United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 24-1656
LINDA CRAWFORD,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SALVE REGINA UNIVERSITY; SALVE REGINA UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES, through its President, Dr. Kellie J. Armstrong; JAMES G. MITCHELL, Chair, SRU Department of Modern Languages and President, Salve Regina AAUP CCHP; ESTHER ALARCON-ARANA, Faculty, SRU Department of Modern Languages; EMILY COLBERT-CAIRNS, Faculty, SRU Department of Modern Languages,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary S. McElroy, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Gelpí and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Stephen T. Fanning for appellant. Joseph D. Whelan, with whom Sara A. Rapport, and Whelan Corrente & Flanders LLP, were on brief for appellees.
June 11, 2026 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Dr. Linda Crawford was a tenured
professor at Salve Regina University (the "University") who was
fired in 2022. She brought this action against the University and
its Board of Trustees, alleging that her firing was motivated by
unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal
and state law. She also brought related state tort and contract
claims against them and some of her former colleagues. The
district court dismissed Crawford's discrimination claims for
failure to state a claim and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state tort and contract claims. We now
affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual Background1
Crawford was a tenured Spanish professor in the
University's Modern Languages Department from 2004 until her
termination in 2022. In the years preceding her termination, she
"maintained a positive record of employment," with her evaluations
showing "no negative trends in her performance or deviations
[from] . . . her teaching responsibilities."
1 "We draw the facts from the plaintiff['s] complaint" and from "documents attached to or fairly incorporated into the complaint." Better Way Ford, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.4th 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
- 2 - The events relevant to this appeal begin on November 15,
2021. On that day, Crawford taught a class on Spanish American
Culture and Civilization focused on Gender and Sexuality in Latin
America. In preparation for the class, Crawford had assigned a
reading that contained the word "trans[vestites],"2 and, in class,
led a brief discussion on LGBTQ+ rights in Latin American
countries, noting "that these rights have not evolved to the level
such rights have evolved [to] in the United States." During class,
a student identified as "Student D" became upset. He objected to
the terminology used in the assigned reading and "had an outburst
in class."
Afterward, some of the students who were upset met with
Modern Languages Department Chair James G. Mitchell ("Mitchell")
to discuss the incident. During the meeting, Mitchell "encouraged
and/or directed the students to submit written statements to the
[U]niversity criticizing" Crawford. Crawford alleges that
Mitchell coordinated these student complaints "to retaliate
2In paragraph 27 of the complaint, Crawford alleges that the assigned reading used the word "transgender," and that Student D objected to the term "transgender." This appears to be a typographical error because earlier in the complaint she alleges that the reading to which the students objected used the word "transvestites." Moreover, in the letter that Student D wrote about Crawford, he described himself as a "transgender gay man." The district court also thought this was a typographical error. Crawford v. Salve Regina Univ., No. 1:23-CV-00380, 2024 WL 3046404, at *2 n.1 (D.R.I. June 18, 2024).
- 3 - against" her based on prior disagreements and a prior grievance
against him. And she alleges that this was not an isolated event.
At the start of the semester, Mitchell and the University Provost
had instructed undergraduate students to "keep a running list of
criticisms" about her.
Several students followed Mitchell's suggestion and
submitted written complaints to the University. Student D wrote
a lengthy letter to the Provost explaining his view that the
reading using the word "transvestite" was "inappropriate."
Student D wrote that he had told Crawford "he was a 'transgender
gay man,'" and that because she "is a white straight cis3 woman,"
she cannot tell him what he finds offensive. Student D then asked
the Provost to "take action" against Crawford, whom he described
as "ignorant." Another student, Student C, wrote that he was
"directed by an advisor," who Crawford identifies as Mitchell, to
email the Provost about "derogatory language regarding transgender
people in [Crawford's] class." Student C reported that he found
the language at issue to be "triggering" and opined that the
classroom should be a "warm and safe space."
