GREENE, Judge.
Jay Stearman and Carla Stearman are married. On June 5, 2002, Mrs. Stearman suffered serious injuries as a result of an accident that occurred while she was passenger in a vehicle driven by Mr. Stearman. Mrs. Stearman sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Mr. Stearman in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Mrs. Stearman alleged that her husband’s negligence caused her injuries. She and Mr. Stearman both sought a declaration that the household exclusion in State Farm’s auto liability insurance policy was invalid. The trial court heard argument on the motions on July 28, 2003, and granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment, declaring that the household exclusion was valid. The Stearmans noted their appeal and cross-appeal on August 7, 2003. Thereafter, Mr. Stearman filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted before the Court of Special Appeals heard the case. Stearman v. State Farm, 377 Md. 111, 832 A.2d 204 (2003).
The issue before the Court is the validity of a household exclusion that reduces the limit of liability in an auto insurance policy to the statutory minimum amount, if that policy otherwise provides liability coverage in excess of the statutory minimum liability limits. We hold that the exclusion is valid.
FACTS
As a result of the June 5, 2002 collision, Mrs. Stearman suffered serious injuries, including a broken rib, a broken [439]*439collar bone, and a collapsed lung. The only vehicle involved in the collision was the vehicle driven by Mr. Stearman. Mrs. Stearman alleges that her husband’s negligence caused the collision and her injuries.
At the time of the collision, appellant and his wife were both insured by State Farm under an automobile policy that obligates State Farm to pay “damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because of bodily injury to others ... caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use” of an insured vehicle. The declarations page of the policy provides for $100,000 per person of bodily injury liability coverage.
The policy also includes the following language under the Liability Coverage section of the policy:
Who is an Insured
When we refer to your car, a newly acquired car or a temporary substitute car, insured means:
1. you;
2. your spouse;
3. the relatives of the first person named in the declarations;
4. any other person while using such a car if its use is within the scope of consent of you or your spouse; and
5. any other person or organization liable for the use of such a car by one of the above insureds.
(Emphasis in the original.)1
The policy also included the following restriction on coverage:
When Coverage Does Not Apply.
In addition to the limitations of coverage in Who is an Insured and Trailer Coverage:
THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
***
2. FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO:
[440]*440* * *
c. ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF AN INSURED’S FAMILY RESIDING IN THE INSURED’S HOUSEHOLD TO THE EXTENT THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF THIS POLICY EXCEED THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY REQUIRED BY LAW.
(Emphasis in original.)
DISCUSSION
The Stearmans argue that State Farm’s attempt to reduce liability coverage from the stated policy amount of $100,000 per person to the statutory limit of $20,000 per person is unsuccessful because such a restriction is invalid and void as against public policy. State Farm, however, asserts that this Court’s decision in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 307 Md. 631, 516 A.2d 586 (1986), invalidated household exclusions that attempted to exclude coverage below the statutory mínimums, but also validated household exclusions that provided coverage above the statutory minimum. We agree with State Farm’s position.
Prior to State Farm v. Nationwide, however, this Court decided Jennings v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166 (1985). In Jennings, we held that a household exclusion clause in an automobile liability insurance policy was invalid because the clause was contrary to the public policy as embodied in the compulsory automobile insurance requirements. Id. at 357, 488 A.2d at 168. The household exclusion in the policy in that case excluded all liability coverage for injury to the insured and members of his household. Id. at 354, 488 A.2d at 167. The insured, Jennings, was a passenger in an automobile owned by him and operated by his stepson at the time of Jennings’s injuries. Id. at 353-54, 488 A.2d at 167.
Jennings sued his stepson and obtained a default judgment in the amount of $100,000. Id. at 354, 488 A.2d at 167. Jennings then brought a declaratory judgment action against [441]*441GEICO, seeking to establish that GEICO must pay the judgment that Jennings obtained against his stepson. Jennings, 302 Md. at 354, 488 A.2d at 167. Jennings contended that the household exclusion was void because it was contrary to statute. Id. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment and the circuit court granted GEICO’s motion. Id. at 354-55, 488 A.2d at 167. Jennings appealed, and, prior to the argument in the Court of Special Appeals, this Court granted certiorari. Id. at 355, 488 A.2d at 167.
