Collins v. State

321 Ga. 215

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: March 4, 2025
• Docket: S25A0032
• Status: Published

Opinion

321 Ga. 215 FINAL COPY

S25A0032. COLLINS v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

Quame Lamar Collins appeals his convictions related to the

armed robbery of three men, resulting in the deaths of Eddie Louis

Grubbs and Marshall Jordan and injuries to Walter Smith. 1 Collins

argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a

1 The shootings occurred on January 23, 2017. On August 3, 2017, a

Burke County grand jury indicted Collins, charging him with malice murder and felony murder based on the killing of Grubbs (Counts 1 and 2), malice murder and felony murder based on the killing of Jordan (Counts 5 and 6), armed robbery (Count 3), possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 4, 7, and 9), aggravated assault against Smith (Count 8), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 10). At a bifurcated trial in June 2021, the jury found Collins guilty on all counts. On June 21, 2021, the trial court sentenced Collins to two consecutive life sentences without parole for the counts of malice murder (Counts 1 and 5), a consecutive life sentence for armed robbery (Count 3), consecutive five-year sentences for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 4, 7, and 9), a consecutive 20-year sentence for aggravated assault (Count 8), and a consecutive ten-year sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 10). Although the trial court purported to merge the felony murder counts, those counts were actually vacated by operation of law. See Whittaker v. State, 317 Ga. 127, 138 (5) (891 SE2d 849) (2023). On July 2, 2021, Collins made a timely motion for a new trial, which was amended on May 16, 2024. After a hearing, the trial court denied Collins’s motion for a new trial. On July 2, 2024, Collins timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred by not granting his

request for a mistrial; and (3) the trial court erred by admitting

certain hearsay statements. We conclude that the evidence was

constitutionally sufficient; Collins waived his right to complain

about the trial court’s denial of his motion for mistrial; and even if

some of the alleged hearsay statements should have been excluded,

their admission was harmless because they were cumulative of

other, properly admitted evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

The evidence at trial showed the following. In January 2017,

Grubbs lived in a single-wide mobile home with his cousin, Robbie

Freeman, and Freeman’s girlfriend, Joyce Striggles Herndon. The

mobile home had a small addition in the back, where Grubbs would

play dominoes with his friends. On January 23, 2017, Grubbs was

playing dominoes in the back room with Jordan and Smith. Herndon

was sitting in the living room when she heard a knock on the door.

Herndon answered the door, and a man she knew as “Fat Boy” asked

to see Grubbs. “Fat Boy” was accompanied by a younger male, who

looked middle-school-aged. Herndon let the two males into the

2 mobile home and told them that Grubbs was in the back room. The

two males went down the hallway into the back room and started

shooting. Herndon heard two shots, ran out of the mobile home

through the front door, and hid behind a tree. As she was running,

Herndon heard two additional shots.

Grubbs’s nephew, Anthony, who was working at his straw field

adjacent to Grubbs’s mobile home, testified that he saw a black

Dodge Journey with a paper tag in his driveway the day of the

shooting. Additionally, Roger Young, who worked for Anthony, was

sitting on Anthony’s porch when he saw two men running across the

field in front of Grubbs’s home. Young testified that one man was

“heavyset,” the other man was “slim,” and Young heard gunshots

shortly after the two men entered Grubbs’s mobile home. Young

then saw Herndon run out of the mobile home and the heavyset man

run across the field into a black SUV. Young did not see the slim

man exit the mobile home.

After the shooters left, Anthony and Herndon went into

Grubbs’s mobile home. They found Grubbs dead in his chair, Jordan

3 dead on the floor, and Smith sitting in his chair struggling to

breathe. Herndon called 911 at 2:50 p.m., and officers arrived at the

scene shortly thereafter.

Approximately ten minutes after arriving at the scene, an

officer with the Burke County Sheriff’s Office interviewed Herndon.