3 "Cis" is short for "cisgender," which is an adjective describing a person whose gender identity corresponds with the sex registered for them at birth.
- 4 - Crawford cites the similar "tone and content" of the
student complaints as "indicating that they were the product of a
deliberately coordinated effort . . . to unfairly undermine
[Crawford's] reputation and denigrate her performance." She also
characterizes "certain students" as taking "the position that
[she] had no right to teach about certain cultural norms in Latin
America because she was [a] 'cis white woman.'"
After receiving these complaints, the University held a
group Zoom meeting for students to share what had occurred in
Crawford's classes that semester. Some students described
Crawford as using "offensive language and hateful rhetoric"
towards the LGBTQ+ community and people of color. The University
did not inform Crawford of the meeting or permit her to
participate. It also never properly investigated or verified any
of the allegations.
On November 22, 2021, the University's Title IX
Coordinator emailed Crawford a "Notice of Interim Action."
According to the Notice, students alleged that Crawford had made
derogatory comments toward "a population based on that
population['s] . . . gender identity or expression" and expressed
that they did "not feel safe around" Crawford. The Notice
restricted some of her duties but stated that it should not be
construed to indicate that the University had taken any
- 5 - disciplinary action against her. Crawford does not recall
receiving the Notice but suggests it is evidence that the
University completed its investigation in "less than a week"
without giving her an opportunity to respond.
On January 3, 2022, six weeks later, the University
informed Crawford that her employment was terminated "for cause."
The University cited "continued misconduct," "failure to
communicate," and "failure to comply with the requirements of a
faculty member in accordance with the Faculty Manual." Per
Crawford, the University President described the November 15, 2021
class as the "catalyst" for the termination, but went on to
"falsely assert that the past seven years of [her] employment ha[d]
been 'fraught' with misconduct in the classroom and unacceptable
teaching practices . . . ."
Next, Crawford appealed her termination to the Faculty
Hearing Board ("Faculty Board"), which ultimately upheld the
decision. Crawford maintains that the appeals proceeding was
prejudiced and driven by an intent to destroy her career because
certain individuals disliked her teaching methods or believed she
had no right to teach certain topics. Crawford describes the
proceedings as an "ex post facto effort to lend an air of
legitimacy to an unsupportable discharge decision." To support
that contention, she points to several procedural irregularities.
- 6 - First, the University did not follow the American Association of
University Professors' recommended institutional protocols and
regulations pertaining to involuntary terminations of faculty
appointments. Second, before the Faculty Board heard her appeal,
her email account was deactivated, and she could not access
messages to prepare for the hearing. Third, she was not allowed
to have an advisor or legal counsel speak on her behalf. And,
lastly, unsworn and "unreliable" testimony from faculty and
students was collected haphazardly, without gathering the views of
all members of the community.
In addition to these alleged procedural defects,
Crawford alleges that some of her colleagues in the Modern
Languages Department submitted false and defamatory statements.
Esther Alarcon-Arana wrote that Crawford made transphobic,
homophobic, antisemitic, and xenophobic comments; that Crawford's
focus was to undermine the Modern Languages Department; that she
bad-mouthed male colleagues; and that students "refused to be in
[Crawford's] class." And Emily Colbert-Cairns wrote that Crawford
"s[o]wed acrimony" among students, faculty, and staff, and that
she made antisemitic remarks.4
4 Crawford objects to her colleagues' statements because they "created the impression that she is an adherent of hate and intolerance," which contravenes her Christian values and beliefs.
- 7 - The Faculty Board's decision was 3-2. The majority
opinion first addressed the procedural issues with the
investigation, and it acknowledged that some evidence was
"collected prejudicially" -- some of the collected information was
biased and "was not solicited in an independent way but more
haphazardly and unchecked." But the majority opinion attributed
the procedural issues to "ill-conceived dismissal procedure[s]
that [were] greatly out of date" -- not a complete function of
prejudice against Crawford.