We noted, generally, that any clause in an insurance policy that is contrary to the public policy of this State, as set forth in any statute, is invalid and unenforceable. Id. at 356, 488 A.2d at 168. We concluded, specifically, that the household exclusion clause in Jennings violated the public policy embodied in the 1972 General Assembly’s action to require compulsory automobile insurance for all Maryland automobiles, with specific mandatory minimum coverage amounts.2 Jennings, 302 Md. at 357, 488 A.2d at 168. The General Assembly expressly authorized certain exclusions from mandatory coverage in the statutory provisions enacted in 1972. Id. at 358, 488 A.2d at 169. The household exclusion was not among those expressed by the Legislature, and, consequently, we stated that we “will not insert exclusions from the required coverages beyond those expressly set forth by the Legislature.” Id. at 358-59, 488 A.2d at 169. Such an exclusion would be “ ‘contrary to the remedial legislative purpose of assuring compensation for damages to victims of motor vehicle accidents....’” Id. at 359, 488 A.2d at 169 (quoting Pennsylvania Nat’l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 156, 416 A.2d 734 [442]*442(1980) (invalidating an insurance policy provision that excluded an insured from PIP coverage)).
We emphasized that “[w]hile many exclusions in automobile insurance policies do not conflict with legislative policy and are therefore valid, the so-called household exclusion from compulsory automobile liability insurance does not fall into such a category.” Jennings, 302 Md. at 362, 488 A.2d at 171 (emphasis added). Jennings invalidated a provision of a policy that excluded an insured from all liability coverage. It did not address the question of whether such a household exclusion would be valid above mandatory minimum coverage requirements. That question was resolved by this Court in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 307 Md. 631, 516 A.2d 586 (1986).
In State Farm, we addressed whether a household exclusion was “wholly invalid, or whether its invalidity extends only to the amount of the minimum liability coverage required by the compulsory insurance law.” Id. at 633, 516 A.2d at 586-87. We concluded that such an exclusion was invalid to the extent of the statutory limits. Id. at 633, 516 A.2d at 587.
In State Farm, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company insured Carroll, who suffered injuries as a result of an accident that took place when he was a passenger in his own insured vehicle. Id. A friend of Carroll’s, named Glass, drove the vehicle off the road and it overturned, killing Glass and another passenger, and injuring Carroll. Id. Carroll sued Glass’s estate. State Farm, 307 Md. at 634, 516 A.2d at 587. Glass had been insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and her policy insured her against liability for any accident involving her use of a motor vehicle belonging to someone who, like Carroll, was not a member of her household. Id. at 633-34, 516 A.2d at 587. Carroll’s policy included liability coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Id. at 633, 516 A.2d at 587. Carroll’s policy also excluded coverage for injury to “any insured or any member of an insured’s family residing in the insured’s household.” Id.
[443]*443Nationwide sought a declaration that the household exclusion in State Farm’s policy was void as against public policy. Id. at 634, 516 A.2d at 587. State Farm argued that the exclusion was valid. State Farm, 307 Md. at 634, 516 A.2d at 587. As noted in State Farm, while that case was pending in the circuit court, this Court decided Jennings, in which we decided that a household exclusion that eliminated all liability coverage was invalid. Id. at 634, 516 A.2d at 587. Consequently, State Farm and Nationwide agreed that Jennings eliminated State Farm’s argument that the exclusion in this case was valid below the statutory minimum personal injury coverage of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per incident, required by section 17 — 103(b)(1) of the Transportation Article. Id. Nonetheless, State Farm maintained that the exclusion should be considered valid above the statutory minimum requirements. Id. at 635, 516 A.2d at 587.
To answer the question raised in State Farm, this Court discussed Jennings and its review of the history of the treatment of household exclusions. Id. at 635, 516 A.2d at 588. We also noted that, before 1972, Maryland upheld the validity of exclusions that were not precluded by statute. State Farm, 307 Md. at 635, 516 A.2d at 588. Beginning in 1972, the General Assembly changed the public policy of the State by mandating compulsory automobile insurance with minimum coverage amounts.3 Id.
We noted that Jennings spoke in “broad terms” about the invalidity of the household exclusion in that case “because of its violation of the statutory compulsory liability insurance policy.” Id. at 636, 516 A.2d at 588. We concluded, however, that while Jennings did not deal specifically with the question before the Court in State Farm, the reasoning in Jennings supported State Farm’s argument that excluding household [444]*444liability coverage above the mínimums required by statute does not violate public policy. Id. at 636-37, 516 A.2d at 588-89.
