NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: January 21, 2026
S25A1365. DICKERSON v. THE STATE.
LAND, Justice.
John Lorenzo Dickerson was convicted of felony murder and
other crimes for the shooting death of Bernie Givens. 1 On appeal,
1 The crimes occurred on October 1, 2016. On December 14, 2016, an
Emanuel County grand jury indicted Dickerson, charging him with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 5), criminal attempt to commit armed robbery (Count 7), and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 2, 4, 6, and 8). At a trial from September 25 to 29, 2017, a jury found Dickerson not guilty of Counts 1 and 2 but guilty of the remaining counts. On October 12, 2017, the trial court sentenced Dickerson to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 3, five years in prison on Count 4, consecutive to Count 3, 30 years in prison on Count 7, concurrent with Count 3, and five years in prison on Count 8, consecutive to Count 7 but concurrent with Count 4. Count 5 was merged with Count 3, and Count 6 was merged with Counts 3 and 4 for sentencing purposes. Dickerson filed a timely motion for new trial on October 20, 2017, which was amended several times. Following hearings on August 7, 2019, and April 6, 2022, the trial court denied Dickerson’s motion for new trial on February 10, 2025. Dickerson filed a timely notice of appeal on February 14, 2025, and the case was docketed to the August term of this Court and orally argued on November 4, 2025. Dickerson argues that the trial court erred by admitting extrinsic
evidence for the purposes of intent and identity and by giving the
jury instructions on flight and witness intimidation. He also argues
that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance
by failing to object when the State presented evidence at trial and
argued during closing that two of the State’s witnesses were
intimidated, requesting jury instructions that evidence of witness
intimidation and flight could be circumstantial evidence of guilt,
failing to object to inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay, and failing
to object to irrelevant and highly prejudicial character evidence.
Dickerson contends that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect
of these errors and omissions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. The evidence presented at trial showed as follows. At 3:09
a.m. on October 1, 2016, Givens’s girlfriend called 911 and reported
that Givens had been shot in their front yard. Givens’s girlfriend
testified that she was awakened when she “heard the gunshot,” and
ran outside because Givens called out for help. She pulled Givens –
who was still alive and able to assist – towards the house to “get him
2 to safety.” Because her cell phone had no signal, she ran down the
street to her neighbor’s house to call 911. When Givens’s girlfriend
returned, she emptied Givens’s pockets – which included money,
marijuana, a cell phone, and cigarettes – at another neighbor’s
suggestion and placed the items in a drawer of their bedroom
dresser.
Officers responded at 3:14 a.m. They saw a “blood trail from
the carport leading up into the side entrance of the house” and found
Givens “lifeless” in the kitchen area with one foot “hanging out the
door.” Givens’s girlfriend was attempting to move one of the vehicles
in the driveway to make room “for the ambulance to come in,” but
the officers stopped her when they noticed a “black … .380” Smith &
Wesson pistol lying “[i]n front of the SUV on the grass area.” The
pistol’s magazine was filled, and it did not appear to have been
recently fired. Officers also noted that, “just behind the trash can in
the sandy area it looked … like a scuffle had taken place” based on
the different “shoe impressions” in the sand. They collected
additional evidence consisting of a 9mm shell casing behind the
3 trash can; a $50 bill, a small plastic bag of cocaine, and a .380-caliber
shell casing that did not appear to have been recently fired in the
front yard; several cell phones and other narcotics in Givens’s truck;
and a pink firearm, a bag of marijuana, another cell phone, $1,361
in cash, and cigarettes in the master bedroom.
The medical examiner testified at trial that Givens suffered
“three gunshot wound defects,” all resulting from a single bullet,
which caused him to bleed out within “several minutes.” The
examiner found “no gunpowder stippling or gunpowder residue or
soot on the skin,” indicating that the shot was likely fired from more
than four feet away.
Earlier that night, a large group of people, including Givens,
had attended a block party in Swainsboro. Michael Gardner,
Givens’s cousin, testified at trial that, at some point during the
party, Givens “went down the street and started playing cards” and
ended up with “a lot of money.” Later, while Givens and Gardner
were speaking, Dickerson “walked by [them] … maybe eight or ten
times.” Each time, Dickerson looked “[k]ind of mad” and had his
4 hand “in his pocket” on what Gardner believed – from the imprint in
Dickerson’s hoodie – to be a 9mm gun. A few minutes later, Gardner
heard a gunshot and Givens said, “I knew [Dickerson] was going to
do that s**t, let’s leave.”