On the merits of the termination, the majority concluded
that Crawford "regularly and routinely use[d] derogatory language
that minimize[d] others and promote[d] hurtful stereotypes."
Although it recognized that her in-class lessons were crafted to
explore the nature of stereotypes and foster educational dialogue,
it determined that Crawford lacked "the training to teach these
controversial topics in a way that le[d] to transformative
interactions with students." The majority thus believed that the
issues were "not taught in a culturally responsive manner."
Next, the Faculty Board wrote that "Crawford show[ed]
regular patterns of abandonment in her teaching or interaction
with students." There were longstanding concerns about Crawford's
lack of responsiveness to students, colleagues, and
administrators. The Faculty Board was also troubled by Crawford's
- 8 - participation-based grading practices, noting student complaints
over the years about her methods and lack of transparency had gone
unaddressed. And it expressed concern about her classroom
practices, including Crawford's use of class time to discuss her
personal life without an apparent pedagogical reason.
The minority opinion disagreed with Crawford's
termination. It acknowledged that Crawford "had a pattern of
relationship problems over the years with every level of the
[U]niversity -- with some students, the majority of her faculty
colleagues in the Modern Languages [D]epartment, and the entirety
of the present undergraduate academic affairs administration."
But it opined that firing her was not the "proper way to solve the
problem" and that the process had been unfair and unreasonable.
The minority opinion went on to explain that evidence
was collected from a biased sample of students and
colleagues; student feedback and other objective performance
measures were cherrypicked to support dismissal; the November 15,
2021 class discussion incident was unfairly "characterized as a
one-way, unilateral failure on the part of the professor, with no
critical exploration of student reactions to" the controversial
reading; and the University did not substantively respond to
Crawford's presented evidence, which "undercut[] the legitimacy of
[its] charges." The minority characterized the administration's
- 9 - approach to the termination process as: "We need to dismiss
Dr. Crawford; these are the categories available to us to do so;
let us try to wedge Dr. Crawford's problems into these categories
as best we can." But in the minority's view, none of the evidence
proffered by the University supported the criteria it cited as
cause for removal. Lastly, the minority flagged the "sad irony"
that one of Crawford's colleagues in the Modern Languages
Department "could have justifiably been 'fired for cause' on
grounds that were publicly known (newspaper stories and police
reports)" but received mercy. In the minority's view, Crawford
was someone with "less 'cause'" who "d[id] not even receive
justice."
Crawford appealed the Faculty Board's decision to the
University's Board of Trustees, which affirmed the termination
unanimously. The University "replaced [Crawford] with respect to
at least part of her teaching schedule with a male significantly
younger than [her] who is believed to be the husband of Defendant
Alarcon-Arana."
To support an age discrimination claim, Crawford also
asserts that unidentified individuals referred to her "as 'old
school'" because she requested that students use her title and not
her first name; that a student requested a different advisor with
"fresh ideas and perspectives"; that she was "criticized" "for not
- 10 - using gender neutral endings in Spanish and told this was because
she was 'older'"; and that the University did not provide office
assignments by seniority, instead providing favorable spaces to
younger/junior faculty members.
B. Procedural Background
On June 7, 2023, Crawford filed a verified complaint5 in
Rhode Island Superior Court against the University, the Board of
Trustees, and her former colleagues (Mitchell, Alarcon-Arana, and
Colbert-Cairns). She alleged breach of contract, various torts
(defamation, tortious interference with a contractual
relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional distress),
and violations of federal and state anti-discrimination law
related to her termination.6 The University removed her case to
the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.
Then, it moved to dismiss the entirety of the complaint for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).
5A verified complaint is one where the plaintiff swears to the factual allegations contained therein. 6Crawford asserted anti-discrimination claims under five statutes: the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act ("RICRA"), R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 et seq.; the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act ("FEPA"), R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"), 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
- 11 - The district court granted the University's motion to
dismiss as to Crawford's federal and state anti-discrimination
claims. It reasoned that she failed to allege any nexus between
her protected categories and the University's decision to
terminate her employment. Then, it declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Crawford's remaining state-law
claims and remanded those claims to Rhode Island Superior Court.
