market power in the market for the

tying product to appreciably restrain trade in the market for the

tied product; and (4) that, as a result, the seller is able to

foreclose a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in

the tied product. See Borschow Hosp. and Med. Supplies, Inc. v.

- 20 - Cesar Castillo Inc., 96 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Data

General Corp. v. Grumman Svs. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1178

(1st Cir. 1994)); George Lussier Enters., Inc., 1999 WL 1327396,

*2; see also Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858

F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir. 1988) (observing that the essential

elements of a tying claim are the same under §1 of the Sherman

Act and §3 of the Clayton A c t ) .

Plaintiffs contend that because they plan to offer common

proof of their announced tying claim, class certification is

appropriate. While plaintiffs do not specifically address how

they will attempt to prove the first and fourth elements of their

tying claims, the defendants do not seriously dispute that both

elements are readily amenable to common proof.3 See visa

3 At the class certification hearing, defendants argued, for the first time, that plaintiffs would be unable to offer common proof of the information and switching costs necessary to prove the market-power element of a lock-in tying claim. Transcript ("T r .") of Hearing on Jan. 29, 2001, (Doc. No. 219), at 69, 110-11; see George Lussier Enters., Inc., 1999 WL 1327396, *3-5 (discussing information and switching costs) . Since defendants did not brief this issue, however, I need not dwell on it here. I find, however, that because a number of other common questions predominate over individual questions in this case, plaintiffs' need to prove switching and information costs does not defeat a finding of predominance. See Collins v. Int'1 Dairy Queen, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 668, 676 (M.D. G a . 1996) (certifying lock-in tying claim without directly addressing the issue of

- 21 - Check/Mastermonev Antitrust Litiq., 192 F.R.D. 68, 87 (E.D.N.Y.

2000) (finding that the question of distinctness is amenable to

common proof); Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 172 F.R.D.

236, 266 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (finding that the question of the

seller's effect on interstate commerce was common to the class).

Accordingly, I focus my analysis on the element of conditioning,

a. Conditioning

Before specifically addressing plaintiffs' announced tying

claim, I first discuss conditioning in general and the concept of

the announced tie in particular.

Conditioning is central to the nature of a tying claim:

"[b]y conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of

another, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent

judgement as to the 'tied' product's merits and insulates it from

the competitive stresses of the open market." Times-Picayune

Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); see

Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984)

("Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of

an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of

switching and information costs); see also Mowbrav. 208 F.3d at 298 .

- 22 - its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the

purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at

all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different

terms.").

To prove "conditioning," plaintiffs must show that

defendants conditioned plaintiffs' ability to purchase vehicles,

the product that plaintiffs really wanted (the "tying product"),

on the purchase of accessories, a product that plaintiffs may not

have wanted (the "tied product"). See Borschow Hosp. & Med.

Supplies, Inc., 96 F.3d at 17 (plaintiffs must offer proof of "an

agreement or condition, express or implied, that establishes a

tie." (quoting Data General Corp., 36 F.3d at 1178)); George

Lussier Enters., Inc., 1999 WL 1327396, *2.

The parties disagree as to whether plaintiffs can prove

conditioning through proof common to the class or whether they

will have to offer the testimony of individual dealers in an

attempt to show that SNE forced them to purchase unwanted

accessories as a condition to purchasing vehicles. The parties

do agree, however, that common proof of conditioning would ensure

that common issues predominate, rendering class certification

appropriate, while individualized proof of conditioning would

- 23 - render class certification inappropriate. See, e.g.. Chase

Parkway Garage, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 94 F.R.D.

330, 332 (D. Mass. 1982) (denying class certification where

plaintiffs offered individualized proof of conditioning); Rental

Car of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Westinqhouse Elec. Corp., 496 F.

Supp. 373, 378 (D. Mass. 1980) (stating that certification is

appropriate only where a proposed class can offer common, not

individualized, proof of conditioning).

(i). The "Announced Tie"

One way for a class of plaintiffs to prove conditioning is

to point to an express contractual tie: an agreement that

explicitly conditions the purchase of one product on the purchase

of another. See, e.g.. Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d

1123, 1131 (6th Cir. 1981); Unqar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc.,

531 F.2d 1211, 1224 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that a formal

agreement is sufficient, but not necessary, to prove

conditioning); see generally ABA Section of Antitrust Law,

Antitrust Law Developments Vol. I, 187-88 (4th ed. 1997); P.

Areeda and H. Hovencamp, Antitrust Law Vol. X, 5 1753, at 292-94

(1996) (hereinafter "Areeda" ) .

Courts agree that class certification of a tying claim is

- 24 - appropriate where conditioning can be proved by establishing that

all class members were subject to the same express contractual

tying agreement. See, e.g., Boqosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d

434, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1977); Rental Car of New Hampshire, Inc.,

4 96 F. Supp. at 37 8; Schuler v. Better Equip. Launder Center,

Inc., 74 F.R.D. 85, 87 (D. Mass. 1977) .