Maurice Pullens, Givens’s friend, testified that, prior to the
block party, Dickerson told him that he was “trying to get back to
Jersey” but that he did not have the money to do so. Later that night,
Pullens was standing with Givens as Givens “count[ed] his money.”
Givens then “noticed that [Dickerson] was checking him out” from
“across the road.” Pullens recalled that Givens said, loudly enough
for Dickerson to hear, “why you looking at me while I’m counting my
money.”
Though he gave several different stories over the course of the
investigation, Shelton Wright testified at trial that he been at the
block party that evening with Dickerson, who was showing off his
gun and “saying he needed to get some money.” Dickerson later
admitted to Wright that he was the “one that did it,” in reference to
Givens’s murder. According to Wright, Dickerson said that he and
5 Givens “were tussling and he shot,” that Givens “had a gun and he
dropped his, and [Dickerson] shot him,” and that Lonnell “Lo”
Denson was with him. 2 Dickerson claimed that he did it because “he
was trying to get back to Jersey.”
Darrell McKinney also provided several different versions of
events throughout the investigation. At trial, he testified that he had
asked Givens for about $50 worth of “dope” and that Givens told him
to meet him at Givens’s house after the block party. When McKinney
got to Givens’s house, he pulled into the driveway and talked to
Givens for a moment. He testified that “that’s when the gunfire came
up … it came from the back of the house.” He saw a white Buick that
“[w]ent up the road … turned around and … came by like slow,”
stopping two houses up from Givens’s house. McKinney saw two
people go behind that house, and then Givens was shot from “close
up” and started bleeding from his leg. McKinney heard the shooter
2 Denson was interviewed several times by investigators and was eventually arrested in relation to Givens’s murder. At the time of this trial, however, the State was still investigating Denson’s involvement in the case. Denson did not testify at Dickerson’s trial. 6 say, “I finally got you, motherf**ker.” McKinney testified that he
recognized Dickerson – who typically drove a “reddish-orange” PT
Cruiser-like car – as the shooter and Denson as the man with him.
After Givens was shot, McKinney “jumped in [his] car and [he]
threw it in reverse.” He then went back to “help [Givens] out” and
saw him bleeding profusely from his leg, but he “got scared” and
“tore out” when the house door opened. McKinney then went to a
convenience store where his cousin worked and told her about the
shooting.
Jamaica McCann-Bell – Dickerson’s girlfriend – testified that
she and Dickerson got home from the block party around 11:00 p.m.
She woke up around 3:00 a.m. and saw Dickerson sitting outside.
Shortly after, she saw two men speaking with Dickerson. Dickerson
came inside and told McCann-Bell that Givens had been killed, and
they went to the crime scene where many onlookers had gathered.
One onlooker testified at trial that, while she was at the crime scene,
Dickerson told her that Givens “didn’t get shot in the head; he got
shot in the leg.”
7 Later that night, McCann-Bell saw Dickerson take the bullets
out of a firearm and then wipe the firearm and its bullets down with
bleach. Dickerson told her that “his cousin [Travis Brown] brought
him this gun … for protection or whatever.”3 But Dickerson said that
he did not “trust it,” so he “put it back” in Brown’s house next door.4
McCann-Bell and Dickerson then went to see Dickerson’s sister.
Dickerson “took all his clothes with him” to his sister’s house.
McCann-Bell further testified that, the next day, Dickerson got
the oil changed on his “burgundy-reddish” PT Cruiser. He told her
that he wanted to leave for New Jersey because “he was receiving
threats, calls” and “word got out saying he was the one that was
involved” in Givens’s murder. McCann-Bell and Dickerson left
Swainsboro that night, but they were pulled over during a traffic
stop and arrested in New Jersey.
Dickerson’s ex-girlfriend testified that, on the night of Givens’s
murder, Dickerson texted her once and called her four times before
3 Brown testified that he did not give Dickerson a pistol that night. 4 Investigators searched Brown’s house about a month after Givens’s
murder, but they did not find a gun. 8 she woke up.5 She answered his fifth call at 3:11 a.m., and Dickerson
said “something just happened … I heard [Givens] just got killed,”
and “he was shot.”