Crawford timely appealed the dismissal.
II. Discussion
"We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo."
Better Way Ford, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.4th 67, 77 (1st Cir.
2025) (citation modified). In doing so, we accept as true all
well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. We need not, however,
credit conclusory allegations. Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only
plead facts that make the claim plausible. See Carrero-Ojeda v.
Autoridad De Energía Eléctrica, 755 F.3d 711, 717-18 (1st Cir.
2014); Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st
Cir. 2013). Although plausibility is necessary, see Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), "there is no requirement to plead
a complete prima facie case of liability," DeAngelis v. Hasbro,
Inc., 165 F.4th 646, 652-53 (1st Cir. 2026); see also
- 12 - Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 54 ("It is not necessary to plead
facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case at the pleading
stage."); Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina, 747 F.3d
15, 24 (1st Cir. 2014) ("We have explicitly held that plaintiffs
need not plead facts in the complaint that establish a prima facie
case under Title VII . . . .").
That said, "the elements of a prima facie case may be
used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim."
Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 54; see also, e.g., Carrero-Ojeda,
755 F.3d at 718. Thus, we consider whether the complaint sets
forth sufficient allegations to make out plausible claims of
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims
and use the elements of a prima facie case for each claim only as
is useful in making that determination. See DeAngelis, 165 F.4th
at 653; see also Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 54 (noting that the
elements of a prima facie case of liability remain relevant to the
plausibility assessment because they form "part of the background
against which [the] plausibility determination should be made").
The most important of these considerations is whether Crawford has
alleged facts that make it plausible that there is a causal
connection between Crawford's alleged protected class and the
alleged adverse action.
- 13 - With that framework in mind, we address Crawford's
several arguments on appeal. First, she raises a threshold
procedural challenge: that the district court improperly relied on
documents outside the complaint and thereby converted the motion
to dismiss into one for summary judgment without proper notice.
On the merits, she renews her contentions that she sufficiently
pleaded that she was discriminated against and unlawfully
terminated based on protected characteristics; subjected to a
hostile work environment on the basis of those characteristics;
and terminated in retaliation for protected conduct. We address
each argument seriatim.
A. Extraneous Documents
As an initial matter, Crawford argues that the district
court improperly relied on documents extraneous to the complaint
in dismissing her case. Specifically, she challenges the district
court's reliance on the University's Faculty Manual and the Faculty
Board's majority and minority opinions.
Generally, when a "district court considers 'matters
outside the pleadings' on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
'the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56.'" Irizarry Sierra v. Bisignano, 158 F.4th 43, 49 (1st Cir.
2025) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). But "there is a narrow
exception for documents -- the authenticity of which is not
- 14 - challenged -- that are central to the plaintiff's claim or
sufficiently referred to in the complaint . . . ." Carrero-Ojeda,
755 F.3d at 717 (citing Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001)). If a document falls
under this exception, it merges into the pleadings, and a district
court may properly consider it without converting a motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Irizarry Sierra, 158
F.4th at 49. Otherwise, plaintiffs could frustrate "the district
court's inquiry into the feasibility of a complaint" by omitting
critical documents from it. Id.
This exception applies here. Crawford does not dispute
the authenticity of the University's Faculty Manual or the Faculty
Board's majority and minority opinions; and indeed, she conceded
that they are "arguably incorporated in the [c]omplaint." The
complaint repeatedly references or quotes these materials, and
they are central to her claims. The district court therefore
properly considered them without converting the motion to dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment. As do we.
B. Discrimination Claims
We proceed with Crawford's substantive claims. She
maintains that the University and Board of Trustees discriminated
against her based on her gender, race, sexual orientation, age,
- 15 - and religion in violation of RICRA, FEPA, Title VII, Title IX, and
the ADEA.7
To make the required showing, Crawford points to a mix
of student comments, alleged hostility from her Department Head,
and criticism of her and her teaching as suggestions of
discriminatory animus. The complaint, however, either fails to
attribute the alleged animus to the University's decisionmakers or
fails to provide any factual detail to support animus based on her
protected characteristics. Let us explain.
