GREENE, J.
This case involves the termination of a lease for computer equipment. We are asked to decide whether a fee paid by the lessee to terminate the lease is taxable. Two preliminary questions reside within this question: (1) whether the payment was made pursuant to a transaction that can be defined as a “sale,” within the meaning of the relevant Tax General Article sections, and (2) if the payment was made pursuant to a “sale,” whether the amount paid constituted part of the “taxable price” of the lease transaction. We hold that the fee paid to terminate the lease was not a “sale” and, therefore, is not subject to sales tax.
FACTS
On May 30, 1990, Citicorp International Communications, Inc. (“CICI”) entered into a lease agreement (“Master Lease”) with IBM Credit (“IBM”) for computer equipment that CICI used in its data center in Silver Spring, MD. In January 1997, [161]*161the parties extended the lease for an additional term. On September 3, 1998, CICI decided to upgrade its computer equipment and sought a release from the obligations of its lease with IBM.
On October 20, 1998, CICI and IBM negotiated a termination agreement (“Termination Agreement”) which released CICI from its Master Lease obligations, as of November 1, 1998. Pursuant to the Termination Agreement, CICI returned the old computer equipment to IBM and paid a termination fee of $7,219,998. In addition, CICI purchased replacement equipment from IBM at a cost of $7,387,800, plus sales tax of $369,390.
Initially, CICI did not pay sales tax on the lease termination fee. On December 1, 1998, IBM submitted another invoice to CICI for sales tax on the termination fee, in the amount of $360,999.90. On April 1, 1999, CICI paid the sales tax, even though it doubted its obligation to pay the tax. On April 24, 2000, CICI made an anonymous request, through Christine M. Oates, a Manager at the accounting firm of KPMG, LLP, to the Maryland Comptroller of the Treasury for a ruling on the taxability of the termination fee. James Dawson, the Assistant Legal Director of the Office of the Comptroller, responded to the request by letter, dated June 8, 2000. Dawson “declined to issue a formal declaratory ruling” but did agree to answer the question informally. Dawson framed the question before him as “whether the Maryland sales and use tax applies to termination payments made for the early termination of a lease of tangible personal property when the property subject to the lease is required to be returned to the lessor and title to the tangible personal property does not pass to the lessee.” Noting that the statutes and regulations do not address termination fees, Dawson concluded that,
[t]he termination fee ... is a charge imposed by the lessor on the lessee to terminate the lease agreement and relieve each of the parties from the requirements of the lease agreement. The property subject to the lease agreement is to be returned to the lessor by the lessee and title to the property will not in any way vest to the lessee. The [162]*162termination agreement as described in your request is an agreement separate and apart from the lease agreement and does not appear to be a condition or requirement of the lease agreement. Therefore, the termination fee cannot be deemed consideration in the “consummation and complete performance of a sale” as provided in § ll-101(j). The termination fee would not be considered part of the “taxable price” and thus, would not be subject to the Maryland sales and use tax.
On September 5, 2000, CICI filed a Sales and Use Tax Refund Application with the Comptroller seeking a refund of the sales tax paid on the termination fee. The Comptroller’s Refund Supervisor requested that CICI file additional documents with its application, and on January 29, 2001, CICI refiled its Refund Application along with those documents. By letter dated July 30, 2001, the Refund Supervisor denied CICI’s request. On September 28, 2001, the Comptroller held an informal hearing on the matter. On January 4, 2002, the Comptroller issued a Notice of Final Determination, denying the refund.
CICI appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and on November 6, 2002, the court heard oral arguments on the matter. The parties stipulated to the relevant facts and presented argument to the court. On February 23, 2004, the Tax Court reversed the Comptroller. The Tax Court found that, under the lease termination agreement, CICI “released its interest in the leased equipment and was relieved of all obligations with respect to such property after November 1, 1998.” The court concluded that “the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Master Lease and the Lease Termination Agreement and the lack of any transfer of title of the leased property to the Petitioner establish that the lease termination payment was not made pursuant to a transaction that is a ‘sale’ as defined by § 11 — 101(g).”