2. Dickerson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting extrinsic evidence from a prior shooting for purposes of
intent and identity under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”).6
Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting the evidence, we conclude that any such error was
harmless and does not require reversal.
Prior to trial, the State filed notice of its intent to introduce
evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) that Dickerson had committed
aggravated assault against Tyrone Phillips two months prior to
Givens’s murder. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order
5 Dickerson’s cell phone texted “wyd” at 3:07 a.m. and then placed five
total calls to two different phone numbers associated with his ex-girlfriend between 3:08 and 3:11 a.m. on October 1, 2016. 6 Rule 404(b) provides, in relevant part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 9 admitting the evidence for purposes of intent and identity.
At trial, an officer testified that, on August 12, 2016, she
responded to a call where the victim, Phillips, had a “gunshot wound
to his right leg, thigh area.” At that time, he would not provide any
information to law enforcement about who shot him.
Phillips testified that he was on his way to “buy something to
drink” when Dickerson “struck” him. Phillips then “offered to fight”
Dickerson but noticed that “he had a pistol in his pocket.” As Phillips
was walking off, Dickerson followed him and “hit [him] again.”
Phillips started running, “felt a hit in the back of [his] leg,” and knew
he had been shot. Phillips testified that Dickerson was “standing up
over [Phillips] like he was fixing to finish [him]” but that Phillips de-
escalated the situation. Phillips was then taken to the hospital. He
testified that he did not cooperate with police because he wanted to
“handle it” himself.
A witness to the Phillips shooting testified that she heard a
gunshot, came around the corner, and “saw [Phillips] dragging his
leg out [in] the middle of the road, and [Dickerson] had a gun pointed
10 at him.” The witness testified that she did not tell police about the
incident because Phillips asked her not to.
Dickerson argues that the above testimony was improperly
admitted under Rule 404(b) and that he was harmed by the
improper evidence. “We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings
under an abuse of discretion standard of review … [a]nd even where
an abuse of discretion is shown, there are no grounds for reversal if
the error did not affect a substantial right, and thus harm, the
defendant.” Smith v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2025), S25A1131, slip op. at
4 (Ga. Oct. 21, 2025) (cleaned up). And where, as here, “the alleged
error is non-constitutional, we examine whether it is highly probable
that the error did not contribute to the verdict by reviewing the
record de novo and weighing the evidence as we would expect
reasonable jurors to have done.” Id. at 4–5 (cleaned up). See also
Redding v. State, 320 Ga. 107, 116 (2024); Jones v. State, 315 Ga.
117, 122 (2022). Generally, “we have found Rule 404(b) errors
harmless where the properly admitted evidence was so strong that
the prejudicial effect of the other-acts evidence had no significant
11 influence on the guilty verdicts.” Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 6 (2023)
(cleaned up). See also Stafford v. State, 312 Ga. 811, 817–18 (2021)
(“Given the limited prejudicial effect of the admission of the [prior]
incident and the strength of the other evidence of [a]ppellant’s guilt,
we conclude that it is highly probable that any error in admitting
evidence of the [prior] incident did not contribute to the verdicts.”).
We first note that the properly admitted evidence of
Dickerson’s guilt was strong. Pullens testified that Dickerson
complained of needing money to go to New Jersey and then watched
Givens “count[] his money” at the party. Gardner testified that
Dickerson kept “walk[ing] by” him and Givens at the block party,
looking “[k]ind of mad.” According to Wright, Dickerson said that he
“needed to get some money” and that Dickerson later admitted to
committing the murder “to get back to Jersey.” McKinney provided
an eyewitness account identifying Dickerson as the one who shot
Givens. Dickerson’s ex-girlfriend testified that, minutes after
Givens’s murder, Dickerson called her and said that “something just
happened” and that Givens “was shot.” As onlookers gathered at the
12 crime scene, believing at the time that Givens had been shot in the
head, Dickerson correctly told one of them that “he didn’t get shot in
the head; he got shot in the leg.” And McCann-Bell attested to
Dickerson’s actions after the shooting, which included cleaning a
gun, packing his things, and leaving for New Jersey.
As to the potential harmful effect of the other-acts evidence,
the trial court instructed the jury extensively both before the State
presented evidence of the Phillips shooting and again during the
final charge that the evidence could be considered only for the
limited purposes of showing Dickerson’s intent and identity; that the
jury could not infer from such evidence that Dickerson is of a
character that would commit such crimes; and that Dickerson was
on trial for the offenses charged in this case, not for any other acts.