First, Crawford points to Student D's reference to her
as a "cis [w]hite woman" to suggest that "faculty and
students . . . harbored an animus towards her" based on her
gender, sexual orientation/identification, and race. But
Student D did not participate in the termination decision, so his
7Crawford's theory of causation mostly rests on conclusory assertions rather than well-pleaded factual allegations. For example, on religion and sexual orientation, Crawford's only factual allegations are that she is Christian and heterosexual. But she offers no facts connecting either trait to the University's decision to fire her. Conclusory assertions do not suffice absent supporting facts that plausibly connect her protected characteristics to the University's termination decision. See Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Dismissal . . . is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth 'factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.'" (citation omitted)). We thus further narrow our focus to the few well-pleaded facts and explain why they fail to state a claim.
- 16 - bias alone does not plausibly give rise to an inference of
discrimination by the entity that effected the challenged adverse
action -- the University.
The fact that Student D submitted his complaint to
University officials before Crawford was terminated does not
change that outcome because the complaint supplies no facts
suggesting that the decisionmakers referenced Student D's language
when deciding to fire her, endorsed his characterization of
Crawford, or acted for reasons tied to her protected traits. In
fact, the University supplied independent reasons to terminate
her. Crawford does allege those reasons were pretextual. (And
that the University engaged in multiple procedural irregularities
to mask its true motives.) We accept that factual allegation as
true at this stage. But that does not mean we must credit
Crawford's unreasonable inferences from it. See Butler v. Deutsche
Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 748 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2014) ("[Our]
deferential review . . . does not require that we accept the
complaint wholesale; 'bald assertions' and 'unsupportable
conclusions' are properly disregarded." (quoting Aulson v.
Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)). While the University's
stated reasons may or may not have been pretextual, none of
- 17 - Crawford's pleaded facts suggest that it was plausibly masking
discriminatory animus.8
Start with her claims about her Department Head,
Mitchell. Crawford maintains that he sought to retaliate against
her for "a protracted history of disagreements" and her prior
grievance against him. And that he "directed" students to submit
criticisms of her to the University (criticisms that ultimately
referenced some of Crawford's protected characteristics). But
Crawford provides no context about her disagreements with Mitchell
or her grievance's nature -- no facts from which we could assess
8 Crawford's complaint points to various procedural irregularities, and both the majority and minority opinions from the Faculty Board affirming the President's decision to dismiss Crawford admitted as much. But even the minority opinion, to which Crawford points in her complaint, does not include any indication that the procedural irregularities masked discriminatory motives. Instead, the minority opinion "acknowledge[d] that Dr. Crawford has had a pattern of relationship problems over the years with every level of the university -- with some students, the majority of her faculty colleagues in the Modern Languages department, and the entirety of the present undergraduate academic affairs administration," noting that the fact that "she finds herself in wide-ranging tension, even conflict, with various members of the Salve community, is not by itself an indication of fault on her part in every instance" but her continual presence "in the middle of such tensions, however, does pose a problem for the institution." Thus, while "procedural irregularities may be relevant in identifying . . . discrimination," they "are not inevitably a sign of [protected-class] bias" and may instead reflect ineptitude, inexperience, or non-discriminatory motives. Doe v. Stonehill Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th 302, 334 (1st Cir. 2022). Without facts linking those irregularities to discriminatory motive -- which is lacking in Crawford's complaint and brief to us -- the procedural issues do not support a plausible inference of discrimination.
- 18 - whether they bore any relationship to her protected
characteristics. Nor does she allege facts suggesting that
Mitchell encouraged students to submit criticisms that were animus
based, rather than to raise legitimate pedagogical concerns.9
Second, Crawford suggests that she was actually fired
because "certain individuals" disliked her teaching methods, or
perhaps more generally disliked her. But dislike of her teaching
methods of personality is not, without more, indicative of
discrimination. And because Crawford fails to identify who these
individuals are, the allegations remain untethered to the
decisionmakers who decided to terminate her employment.