During the interview, Herndon identified “Fat Boy” as a potential

suspect. After a brief investigation, the officer concluded that Collins

was associated with the nickname. Another officer, who was

unaware that Collins was a suspect, showed Herndon a six-person

photographic lineup that included Collins. Herndon identified

Collins in the photographic lineup as the individual she knew as

“Fat Boy.” The day after the shooting, Jermaine Williams, who was

a friend of the victims, showed Herndon a picture of Collins, and

Herndon once again confirmed that Collins was the shooter.

During the processing of the scene, a GBI agent noticed that

Grubbs’s front pants pocket was turned out and empty. Grubbs’s

wallet was later found in a driveway in South Augusta. Several days

later, investigators obtained and executed a search warrant for

4 Collins’s cell phone data. The records revealed that on the day of the

shooting, Collins’s phone was turned off between 1:37 p.m. and 3:22

p.m.

On January 25 and 27, 2017, Georgia Bureau of Investigation

Special Agent Mary Chandler met with Tonya Simmons, a friend of

Collins’s family, to discuss the shooting. At trial, the State called

Simmons as a witness, but she denied speaking to Agent Chandler.

As a result, the State introduced the recordings of these interviews

to impeach Simmons’s denials.

In the first recorded interview, Simmons stated that the day

after the shooting she saw Collins meet with his mother, Uzetta

Gresham, at a Sprint gas station in the Augusta area. While at the

gas station, Simmons heard Collins tell Gresham that he and Chris

Scott went to do a “lick,” he shot “the guy,” a woman ran out of the

door, he chased her, the gun jammed, he was worried that this

woman could identify him, and that they ditched the “hot box” with

the “paper tag.” Simmons reiterated the same information in the

second interview. During his deposition, Smith could not recall

5 whether he saw the assailant. As a result, the State played a prior

recorded interview of Smith taken the day after the shooting to

refresh his recollection during the deposition. In the recorded

interview, Smith stated that he saw the shooter and described the

shooter as a “slender” man.

Young testified that Collins was the heavyset man he saw

running from Grubbs’s mobile home. On direct examination, Young

stated that he “got a good look” at the heavyset man’s face as the

man was running across the field. But on cross-examination, Young

admitted that he told investigators he did not see the heavyset man’s

face.

Herndon testified that she was standing about ten feet away

from Collins after she opened the door for him on the day of the

shooting and clearly saw his face. Herndon said that she would

“never” forget his face.

1. Collins’s first enumeration of error contends that the jury

verdict “is contrary to the evidence and the principles of justice and

equity,” citing the general grounds, OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21, and

6 some unspecified special grounds, OCGA § 5-5-25. Collins does not

support this enumeration of error with any citations to the record or

argument that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion as the

thirteenth juror. Thus, Collins has abandoned this argument under

Supreme Court Rule 22. See Sauder v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 816 (7) (f)

n.21 (901 SE2d 124) (2024) (“[Appellant] makes no specific

argument and cites no authority to support any of these claims, so

we do not address them.”).

Instead, in this enumeration of error, Collins argues that the

evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions as a matter of

constitutional due process. “[I]n the past, in evaluating a trial court’s

denial of a motion for new trial on the general grounds,” this Court

has “performed or referenced a constitutional due process

sufficiency-of-the-evidence review under” Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), although many of us

question that practice. King v. State, 316 Ga. 611, 616 (2) n.8 (889

SE2d 851) (2023) (collecting cases). And although enumerations of

error cannot be expanded by arguments in the briefs, see Mims v.

7 State, 310 Ga. 853, 854 n.2 (854 SE2d 742) (2021), Collins does argue

that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We

need not consider today whether it is appropriate to review

constitutional sufficiency when the appellant’s enumeration of error

is limited to general and special grounds, because the evidence

against Collins was constitutionally sufficient. See King, 316 Ga. at

616 (2) n.8.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of

constitutional due process, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict and inquire whether a rational trier of fact