The Comptroller appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. That court held a hearing on the matter and on August 24, 2004, affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. The [163]*163Comptroller filed a Motion for Reconsideration that was later denied by the Circuit Court. Subsequently, the Comptroller noted a timely appeal. While the case was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, but before a decision there, we granted certiorari on our own initiative. Comptroller v. Citicorp, 385 Md. 511, 869 A.2d 864 (2005).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As stated in CBS v. Comptroller, 319 Md. 687, 697-98, 575 A.2d 324, 329 (1990), “[a] reviewing court must affirm [the decision of] the Tax Court if its order ‘is not erroneous as a matter of law,’ and if the order ‘is supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record’ ” (quoting Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 834, 490 A.2d 1296, 1300-01 (1985)). We explained in Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. that, “the Tax Court’s decision is based on a factual determination, and there is no error of law, the reviewing court may not reverse the Tax Court’s order if substantial evidence of record supports the agency’s decision.” Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 302 Md. at 834, 490 A.2d at 1301 (internal citations omitted).
We are not at liberty to substitute our judgment for the expertise of the agency. Our role is to accord deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute which it administers. Charles County Department of Social Services v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 295-96, 855 A.2d 313, 319 (2004)(stating that a court gives deference to an agency’s legal interpretation of its own statute or regulations); Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376 (1999)(noting that, “an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.”) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, recognizing that the agency’s decision is “prima facie correct and presumed valid,” “we must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it.” Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 302 Md. at 835, 490 A.2d at 1301. We also note that “it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting [164]*164evidence and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence it is for the agency to draw the inferences.” Id.
Finally, we note that the interpretation of the tax law can be a mixed question of fact and law, the resolution of which requires agency expertise. NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md. 118, 133-134, 544 A.2d 764, 771 (1988) (stating that “determinations involving mixed questions of fact and law must be affirmed if, after deferring to the Tax Court’s expertise and to the presumption that the decision is correct, a reasoning mind could have reached the Tax Court’s conclusion.”)(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Vann, 382 Md. at 298, 855 A.2d at 320 (stating that “[deferential review over mixed questions of law and fact is appropriate in order for the agency to fulfill its mandate and exercise its expertise”); CBS, 319 Md. at 698, 575 A.2d at 329 (noting that, “we apply [a] deferential standard of review not only to its fact-finding and its drawing of inferences, but also to its ‘application of the law to the facts’ ”); Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 302 Md. at 838, 490 A.2d at 1303 (holding that “whether a business is unitary or separate ... for tax purposes ... is not solely a question of law” and therefore, the Tax Court’s decision on the question deserves deference. Rather, we must ask “whether in light of substantial evidence appearing in the record, a reasoning mind could reasonably have reached the conclusion reached by the Tax Court, consistent with a proper application [of the tax statute in question].”).
Unless the Tax Court’s decision was erroneous as a matter of law, or its conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence, we must affirm that decision. See CBS, 319 Md. at 697-98, 575 A.2d at 329 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In the instant case, the issue of whether the termination fee is part of the “taxable price” of the Master Lease is a question of law that hinges on two factual issues: (1) was the termination fee part of a sale, and (2) was the Lease Termination Agreement part of the Master Lease. Therefore, [165]*165whether the termination fee is subject to sales tax is a mixed question of law and fact and compels a certain deference to the Tax Court’s decision.
DISCUSSION
The resolution of the question in this case depends on the interpretation and application of sections of the Tax General Article and related provisions of COMAR. We begin, therefore, with a review of the rules of statutory interpretation. Our goal is to “ ‘ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature,’ ” and we begin that exercise by reviewing the statutory language itself. Rockwood Casualty Insurance Co. v. Uninsured, Employers’ Fund, 385 Md. 99, 108, 867 A.2d 1026, 1031 (2005) (quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)). As explained in Oaks, “ ‘if the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.’ ” Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429 (quoting Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994)). Furthermore, we note that we will not read COMAR provisions in isolation. Rather, “we must interpret [them] in light of [their] enabling legislation.... ” Worton Creek Marina v. Claggett, 381 Md. 499, 511, 850 A.2d 1169, 1176 (2004). Finally, we note that “ ‘when specifically interpreting tax statutes, this Court recognizes that any ambiguity within the statutory language must be interpreted in favor of the taxpayer.’” Supervisor of Assessments of Anne Arundel County v. Hartge Yacht yard,, Inc., 379 Md. 452, 461, 842 A.2d 732, 737 (2004) (quoting Comptroller v. Clyde’s of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 484, 833 A.2d 1014, 1021 (2003)).