In their treatise on antitrust law. Professors Areeda and

Hovencamp suggest another means of proof, a corollary to the

contractual tying agreement which they call an "announced tie."4

4 While few cases actually use the term "announced tie," but see, e.g.. Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 172 F.R.D. at 265 ("The commonality of proofs of a tie-in is an easy issue where there is an express contractual tie or an announced tie-in."), the case law suggests that a non-contractual statement can create an inference of conditioning. See, e.g.. Bogus v. Am. Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 287 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding conditioning where association's internal rule required membership in the organization in order to be eligible for professional certification); B.J.L.M. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Block Distrib. Co.. Civ. A. No. L-85-64, 1987 WL 13811, *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 1987) (assuming that non-contractual statement constituted an attempted tying arrangement); Martino v. McDonald's Svs.. Inc.. 81 F.R.D. 81, 88-89 (N.D. 111. 1979) (finding that conditioning could be shown on a class-wide basis where employee testified that he told 99% of prospective franchisees that a tying condition existed because this evidence established a "firm policy" of conditioning); see also Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that company's policy statement did not establish tying arrangement because it was ambiguous and the plaintiff offered no evidence that it was ever implemented).

- 25 - See Areeda 5 1753a, at 292; 5 1754, at 301-06. Under this

theory, when a seller announces that he will condition the

purchase of a tied product on the purchase of a tying product,

any sale made subsequent to that announcement is presumed to be a

tied sale because the announcement creates the impression among

buyers that the tying condition exists. I d . 5 1754b, at 302-03;

5 1754d, at 305-06. Thus, proof of the announcement creates an

inference of conditioning. I d . I 1754d, at 305-06.

Professors Areeda and Hovencamp suggest, however, that this

inference could be rebutted if a defendant offers evidence "that

the announcement was not taken seriously," including, for

example, evidence showing: (1) "widespread knowledge that

defendant actually sold" the tied and tying products separately

or "did not terminate dealers who purchased" the tied product

elsewhere; or (2) "that buyers frequently and successfully

requested" that the tied and tying products be offered

separately. Id. 5 1754d, at 306.

Generally, if a class can introduce an announcement that

creates an inference of conditioning, class certification would

be appropriate because the common issue of conditioning would

predominate. See Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 172 F.R.D. at 265;

- 26 - see also 4 Newberq § 18.30, at 18-114 ("Evidence of an

unremitting policy of tie-in . . . may also be proffered to show

classwide coercion.")

With this jurisprudence in mind, I proceed to address

plaintiffs' announced tying claim.

(ii). Plaintiffs' proof

Plaintiffs contend that in January 1999, SNE, in a written

response to dealers' concerns about option-packing, "announced" a

uniform, company-wide policy of tying purchases of discretionary

vehicles to purchases of accessories for those vehicles. See T r .

at 18-20; SNE Response at 7 (stating that "SNE pre-accessorizes

our demonstrators . . . and any discretionary vehicles determined

in accordance with current allocation procedures"). Unsur­

prisingly, plaintiffs intend to offer the purported announcement

into evidence.

While an announcement, assuming it explicitly states the

tying condition, is itself sufficient to create an inference of

conditioning, plaintiffs intend to bolster this inference with

other documentary and testimonial evidence showing that SNE

implemented its announced policy of conditioning on a class-wide

basis. See 4 Newberq § 18.30, at 18-114 ("Allegations of such a

- 27 - policy [of conditioning] may be insufficient . . . and the

plaintiff should bolster such charges with evidence such as

classwide adherence to the tie-in policy."). This additional

evidence will allegedly show that SNE: (1) pre-installed

accessories on discretionary vehicles, see, e.g., D e p . of Donald

Smith, Jr. ("Smith Dep."), Ex. 1 to Pis.' Reply Memo. Supporting

Class Certification (hereinafter "Pis.' Reply"), (Doc. No. 183),

at 114-16; 135-36; and (2) enthusiastically encouraged DSM's to

aggressively market accessories to dealers, see, e.g.. Memo, from

Joseph Appelbe to John Seybold and DSM's of 6/3/1998, Ex. 2 to

P i s .' Reply.

(iii). The proposed defense

Presumably, defendants will attempt to rebut any inference

of conditioning created by the alleged announcement by pointing

out ambiguities and qualifiers in the document itself. See Trans

Sport, Inc., 964 F.2d at 192 (holding that company's policy

statement did not establish tying arrangement because it was

ambiguous and the plaintiff offered no evidence that it was ever

implemented). In addition, defendants will offer the testimony

of SNE employees that the tying condition was not implemented on

a class-wide basis. See Lustbader Aff. 16-20; Trans Sport,

- 28 - Inc., 964 F.2d at 192; Areeda I 1754d, at 306. For example,

Phillip L. Lustbader, SNE's Vice President of Operations and

Dealer Relations, stated in an affidavit that while SNE pre­

accessorizes some discretionary vehicles in various ways, and

offers those vehicles for sale to dealers, other discretionary

vehicles are accessorized only after consultation with, and

agreement by, dealers. Lustbader Aff. 17-20; see also Aff. of

James Shea, submitted with Defs.' Objection.

Defendants will also offer testimony that individual dealers

negotiated agreements with SNE to purchase discretionary vehicles

without having to purchase accessories on those vehicles. See

T r . at 70; Areeda 5 1754d, at 306 (stating that an inference of

conditioning can be rebutted if a defendant shows "that buyers

frequently and successfully requested" that the tied and tying

products be offered separately); see also 4 Newberq § 18.30, at

18-114.

The weight of this evidence, defendants argue, will

successfully rebut any inference of conditioning created by

plaintiffs' evidence. T r . at 70-72; see Areeda 5 1754d, at 306.