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. “Under this review, we must put aside any

questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or

the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to

the discretion of the trier of fact.” Mims v. State, 304 Ga. 851, 853

(1) (a) (823 SE2d 325) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

In arguing that the evidence was insufficient, Collins contends

that the testimonies of Smith, Young, and Herndon did not support

8 the conclusion that he was the shooter and that Simmons’s

testimony should not be believed. Even if Smith’s description of the

shooter as a “slender” man did not match Collins’s body type, there

was more than sufficient evidence that Collins was involved as a

party to the crime. See OCGA § 16-2-20 (a) (“Every person concerned

in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged

with and convicted of commission of the crime.”); Byers v. State, 311

Ga. 259, 265 (1) (857 SE2d 447) (2021) (“[A] defendant need not be

charged specifically as a party to the crime in order to support a

conviction based on that theory.”); Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 745

(1) (733 SE2d 294) (2012) (holding evidence was sufficient to support

the defendant’s murder conviction as a party to the crime even

assuming that the defendant’s companion, and not the defendant,

fired the fatal shot, as they were engaged in a common enterprise at

the time of the shooting and it could be reasonably inferred from the

evidence that they shared a criminal intent). On three separate

occasions, Herndon identified Collins as one of the individuals she

let into the mobile home before hearing gunshots ring out. And

9 although Young gave conflicting testimony about whether he “got a

good look” at Collins when Collins was running out of the mobile

home, “[i]t is the role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the

evidence[.]” Green v. State, 304 Ga. 385, 387-388 (1) (818 SE2d 535)

(2018).

In addition to this eyewitness testimony, Simmons testified

that Collins relayed details of the crime to Simmons that would be

known only by the perpetrators. Collins challenges her credibility,

as well as that of Young and Herndon, but this was a matter for the

jury to resolve. “It is the role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the

evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses, and the

resolution of such conflicts adversely to the defendant does not

render the evidence insufficient.” Green, 304 Ga. at 387-388 (1)

(citation and punctuation omitted); see also Coley v. State, 305 Ga.

658, 661 (2) (827 SE2d 241) (2019) (“As long as there is some

competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact

necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be

upheld.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Brooks v. State, 298

10 Ga. 722, 722-723 (783 SE2d 895) (2016) (sufficient evidence of malice

murder where, among other things, defendant provided specific

details of the crime known only to the perpetrator). In short, the

evidence was sufficient to support Collins’s convictions.

2. Collins contends that the trial court erred in denying his

motion for mistrial after the State introduced evidence of his alleged

gang affiliation. Specifically, Simmons’s first interview with Agent

Chandler contains a brief discussion of Collins’s potential affiliation

with the “GD” gang. After this portion of the interview was played

for the jury, Collins moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the

motion but offered to give a curative instruction, which Collins

declined. Because Collins rejected the trial court’s offer of a curative

instruction, he “waived his right to complain about the trial court’s

denial of his motion for mistrial.” Dobbins v. State, 309 Ga. 163, 166

(3) (844 SE2d 814) (2020); see also Stephens v. State, 307 Ga. 731,

740 (5) (b) (838 SE2d 275) (2020); Brewer v. State, 301 Ga. 819, 820

11 (2) (804 SE2d 410) (2017). 2 Accordingly, this enumeration leaves

nothing for us to review.

3. Collins also argues that the trial court erred when it

admitted Simmons’s January 25 and 27 interviews because she was

repeating information she heard from Gresham, rather than Collins,

and thus the interviews contained inadmissible hearsay. But in the

interviews, it is clear that Simmons was repeating certain

admissions Collins made to her, so these statements are admissible

as statements of a party opponent. See OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2). To

the extent that Simmons was repeating statements Gresham made,

they were cumulative of other evidence, and thus any error in their

admission was harmless. See Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 335 (2)

2 Some of us doubt the validity of a bright-line rule that any refusal of a

curative instruction waives the right to appeal the denial of a mistrial. There may be some prejudicial matters as to which a curative instruction would be insufficient. But this case does not present that question. See Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 896-898 (3) (873 SE2d 185) (2022) (holding that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a mistrial was not erroneous and a curative instruction was sufficient to remedy any alleged prejudice resulting from the witness’s brief mention of the defendant’s gang affiliation); Smith v. State, 302 Ga. 699, 701-702 (3) (808 SE2d 692) (2017) (holding that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a mistrial was not erroneous and a “curative instruction was sufficient to counter any alleged harm caused by the witness’s brief statement” about the defendant’s involvement with drugs). 12 (806 SE2d 573) (2017).