Section 11-102 of the Tax General Article provides that a sales and use tax is imposed on “(1) a retail sale in the State; and (2) a use, in the State, of tangible personal property or a taxable service.” Md.Code (1988, 2004 Repl.Vol.), § 11-102(a) of the Tax General Article. In addition, § 11-103 provides that there is a rebuttable presumption “that any sale in the State is subject to the sales and use tax imposed under § 11-102(a)(1) ...” and that “[t]he person required to pay the sales [166]*166and use tax has the burden of proving that a sale in the State is not subject to the sales and use tax.” Md.Code (1988, 2004 Repl.Vol.), § 11-103 of the Tax General Article.
Section 11-101 (i) of the Tax General Article defines “sale” as
(i) title or possession of property is transferred or is to be transferred absolutely or conditionally by any means, including by lease, rental, royalty agreement, or grant of a license for use; or
(ii) a person performs a service for another person.
Md.Code (1988, 2004 Repl.Vol.), § ll-101(i) of the Tax General Article.1 In further explanation of the definition of a “sale,” Section 03.06.01.28 of COMAR provides:
A. The transfer of possession, absolutely or conditionally by any means, of tangible personal property for a consideration, by way of lease, rental, royalty agreement or grant of a license for use, referred to in this regulation as a “lease,” is included within the statutory definition of the term “sale” and is thus subject to the tax in the absence of a specific exemption or exclusion.
B. Each lease payment period is considered a separate lease, and thus a separate sale, for the purpose of determining when the tax is to be collected or paid.
Section 11-101 (l) of the Tax General Article defines “taxable price” as “the value, in money, of the consideration of any kind that is paid, delivered, payable, or deliverable by a buyer to a vendor in the consummation and complete performance of a, sale without deduction for any expense or cost....” Md.Code (1988, 2004 Repl.Vol.), § 11-101(0 of the Tax General Article (emphasis added).
As made clear by § 11-102, the imposition of sales tax requires, in the first instance, a sale. Md.Code (1988, 2004 [167]*167Repl.Vol.), § 11-102 of the Tax General Article. In keeping with that concept, the statutory definition of “taxable price” includes consideration paid “in the consummation and complete performance of a sale.” Md.Code (1988, 2004 Repl.Vol.), § 11-101(l) of the Tax General Article. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, under § 11-103, the presumption that sales tax is owed and the burden of proof on the taxpayer, only exist if the transaction in question actually is a sale. Md.Code (1988, 2004 Repl.Vol.), § 11-103 of the Tax General Article. Considering the plain language of the statutory and regulatory provisions in question, it is clear that if the transaction at issue in this case is not a “sale,” the consideration paid for the transaction, by definition, cannot be part of the “taxable price,” and cannot be subject to sales and use tax.
Section 6.1 of the Master Lease between CICI and IBM provides that payment is “absolute and unconditional and shall not be subject to any abatement, reduction, set off, defense, counterclaim, interruption, deferment or recoupment for any reason whatsoever, and that such payments shall be and continue to be payable in all events.” The Comptroller argues that, under this language, “there is no way out of the Lease, short of complete and total payment of all rental payments due at the inception of the Lease.” As a result, the Comptroller asserts that the Termination Agreement entered into by CICI and IBM was not a separate agreement at all, but merely an amendment to the existing lease.2 The Comptroller argues that because CICI paid the Termination fee “to meet [168]*168and complete its pre-existing obligations under the Lease, payment of this fee constitutes ‘consummation and complete performance of a sale,’ and is therefore a payment of ‘taxable price’ subject to sales tax.”
There are two flaws in the Comptroller’s argument. First, the argument ignores language in the Master Lease that provides an exception to the seemingly “absolute and unconditional” language of Section 6.1. Second, the argument mischaracterizes the nature of the termination transaction between IBM and CICI.