Put simply, what the legislature has prohibited is liability coverage of less than the minimum amounts required by § 17 — 103(b)(1) of the Transportation Article.... The “household exclusion” violates public policy only to the extent that it operates to prevent this mandatory minimum coverage.
Id. at 637, 516 A.2d at 589.
The purpose of the Maryland compulsory insurance statutes is to “ ‘[assure] recovery for innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents.’ ” State Farm, 307 Md. 631 at 639, 516 A.2d at 590 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund., 277 Md. 602, 604, 356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976)). Nonetheless, we stated in State Farm that we “do not view that purpose as extending beyond the prescribed statutory minimum coverage, so far as the ‘household exclusion’ is concerned.” Id. at 640, 516 A.2d at 590.4 Succinctly stated, the public policy in question in State Farm and in the case at bar is
that all automobile liability policies shall contain bodily injury or death liability coverage in at least the amount of $20,000/$40,000. To permit the “household exclusion” to operate within those limits would be to “deprive injured persons of the protection which the Legislature intended to provide,” Keystone Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hinds, 180 Md. 676, 682, 26 A.2d 761, 763 (1942), and would violate public policy.
***
We hold, therefore, that the “insured” segment of a “household exclusion” clause in an automobile liability insurance policy is invalid to the extent of the minimum statutory liability coverage. So far as the public policy evidenced by [445]*445the compulsory insurance law is concerned, it is a valid and enforceable contractual provision as to coverage above that minimum.
Id. at 643, 644, 516 A.2d at 592.5
Despite the clear holding in State Farm, the Stearmans contend that the holding is “limited to the facts of that case and is not a general validation of exclusions above statutory minimum required limits.”6 While we would agree that State Farm is not a “general validation” of any exclusion above a statutory minimum, we think it quite clear that the case does validate household exclusions above those mínimums.
In support of their arguments, the Stearmans cite West American Insurance Co. v. Popa, 352 Md. 455, 723 A.2d 1 (1998). In that case, we invalidated insurance policy provisions that excluded vehicles owned or operated by a self-insurer or by any governmental unit or agency from the definition of uninsured/underinsured vehicles. Id. at 474, 723 A.2d at 10. In support of that holding, we stated that “this Court has consistently held that exclusions from statutorily [446]*446mandated insurance coverage not expressly authorized by the Legislature generally will not be recognized.” Id. at 475, 728 A.2d at 10.
Relying on State Farm v. Nationwide, West American argued, in the alternative, that in the event that the exclusions are invalidated, they are void only to the extent of the $20,000/$40,000 statutorily required minimum liability insurance limits. West American Insurance Co. v. Popa, 352 Md. at 476, 723 A.2d at 11. We rejected that argument and distinguished State Farm from West American Insurance:
In State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide, supra, this Court held that a “household exclusion” to liability coverage in an automobile insurance policy was invalid only to the extent of the $20,000/$40,000 statutorily prescribed minimum liability coverage. The holding of the State Farm Mut. case, however, has not been applied by this Court to any other automobile insurance policy exclusions or provisions. Moreover, we have specifically declined to apply the State Farm Mut. holding in a context other than the household exclusion to liability coverage. See Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual [Ins. Co.], supra, 334 Md. [669] at 694-696, 641 A.2d [195] at 207-208.
Id. at 477, 723 A.2d at 11-12. We also dismissed West American’s suggestion that any exclusion above statutory minimum limits would be acceptable:
Adoption of the broad proposition advanced by West American would permit insurers to load up motor vehicle insurance policies with a multitude of invalid exclusions, thereby limiting coverage in numerous situations to the statutory mínimums instead of the stated coverage limits set forth on the insured’s declaration page.
***
Persons who paid much more in premiums for coverage in excess of mínimums could, in many circumstances, receive no more than those who only paid for minimum coverages. Consequently, we decline to extend the holding of State [447]*447Farm Mut v. Nationwide, supra, beyond the household exclusion clause which was involved in that case.
West American Insurance Co. v. Popa, 352 Md. at 477, 723 A.2d at 12.