Defendants contend that, since they can offer evidence that

will rebut the presumption of conditioning created by the tying

- 29 - announcement, plaintiffs will have no choice but to offer

individual proof of conditioning. Thus, they claim, the trial

will degenerate into a series of mini-trials focusing on whether

individual dealers were forced to purchase unwanted accessories

on discretionary vehicles. T r . at 77-78, 101. Under these

circumstances, individual questions, such as dealer intent, will

predominate over questions common to the class.

(iv). Analysis

As plaintiffs' case is presently formulated, it focuses on

documentary and testimonial evidence establishing that defendants

had an announced policy of pre-accessorizing discretionary

vehicles and conditioning all dealers' purchases of those

vehicles on the purchase of those accessories. Under these

circumstances, common issues predominate over individual issues.

See Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 172 F.R.D. at 265 ("[T]he

critical question for Rule 23(b) (3) is whether the method of

proving [conditioning] involves facts -- even if complex and

external to the contract -- that are predominantly common to the

class and not individual.").

In response, defendants ask that I: (1) evaluate the merits

of their proposed defense and conclude that it successfully

- 30 - rebuts any presumption of conditioning; and (2) predict that, in

response, plaintiffs will offer the individual testimony of

dealers in an attempt to prove conditioning. I reject this

argument for two reasons.

First, while I may "formulate some prediction as to how

specific issues will play out in order to determine" whether

class certification is appropriate, see Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 298,

the Supreme Court has held that I may not evaluate the merits of

a case at the class certification stage. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at

177. There is "nothing in either the language or history of Rule

23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary

inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether

it may be maintained as a class action." Id. If I were to deny

class certification because of my own evaluation of the merits of

the defendants' proposed defense, I would be unduly prejudicing

the plaintiffs, who have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23.

C f . i d . (noting that a preliminary determination on the merits

might result in substantial prejudice to a defendant).

Second, even if I were to make a preliminary determination

of the merits of the proposed defense, I would be unable, at this

time, to determine whether the defendants could successfully

- 31 - rebut any inference of conditioning created by the alleged

announcement. Defendants have not said which, or how many,

dealers would testify that they negotiated agreements with SNE to

purchase discretionary vehicles without having to purchase

accessories on those vehicles. Nor have defendants offered any

details about that testimony. Nor can I fully discern the impact

of the proffered testimony of Lustbader and other SNE employees.

Nor can I fully evaluate the import of the common proof that

plaintiffs will introduce to buttress any inference of

conditioning raised by the alleged announcement. While

defendants may indeed have a strong defense and may well prevail

at the summary judgment stage of the litigation, these and other

deficiencies in the record would necessarily prevent me from

reaching any preliminary determination as to the merits of their

proposed defense.5

Because I find that plaintiffs can offer common proof of

5 Further, even if defendants successfully rebut the presumption of conditioning, there is no guarantee that the plaintiffs would offer individual dealer testimony. Indeed, at oral argument plaintiffs suggested that they might not offer such testimony. T r . at 21. Creative lawyering leaves open the prospect of other methods of proof. See Boaosian, 561 F.2d at 452; Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 172 F.R.D. at 253.

- 32 - conditioning, I conclude that their announced tying claim

satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 and is appropriate for

class certification.

b. Temporal Constraints

By its very terms, a cause of action based on an alleged

announced tie applies only to purchases made after the

announcement. See Areeda I 1754b, at 302-03; I 1754d, at 305-06.

In this case, SNE allegedly announced the existence of a tie on

January 21, 1999. See SNE Response. Accordingly, in the event

of a finding of liability, only those dealers who purchased

discretionary vehicles from SNE on or after January 21, 1999 may

recover damages from SNE under an announced tie theory.

2. The Unannounced Tying Claim

Plaintiffs also allege that SNE conditioned dealers' access

to discretionary vehicles (the tying product) on their purchase

of accessories (the tied product) on desirable non-discretionary

vehicles which dealers needed to maintain profitable dealerships

(the lock-in product). See George Lussier Enters., Inc., 1999 WL

1327396, *2-6 (discussing this claim). Because plaintiffs can

point to no direct evidence to support their unannounced tying

claim, they rely instead on circumstantial evidence of

- 33 - conditioning. T r . at 26-27. As was the case with the announced

tying claim, the parties disagree as to whether plaintiffs'

proposed means of proving conditioning will make their

unannounced tying claim suitable for class certification.

In essence, defendants advance two alternative arguments in

opposition to plaintiffs' motion to certify the unannounced tying

claim. First, they contend that because no explicit tying

contract or announcement exists, plaintiffs must offer individual

dealer testimony to prove class-wide conditioning. Thus, they

contend that individual questions of dealer intent will

necessarily predominate over questions common to the class.

Second, defendants contend that, even if it were

hypothetically possible for plaintiffs to prove class-wide

conditioning in the absence of either: (1) an express tying

contract or announcement; or (2) individual dealer testimony,

plaintiffs' proposed method of proof is not sufficient to do so.

Therefore, defendants argue, plaintiffs' motion for class

certification should be denied.

After addressing defendants' first argument, I will then

review plaintiffs' proposed means of proof, the proposed defense,

and, ultimately, analyze defendants' second argument.