Section 14.1 of the Master Lease, provides that “[njeither this Master Lease nor any Equipment Schedule may be altered, modified, terminated or discharged except by a writing signed by the party against whom such alteration, modification, termination or discharge is sought.”3 (Emphasis added.) We agree with the Tax Court’s finding that the written Termination Agreement entered into by CICI and IBM released CICI from its obligations under the lease.4 The Termination Agreement states, in relevant part,
[169]*169Lessee releases all of its interest in the leased equipment indicated above (“Leased Items”) and Lessor agrees to discontinue stick leases and to relieve Lessee from all continuing obligations to pay Rent due after the Termination/Prepayment Date indicated above.... In consideration for Lessor’s agreement to release Lessee from its original lease/financing obligations after the Termination/Prepayment date, Lessee shall pay Lessor the Total Charge indicated above.
(Emphasis added.)
The transaction between CICI and IBM, whereby IBM released CICI from its obligations under the lease and CICI paid the termination fee and returned the old equipment, does not fit within the statutory or regulatory definition of the word “sale.” Upon termination of the agreement and payment of the termination fee to IBM, there was no transfer of title or possession of property to the lessee, as contemplated by § ll~101(g) of the Tax General Article and Section 03.06.01.28 of COMAR. In fact, in the instant case, CICI, the party paying the fee, transferred the property back to IBM, the party receiving the fee. Such an arrangement cannot fairly be described as a “sale,” as that term is generally defined or as it is defined in the relevant statutes and regulations. To consider this arrangement a “sale” would turn the statutory definition of that term on its head. We seek to avoid statutory constructions “that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994).
We do not think the statutory definition of “sale” is ambiguous. Even if it were, we would not be inclined to interpret the statute as suggested by the Comptroller, in view of the [170]*170standard described in Comptroller v. Gannett, 356 Md. 699, 707-08, 741 A.2d 1130, 1135 (1999), in which we said:
“When ... the applicability of a tax statute and not a tax exemption is being construed, it is the established rule not to extend the tax statute’s provisions by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, to cases not plainly within the statute’s language, and not to enlarge the statute’s operation so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt, tax statutes are construed ‘most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen.’ ”
(quoting Comptroller v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 539, 404 A.2d 1045, 1053 (1979) (internal citations omitted)).
The Comptroller also argues that the Termination Fee is taxable because, even though IBM and CICI call it a termination fee, it should be viewed as a consolidation of the payments CICI would have paid under the Master Lease had the lease continued through the end of the term, discounted to present value.5 In other words, instead of making several payments over the course of the Master Lease (for the use of the equipment), the Comptroller argues that CICI made one lump sum payment to fulfill its lease obligations. That argument ignores the fact that the termination fee was not actually paid to fulfill CICI’s lease obligations, which consisted of the requirement to pay for the use of the equipment. Rather, as stated in the Termination Agreement itself, CICI paid the fee to cancel the lease and to be released from “all continuing obligations to pay Rent” under the Master Lease.
We will not look behind the words of the agreement between IBM and CICI in an attempt to ferret out an intention not otherwise described by the language of the agreement itself. To do so would violate the rules of the interpretation of contracts. As recently noted in Owens-[171]*171Illinois v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 872 A.2d 969 (2005), when construing a contract, we
“must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. In addition, when the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed.”
Owens-Illinois v. Cook, 386 Md. at 496-97, 872 A.2d at 985 (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985)).
Moreover, this transaction cannot be viewed as a buyout of a lease because CICI returned the leased equipment to IBM upon signing the Termination Agreement and paying the termination fee. The party that received the money also retained the goods. Consideration, within the context of the statutory definitions of “sale” and “taxable price,” involves an exchange. Md.Code (1988, 2004 Repl.Vol.), §§ 11-101®, (l) of the Tax General Article. As previously noted, a “sale” occurs when “title or possession of property is transferred ... absolutely or conditionally ... including by lease.” Md.Code (1988, 2004 Repl.Vol.), §§ ll-101(i) of the Tax General Article. Furthermore, Section 03.06.01.28 of COMAR further defines “sale” as “[t]he transfer of possession ... of tangible personal property for a consideration.... ” Ordinarily, the buying party makes payment in exchange for the receipt of goods from the selling paily.