We ordinarily presume that jurors follow their instructions.
See Howell v. State, 307 Ga. 865, 875 (2020). Because the properly
admitted evidence of Dickerson’s guilt was strong and the trial court
provided proper limiting instructions, we conclude that it is highly
probable that any error in admitting the Phillips shooting evidence
13 did not contribute to the jury’s guilty verdicts. We therefore reject
this claim of error. See Howell, 307 Ga. at 875 (holding that any
error in the admission of other-acts evidence was harmless in light
of the other strong evidence of guilt and the trial court’s limiting
instructions).
3. Dickerson also argues that the trial court plainly erred when
it gave jury instructions on flight and witness intimidation. To show
plain error, Dickerson “must point to an error that was
not affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not
open to reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his
substantial rights, and the error must have seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 668, 670–71 (2025). “For purposes of plain
error review, an affirmative waiver is the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Id. at 671.
Because Dickerson’s trial counsel requested the jury instructions
about which he complains on appeal, we conclude that Dickerson
intentionally relinquished any claim that the trial court erred by
14 giving these instructions, and this enumeration fails at the first step
of plain error review. Id.
4. Dickerson next argues that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel in several respects. For Dickerson to prevail on
his ineffective assistance claims, he must prove both deficient
performance by his trial counsel and resulting prejudice. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To show
deficiency, Dickerson must establish that trial counsel performed
his duties in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the
circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms. Id.
at 687–88. The law recognizes a “strong presumption” that counsel
performed reasonably, and the defendant bears the burden of
overcoming this presumption. Id. at 689.
Even if Dickerson proves that his counsel’s performance was
deficient in this constitutional sense, he also must prove resulting
prejudice to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
To satisfy the prejudice prong, Dickerson must show that, but for his
counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a “reasonable probability”
15 that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland, 466 US at 694. And “if either Strickland prong is not
met, this Court need not examine the other prong.” Fraser v. State,
322 Ga. 544, 547 (2025). We conclude that Dickerson’s trial counsel
did not render ineffective assistance for the reasons stated below.
(a) Dickerson first argues that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to object when the State presented evidence at trial and
argued during closing that two of the State’s witnesses – McKinney
and Wright – were intimidated. We are not persuaded.
At trial, McKinney explained that he had changed his
statements to law enforcement because he was “scared” and was
“being threatened” about providing his testimony. McKinney
testified that he received his first threat shortly after Givens’s
murder, and then, about four months prior to the trial, Dickerson’s
sister told McKinney that she was “going to get” him. McKinney
further testified that, the Saturday before he was set to testify,
Dickerson’s sister and her husband “c[a]me through.” Dickerson’s
sister told McKinney that he was a “lying motherf**ker,” that he got
16 Dickerson “locked up for nothing,” and that they were “going to get”
him. Dickerson’s brother-in-law then “showed [McKinney] a gun,
and [McKinney] tried to run.” The brother-in-law “ran [McKinney]
down … picked [him] up … slammed [him] and kicked [him] in [his]
back.” The brother-in-law also “hit [McKinney] in the face like three
or four times” before McKinney “blanked out.”7 McKinney went to
the hospital for his injuries.
Wright testified that he was not forthcoming in providing
information to law enforcement because he was “[s]cared” to be
involved in the case. And an investigator later testified that Wright
“called to tell [law enforcement] that a threat was made” against him
after he testified, but the threat had not been connected to
Dickerson.
In the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor argued that
“the intimidated witnesses, they came in spades.” The prosecutor
7 Dickerson’s brother-in-law testified at trial that McKinney was acting
aggressively, had “a knife or something,” and “scratched [him],” so he “charged [McKinney].” But the brother-in-law said that he “got the worse end of it” and never pulled out a gun. The brother-in-law also testified that Dickerson never asked him to intimidate McKinney. 17 argued that McKinney was “body slammed … because he was
coming to tell you what he saw” and that Wright was “frightened” to
be in court.
At the motion for new trial hearing, Dickerson’s trial counsel
testified that he made a tactical decision not to object to the witness
intimidation evidence because he was “not that … concerned” about
it, was focused on McKinney’s credibility “above everything else,”
and did not think that the fact that McKinney had allegedly been
assaulted by Dickerson’s sister would have made him look any more
credible. And the record reflects counsel’s thorough cross-
examination of McKinney, during which he attempted to discredit
McKinney as the only eyewitness to Givens’s murder and to
highlight the inconsistencies in his prior statements to law
enforcement.
