NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: January 5, 2026
S25A1044. SELLERS v. THE STATE.
COLVIN, Justice.
Appellant Christopher Sellers was convicted of malice murder
and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of
Thedarious Mitchell and sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole, plus a term of years.1 On appeal, Appellant
1 The crimes occurred on April 2, 2019. On December 1, 2020, a DeKalb
County grand jury returned an indictment charging Appellant with malice murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), aggravated assault (Count 4), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6). At the conclusion of a jury trial held from October 9 to October 11, 2023, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1) and issued consecutive sentences of 10 years in prison for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5) and five years in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6). Appellant’s remaining charges were either merged or vacated by operation of law. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on November 2, 2023, which he amended through new counsel on August 9, 2024. Appellant’s motion was heard on November 25, 2024, and denied by written order on January 3, 2025. On January 21, 2025, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. His case was docketed to the August 2025 term of court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a
matter of constitutional due process to support his conviction for
malice murder, the trial court plainly erred by charging the jury on
parties to a crime, and his sentence of life without parole constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
“similar provisions” of the Georgia Constitution. 2 As explained
below, Appellant’s arguments fail, and we accordingly affirm his
conviction for malice murder and sentence of life without parole.3
1. The evidence at trial showed the following. At about 8:45
2 Appellant’s brief cites “Article I, Par. XVIII” of the Georgia Constitution, but there is no such provision. Appellant appears to be referring to Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVII, which provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted[.]” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII. See US Const. Amend. VIII (same). We therefore construe his brief as raising his sentencing claim under that provision. But we decline to consider his claim under the Georgia Constitution because Appellant does not argue that the federal Constitution and the Georgia Constitution apply differently to his sentence. See Regan v. State, 317 Ga. 612, 612 n.2 (2023) (declining to consider the appellant’s equal protection claim under the Georgia Constitution because the appellant failed to argue that the Georgia Constitution applied differently to his equal protection claim than the federal Constitution). 3 Appellant does not challenge on appeal his convictions for possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6). 2 p.m. on April 2, 2019, law enforcement officers received a shots-fired
call regarding an incident at a motel in DeKalb County. By the time
the first detective arrived at the scene, first responders had already
transported the victim, who was later identified as Mitchell, to the
hospital. Despite an emergency surgery and other resuscitative
efforts, Mitchell died from a single gunshot wound to his back.
Detectives recovered a single shell casing and a small bag of
suspected marijuana from the scene. They also obtained security
camera footage from the motel. This footage, which was entered into
evidence and played for the jury, showed that at 8:43 p.m., two men
entered Mitchell’s hotel room. Then, at 8:44 p.m., Mitchell ran out
of his room and into the hotel’s breezeway, followed by the two men
and a third person. One of the men then shot Mitchell before the
three fled the scene. 4
R. W. was in the motel room with Mitchell when the men
entered. R. W. testified that “there was a knock at the door,” and
4 The security footage captured the incident from a distance and was of
insufficient quality to identify the assailants. 3 when Mitchell answered it, “two people ... pushed their way in, and
then they started beating him.” According to R. W., Mitchell
“managed to get away ... and went down the hall, and one [of the
men] stepped out and shot him in the back.” 5
R. W. also told a detective that she knew the man who had shot
Mitchell by his nickname, “Baldhead,” and that she had heard
people call him “Chris.” She gave detectives the hotel and room
number where he stayed. And after a detective obtained a copy of
the driver’s license of the man staying in that hotel room, which
showed that the occupant was Appellant (Christopher Sellers),
R. W. identified Appellant in a photo lineup as the shooter.6 The
detective testified at trial that additional statements from R. W. led
him to believe that R. W. engaged in sex work; that Appellant had
5 In a written statement, which a detective described at trial, R. W. reported that during the fight in the hotel room, one of the men pistol-whipped Mitchell in his head or his face, and it was this man who subsequently shot Mitchell. Mitchell’s autopsy did not reveal any injuries consistent with him being pistol-whipped, but the medical examiner testified that because Mitchell had been shot soon thereafter, “his body would not react the same way that yours or ours [would].” Mitchell would take longer to bruise, the medical examiner explained, “because he ha[d] low blood pressure and then he ha[d] no blood pressure.” 6 R. W. also identified Appellant at trial.
4 been her procurer; that she had switched to working for Mitchell;
and that Mitchell was now her procurer.