- 34 - a. Common Proof of Conditioning - Generally

_____ Defendants' initial argument is at odds with case law which

holds that a class may prove conditioning, without relying on

either an explicit tying announcement or individualized

testimony, by showing that the "practical economic effect" of a

contract or contracts is to create a tying arrangement even

though the contracts do not, on their face, explicitly condition

the purchase of one product on the purchase of another. See

Boaosian, 561 F.2d at 452; see also Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni

Promotions Co. of Georgia, 815 F.2d 1407, 1418 (11th Cir. 1987)

("It is well established that coercion may be established by

showing that the facts and circumstances surrounding the

transaction as a practical matter forced the buyer into

purchasing the tied product." (citations omitted)).

For example, in Boaosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., a proposed class

of independent gas station operators sued their lessors, alleging

that their lease agreements tied the leasing and subleasing of

gas station sites to the purchase of gasoline supplied by each

dealer's lessor. 561 F.2d at 439. While no single lease

provision required the lessee to purchase all of its gasoline

from the lessor, the leases provided: (1) for terms of only six

- 35 - to twelve months; (2) that the lessee had to purchase a license

to use the lessor's trademark and, as a condition of that

license, the lessee was required to sell only the lessor's

gasoline from any pump bearing the lessor's trademark; (3) that

the lessor could make no alteration of the leasehold without the

lessor's approval; and (4) that the lease could be terminated

whenever the lessee failed to purchase a stated quantity of

gasoline from the lessor. I d . at 452. The district court

refused to certify the class because, since there was no express

contractual tie in the leases, the plaintiffs would have to show

that each lessee was coerced into purchasing the lessor's

gasoline. See i d . at 452 (discussing district court opinion).

The Third Circuit vacated the district court's opinion

because it concluded that the plaintiffs need not offer

individualized proof of coercion to establish the existence of a

tying claim. I d . at 452. The Court noted that the " [p]laintiffs

do not contend that defendants pressured them into refraining

from selling competing brands, but that the lease contracts

themselves precluded them from doing so." I d . at 452. The

defendants acknowledged that while the leases did not explicitly

establish any tying arrangement, under the terms of those leases

- 36 - the only way that a lessee could sell other brands of gasoline

would be to install his own pumps and tanks. I d . at 452. The

Court went on to say that:

Whether such a course is realistically open to a short term lessee is a common question of fact which can be developed by expert testimony concerning the relative costs and benefits of making such installations. Similarly, a lease provision which permits termination of the lease when a stated quantity of gasoline is not purchased from the lessor hardly leaves the lessee open to reject some or all of the lessor's gas in favor of that of a competitor. If plaintiffs are able to show that the lease agreements in use by all defendants have similar clauses which have the practical ___________economic effect of precluding sale of other than the lessor's gasoline, they will have shown that the purchase of gasoline was tied in to the lease of the service station. Under these circumstances the lease agreement itself conditions the sale of one product (here a lease) upon purchase of another [and therefore the plaintiffs need not prove individualized conditioning].

I d . at 452 (emphasis added).

Thus, Boaosian supports the proposition that class

certification is appropriate where a class can establish by

common proof that the practical economic effect of a contractual

arrangement is to condition the purchase of one product on the

purchase of another. See i d . at 452.

b. Plaintiffs' Proposed Proof of Conditioning

- 37 - Plaintiffs, relying on Boaosian, seek to prove conditioning

on a class-wide basis by showing that the practical economic

effect of their relationship with SNE was that dealers' access to

discretionary vehicles was conditioned on their purchase of

accessories on non-discretionary vehicles. Plaintiffs intend to

prove this practical economic effect in two ways.

First, plaintiffs intend to offer the expert testimony of

Michael J. Wagner, who will show through regression analysis that

dealers purchased accessories at a loss. See Expert Report of

Michael J. Wagner, submitted with Pis.' Motion. Plaintiffs

contend, based on the assumption that dealers act in their

economic self-interest, that this testimony supports an inference

that the purchase of discretionary vehicles was conditioned on

the purchase of these accessories. T r . at 50-51; see Ungar, 531

F.2d at 1225 (finding that while proof that large numbers of

buyers purchased a financially burdensome product does not by

itself establish conditioning, such proof might be relevant under

other circumstances).

Second, plaintiffs also intend to offer the testimony of

former SNE employees, including Don Smith. T r . at 24-26. Smith

is apparently prepared to testify: (1) that SNE took adverse

- 38 - actions against Subaru of Wakefield for failing to purchase

accessories; and (2) that SNE had a policy of aggressively

marketing certain accessories to dealers. See Smith Dep. at 56-

GO, 91-96.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that the testimony of Wagner and

Smith, even when taken together, may not be sufficient to

demonstrate conditioning on a class-wide basis. See Boaosian,

561 F.2d at 451; Ungar, 531 F.2d at 1225; Auto Ventures, Inc. v.

Moran, Case No. 92-436-CIV-Kehoe, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7037, *10

(S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 1997) (finding no support for the proposition

that former employee testimony suffices to establish conditioning

on a class-wide basis); see also Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Avis

Rental Car Corp., 735 F.2d 636, 638 (1st Cir. 1984) (per curiam)

(noting that proof that a high percentage of purchasers actually

bought the tied product "would be insufficient, standing alone,

to demonstrate" conditioning (citing Ungar, 531 F.2d at 1213,

1225 n.14)). Therefore, plaintiffs may decide to "present

additional individual evidence by individual dealers" in an

attempt to satisfy their burden of proof. Pis.' Reply, at 11;

see T r . at 2 9.