Third, Crawford suggests that she was fired because
"students" and "certain individuals" objected to her teaching "at
all in certain subject areas" because she is a "cis white woman."
That theory does implicate her protected characteristics, but it
is not supported by any factual detail. The complaint does not
identify who made any such statements, what was said, when the
statements were made, or whether they were communicated to -- or
relied upon by -- any decisionmaker. As pleaded, this is a
9 Crawford also seems to point to the fact that Mitchell is male as suggesting gender discrimination. But the mere fact that a male decisionmaker terminated a female employee does not, standing alone, substantiate a claim of gender discrimination. Rivas Rosado v. Radio Shack, Inc., 312 F.3d 532, 534 (1st Cir. 2002).
- 19 - conclusory allegation that we need not credit at the motion to
dismiss stage. See Better Way Ford, LLC, 142 F.4th at 77.
Crawford next attempts to show animus through disparate
treatment, alleging that she was the "first and only tenured full
professor subject to termination proceedings." And that a male
administrator in the Modern Languages Department was
"allowed . . . to 'step down' from his position and
awarded . . . full tenure, two sabbaticals and several course
reductions" despite his involvement in a "concerning legal
matter." But she supplies no facts about the "concerning legal
matter," the nature or severity of the misconduct, or whether it
was comparable to the conduct attributed to Crawford. So we cannot
determine whether the proposed comparator closely resembles
Crawford in relevant respects such that we could infer gender-based
discrimination. See, e.g., Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626
F.3d 187, 190-91 (4th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal where "the
complaint fails to establish a plausible basis for believing [the
two comparator employees] were actually similarly situated [to the
plaintiff] or that race was the true basis for [the plaintiff's]
termination."). Juxtaposing her gender with the male
administrator's is not enough.
On age discrimination, Crawford alleges that she was
replaced with a "significantly younger" male for "part of her
- 20 - teaching schedule" and that the University assigned favorable
office spaces to younger faculty but offers no factual details
supporting these statements. Conclusory allegations need not be
credited. See Better Way Ford, LLC, 142 F.4th at 77. She further
alleges that she has been called "old school" for asking students
to use her title and not her first name and that a student requested
a different advisor with "fresh ideas and perspectives." But,
once more, these statements come from either students or
unidentified people, at unspecified points in time, and are not
alleged to have been made by -- or in the presence of -- any
decisionmaker responsible for Crawford's termination. So we
cannot infer from them any nexus to her termination.
Because Crawford's discrimination claims are unsupported
by factual detail or supported by details untethered to the
University's termination decision, the district court properly
dismissed them.
C. Hostile Work Environment Claims
Crawford next contends that the University and the Board
of Trustees subjected her to an unlawful hostile work environment
related to her gender, race, sexual orientation, age, and religion
in violation of RICRA, FEPA, Title VII, and the ADEA. Hostile
work environment claims under these statutes are analyzed under
the same substantive standard. See DeCamp, 875 A.2d at 21-23
- 21 - (RICRA and FEPA); Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 46
(1st Cir. 2018) (Title VII); Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina,
Inc., 898 F.3d 77, 91 (1st Cir. 2018) (ADEA). A plaintiff must
ultimately prove that she (1) is a member of a protected class;
(2) was subject to harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her
membership in a protected class; (4) the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
her employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) the
harassment was both objectively and subjectively offensive; and
(6) there exists some basis for employer liability. Tang v.
Citizens Bank, N.A., 821 F.3d 206, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2016).
However, at the motion to dismiss stage, we assess only whether
Crawford has pleaded facts rendering her claim plausible. See
Gorski v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 472 (1st Cir. 2002).