Under the Master Lease in the present case, CICI’s money was exchanged for the possession and use of computer equipment. Under the Lease Termination Agreement, CICI’s money was exchanged not for possession and use of computer equipment but for a release from the Master Lease obligations. The term “release” is defined as “[l]iberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1292 (7th ed.1999). As a [172]*172practical matter, CICI paid an agreed-upon fee to avoid being sued for breach of lease.6 If we view the transaction as requested by the Comptroller, there is no exchange. Under the Comptroller’s view, CICI would have paid “rent” for the remaining term of the lease and in return would get nothing— except the prior possession and use of the equipment that CICI had already enjoyed and for which it had already paid rent and taxes. Had the Master Lease actually remained in effect, the rent would have continued to be paid monthly and CICI would have continued to enjoy monthly possession and use of the computer equipment, in exchange for each payment. There is no comparable exchange of payment for possession and use of equipment, if the fee is paid all at once and the equipment is returned before the expiration of the lease term.7
[173]*173The Tax Court made a finding that the termination fee “relieved each of the parties from the requirements of the lease agreement.” The only thing exchanged for the termination fee in this case, and therefore the only thing for which it can be said to be consideration, is the release from the Master Lease obligations. In our view, payment in exchange for the termination of a lease is not part of the “taxable price” of a transaction because it is not among the transactions that fairly fit within the statutory definition of a “sale.” As a result, the Comptroller has no statutory authority to impose a sales tax on such a transaction.
We have found no Maryland case discussing the question of whether a lease termination fee, paid in connection with the return of the leased property, is subject to a sales and use tax. The Comptroller relies on Chesapeake Industrial Leasing Company, Inc. v. Comptroller, 331 Md. 428, 628 A.2d 234 (1993), in support of its argument. The Comptroller’s reliance on Chesapeake is misplaced. Our discussion in Chesapeake of “lease payment periods” (the part of the opinion upon which the Comptroller relies), actually provides support to CICI’s position. We said:
In particular, the parties differ on the meaning of section 03.06.01.73. B, which identifies each “lease payment period” as a separate sale and, therefore, as the trigger for collection and remission of tax under the Statute.
Chesapeake’s first argument is that if the lessees ceased paying rent, the leases ended, meaning there were no more “lease payment periods” and consequently no more “sales” to which the sales tax could apply as per COMAR 03.06.01.73. B. We need not address today the effect of lease termination upon a vendor’s obligation to remit sales tax because there is no evidence that the leases in this case actually terminated. Chesapeake’s lessees apparently remained in possession of the leased property, and so we presume the periodic payments remained due and the leases continued to exist. There is no indication that the leases were ever terminated or, alternatively, that they contained [174]*174an automatic termination clause effective upon a lessee’s failure to pay.
Chesapeake, 331 Md. at 439, 628 A.2d at 239.
By contrast, in the instant case, it is clear that the lease terminated, that the lessee no longer was obligated to pay rent, and that the lessee returned the property to the lessor. As already noted, the Tax Court found that the Termination Agreement between IBM and CICI was not a part of the lease but that it “effectively rendered the Master Lease void.” The discussion in Chesapeake does not in any way lead to the conclusion that a payment made to terminate a lease (in conjunction with the lessee’s return of the leased equipment to the lessor), is subject to sales and use tax.8
CICI relies on Maryland Glass Corporation v. Comptroller, 217 Md. 241, 142 A.2d 570 (1958). In Maryland Glass Corporation, Maryland Glass purchased manufacturing machinery from a company known as Hartford-Empire. Maryland Glass, 217 Md. at 243, 142 A.2d at 571. At the time of the purchase, the machinery was installed and used by Maryland Glass because Maryland Glass had been leasing the machinery from Hartford-Empire. Id.9 In addition to the purchase price [175]*175of $39,974.13, Maryland Glass also paid Hartford-Empire $175,500 “in consideration of the cancellation and termination of outstanding leasing and licensing agreements covering the machinery and related patents.... ” Maryland Glass, 217 Md. at 243, 142 A.2d at 571.