Citing Wade v. State, 304 Ga. 5, 12 (2018), Dickerson contends
that the witness intimidation evidence was irrelevant and
inadmissible because there was no evidence that he was involved in,
ordered, or even knew about the threats against McKinney or
18 Wright and that trial counsel’s failure to object constituted
ineffective assistance. But we have held that a “trial court has
discretion to admit evidence of a threat to a witness that is not
shown to be connected to the defendant if the evidence is relevant to
explain the witness’s reluctant conduct on the witness stand or his
prior inconsistent statements.” See Bryant v. State, 296 Ga. 456, 459
(2015). See also Palmer v. State, 303 Ga. 810, 817 (2018) (“[E]ven
when evidence of a threat to a witness is not connected to the
defendant,” the trial court still has discretion to admit the evidence
“if it is ‘relevant to explain the witness’s reluctant conduct on the
witness stand.’”); Foster v. State, 294 Ga. 383, 385–86 (2014)
(testimony that a witness had received threats from someone other
than the appellant, which the prosecutor did not connect to the
appellant, was admissible to explain the witness’s reluctance on the
stand).
The State presented evidence that McKinney and Wright were
hesitant to speak with investigators, provided many different
versions of events throughout the investigation, and were reluctant
19 to testify at trial because they had been threatened. But the State
did not present evidence showing that the threats made against
McKinney and Wright were connected to Dickerson and did not
argue that they were circumstantial evidence of his guilt. See
Williams v. State, 290 Ga. 533, 539 (2012) (evidence of a threatening
gesture to a witness, which the State did not connect to the
appellant, was admissible “to explain [the witness’s] inconsistent
statements and reluctance on the witness stand, which occurred
both before and after the threat”). Thus, the intimidation evidence
was admissible as it was used – to explain why the witnesses were
reluctant to testify and to explain their prior inconsistent
statements – and any objection would have been meritless. See
Redding v. State, 297 Ga. 845, 851–52 (2015) (concluding that,
where witness intimidation evidence is admissible, counsel’s failure
to object to such evidence does not constitute deficient performance).
Moreover, Dickerson failed to establish that trial counsel’s
chosen defense strategy of attacking McKinney’s credibility through
cross-examination, rather than objecting to the witness intimidation
20 evidence, was objectively unreasonable. See Johnson v. State, 294
Ga. 86, 92–93 (2013) (“[C]ounsel’s decision not to object to [witness’s]
testimony and to instead cross-examine [witness] ... was a matter of
trial strategy and was not so patently unreasonable that no
competent lawyer would have made the same decision.”). Therefore,
Dickerson has failed to show that his trial counsel performed
deficiently, and this claim fails.
(b) Dickerson also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he requested jury instructions on witness intimidation and
flight. Dickerson’s trial counsel requested – and the trial court gave
– the following jury charge:
Evidence of alleged flight or intimidation of witnesses has been introduced. Such evidence is governed by the rules concerning circumstantial evidence you have already been given. Furthermore, you may only consider it if you find more likely than not that the Defendant actually committed such act, and that the reason was to evade the charge now on trial.
At the motion for new trial hearing, counsel testified that he
pulled the language from the pattern jury charges. And though “in
hindsight” he would not have requested the charge because it was
21 “not favorable,” he believed that the evidence of Dickerson’s flight
was “not evidence of guilt.” Assuming without deciding that the
charge was improperly requested, we discern no prejudice. See Floyd
v. State, 318 Ga. 312, 323 (2024) (“[T]rial counsel’s failure to request
appropriate jury instructions … is prejudicial if but for the errors,
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”).