The jury also heard the testimony of Calvin Leslie, who met
Appellant while they were both incarcerated on unrelated charges
in Nevada. According to Leslie, Appellant relayed that he had shot
a man in the head in a motel in Georgia; that the man owed him
money; that a “girl” was there; but that he would “beat the case”
because the “girl ... [was] strung out on drugs.” Appellant claimed
that “it was like a drug deal went bad.” And according to Leslie,
Appellant was “laughing and joking” when he described what had
happened. Leslie claimed the conversation left him feeling so
“disturbed” that he decided to report it to the DeKalb County
District Attorney’s Office.
2. In his first enumeration of error, Appellant argues that the
evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process
to support his conviction for murder because R. W. and Leslie were
not credible and because Leslie’s testimony was inconsistent with
R. W.’s and inconsistent with the physical evidence. This argument
5 fails, however, as explained below.
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of
constitutional due process, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and inquire whether a rational trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Collins v. State, 321 Ga. 215, 218 (2025) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 US 307, 319 (1979)).
R. W. testified that Appellant, assisted by an unidentified man,
entered Mitchell’s motel room, beat him, and shot him when he tried
to flee. She identified Appellant in a photo lineup and again at trial,
and the events she described were partially captured on the motel’s
security cameras. Additionally, Leslie testified that Appellant
admitted he shot a man in a Georgia motel in the presence of a
female witness. This evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational
jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice
murder. See Collins, 321 Ga. at 219 (holding that the evidence was
constitutionally sufficient to support the appellant’s convictions for
malice murder and other crimes where a witness identified the
6 appellant as one of the two men who participated in the shooting
and where another witness overheard the appellant admit his
involvement in the shooting to a third person); Young v. State, 292
Ga. 443, 443–44 (2013) (holding the evidence was constitutionally
sufficient to support the appellant’s convictions for malice murder
where the appellant’s fingerprint was found at the scene and a
jailhouse informant testified that the appellant admitted to the
informant that he shot the victim). Though, on appeal, Appellant
attacks the witnesses’ credibility and contends that there were
conflicts in the evidence, questions of credibility and the resolution
of such conflicts are left to the jury under the Jackson standard and
the resolution of such issues “adversely to the defendant does not
render the evidence insufficient.” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 400, 406
(2022) (quotation marks omitted)).
3. Next, Appellant claims that the trial court plainly erred by
charging the jury on parties to a crime. Appellant argues that this
instruction was erroneous because the State claimed that Appellant
was the shooter and because no one other than Appellant was ever
7 charged or arrested in relation to Mitchell’s killing. Appellant’s
argument is difficult to parse, but he appears to further claim that
the parties-to-a-crime instruction affected his substantial rights by
relieving the State of its burden to prove each element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. As explained below, Appellant’s
claim fails.
Appellant was charged individually and as a party to a crime
with malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and aggravated
assault. Prior to trial, the State submitted its requested jury
instructions, which included a request for the pattern charge on
parties to a crime. Defense counsel did not object to this charge at
the charge conference. Accordingly, consistent with the State’s
request, the trial court charged the jury that:
Every party to a crime may be charged with and convicted of commission of a crime. A person is a party to a crime only if that person[:]
(a) directly commits the crime; (b) intentionally helps in the commission of the crime; (c) intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime;
8 or (d) intentionally causes some other person to commit the crime under such circumstances that the other person is not guilty of any crime either in fact or because of legal incapacity.
Defense counsel did not object to the charge after it was given.
Because Appellant’s trial counsel did not object to the parties-
to-a-crime charge, we review Appellant’s claim for plain error only.
See OCGA § 17-8-58(b). See also Williams v. State, 321 Ga. 390, 393
(2025). When determining whether a jury instruction constitutes
plain error, the Court applies the following test:
First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Id. at 393–94. “If one prong of the plain error test is not satisfied, we
9 need not address the other prongs of the test.” Id. at 394. Plain error
presents a high standard, and establishing it is “difficult, as it
should be.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Appellant’s claim fails because it is not error — let alone clear
or obvious error — for the trial court to give the parties-to-a-crime
instruction where the State contends that the appellant was the
shooter, so long as there was slight evidence to support the charge.
See Leeks v. State, 303 Ga. 104, 107 (2018) (holding that the trial
court did not err in charging the jury on party to a crime because
there was slight evidence supporting the theory, even though the
State maintained that the appellant was the shooter). This rule
remains applicable, where, as here, “the party requesting a charge
on a particular theory did not advance that theory” at trial.
Nunnally v. State, 319 Ga. 701, 710 (2024). See also Bowman v.
