Costanzo v. DXC Technology Company

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJuly 27, 2020
Docket5:19-cv-05794
StatusUnknown

This text of Costanzo v. DXC Technology Company (Costanzo v. DXC Technology Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Costanzo v. DXC Technology Company, (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 NEIL COSTANZO, et al., Case No. 19-cv-05794-BLF

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 10 DXC TECHNOLOGY COMPANY, et al., [Re: ECF 39] 11 Defendants.

12 This is a putative class action pursuant to Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 13 (the “Securities Act”) arising from the prospectus and registration statement (the “Registration 14 Statement”) issued in connection with the merger of Computer Sciences Corporation and the 15 Enterprise Services division of Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company completed in April 2017 (the 16 “Merger”). 17 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Motion, ECF 18 39. The Court heard oral arguments on June 4, 2020 (the “Hearing”). For the reasons stated below, 19 the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion with leave to amend. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Defendant DXC Technology Company (“DXC”) is a Fortune 500 company, providing “end- 22 to-end IT services” to its clients. Amended Class Action Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 31. DXC is the 23 result of the combination of two large IT services businesses, Computer Sciences Corporation 24 (“CSC”) and HPE’s Enterprise Services division (“HPES”). Id. ¶ 33. In May 2016, CSC and HPE 25 publicly announced the merger of CSC and HPES, which was completed in April 2017. Id. The 26 Merger was structured as a “Reverse Morris Trust,” wherein Hewlett Packard spun off HPES into a 27 new company, and then the new company purchased CSC to form DXC. Id. CSC shareholders’ 1 draft registration statement on Form S-4 with the SEC to register the DXC shares to be issued and 2 exchanged in the Merger. Id. ¶ 34. After filing several amendments, on February 24, 2017, DXC 3 filed with the SEC a final amendment to the Registration Statement on Form S-4/A, which forms 4 part of the Registration Statement. Id. ¶ 35. On February 27, 2017, the SEC declared the 5 Registration Statement effective. Id. ¶ 36. DXC was formed on April 1, 2017 through various 6 transactions. Id. ¶ 37. On April 3, 2017, DXC common stock began publicly trading on the NYSE 7 under the symbol “DXC” at approximately $59 per share. Id. ¶ 39. 8 This suit arises from the disclosures in the Registration Statement. Specifically, Neil 9 Costanzo, Ronald Jackson, and Ronald W. Fallness (“Lead Plaintiffs” or “Plaintiffs”) allege that the 10 Registration Statement failed to adequately disclose facts and risks that existed at the time of the 11 Merger regarding DXC’s “workforce optimization” plan. Compl. ¶ 40. Plaintiffs allege that the 12 Registration Statement “touted the more than $1 billion in synergies that DXC would purportedly 13 experience in the first year after the Merger due to a ‘workforce optimization’ plan that would ‘align 14 [DXC’s] costs with its revenue trajectory” without disclosing that “the cuts to DXC’s workforce 15 would be too large, too soon, resulting in client dissatisfaction and the departure of key employees, 16 which, consequently, would materially harm DXC’s ability to secure and generate revenue on new 17 or renewed contracts.” Id. ¶¶ 41-42. 18 Specifically, the Registration Statement provided:

19 The combined company expects that the merger of Everett with CSC will produce first-year synergies of approximately $1.0 billion post- 20 close, with a run rate of $1.5 billion by the end of year one. The $1.0 billion post-close and $1.5 billion run rate at the end of year one were 21 each calculated by estimating the expected value of harmonizing policies and benefits between the two companies, supply chain and 22 procurement benefits from expected economies of scale such as volume discounts as well as cost synergies expected from workforce 23 optimization such as elimination of duplicative roles and other duplicative general, administrative and overhead costs. 24 Compl. ¶ 77. Further, the Registration Statements detailed a “turnaround plan” that would “align 25 [DXC’s] costs with its revenue trajectory” and purportedly included “initiatives to improve 26 execution in sales performance and accountability.” Id. Plaintiffs allege that these statements were 27 false and misdealing because “they failed to disclose and/or misrepresented [certain] adverse facts 1 that existed at the time of the Merger.” Id. ¶ 78. Plaintiffs also allege that the Registration Statement 2 misleadingly represented that DXC could “attract and retain highly motivated people with the skills 3 necessary to serve their customers,” and that DXC would continue to “hire, train, motivate and 4 effectively utilize employees with the right mix of skills and experience to meet the needs of it 5 clients.” Id. ¶ 79. 6 For support, Plaintiffs rely on a lawsuit filed by a former DXC executive, Stephen J. Hilton 7 (“Hilton”). Following the Merger in April 2017, Hilton (an Executive Vice President at CSC) 8 became DXC’s Executive Vice President and Head of Global Delivery. Compl. ¶ 45. Hilton’s 9 employment was, however, terminated on July 20, 2018, following disagreements between Hilton 10 and Defendant Lawrie – who was Chairman of the DXC Board, President, and CEO of DXC. Id. 11 ¶¶ 45, 23. Hilton commenced a lawsuit against his former employer in the U.S. District Court for 12 the Southern District of New York, titled Hilton v. DXC Technology Company, Case No. 1:19-cv- 13 01157-PKC. Id. ¶ 43. The complaint filed in that action on February 6, 2019 (the “Hilton Compl.”, 14 ECF 40-8), brought various breach of contract claims related to Hilton’s termination by DXC. Id. 15 According to the Hilton Complaint, Defendant Lawrie told Hilton that he wanted to achieve 16 major cuts to DXC’s total expenses. Compl. ¶ 50. Lawrie and Hilton agreed that DXC could 17 eventually cut the Global Delivery division’s annual expenses by approximately $2.7 billion— 18 meaning that Hilton’s division could spend $2.7 billion less annually than its legacy entities, CSC 19 and HPES, together had spent in the year before the April 2017 Merger. Id. ¶ 51; Hilton Compl. ¶ 20 68. The bulk of these cuts would be obtained through workforce reductions. Id. Based on Hilton’s 21 allegations, Plaintiffs claim that DXC had an internal target to “to make approximately $2.7 billion 22 in cuts within the first 12 months after the Merger.” Id. ¶ 53. In his complaint, Hilton claims that 23 he “repeatedly advised Lawrie about his reservations concerning the pace of cuts.” Id. ¶ 54; see 24 also Hilton Compl. ¶ 69. Hilton alleged that to meet the internal target of $2.7 billion in cuts, his 25 department “would have to fire far more people far more quickly, with the resulting negative impact 26 on customer satisfaction.” Compl. ¶ 53; see also Hilton Compl. ¶ 68. At Lawrie’s direction, Hilton 27 alleges, “DXC slashed Global Delivery’s workforce by approximately 20% worldwide.” Compl. ¶ 1 Plaintiffs allege that DXC’s workforce reduction plan “hamper[ed]its ability to deliver on 2 its client contracts, leading to widespread client dissatisfaction.” Compl. ¶ 65. But according to 3 Plaintiffs “[t]he negative impact of the extreme workforce reduction plan on service delivery, 4 customer satisfaction, and revenues had a built-in lag.” Id. ¶ 64. Starting in the fall of 2018 through 5 the end of 2019, these negative impacts reached the media. See id. ¶¶ 66-67. On May 23, 2019, 6 August 8, 2019, and November 11, 2019, DXC issued press releases announcing disappointing 7 financial results. Id. ¶¶ 69, 71, 73. On November 11, 2019, DXC’s new CEO Mike Salvino 8 acknowledged “delivery and personnel retention problems,” which Plaintiffs allege “directly 9 resulted from his predecessor’s workforce reduction plan[.]” Id. ¶ 74. By the commencement of 10 this action, DXC stock was trading at $32.70 per share, a nearly 45% decline from the $59 price of 11 DXC stock at the time of the Merger. Id. ¶ 75.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Foman v. Davis
371 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Cutera Securities Litigation v. Conners
610 F.3d 1103 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Grossman v. Novell, Inc.
120 F.3d 1112 (Tenth Circuit, 1997)
Dagley v. Russo
540 F.3d 8 (First Circuit, 2008)
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano
131 S. Ct. 1309 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.
643 F.3d 681 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Conservation Force v. Salazar
646 F.3d 1240 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Lee v. City Of Los Angeles
250 F.3d 668 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
In Re Gilead Sciences Securities Litigation
536 F.3d 1049 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd.
551 F.3d 1156 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
In Re Wet Seal, Inc. Securities Litigation
518 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (C.D. California, 2007)
Ramsey v. National Ass'n of Music Merchants, Inc.
798 F.3d 1186 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Costanzo v. DXC Technology Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/costanzo-v-dxc-technology-company-cand-2020.