Plaintiffs contend that this individual dealer testimony,

- 39 - when coupled with the other class-wide circumstantial evidence

discussed above, proves conditioning and satisfies the

requirements of Rule 23. See T r . at 29; c f . Martino, 81 F.R.D.

at 88-89 (finding that the cumulative effect of former employee

testimony and documentary evidence "induces us to hold that proof

of coercion can be presumed to be classwide.").

c. The Proposed Defense

In response, defendants will offer the testimony of SNE

employees and current and/or former dealers to show that dealers

purchased accessories for individual reasons having nothing to do

with coercion. See Lustbader Aff. 11-14; Shea Aff. 55 8-11,

19-20; see also Defs.' Surreply, at 5n.3 (disputing the

credibility and sufficiency of Smith's testimony). Defendants

will also contest the methodology and conclusions of Wagner,

through both cross-examination and their own expert testimony.

See, e.g.. Report of Jeffrey S. Gray, submitted with Defs.'

Obj ection.

Defendants argue that, because the class will offer the

testimony of individual dealers, the trial will become a series

of mini-trials concerning the purchases of those individual

dealers. Accordingly, common issues will not predominate over

- 40 - individual issues and class certification is not appropriate

under Rule 23 (b) (3) . See, e.g., Waldo v. North American Van

Lines, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 807, 814 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Chase Parkway

Garage, Inc., 94 F.R.D. at 332; Rental Car of New Hampshire,

Inc., 496 F. Supp. at 378; Schuler, 74 F.R.D. at 87.

d. Analysis

Where a class seeks to prove conditioning solely through the

testimony of individual purchasers, individual questions of

"coercion"6 predominate and class certification ordinarily is not

6 When the facts of a case dictate that a class can not offer common proof of conditioning, each individual class member must offer "some proof that [he] did not accept the tied product voluntarily, but was forced to take it." See Antitrust Law Developments, supra, at 188. Courts often refer to this as a need to prove conditioning via a showing of "coercion." Se e , e.g., Petrolera Caribe, Inc., 735 F.2d at 638 ("As there is no express contractual tie, [the plaintiff] must prove ''coercion.'" (citation omitted)); see also Areeda 'It 1752e, at 283-86 (discussion coercion); Antitrust Law Developments, supra, at 188- 89 (same); William C. Holmes, Antitrust Law Handbook 432-33 (1999 ed.) ("Common paraphrasings of the [conditioning] requirement are that "coercion" or "forcing" must be proven."). To prove "coercion," an individual buyer must show that he did not want to purchase the tying product but he did so only because the seller conditioned his purchase of the tied product, through, for example, threats, pressure or intimidation, on his purchase of the tying product. See Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 451. Thus, unlike common proofs of conditioning, which focus on the seller, this inquiry focuses on: (1) the buyer's state of mind as to the desirability of both the tied and tying product; and (2) her interactions with the seller.

- 41 - appropriate. See generally 4 Newberq § 18.30, at 18-108 n.165

(collecting cases). In this case, however, plaintiffs may offer

individualized proof of coercion to buttress their class-wide

proof of conditioning. C f . Martino, 81 F.R.D. at 88-89 (holding

that the cumulative effect of documentary and testimonial

evidence established class-wide proof of conditioning). After

reviewing the relevant case law and the record in this case, I

conclude that plaintiffs' unannounced tying claim satisfies the

requirements of Rule 23 (b) (3) .

First, although plaintiffs wisely reserved the option of

offering individual dealer testimony as circumstantial evidence

of conditioning, the expert testimony of Wagner and the testimony

of former SNE employees may prove to be sufficient evidence that

the practical economic effect of the contractual relationship

between SNE and its dealers was to condition the purchase of

desirable, non-discretionary vehicles on their purchase of

accessories on discretionary vehicles. C f . Tic-X-Press, Inc.,

Courts are reluctant to certify a class where conditioning must be established by individualized instances of coercion because individual questions as to a buyer's state of mind and the nature of her interactions with the seller tend to predominate over issues common to the class. See, e.g.. Ungar, 531 F.2d at 1226; Chase Parkway Garage, Inc., 94 F.R.D. at 332.

- 42 - 815 F.2d at 1418; Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 452; Martino, 81 F.R.D.

at 88-89. Although defendants take issue with Wagner's

methodology, assumptions, and preliminary findings, the need to

make a class certification decision "[a]s soon as practicable

after the commencement of an action," Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 3 ( c ) (1),

necessarily implies that, in some cases, the parties' offers of

proof will not be fully developed at the time of the

certification decision. C f . Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 298. If, at a

later date, it becomes obvious that plaintiffs will be required

to offer individual dealer testimony, I may reassess whether such

testimony alters my conclusion as to the predominance requirement

of Rule 23( b ) (3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) (stating that a

class certification order "may be altered or amended before the

decision on the merits").

Second, because plaintiffs intend to offer dealer testimony,

if at all, as a supplement to other circumstantial evidence, they

need not offer the testimony of every single member of the class.

They may choose to group dealers with similar experiences and

offer only a few representative dealers as witnesses. Under such

circumstances, I cannot say that individual questions would

- 43 - necessarily predominate over questions common to the class.7

Ultimately, it is difficult to say definitively whether

common questions will predominate with regard to plaintiffs'

unannounced tying claim. But see Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 298

(stating that, as a general matter, when a court finds that an

issue which requires individualized factfinding is unlikely to

survive summary judgment, the court should conclude that the

issue does not undermine the predominance of common issues). I

note, however, that "because of the important role that class

actions play in the private enforcement of the antitrust

statutes, courts resolve doubts about whether a class should be

created in favor of certification." Lease Oil Antitrust Litig.,

186 F.R.D. 403, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (collecting cases); see

Industrial Diamonds Antitrust Litig., 167 F.R.D. 374, 378

(S.D.N.Y. 1996).