State, 317 Ga. 457, 460–61 (2023) (“[A]s we have repeatedly held,
the State need not charge or even argue a theory of party to a crime
or conspiracy for a crime to be proven in that manner.… So even if
the party requesting a charge on a particular theory did not advance
10 that theory, that instruction is authorized as long as slight evidence
… support[s] the theory of the charge.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
Here, the instruction was supported by at least slight evidence:
R. W. testified that two men broke into their room; that the men beat
Mitchell; and that Appellant shot Mitchell as he fled. This evidence
supported the State’s theory that Appellant was the shooter. But
even if the jury only partially credited R. W.’s testimony — such that
it believed Appellant was one of the two men, but not necessarily the
shooter — R. W.’s testimony authorized a murder conviction on the
theory that Appellant was a party to the crime. See Bowman, 317
Ga. at 462 (holding that there was at least slight evidence to support
the parties-to-a-crime instruction where a witness testified that he
was “[a] hundred percent” sure that the defendant was the shooter
because the jury could have disbelieved the witness’s testimony and
because the evidence also authorized the jury to accept a party-to-
the-crime theory in which the defendant’s associate was the
shooter). R. W. testified that two men entered Mitchell’s room
11 together, that both participated in the beating, and that both fled
after the shooting. And the assailants’ entrance into the room, the
shooting, and their flight was captured on security footage. A jury
could infer from this evidence that both men were a party to
Mitchell’s murder, even if Appellant was not the shooter. See id.
(explaining that “[w]hether a person was a party to a crime can be
inferred from his presence, companionship, and conduct before and
after the crime was committed” (quoting Dublin v. State, 302 Ga. 60,
65 (2017))). Because the trial court’s instruction was supported by
at least slight evidence, Appellant has failed to establish that the
court made a clear or obvious legal error by giving it. And because
Appellant has failed to establish one of the elements of plain error,
his plain error claim fails. Williams, 321 Ga. at 394.
4. In his last enumeration, Appellant contends that his
sentence of life without the possibility of parole constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
12 Section I, Paragraph XVII of the Georgia Constitution. 7 Appellant’s
briefing is unclear, but he appears to advance three separate
arguments in support of his cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim:
first, sentences of life without parole are always unconstitutional, in
light of society’s “evolving standards of decency”; second, his
sentence of life without parole is unconstitutional because it is
disproportionate to his crime; and third, the trial court violated his
due process rights by sentencing him without assessing, on the
record, whether the sentence imposed was proportionate to the
particular circumstances of his crime. We examine each argument
below and conclude that one of these arguments is waived and that
the other two fail on the merits.
(a) Immediately following the verdict, the trial court conducted
a brief sentencing hearing in which the State argued that Appellant
should be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole,
and Appellant argued that he should be sentenced to life in prison
with the possibility of parole. Though Appellant’s counsel argued
7 See note 2, supra.
13 that his client should receive a more lenient sentence than the State
recommended, Appellant’s counsel did not argue that life without
parole was an unconstitutional or otherwise legally impermissible
sentence for malice murder. Following argument, the trial court
sentenced Appellant, who was 41 years old at the time of the offense,
to life without parole, and Appellant did not object.
(b) We begin by examining whether Appellant’s claims are
preserved for appellate review. As a general rule, to preserve a claim
for appellate review, an appellant must have raised it at the first
available opportunity. See Regan, 317 Ga. at 613. Because the first
opportunity to object to a sentencing statute does not usually arise
until after the jury has returned a guilty verdict, such claims must
typically be raised at or before sentencing. See id. We have
explained, however, that there is an exception to this general rule:
a void sentence — that is, a sentence that the law does not allow —
may be challenged at any time, and “the failure to object at trial does
not waive such a claim.” Marshall v. State, 309 Ga. 698, 702 (2020).
See Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 699 (2016) (“[C]laims that a sentence
14 is void (i.e., illegal) are not subject to general waiver or procedural
default rules[.]”), disapproved of on other grounds by Jones v.
Mississippi, 593 US 98 (2021). By contrast, a claim that a sentence
is merely voidable — that is, erroneous — is waived if it is not raised
at the appropriate time. Veal, 298 Ga. at 699 (“[A] defendant ...
forfeit[s] a claim that his sentence was merely voidable (i.e.,
erroneous) if he does not raise the claim in timely and proper
fashion.”).
In Appellant’s first two arguments, he contends that his
sentence of life without parole is prohibited by the cruel and unusual
punishment clauses of the United States and Georgia constitutions.