In West American Insurance, we refused to extend the holding of Stale Farm to a case involving uninsured motorist exclusions.7 It is equally clear that the holding of State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide is applicable to other household exclusion cases, like the one currently before the Court. The Stearmans’s argument to the contrary is simply not persuasive. As summarized in Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, 334 Md. 669, 694-95, 641 A.2d 195, 207 (1994):
In State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide Mut., supra, this Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., supra, 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166, that a “household exclusion” clause in an automobile liability insurance policy was contrary to the public policy embodied in Maryland’s compulsory motor vehicle insurance law. We went on in State Farm, however, to hold that the household exclusion clause was invalid only to the extent of the statutorily prescribed minimum liability coverage of $20,000/$40, 000. We pointed out that it could “readily be inferred that the premium took account of the exclusion contained in the policy” (307 Md. at 638, 516 A.2d at 589), that the majority of compulsory insurance jurisdictions had invalidated household exclusion clauses only to the extent of the statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum liability coverage (307 Md. [448]*448at 641-43, 516 A.2d at 591-592), and that “[a]s a general rule, parties are free to contract as they wish” (307 Md. at 643, 516 A.2d at 592).
The Stearmans also argue that Section 19~502(b) of the Insurance Article evidences a legislative intention that automobile insurance policies that provide liability coverage in excess of the statutory mínimums must not exclude that level of coverage in any situation. We do not see how the language cited declares such an intention. The statute provides:
On amount of liability coverage provided by insurer.— Neither this subtitle nor Title 17 of the Transportation Article prevents an insurer from issuing, selling, or delivering motor vehicle liability insurance policies that provide liability coverage in excess of the requirements of the Maryland Vehicle Law.
Md.Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.) § 19-502(b) of the Insurance Article. The plain language of the quoted section evidences an intention to permit insurance companies to offer policies that contain greater coverage than that required by statute.8 It certainly does not require insurance companies to provide coverage greater than that mandated by statute. Nor does it display a legislative intention to change the public policy embodied in the statutorily mandated minimum liability coverage requirements. The Stearmans have cited no Maryland case that supports such a position.
[449]*449They argue, however, that the remedial nature of Maryland’s comprehensive motor vehicle insurance scheme (that of assuring compensation for damages to victims of motor vehicle accidents, as noted in Jennings, 302 Md. at 359, 488 A.2d at 169), must be given “a liberal construction to effectuate its purpose.” Even employing a “liberal construction” of Section 19-502(b), we cannot construe it to mean what the Stearmans suggest. To do so would be illogical and unreasonable. See Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 419, 422 (1997) (noting that our goal is to give statutes their “most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used”); Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994) (stating that we will avoid constructions that are “illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense”).
As we noted previously, the purpose of the Maryland compulsory insurance statutes is to “ ‘[assure] recovery for innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents.’ ” State Farm, 307 Md. at 639, 516 A.2d at 590 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund., 277 Md. 602, 604, 356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976)). Despite the allure of the idea of total compensation for any innocent victim of a motor vehicle accident, there is no indication that the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting the compulsory insurance statutes was to assure complete insurance recovery for all victims.9 As we [450]*450stated in State Farm, we “do not view that purpose as extending beyond the prescribed statutory minimum coverage, so far as the ‘household exclusion’ is concerned.” State Farm, 307 Md. at 640, 516 A.2d at 590. Clearly, if the General Assembly had intended something closer to complete insurance recovery for all victims, they would have said so or increased the mandatory minimum liability limits.
The Stearmans argue that we should overrule State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide. They have not convinced us, however, that the public policy (regarding mandatory minimum liability insurance and household exclusions) has changed since State Farm was decided. Neither have they shown us why the reasoning in State Farm was flawed and should be overruled.
They do argue that Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003) and Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983), changed the public policy regarding interspousal immunity10 and that as a result, we should rethink the public policy as outlined by the insurance statutes discussed in State Farm. The relevant change in the interspousal immunity doctrine occurred in 1983 (three years before State Farm and two years before Jennings), with the issuance of this Court’s opinion in Boblitz. In that case, we partially abrogated the [451]*451common law doctrine of interspousal immunity as to cases sounding in negligence. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522.
If the Court believed that such a change in common law required a declaration that household exclusions in liability automobile insurance policies should be completely invalidated, we could have done so in State Farm or Jennings.11 Our holding in Bozman, which completely invalidated the doctrine of interspousal immunity (by taking away immunity for any kind of intentional tort), adds little to the analysis.
The question of whether the abrogation of interspousal immunity for cases sounding in negligence should change our view of household exclusions has not been directly before this Court. The Court of Special Appeals, however, has addressed the issue and decided that Boblitz did not demand the invalidation of household exclusions above the amounts required by statute. Walther v. Allstate Insurance Company, 83 Md.App. 405, 575 A.2d 339 (1990), cert. denied, 320 Md. 801, 580 A.2d 219 (1990). In that case, the Walthers made the same argument made by the Stearmans in the case at bar.