“The admission of evidence is committed to the sound

discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision whether to

admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an

abuse of discretion.” Anglin, 302 Ga. at 335 (2). “And the erroneous

admission of hearsay is harmless where substantial, cumulative,

legally admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced.” Id. at 336

(2); see also Campbell v. State, 320 Ga. 333, 343 (3) (b) (907 SE2d

871) (2024) (holding that non-constitutional error is harmless when

“it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict”

(citation and punctuation omitted)).

During her first interview with Agent Chandler, Simmons said,

she was getting her information “from listening to her story, the

mother’s story, not from him, his mouth.” And the “mother” was

“saying something about a lady running out the back door” and

trying to get Collins a lawyer. However, Simmons also stated that

Collins told her this information directly. Because Simmons’s story

was hard to follow, Agent Chandler clarified that the information

13 was coming from Collins:

CHANDLER: And the mother told him that he needed to tell that and turn himself in? SIMMONS: Well, well the mother said first get a lawyer. And so the lawyer, uh, could do something. You know, to take the case, you know — CHANDLER: Yeah. SIMMONS: — the lawyer take the case — CHANDLER: And she told him that after he told her what happened? SIMMONS: Right, what had happened, yes. CHANDLER: That him and Chris Scott went to do a lick, and that they, uh, he shot the guy, that they, the woman ran out the door, he chased her but the gun jammed, couldn’t shoot her, he’s worried she can ID him, and then they ditched the hot box and they had put a paper tag on it, drive out tag on it, and that they ditched Chris’s phone, and that he’s hiding out at Georgetown and Chris is hiding out at Richmond Villas in Augusta? Is that correct? SIMMONS: Right, that’s correct. CHANDLER: And they told you all that at a Sprint gas station? SIMMONS: That’s what he was telling the mother. CHANDLER: Yeah, but you — SIMMONS: I was standing there, so I could hear it. I could hear him talking, yeah. CHANDLER: But then you asked him a couple of questions about it too, right? SIMMONS: Yeah, I did ask him — I asked him what “did you do wrong.”

Collins admitted to Simmons that he shot “a guy,” saying that he

had no choice. In the second interview, Simmons confirmed that she

14 was present when Collins admitted to Gresham that he participated

in the shooting. At trial, Collins objected to the recorded interviews,

arguing that because Simmons was repeating statements “she heard

from the mother,” the interviews contained inadmissible hearsay.

Because Collins was present when the statements were made, the

trial court overruled the objection.

Collins argues that there is no evidence to support the trial

court’s conclusion that the statements were made by him or in his

presence. We disagree. In the first interview, Simmons

unequivocally stated that she heard Collins say he shot the victims,

chased a woman out of the door, and ditched the “hot box” with the

“paper tag.” In the second interview, Simmons once again confirmed

that Collins said he was the shooter. Thus, the trial court properly

admitted those statements as statements by a party opponent. See

OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2).

It is true that in both interviews Simmons also repeats

statements that Gresham made, and it is arguably unclear whether

Collins was present when those statements were made and thus

15 whether those statements would be admissible as adoptive

admissions. See OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (B). But the information

that Gresham provided to Simmons was cumulative of the

information Collins provided directly. Thus, even assuming that the

statements were inadmissible, any alleged error in admitting them

was harmless. See Anglin, 302 Ga. at 335-336 (2); see also Rutledge

v. State, 298 Ga. 37, 40 (2) (779 SE2d 275) (2015) (no harm from

admission of hearsay that was “largely cumulative” of other,

properly admitted testimony). Accordingly, Collins’s claim fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

16 Decided March 4, 2025.

Murder. Burke Superior Court. Before Judge Craig.

Harold V. Jones II, for appellant.

Jared T. Williams, District Attorney, John M. Kraft, Assistant

District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.

Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Clint C. Malcolm,

Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.