Maryland Glass attempted to obtain a refund of the use tax it paid “upon the use of the property acquired by reason of said payments____” Maryland Glass, 217 Md. at 243, 142 A.2d at 572. Maryland Glass argued, among other things, that the transaction was not subject to use tax because the payment to terminate and cancel the leasing and licensing agreements did not constitute “use ... of tangible personal property purchased from a vendor within or without this State,” under the applicable tax statute. Id. In answer to that contention, we held:
The property transferred in the instant case was tangible personal property, and the price paid for each transfer included not only the depreciated book value but an additional sum representing the value to the vendor of the cancellation of the outstanding agreements relative thereto. It was only by reason of such payment that the purchaser could receive the bundle of rights making up the complete and unconditional title. There was no separate sale of the patent rights as such. We think the transactions fall within the definition of “price” set up in Code (1951), Art. 81, § 368(g). Cf.Code (1957), Art. 81, § 372(g). As we see it, the transactions were no different in character from sales of articles whose sales value is enhanced because of the fact [176]*176that the manufacturer holds patents that give it a virtual monopoly in the field. Under the terms of the judgment, the “consummation and complete performance” of the sale in each case was conditioned upon the payment of a sum that may fairly be described as representing the “aggregate value in money” of the property purchased, without deduction for “cost, or any other expense whatever. ” We think the release of claims for rentals and royalties was thus an integral part of the price of acquiring title.
Maryland Glass, 217 Md. at 245, 142 A.2d at 573 (emphasis added). In other words, in Maryland Glass, the purchaser of the property had to pay a purchase price and a lease termination fee, in exchange for title to the property. By stark contrast, in the instant case, the lease termination fee was not paid in exchange for acquiring title or possession of the leased property, because the property was returned to the lessor. As a result, the termination fee was not paid in the consummation and complete performance of a “sale.”
In view of the fact that no Maryland case illumines the issue before us, both parties have urged us to rely on cases from other jurisdictions. CICI relies on Grabler Manufacturing Company v. Kosydar, Tax Commr., 35 Ohio St.2d 23, 298 N.E.2d 590 (1973). In Grabler, the lease between the parties included a provision for “premature termination” of the lease that permitted the lessor to terminate the lease and demand a return of the equipment or enter the lessee’s property to take possession of the equipment, if the lessee defaulted in the payment of rent. Grabler, 298 N.E.2d at 593. The “premature termination” provision of the lease also provided for the payment of liquidated damages owed to the lessor in the event of such a breach by the lessee. Id. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the payments made as liquidated damages were taxable because the amount paid was “contracted for within the term of ‘price’ ” as defined under the applicable tax statute. Grabler, 298 N.E.2d at 594.
Similar to Maryland’s definition of “taxable price,” the Ohio statute at the time defined “price” as “the aggregate value in money of anything paid or delivered, or promised to be paid or [177]*177delivered, in the complete performance of a retail sale.... ” Grabler, 298 N.E.2d at 594. Also similar to Maryland’s definition of “sale,” the Ohio statute defined “sale” and “selling” to “include all transactions by which title or possession, or both, of tangible personal property, is or is to be transferred.... ” Id. Having reviewed those statutory provisions, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Board of Tax Appeals and held that,
[t]he monies paid by Grabler as a deficiency, even though paid in accord with the terms of a lease contract, cannot be included within the definition of “price” in R.C. Chapter 5739, and hence are not taxable. Further, the monies paid were specifically labeled in the lease contracts as “liquidated damages.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (4 Ed.) defines “rent” as “consideration paid for use or occupation of property.”
The essence of this definition is an exchange of some consideration paid for the use of something. In the instant case, the monthly rental installments were paid by Grabler to Commercial Credit Corporation as the consideration for use of the equipment. The monies paid as a deficiency by Grabler were not paid for the use of something; nor were they paid in exchange for anything.
Grabler, 298 N.E.2d at 594.
While Grabler is factually distinguishable from the case at bar, we think its reasoning is instructive. The liquidated damages in Grabler were not paid in exchange for the possession and use of the equipment, and therefore, could not be included within the statutory definition of the term “sale.” Likewise, in the instant case, the termination fee was not paid in exchange for the possession and use of the equipment, and therefore, for reasons already explained, cannot be included within the statutory definition of “sale.”10
[178]*178The Comptroller relies on Residential Information Services Limited Partnership v. Rylander, 988 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.App.1999). In Rylander, the Court of Appeals of Texas considered whether payment to terminate a computer equipment lease was subject to sales tax. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Comptroller, holding that the termination payment was taxable because it was a part of the entire lease price. Rylander, 988 S.W.2d at 471. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that
Comptroller Rule 3.294(d) specifically indicates that all charges related to a lease agreement are taxable, including “a charge imposed for the early termination of the lease.” 34 Tex. Admn.Code § 3.294(d) (1988). Additionally, Comptroller Rule 3.294(d)(5) makes clear that “a charge imposed for the early termination of the lease is included in the lease price and is taxable.” Id. § 3.294(d)(5).
