Cooke v. United States

91 U.S. 389, 23 L. Ed. 237, 1 Otto 389, 1875 U.S. LEXIS 1381
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedNovember 29, 1875
Docket275
StatusPublished
Cited by160 cases

This text of 91 U.S. 389 (Cooke v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 23 L. Ed. 237, 1 Otto 389, 1875 U.S. LEXIS 1381 (1875).

Opinions

Mr. Chiek Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court.

The United States sued Jay Cooke & Co., in this action, to recover back money paid them by the assistant-treasurer in New York for the purchase or redemption before maturity, under the the act of Aug. 12, 1866 (14 Stat. 31), of what purported to be eighteen 7-30 treasury notes, issued under the authority of the act of March 3,1865 (13 Stat. 468), but which it is alleged were counterfeit. Cooke & Co. insist, that if they honestly believed the notes in question were genuine, and, so believing, in good faith passed them to the assistant-treasurer, and he, under a like, belief, and with like good faith, received and paid for them, there can be no recovery, even though they may have been counterfeit.

As this.defence meets us at the threshold of the case, it is proper that it should be first considered.

It was conceded in the • argument, that, when the United States become parties to commercial paper, they incur all the responsibilities of private persons under the same circumstances. This is in accordance with the decisions of this court. The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 557; United States v. Bk. of Metropolis, 15 Pet. 377. As was well said in the last case, “ From the daily and unavoidable use of commercial paper by the United States, they are as much interested as the community at large can be iii maintaining these principles.” It was also conceded that genuine treasury-notes, like those now in question, were, before their maturity, part of the negotiable commercial paper of the country. We so held at the last term, in Vermilye & Co. v. Express Co., 21 Wall. 138.

It is, undoubtedly, also true, as a general rule of commercial law, that where one accepts forged paper purporting to be his own, and pays it to a holder for value, he cannot recall the payment. The operative fact in this rule is the acceptance, or more properly, perhaps, the adoption,, of the paper as genuine by its apparent, maker. Often the bare receipt of the paper accompanied by payment is equivalent to an adoption within [397]*397the meaning of the rule; because, as every man is presumed to know his own signature, and ought to detect its forgery by simple inspection, the examination which he can give when the demand upon him is made is all that the law considers necessary for his protection. He must repudiate as soon as he ought to have discovered' the forgery, otherwise he will be regarded as accepting the paper. Unnecessary delay under such circumstances is unreasonable; and unreasonable delay is negligence, which throws the bullen of the loss upon him who is guilty of it, rather than upon one who is not. The rule is thus well stated in Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 45: “ The party receiving such notes must examine them as soon as he has opportunity, and return them' immediately: if he does not, he is negligent; and negligence will defeat his action.”

When, therefore, a party is entitled to something more than a mere inspection of the paper before he can be required to pass finally upon its character, — as, for example, an examination of accounts or records kept by him for the purposes of verification, — negligence sufficient to charge him with a loss cannot be claimed until this examination ought to have been completed. If, in the ordinary course of business, this might have been done before payment, it ought to have been, and payment without it will have the effect of an acceptance and adoption. But if the presentation is made at a time when, or at a place where, such an examination cannot be had, time must be allowed for that purpose; and, if the money is then paid, the parties, the one in paying and the other in receiving payment, are to be understood as agreeing that a receipt and payment under such circumstances shall not amount to an adoption, but that further inquiry may be made, and, if the paper is found to be counterfeit, it may be returned within a reasonable time. What is reasonable must in every case depend upon circumstances; but, until a reasonable time has in fact elapsed, the law will not impute negligence on account of delay.

So, too, if the paper is received and paid for by an agent, the principal is not charged unless the agent had authority to act for him in passing .upon the character of the instrument. It is the negligence of the principal that binds ; and that of the agent has no effect, except to the extent that- it is chargeable to the principal.

[398]*398. Laches is not imputable to the government, in its character as sovereign, by those subject to its dominion. United States v. Kilpatrick, 9 Wheat. 735; Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269. Still a government may suffer loss through the negligence of its officers. If it comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of. commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there. Thus, if it becomes the holder of a bill of exchange, it must use the same diligence to charge the drawers and indorsers that is required of individuals ; and, if it fails in this, its claim upon the parties is lost. United States v. Barker, 12 Wheat. 559. Generally, in respect to all the commercial business of the government, if an officer specially charged with the performance of any duty, and authorized to represent the government in that behalf, neglects that duty, and loss ensues, the government must bear the consequences of his neglect. Bt*t this cannot happen until the officer specially charged with the duty, if there b.e one, has acted,, or ought to have acted. As the government can only act through its officers, it may select for its work whomsoever it will; but it must have some representative authorized to. act in all the emergencies of its commercial transactions. If it fail in this, it fails in the performance of its own duties, and must be charged with the consequences that follow such omissions in the commercial world.

Such being the principles of law applicableHb this part of the case, we now proceed to examine the facts.

The Department of the Treasury is by law located at the seat of government as one of the execiitive departments, and the Secretary of the Treasury is its official head. Rev. Stat., sect. 233; 1 Stat. 65. All claims and demands against the government are to be settled and adjusted in this department (Rev. Stat., sect. 236; 3 Stat.-366), and the Treasurer of the United States is one of its officers. Rev. Stat., sect. 301; 1 Stat. 65. His duty is to receive and keep the money of the United States, and disburse it upon warrants drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury, countersigned by either comptroller, and recorded by the register, and not otherwise. Rev. Stat., sect. 305; 1 Stat. 65. ' The rooms provided in the treasury-building at the seat of government for the use of the treasurer are by law the [399]*399treasury of the United States. Rev. Stat., sect. 3591; 9 Stat. 59. Assistant-treasurers are authorized and have been appointed 'to serve at New York and other cities. ' Rev. Stat., sect. 3595 ; 9 Stat. 60. The rooms assigned by law to be occupied by them are appropriated to their use and for the safekeeping of the public money deposited with them. Rev. Stat., sect. 3598; 9 S.tat. 59. The assistant-treasurers are to have the charge and care of the rooms', &c., assigned to them, and to perform the duties required of them relating to the receipt, safe-keeping, and disbursement of the public money. Rev. Stat., sect. 3599; 9 Stat. 59.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
91 U.S. 389, 23 L. Ed. 237, 1 Otto 389, 1875 U.S. LEXIS 1381, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cooke-v-united-states-scotus-1875.