7 In Boaosian, the court stated that "if class certification is granted, plaintiffs will be precluded from introducing evidence of threats of termination to prove the existence of a tie-in." 561 F.2d at 452-53 n.12. Accordingly, defendants argue that I should bar plaintiffs from introducing any individual testimony in support of their unannounced tying claim. Because I find, however, that it is conceivable that individual dealer testimony could be offered in this case without upsetting the predominance of common issues, I reject defendants' argument.

- 44 - After careful analysis of the parties' arguments, and given

the factors discussed above, I find that the plaintiffs'

unannounced tying claim satisfies the requirements of Rule

2 3 (b)(3). Accordingly, I grant plaintiffs' motion for class

certification with regard to this claim.

3. The ADDCA Claims _

Plaintiffs allege that the same course of conduct which

comprises their tying claims also gives rise to claims under the

Automobile Dealer Day in Court Act ("ADDCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1221 et

seq. In order to prevail on their ADDCA claims, plaintiffs must

show that: (1) they are automobile dealers; (2) defendants are

automobile manufacturers engaged in commerce; (3) they and

defendants have a manufacturer-dealer relationship embodied in a

written franchise agreement; and (4) they were wrongfully injured

by defendants' actual or threatened coercion or intimidation.

See Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78,

93 (3d Cir. 2000); General CMC. Inc. v. Volvo White Truck Corp.,

918 F.2d 306, 308 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing coercion and

quoting H.D. Corp. of Puerto Rico v. Ford Motor Co., 791 F.2d

987, 990 (1st Cir. 1986)); Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v. Am.

Motors Sales Corp., 780 F.2d 1049, 1056 (1st Cir. 1985)

- 45 - (discussing coercion).

The parties do not dispute, and I agree, that the first

three elements of plaintiffs' ADDCA claims are readily amenable

to common proof. As was the case with the tying claims, the

parties disagree as to whether plaintiffs can offer common proof

of coercion.

Courts characterize the ADDCA as a "supplement to the

national antitrust laws" that was intended to "counter-balance

the economic leverage" that vehicle manufacturers have over

dealers. Northview Motors, Inc., 227 F.3d at 92-93.

Accordingly, courts often rely on antitrust jurisprudence when

interpreting the coercion element of an ADDCA claim. Se e , e.g.,

Lockwood Motors, Inc., 162 F.R.D. at 581 n.ll. Thus, as is the

case with tying claims: (1) where plaintiffs can offer common

proof of coercion, the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b) (3)

is satisfied; and (2) where plaintiffs must offer individualized

evidence of coercion, the predominance requirement is not

satisfied. See i d . at 580-81; Larry James Oldsmobile-Pontiac-GMC

Truck Co., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 164 F.R.D. 428, 439

(N.D. M i s s . 1996) .

Since the legal question of coercion under the ADDCA is

-4 6 - substantially similar to the question of conditioning discussed

above with respect to plaintiffs' tying claims, plaintiffs will

offer the same proof with regard to both their ADDCA and tying

claims. Accordingly, since I have already concluded that

plaintiffs tying claims satisfy the requirements of Rule

2 3 (b)(3), I conclude that plaintiffs' ADDCA claims satisfy the

requirements of Rule 23(b) (3) as well.

4. The RICO Claims

In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that

SNE, Boch, and Appelbe engaged in a pattern of racketeering in

violation of the civil RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). See

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)

(identifying the elements of a § 1962(c) claim). To be liable

under § 1962(c), a person must: (1) "conduct or participate . . .

in the conduct" of (2) an "enterprise" (3) through a "pattern"

(4) of "racketeering activity."8 I d .; Bessette v. AVCO Financial

8 In a prior Memorandum and Order, I concluded that, based on the allegations contained in plaintiffs' initial complaint, "neither the New England Subaru Dealer Network nor Subaru of America can satisfy the enterprise element of the dealers' § 1962(c) claims against SNE." George Lussier Enters., Inc., 2000 WL 1466132, *5. Accordingly, I granted SNE's motion to dismiss Count I of plaintiffs' initial complaint. I d . At this time, however, defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of this

- 47 - Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d 439, 448 (1st Cir. 2000), cert, denied,

121 S.Ct. 2016 (2001). Defendants contend that the "racketeering

activity" alleged by plaintiffs, namely, the predicate acts of

extortion and mail and wire fraud, are not amenable to common

proof, thereby defeating any showing of predominance under Rule

23(b)(3). See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (listing predicate acts which

constitute racketeering activity). I analyze each claim in turn,

a. Extortion

Plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in a pattern of

extortion, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951.

Cplt. 5 67. Specifically, they claim that SNE had a firm policy

of forcing all dealers to purchase accessories, by threatening

them with a number of forms of retaliation, including: (1)

reduced allocations of discretionary vehicles; (2) the imposition

of unreasonable performance standards, which, if not met, would

result in the termination of a dealers' Subaru franchise; and (3)

establishing unreasonable warranty repair requirements and

withholding payment to dealers who do not comply with those

requirements. Id. M 68-102.

aspect of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177.