Rylander, 988 S.W.2d at 470. By contrast, Maryland has no similar regulation, equating a lease termination fee with the lease price or explicitly permitting the imposition of a tax on the payment of a lease termination fee. As a result, even though the facts of the instant case are very similar to the facts of Rylander, the Comptroller’s reliance on that case is misplaced.
The Comptroller argues that even though Maryland has no similar rule, we should follow the conclusion in Rylander because the court in that case found that the Texas Comptroller’s rule was a “proper interpretation” of the “economic realities of the marketplace.” Rylander, 988 S.W.2d at 470. Specifically, the court stated that,
[179]*179fg]iven the economic realities of the marketplace, we believe that the Comptroller correctly views the termination payment as being an integral part of the lease agreement rather than a penalty for forgiveness of future obligations.
The amount of the termination payment was not a punishment for early termination per se, it merely reflected the increased cost of the lease had it been negotiated for a shorter term.
Rylander, 988 S.W.2d at 470. For us to follow that reasoning, we would have to ignore the words of the Termination Agreement itself, in an effort to characterize the transaction between IBM and CICI as a sale instead of a termination of a lease. As previously stated, we are not permitted to do that. Owens-Illinois v. Cook, 386 Md. at 496-97, 872 A.2d at 985. Moreover, as already discussed, the relevant Maryland statutory provisions do not lend themselves to the conclusion that a payment made to terminate a lease is subject to sales tax. The reasoning in Rylander does not change our interpretation of the plain language of those provisions. It would be fundamentally unfair to permit the Comptroller to impose a sales tax on a transaction, without notice to the taxpayer that the law permits such a tax. Again, as already noted:
[WJhen ... the applicability of a tax statute ... is being construed, it is the established rule not to extend the tax statute’s provisions by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, to cases not plainly within the statute’s language, and not to enlarge the statute’s operation so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out.
Comptroller v. Gannett, 356 Md. 699, 707-08, 741 A.2d 1130, 1135 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Comptroller v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 539, 404 A.2d 1045, 1053 (1979) (internal citations omitted)). Neither the Comptroller nor this Court is permitted to extend the tax statute’s reach. Only the legislature has the power to do that. See Stearman v. State Farm, 381 Md. 436, 454, 849 A.2d 539, 550 (stating that “[w]e will not invade the province of the General Assembly and rewrite the law for them.... The formidable doctrine of [180]*180separation of powers demands that the courts remain in the sphere that belongs uniquely to the judiciary — that of interpreting, but not creating, the statutory law.”).
We also note, that even if Maryland had a regulation like the regulation in Rylander, our review of the relevant statutory provisions would require us to hold that such a regulation was beyond the Comptroller’s power to promulgate. As explained in Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 686, 684 A.2d 804, 806 (1996), “in determining whether a state administrative agency is authorized to act in a particular manner, the statutes, legislative background and policies pertinent to that agency are controlling.” The controlling standard is whether the regulation is “ ‘consistent with the letter and spirit of the law under which the agency acts.’ ” Lussier, 343 Md. at 687, 684 A.2d at 807. (Internal citations omitted.) Even when the “Legislature has delegated such broad authority to a state administrative agency to promulgate regulations in [a particular] area, the agency’s regulations are valid under the statute if they do not contradict the statutory language or purpose.'” Lussier, 343 Md. at 688, 684 A.2d at 807 (1996) (emphasis added).
There is nothing in the statutory definition of the term “sale” that could fairly be said to cover the transaction that occurred in the instant case.11 As a result, it would not be “consistent with the letter and spirit of the law” to permit the Comptroller to impose a “sales” tax on such a transaction. Unless the legislature changes the statute, the payment of a fee to terminate a lease is not a sale and, therefore, is not subject to Maryland sales and use tax.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE COMPTROLLER.
WILNER, J., Dissents.