Because Boblitz abolished interspousal immunity in negligence cases, the Walthers aver that the limitation on household claims imposed by the Maryland Financial Responsibility Law violates the public policy derived from Boblitz. The Walthers reason that the abrogation of interspousal immunity not only permits Mrs. Walther to sue her husband for all damages she sustained as a result of his negligence but to assert that because the Maryland Financial Responsibility Law prohibits them from recovering damages in excess of $20,000 it violates public policy. Overlooked by that simplistic argument is the fact that Mrs. Walther is not pre[452]*452eluded from recovering damages from her husband in excess of $20,000 but merely from obtaining more than $20,000 from her husband’s insurance carrier, Allstate.
Walther, 83 Md.App. at 407, 575 A.2d at 340-41. We agree with the intermediate appellate court’s reasoning on this question.
There is no question that public policy regarding whether spouses may sue each other has changed. The law is now crystal clear. Spouses can sue each other for anything that strangers could, with no fear that the defendant spouse will be permitted to raise interspousal immunity as a defense. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003) (completing the abrogation of the doctrine, including for the first time, any type of intentional tort); Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983) (abrogating the doctrine as to cases sounding in negligence); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 335, 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (abrogating the doctrine where the conduct constituting the tort was “outrageous” and “intentional”). The question presented in the case at bar, however, is a different question altogether. The question is, who pays the judgment, the negligent spouse or the negligent spouse’s insurance company? Does Maryland’s change in public policy regarding the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity require the insurance company of the negligent spouse to pay for the recovery of the injured spouse, even though the contract between the negligent spouse and the insurance company provides that there will be no recovery above the statutorily required mínimums? Such a contract provision is clearly allowable under the mandatory minimum requirements laid out by the Legislature.
We recognize that the public policy represented by the complete abrogation of the interspousal immunity doctrine could be viewed as a policy that conflicts with the public policy embodied in the mandatory minimum liability insurance requirements set by the Legislature. For example, as noted by this Court in Bozman, one of the underpinnings of the inter-spousal immunity doctrine was the notion that it prevented [453]*453collusive and fraudulent claims. Bozman, 376 Md. at 481, 830 A.2d at 462. We noted in Boblitz, that “ ‘it seems unjust to deny the claims of the many because of the potentiality for fraud by the few.’ ” Boblitz, 296 Md. at 268-69, 462 A.2d at 518-19, (quoting Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859 (1981), in turn quoting Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481, 488 (1970)). Similarly, the protection of the insurer from “collusive or cozy claims” has traditionally been the reason for household exclusions found in insurance policies. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Briscoe, 245 Md. 147, 151, 225 A.2d 270, 271 (1967).12
Nonetheless, we think that the General Assembly, not the Court, is the appropriate body to reconcile those conflicting policies, in light of the fact that the policy directly at issue in this case is a result of statute in the first place.
There is no doubt that this Court had the power to abrogate the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity. Bozman, 376 Md. at 494, 830 A.2d at 470. Moreover, despite the value of the doctrine of stare decisis and the fact that “ ‘changes in decisional doctrine ordinarily should be left to the legislature,’ ” Bozman, 376 Md. at 492, 830 A.2d at 468 (quoting Boblitz, 296 Md. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521), we recognized in Bozman that it was “eminently wise” of this Court to abrogate a common law doctrine that had become an outmoded vestige of the past. Bozman, 376 Md. at 495, 830 A.2d at 470.
[454]*454By stark contrast, the public policy that the Stearmans urge us to change now is not a policy that has been developed by the courts through common law. Rather, it was an act of the Legislature that created the policy, and ordinarily only an act of the Legislature can change that policy.13 As noted by this Court in State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 510, 325 A.2d 573, 578 (1974), “[w]hen the common law and a statute collide, the statute, if constitutional, controls.” We will not invade the province of the General Assembly and rewrite the law for them, no matter how just or fair we may think such a new law or public policy would be. The formidable doctrine of separation of powers demands that the courts remain in the sphere that belongs uniquely to the judiciary— that of interpreting, but not creating, the statutory law. Article 8 of the Maryland Constitution declares “[t]hat the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.”
