Crandall Corp. v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Crandall Corp. v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.

395 S.E.2d 179, 302 S.C. 265, 1990 S.C. LEXIS 175

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedAugust 27, 1990

Docket23258

StatusPublished

Cited by49 cases

This text of 395 S.E.2d 179 (Crandall Corp. v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Crandall Corp. v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 395 S.E.2d 179, 302 S.C. 265, 1990 S.C. LEXIS 175 (S.C. 1990).

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Opinions

Gregory, Chief Justice:

This is an action for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. The trial judge granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. We reverse.

In Smith v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 270 S.C. 446, 242 S.E. (2d) 548 (1978), and Columbia Management Corp. v. Resort Properties, Inc., 279 S.C. 370, 307 S.E. (2d) 228 (1983), this Court refused to recognize a common law cause of action for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. We now join the vast majority of our sister jurisdictions in recognizing such a cause of action¹ and overrule our holdings to the contrary in Smith and Columbia Management.

2-4 To recover on a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, we hold the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant intentionally

interfered with the plaintiffs potential contractual relations; (2) for an improper purpose or by improper methods; (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. See Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P. (2d) 293 (Utah 1982); see also Blake v. Levy, 191 Conn. 257, 464 A. (2d) 52 (1983); Straube v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 600 P. (2d) 371 (1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B and 767 (1977). If a defendant acts for more than one purpose, his improper purpose must predominate in order to create liability. See Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 346 N.W. (2d) 791 (Iowa 1984); Leigh Furniture, supra. As an alternative to establishing an improper purpose, the plaintiff may prove the defendant’s method of interference was improper under the circumstances. See Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 360 S.E. (2d) 832 (1987) for an extensive discussion of improper methods.

In this case, the trial judge did not consider whether respondent was entitled to summary judgment on the merits of this cause of action. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit courtis

[267]*267Reversed.

Chandler and Finney, JJ., concur. C. Bruce Littlejohn, Acting Associate Justice, and Harwell, J., dissent in separate opinion.

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Gregory, Chief Justice:

This is an action for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. The trial judge granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. We reverse.

In Smith v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 270 S.C. 446, 242 S.E. (2d) 548 (1978), and Columbia Management Corp. v. Resort Properties, Inc., 279 S.C. 370, 307 S.E. (2d) 228 (1983), this Court refused to recognize a common law cause of action for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. We now join the vast majority of our sister jurisdictions in recognizing such a cause of action¹ and overrule our holdings to the contrary in Smith and Columbia Management.

2-4 To recover on a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, we hold the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant intentionally

interfered with the plaintiffs potential contractual relations; (2) for an improper purpose or by improper methods; (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. See Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P. (2d) 293 (Utah 1982); see also Blake v. Levy, 191 Conn. 257, 464 A. (2d) 52 (1983); Straube v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 600 P. (2d) 371 (1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B and 767 (1977). If a defendant acts for more than one purpose, his improper purpose must predominate in order to create liability. See Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 346 N.W. (2d) 791 (Iowa 1984); Leigh Furniture, supra. As an alternative to establishing an improper purpose, the plaintiff may prove the defendant’s method of interference was improper under the circumstances. See Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 360 S.E. (2d) 832 (1987) for an extensive discussion of improper methods.

In this case, the trial judge did not consider whether respondent was entitled to summary judgment on the merits of this cause of action. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit courtis

[267]*267Reversed.

Chandler and Finney, JJ., concur. C. Bruce Littlejohn, Acting Associate Justice, and Harwell, J., dissent in separate opinion.

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395 S.E.2d 179, 302 S.C. 265, 1990 S.C. LEXIS 175, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crandall-corp-v-navistar-international-transportation-corp-sc-1990.

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