For this claim, Crawford argues that her complaint
outlines over twenty-five instances of egregious name-calling,
insults, and accusations that were submitted to the University.
These comments, according to Crawford, "included but were not
limited to accusing [her] of using offensive language and severely
hateful rhetoric towards the LGBTQ+ community and people of color;
accusing her of using a transgender slur; accusing her of making
racist comments; calling her a parasite; inhumane, and toxic."
But none of these comments plausibly suggest harassment based on
- 22 - Crawford's gender, race, sexual orientation, age, or religion.
The students' and faculty's statements may reflect disagreement
with -- or criticism of -- her views about certain minority
groups. But it does not follow from that disagreement that
Crawford's protected characteristics were targeted. See, e.g.,
Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep't, 709 F.3d 87, 97 (2d
Cir. 2013) ("[A] statement that someone is a 'racist' . . . does
not indicate that the object of the statement is being rejected
because of his race . . . . 'Racism' is not a race, and
discrimination on the basis of alleged racism is not the same as
discrimination on the basis of race.").10 Thus, the district court
correctly dismissed Crawford's hostile work environment claims.
See Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2006)
("An employee claiming harassment must demonstrate that the
hostile conduct was directed at him because of a characteristic
protected by a federal anti-discrimination statute." (emphasis
added)); Gorski, 290 F.3d at 473 ("[A] complaint should be
Crawford maintains that it is inconsistent to remand her 10
defamation claim while simultaneously concluding that the same facts are insufficient to state to a hostile work environment. But both claims involve different elements. Defamation does not require that statements target protected characteristics or alter employment conditions. See Acosta v. Madeira Rest. Inc., No. CV 19-093, 2019 WL 3084468, at *3 (D.R.I. July 15, 2019) (citing Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 790 A.2d 368, 373 n.10 (R.I. 2002) (outlining the elements of defamation under Rhode Island law).
- 23 - dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) . . . if it is clear that
no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations." (citation modified)).
D. Retaliation Claims
Lastly, Crawford claims that the University and Board of
Trustees retaliated against her in violation of Title VII and Title
IX. To prove retaliation under either statute must ultimately
show that: "(1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she was
subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse
employment action is causally linked to the protected conduct."
Ing, 81 F.4th at 84 (quoting Theidon v. Harvard Univ., 948 F.3d
477, 505 (1st Cir. 2020)). "Protected conduct" includes
(1) opposing a practice made unlawful under Titles VII or IX or
(2) charging, testifying, assisting, or otherwise participating in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the relevant
statutes. Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP, 799 F.3d 99, 107-08 (1st Cir.
2015); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). At the motion to dismiss stage, we
assess whether Crawford has pleaded sufficient facts to render her
retaliation claim plausible.
Crawford advances two theories of retaliation. First,
she contends that she engaged in protected conduct by filing a
grievance against Mitchell. But she does not describe the
substance of the grievance itself or include any facts tending to
- 24 - show that the grievance concerned conduct protected under Title
VII or IX.
Second, she maintains that she participated in the
University's disciplinary process when the allegations against her
arose, and that it is plausible that the University terminated her
in retaliation for defending herself and accusing it of unlawful
conduct. Defendants counter that the Faculty Board's hearing
occurred after her termination. Because Crawford did not contest
that fact in her reply, we assume without deciding that Crawford's
termination on January 3, 2022, was the adverse action at issue,
notwithstanding that there was a later appeal to the Board of
Trustees on June 27, 2022, that affirmed the decision of the
Faculty Board. This is fatal to her claim because "no protected
conduct after an adverse employment action can serve as the
predicate for a retaliation claim." Pearson v. Mass. Bay Transp.
Auth., 723 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2013).
Because Crawford does not plead facts regarding any
other instance where she opposed an unlawful employment practice
or participated in a statutory investigation or proceeding, she
failed to plausibly allege that she engaged in protected conduct
preceding her termination, which is required to ultimately prove
a retaliation claim.
- 25 - III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court's judgment.
- 26 -