- 48 - In support of this claim, plaintiffs will offer much of the

same class-wide proof as discussed above with regard to their

tying claims, including: (1) internal SNE documents which

allegedly describe a plan to extort dealers into purchasing

unwanted accessories; and (2) the testimony of former SNE

employees as to SNE's alleged class-wide policy of extortion.

Since plaintiffs will offer class-wide proof in support of

questions common to the class, I conclude that this claim

satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 (b) (3) .

b. Mail and Wire Fraud

Plaintiffs also allege that defendants engaged in a pattern

of mail and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and

1343. Cplt. 103-124. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that

defendants sent dealers the following documents: dealer

agreements; agreement renewals; and memoranda and letters

explaining SNE's policies, including its vehicle allocation

policies. Id. These documents were sent, in substantially

identical form, to all dealers, with the exception of two alleged

misrepresentations which were only made to two dealers. See

Cplt. 55 113, 120 (alleging specific misrepresentations made to

two individual dealers).

- 49 - Plaintiffs contend that these documents contained

misrepresentations about SNE's policies. For example, plaintiffs

allege that SNE misrepresented the way it allocates vehicles to

dealers and how and when it accessorizes vehicles. See George

Lussier Enters., Inc., 2000 WL 1466132, *7-8 (discussing earlier

claims against Boch).

To prove that defendants violated the mail or wire fraud

statutes, plaintiffs must show that: (1) defendants knowingly and

willingly participated in a scheme or artifice to defraud the

plaintiffs out of money, property, or the right to receive honest

services; and (2) the mails or interstate wire communications

were used in furtherance of the scheme. See United States v.

Ruiz, 105 F.3d 1492, 1501 (1st Cir. 1997) (mail fraud); United

States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1073 (1st Cir. 1997) (wire

fraud); see also United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 586 n.ll

(1st Cir. 1996) (noting the similarity of language in these

statutes).

Courts disagree as to whether a plaintiff bringing a civil

RICO claim predicated on mail or wire fraud must also prove

- 50 - detrimental reliance as an element of her claim.9 See Sebaqo,

Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 70, 81-85 (D. Mass.

1998) (addressing the split of authority and adopting the

minority position that detrimental reliance need not be proved).

I need not take a position on this issue, however, because

plaintiffs allege that they did, in fact, detrimentally rely on

at least some of the alleged misrepresentations made by S N E . See

Cplt. 5 106 ("Each plaintiff relied on these representations [in

the Dealer Agreements] in entering into its respective Dealer

Agreement and in becoming a Subaru dealer, all to their

detriment."). Thus, the relevant question before me is whether

plaintiffs' need to prove reliance means that individual

questions of reliance will predominate over issues common to the

class.

The overwhelming majority of plaintiffs' allegations focus

9 This disagreement is significant in the class certification context because, in many cases, proof of reliance will require a searching, individualized inquiry that defeats a finding of predominance. See, e.g., Rothwell, 191 F.R.D. at 31 (agreeing with "the majority view that certification generally is inappropriate where individual reliance is an issue" and finding that the predominance requirement was not satisfied). Issues of reliance can be especially troublesome where the plaintiffs base their claims "on oral misrepresentations, which, by their nature, tend to be particularized." I d . at 30 (citations omitted).

- 51 - on documents sent by defendants to all dealers concerning company

policies applicable to all dealers. In essence, plaintiffs

allege "that defendants engaged in a common course of

misrepresentations designed to affect all plaintiffs in a like

fashion." Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Phillip

Morris Inc., 182 F.R.D. 523, 540 (N.D. Ohio 1998). Therefore,

plaintiffs' claims focus on defendants' class-wide conduct, not

on defendants' individual interactions with dealers. See i d . at

541 .

Thus, plaintiffs' claims are readily distinguishable from

those cases where individual issues of reliance were found to

predominate over issues common to the class because the

plaintiffs alleged that they relied on unique, oral

misrepresentations made in the context of individual

transactions. C f ., e.g., Rothwell, 191 F.R.D. at 27-28, 30-32

(finding, in a consumer class action against an insurance

company, that individual issues of reliance predominated because

the court's inquiry would focus on differing oral representations

made between agents and prospective policy holders). Unlike

those cases, plaintiffs' claims focus on objective, documentary

evidence common to the class. See Walco Inv., Inc. v. Thenen,

- 52 - 168 F.R.D. 315, 335 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (finding predominance in

civil RICO claim predicated on wire fraud where claims focused on

a "common scheme" of "substantially identical" documents); Iron

Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund, 182 F.R.D. at 540 (finding

predominance in civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud where

defendants engaged in a common course of misrepresentations).

Some members of the class will need to testify, on behalf of

the class, that they detrimentally relied on the defendants'

alleged misrepresentations. See Iron Workers Local Union No. 17

Ins. Fund, 182 F.R.D. at 537. The difficulty in proving

reliance, however, will vary from allegation to allegation. For

example, one could readily infer that dealers, when entering into

or renewing their dealer agreements, relied on SNE's assurances

that it would allocate vehicles fairly. See Singer v. AT&T

Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 691 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (finding that a

"uniform written price representation . . . provide[d] a

sufficient basis upon which reliance may be presumed" in a RICO

class action based on mail and wire fraud); Smith v. MCI

Telecomm. Corp., 124 F.R.D. 665, 679 (D. Kan. 1989) (finding

that, where class members must have relied on written

representations made to them in commissions plans that they

- 53 - signed upon initiating or continuing their employment with the

defendant, that reliance was an "objective inquiry common to the

entire proposed class") .