As discussed above, the defense presented evidence at trial
that Dickerson was not connected to the threats against McKinney
or Wright. The defense also presented evidence that Dickerson did
not flee to evade the charges against him but had planned to go to
New Jersey prior to Givens’s murder. He told several people prior to
Givens’s murder that he needed money because he wanted to go
back to New Jersey. And Dickerson visited the crime scene and got
his oil changed before leaving Swainsboro, which were delays that
the defense argued would not have been risked if Dickerson had
been fleeing after a crime. Thus, the jury’s consideration of the
evidence involving threats made against witnesses and Dickerson’s
22 travel to New Jersey was curtailed by the instruction because the
defense’s theory was that Dickerson did not “actually commit[] such
act [of intimidating or fleeing]” and that he did not go to New Jersey
to “evade the charge now on trial.” As the defense noted in closing:
There’s been much made about Mr. Dickerson going to New Jersey, and about Mr. Dickerson’s actions on the night afterwards. … He goes with his girlfriend … to the scene of the crime. Now, look, if he’s running, if he’s fleeing, if he’s trying to get out of town, why would you go to the scene of the crime? You wouldn’t. Then, if he’s running, if he’s fleeing, why would you go get your oil changed? Getting your oil changed is what you do when you’re going on a vacation. … If you think the law is hot and after you, you will be gone.
Because this defense theory was consistent with the jury instruction
as given, we fail to see how reasonable jurors would interpret this
instruction in a manner that was harmful to Dickerson.
Further, any alleged harm resulting from this jury instruction
was clearly outweighed by the compelling evidence of Dickerson’s
guilt. As discussed above, the evidence of Dickerson’s guilt was very
strong. Pullens, Gardner, and Wright testified about Dickerson’s
need for money, his odd behavior around Givens at the block party,
23 and even his later admission to shooting Givens. McKinney was an
eyewitness to the crime and identified Dickerson as the shooter.
Dickerson’s ex-girlfriend testified that Dickerson called her just
minutes after Givens had been shot to explain the situation. While
visiting the crime scene, Dickerson correctly identified where Givens
had been shot. And McCann-Bell testified that Dickerson cleaned a
gun and packed his things the day after the murder and that they
then left for New Jersey. Given this substantial evidence, we
conclude that it is unlikely that, but for counsel’s alleged deficient
performance, the outcome of Dickerson’s trial would have been
different.
(c) Dickerson next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to object to inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay.
Assuming without deciding that Dickerson’s trial counsel was
deficient in his failure to object to these statements, Dickerson has
failed to show that he was prejudiced by the error.
At trial, Denson’s ex-girlfriend testified that Denson, who was
with Dickerson at the time of the shooting, called her from a
24 “restricted” number the morning after Givens’s murder. He told her
that he and “John” were present during the shooting, but that
“[Denson] didn’t know that s**t was going to go down.” Denson then
asked the ex-girlfriend to “bring him clothes,” but she refused
because she did not want to get involved. The ex-girlfriend testified
that Denson “disappeared” after that.
Dickerson argues that this testimony was prejudicial because
his defense was that he was neither involved in nor present at the
scene of Givens’s murder. But the other evidence of his presence at
the scene – most notably, McKinney’s eyewitness account
identifying Dickerson as the shooter, Dickerson’s actions after the
murder, and Dickerson’s own admissions to Wright that he shot
Givens – renders cumulative the testimony from Denson’s ex-
girlfriend describing Dickerson’s presence at the crime scene. See
Collins v. State, 321 Ga. 215, 220 (2025) (“[T]he erroneous admission
of hearsay is harmless where substantial, cumulative, legally
admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced.”). Accordingly,
Dickerson’s claim fails.
25 (d) Dickerson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to object to irrelevant and highly prejudicial
character evidence.8 Because any objection by trial counsel would
have been meritless, this claim fails.
At trial, McCann-Bell and Dickerson’s ex-girlfriend both
testified about their relationships with Dickerson. On cross-
examination, trial counsel impeached McCann-Bell about her initial
story to the police regarding how and when Dickerson obtained the
gun she saw him with. On redirect, the State asked her if she was
afraid to testify against Dickerson, to which she answered “no.” But
when asked about her relationship with Dickerson, McCann-Bell
testified that Dickerson was “verbally, mentally, and physically
abusive” towards her and that he “put a gun to [her] throat” within
the past year. She also recalled that Dickerson had previously
8 While Dickerson does not cite to OCGA § 24-4-401 (“Rule 401”) (relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”) or Rule 404(b), we construe his argument to mean that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on these bases. 26 mentioned “rob[bing]” both his cousin and Givens. Dickerson’s ex-
girlfriend initially denied some of the statements that she made to
investigators about the phone call she had with Dickerson after the
murder, but the State refreshed her recollection with an
investigative summary. She was then asked if she had a peaceful
relationship with Dickerson, to which she answered “[f]or the most
part of it, yes.” As the State pressed the issue, she responded that
she had some physical conflict with Dickerson and that he “bit” her
once. Counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he
did not object to this evidence because he “didn’t consider [McCann-
Bell] really as important a witness[] as … McKinney and some of the
others” and that he was “more focused on just trying to get …
McKinney’s credibility destroyed.”