As we stated in Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 295 Md. 442, 460, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983),
in considering whether a long-established common law rule — unchanged by the legislature and thus reflective of this State’s public policy — is unsound in the circumstances of modern life, we have always recognized that declaration of the public policy of Maryland is normally the function of the General Assembly....
The question in Harrison was whether the Court should modify the judicially-created doctrine of contributory negligence. Id. at 444, 456 A.2d at 894. The principle of leaving the creation of public policy to the Legislature is even stronger in a case such as the present one, where the public policy in question is one created by the Legislature in the first in[455]*455stance.14 As discussed in Harrison, “[t]he rationale underlying these decisions [to refuse to abrogate a common law doctrine] is buttressed where the legislature has declined to enact legislation to effectuate the proposed change.” Harrison, 295 Md. at 461-62, 456 A.2d at 904. The refusal of the Legislature to act to change a legislatively enacted public policy (as opposed to a common law one) provides even greater support for the Court to exercise restraint and refuse to step in and make the change, unless constitutional violations exist.
Therefore, it is important that we discuss the attempts in the General Assembly in the recent past to make the change the Stearmans urge us to make now. Every year since 2000, legislators have introduced bills in the General Assembly that would require insurance companies to offer insureds liability coverage for claims made by a family member in the same amount as the liability coverage purchased for claims made by a nonfamily member. None of these bills were enacted until this year, when the Governor signed Senate Bill 460 into law.15
[456]*456This further evidences that the Legislature has recognized a need to act in this area and has chosen to do so. As stated in Harrison, “while we recognize the force of the plaintiffs argument, ‘in the present state of the law, we leave any change in the established doctrine to the Legislature.’ ” Harrison, 295 Md. 442 at 463, 456 A.2d 894 at 905 (quoting White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 355, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966)).
In Allstate Insurance v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 829 A.2d 611 (2003), we discussed the 2001 Act of the General Assembly abolishing the defense of parent-child immunity in a motor vehicle tort action. Id. at 281, 829 A.2d at 613. In discussing the history of the parent-child immunity doctrine in Maryland, we noted that:
[w]e rejected several entreaties to add an additional exception for actions arising from motor torts, despite the existence of limited compulsory insurance in Maryland. Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986); Warren v. Warren, supra, 336 Md. 618, 650 A.2d 252 [(1994)]; Renko v. McLean, supra, 346 Md. 464, 697 A.2d 468 [(1997)]; Eagan v. Calhoun, supra, 347 Md. [72] at 81, 698 A.2d [1097] at 1102 [(1997)]. In Frye and Warren, we expressed the beliefs that exclusion of motor torts from the immunity doctrine would inevitably have some impact on the compulsory insurance program mandated by the Legislature and that, if an exception of that kind was to be made, it should “be created by the General Assembly after an examination of appropriate policy considerations in light of the current statutory scheme.” Frye, supra, 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839; Warren, supra, 336 Md. at 627, 650 A.2d at 257.
Id. at 282-83, 829 A.2d at 614. If we would not make an exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine for motor torts because of a recognition that to do so would impact the compulsory insurance laws, we see no reason why we should invade the province of the Legislature to affect the compulsory insurance laws as they relate to interspousal immunity.
[457]*457It is interesting to note that when the Legislature acted in 2001 to abrogate the doctrine of parent-child immunity in motor tort actions, it did so within the limits of the mandatory minimum liability coverage amounts required by the Transportation Article. Section 5 — 806(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides:
The right of action by a parent or the estate of a parent against a child of the parent, or by a child or the estate of a child against a parent of the child, for wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle ... may not be restricted by the doctrine of parent-child immunity or by any insurance poliey provisions, up to the mandatory minimum liability coverage levels required by § 17-103(b) of the Transportation Article.
Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl. VoL), § 5-806(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Contrary to the Stearmans’ arguments that the current compulsory insurance laws display a public policy that would demand complete insurance coverage for injury to spouses, the Legislature did not see fit to provide complete insurance coverage for injury to children and parents. There is no reason to presume an undeclared public policy that is more favorable to husbands and wives than to children and parents. Nor can we assume that we misread the public policy when we decided State Farm, and later cases that cited State Farm,. We see no reason to overrule that case, especially in view of the fact that to do so in the way the Stearmans suggest would constitute an unlawful intrusion into the province of the Legislature.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY ALL COSTS.
BELL, C.J., dissents and files opinion joined by BATTAGLIA, J.