Given the substantially identical nature of the written

misrepresentations allegedly made by defendants, I conclude that

the issue of detrimental reliance is common to the class and

susceptible to common proof. See Iron Workers Local Union No. 17

Ins. Fund, 182 F.R.D. at 537; Walco In v ., Inc., 168 F.R.D. at

335; Singer, 185 F.R.D. at 691; Smith, 124 F.R.D. at 679.

Accordingly, I grant plaintiffs' motion to certify these claims.

5. The State Dealer Act Claims

comprises their tying claims also violates the automobile dealer

protection statutes of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New

Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont because the dealers were

coerced into purchasing unwanted accessories. Cplt. 185-195.

Although the wording of these statutes differs, they all

generally prohibit a vehicle manufacturer or distributor from

requiring a dealer to purchase unwanted accessories or vehicles.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-133bb(2); Mass. Gen. L. Ch.93B §

4(2) (a); 10 Me. Rev. Stat. § 1174 (2) (A); N.H. Rev. Stat. 357-C:3,

- 54 - II(a); R .I . Gen. Laws § 31-5.1-4(b)(1); 9V.S.A. § 4096(1).

Therefore, plaintiffs will offer the same evidence in support of

these claims that they will offer in support of their tying

claims.

While I recognize that there may be different affirmative

defenses or procedural requirements, such as exhaustion of

administrative remedies, relevant to claims under each state

statute, there is no "per se rule that treats the presence of

such issues as an automatic disqualifier. In other words, the

mere fact that such concerns may arise and may affect different

class members differently does not compel a finding that

individual issues predominate over common ones." Mowbray, 208

F.3d at 296 (rejecting the argument that the need for

individualized statute-of-limitations determinations among class

members automatically defeats a motion for class certification);

see 1 Newberq § 4.26, at 4-105-06 (stating that challenges to

predominance based on "the presence of affirmative defenses

against various class members . . . will not usually bar a

finding of predominance of common issues"). If any such unique

defenses apply to members of the class, they may be asserted at

the damages stage of this proceeding. See 1 Newberq § 4.26, at

- 55 - 4-104-05 (observing that issues that "go to the right of a class

member to recover, in contrast to underlying common issues of the

defendant's liability" generally do not bar a finding of

predominance).

Since plaintiffs will offer the same proof in support of

their state dealer protection act claims as they will in support

of their tying claims discussed above, I find that common issues

predominate with regard to these claims. Therefore, I grant

plaintiffs' motion for class certification of these claims.

6. The Breach of Contract Claims

Plaintiffs allege that SNE, by engaging in option packing,

breached its contractual obligations to dealers to: (1) perform

its contractual duties in a lawful and ethical manner; and (2)

allocate vehicles to dealers using appropriate factors. Cplt.

196-200. These obligations are contained in materially uniform

dealer agreements entered into between SNE and each of its

dealers. See SNE Dealership Agreement and Standard Provisions,

Ex. F to Defs.' Surreply.

The issue of whether SNE's conduct towards dealers

constituted a breach of those agreements presents questions of

law and fact common to the class. See Collins, 168 F.R.D. at

- 56 - 676. Since plaintiffs will offer common proof, i.e., the same

proof that they will offer in support of their tying claims, in

support of their breach of contract claims, I find that common

issues predominate with regard to these claims. See i d . at 67 6

(certifying breach of contract claims despite lack of identical

language in franchise agreements). Therefore, I grant

plaintiffs' motion for class certification of these claims.

D. Damages

Although issues common to the class predominate over

individual issues on the question of liability, the amount of

damages suffered by individual dealers presents individual

questions of fact. See generally 1 Newberq § 4.26. The damages

suffered by an individual dealer will depend upon, among other

factors: (1) the length of the dealer's relationship with SNE;

and (2) the number and cost of unwanted accessories purchased by

the dealer. In addition, the presence of individualized defenses

may negate the availability of an award of damages to some class

members on some claims.

While the presence of individualized issues of damages does

not necessarily defeat a motion for class certification, I

conclude that in this case the issues of liability and damages

- 57 - should be bifurcated. See 1 Newberq § 4.26, at 4-90-96.

Accordingly, I certify the plaintiffs' proposed class as to

issues of liability only. If defendants are found liable, claims

for damages may be resolved through individual trials or in

groups as subclasses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4); Manual for

Complex Litigation (Third) § 30.15 (1995) .

IV. CONCLUSION

After reviewing plaintiffs' claims, their proposed means of

proof, and the proposed defenses to these claims, I find that the

liability aspect of plaintiffs' claims satisfies the requirements

of Rule 23( b ) (3). Accordingly, I grant plaintiffs' motion for

certification of the following class for purposes of determining

defendants' liability: "those entities or individuals who own or

owned a New England Subaru dealership between January 1, 1995 and

the present." I deny plaintiffs' additional request that I also

certify the class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 3 ( b ) (2).

Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, (Doc. No. 168), is

therefore granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs shall

provide notice to all potential class members in a manner

consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) .

- 58 - By agreeing to certify a class, I do not take a view as to

the merits of defendants' anticipated motions for summary

judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge

August 3, 2001

cc: Richard McNamara, Esq. Michael Harvell, Esq. Howard Cooper, Esq. William Kershaw, Esq. Steven W. Kasten, Esq.

- 59 -