OCGA § 24-6-622 (“Rule 622”) provides that “[t]he state of a
witness’s feelings towards the parties and the witness’s relationship
to the parties may always be proved for the consideration of the
jury.” In McNabb v. State, 313 Ga. 701, 715 (2020), we held that “the
nature of the relationships between the witnesses and defendants
27 was relevant, as the jury’s understanding of a familial relationship
between a defendant and a witness could affect the jury’s
assessment of the witness’s credibility or potential bias and provide
context for the witness’s testimony.” Id. Similarly, the evidence of
Dickerson’s prior violence committed against these witnesses was
relevant, see Rule 401, to show why their testimony might have been
more favorable to Dickerson at trial than their initial statements to
police before trial due to fear of retaliation.
Dickerson contends that there was no evidence in the record to
indicate that McCann-Bell or Dickerson’s ex-girlfriend was
reluctant to testify or that the alleged physical abuse was connected
in any way to their testimony in this case. Though neither witness
claimed to be fearful of testifying against Dickerson, the past acts
described by them were admissible under Rule 622 to explain their
potential biases towards Dickerson, why they may have omitted or
minimized facts in favor of Dickerson, and the power and control
dynamics of the relationships that might have affected their
credibility.
28 Moreover, Dickerson’s other acts of physical violence towards
McCann-Bell and his ex-girlfriend were not introduced for improper
propensity purposes as contemplated by Rule 404(b) because the
State did not use this prior violence to show propensity. Rather, it
was used to show the witnesses’ feelings towards and relationships
with Dickerson, a purpose not prohibited by Rule 404(b). See Virger
v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 295 (2019) (evidence that a defendant had
previously been abusive towards a witness was admissible when
“not introduced for one of the purposes listed in OCGA § 24-4-404(b)”
but rather “to show [the witness’s] bias with regard to [the
defendant] under OCGA § 24-6-622”). Because this was a proper
reason to introduce the evidence and any objection to its admission
would have been unsuccessful, Dickerson has failed to show that his
trial counsel was deficient. See McNabb, 313 Ga. at 715 (concluding
that any objection to evidence about the relationship between a
defendant and a witness as irrelevant “would have been futile, and
the failure to make such an objection cannot form the basis of a claim
of ineffective assistance”).
29 5. Finally, Dickerson argues that he was prejudiced by the
cumulative effect of the above errors. Because we assumed error in
Division 2 relating to the trial court’s admission of extrinsic evidence
from a prior shooting, assumed deficiency in Division 4(b) relating
to trial counsel’s request for jury instructions on witness
intimidation and flight, and assumed deficiency in Division 4(c)
relating to trial counsel’s failure to object to certain hearsay
statements, we consider whether the cumulative prejudicial impact
of these errors requires a new trial. Under State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10,
17 (2020), we must “consider collectively the prejudicial effect, if any,
of trial court errors, along with the prejudice caused by any deficient
performance of counsel.” 9 To establish cumulative error, a defendant
must show that “at least two errors were committed in the course of
the trial” and that “the multiple errors so infected the jury’s
9 We also assume without deciding that the evidentiary error and the
instructional error may be aggregated for cumulative-error review. See Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 617 n.9 (2022) (noting the explicit language in Lane, 308 Ga. at 17 – which involved only evidentiary errors that are easily cumulated – that “[s]ome other types of error may not allow aggregation by their nature, but that question is not presented here”). 30 deliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally fair
trial.” Lane, 308 Ga. at 21.
Though we assumed without deciding the presence of several
errors in the course of Dickerson’s trial, they each produced very
little, if any, harm, as explained in the respective divisions above.
See Quintanar v. State, 322 Ga. 61, 75 (2025). And the properly
admitted evidence against Dickerson was very strong, as discussed
above. Id. We therefore conclude that Dickerson has failed to
establish that the combined prejudicial effect of these errors
requires a new trial. See Jackson v. State, 317 Ga. 95, 106–07 (2023)
(considering several assumed errors and finding no cumulative
prejudicial impact that would require a new trial).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.