In doing so, Appellant implicitly argues that his sentence of life
without parole is void. See Veal, 298 Ga. at 701 (“[A] sentence
imposed in violation of [a] substantive [constitutional] rule
[regarding the Eighth Amendment] ... is not just erroneous but
contrary to law and, as a result, void.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we may review these claims even though they are
raised for the first time on appeal. In his third argument, however,
15 Appellant appears to argue that the trial court erred by failing to
perform a procedure he contends was required when issuing a
sentence of life without parole. To the extent Appellant makes such
an argument, he merely advances a claim that his sentence is
voidable. See Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (2004) (explaining that
“[a]ssertions taking issue with the procedure employed in imposing
a valid sentence or questioning the fairness of an imposed sentence”
present a claim that the sentence was voidable, rather than void).
And because Appellant raises that claim for the first time on appeal,
it is waived. See Marshall, 309 Ga. at 704 (holding that because the
appellant alleged that his sentence was voidable, rather than void,
he waived his claim by failing to raise it in the trial court). See also
Dougherty v. State, 321 Ga. 577, 585 (2025) (“[T]o the extent that
Dougherty now argues that the Georgia Constitution’s due process
clause required the trial court to sentence Dougherty
proportionately with [his co-indictee], Dougherty did not make any
such objection at sentencing, so this argument is not preserved on
appeal.”).
16 (c) We now turn to the merits of Appellant’s remaining two
claims. Both fail.
(i) In his first argument, Appellant appears to contend that
sentences of life without parole for murder are categorically
unconstitutional. His brief suggests that life-without-parole
sentences are unconstitutional under society’s “evolving standards
of decency” because such sentences are just as cruel as the death
penalty but lack the attendant “sentencing and appellate
protections.” We have previously rejected such claims, however. See
Mitchell v. State, 314 Ga. 566, 575–76 (2022) (rejecting a claim that
“evolving standards of decency” and recent Eighth Amendment
caselaw from the United States Supreme Court required this Court
to overturn past cases holding that the procedural requirements
found in OCGA § 17-10-30(b) are not applicable when the trial court
issues a sentence of life without parole on a charge for which the
State did not seek the death penalty). See also Williams v. State, 291
Ga. 19, 21 (2012) (“There is no state or federal constitutional
prohibition against sentencing an adult ... to a term of life in prison
17 without parole for the commission of a homicide.”), disapproved of
on other grounds by Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 516, 520 n.6 (2017).
Because this claim is squarely foreclosed by applicable precedent, it
fails. 8
(ii) Next, Appellant contends that his sentence of life without
parole is unconstitutional because it is disproportionate to his crime.
We have explained that
[t]he Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution bans “cruel and unusual punishments,” including those that are grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. To determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, a court first compares the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence. When evaluating the gravity of the offense as part of the threshold comparison, courts look not only at the statutory elements of the offense, but also the particular circumstances of the crime committed as shown by the record. Moreover, courts must defer to the legislature in determinations of sentencing parameters unless a sentence is so overly severe or excessive in proportion to the offense as to shock the conscience. In the rare case
8 As mentioned above in note 2, we decline to consider Appellant’s cruel-
and-unusual-punishment claim under the Georgia Constitution. Accordingly, we express no view as to whether the “evolving standards of decency” test is the proper standard for analyzing the state constitutional right. See Conley v. Pate, 305 Ga. 333, 339–41 (2019) (Peterson, J., concurring) (arguing Georgia cases applying that standard to the Georgia Constitution “cannot be squared with the original public meaning of the Georgia Constitution”). 18 that this threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, a court next compares the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. It is the rare case in which the threshold inference of gross disproportionality will be met and a rarer case still in which that threshold inference stands after further scrutiny.
Sillah v. State, 315 Ga. 741, 754–55 (2023) (citations and
punctuation omitted). Under this standard, Appellant’s claim fails
at the first stage of the analysis. The General Assembly has decreed
that murder “shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life
without parole, or by imprisonment for life.” OCGA § 16-5-1(e)(1).
And, as stated above, “courts must defer to the legislature in
determinations of sentencing parameters unless a sentence is so
overly severe or excessive in proportion to the offense as to shock the
conscience.” Sillah, 315 Ga. at 755 (quotation marks omitted). The
evidence recounted above shows that Appellant broke into the
victim’s motel room, beat him, and shot him in the back when he
tried to flee, killing him. Under these circumstances, Appellant’s
sentence does not “shock the conscience” and therefore fails to raise
19 an inference of gross disproportionality. Id. (holding that the
defendant’s sentence of life without parole for malice murder failed
to raise an inference of gross disproportionality where the defendant
committed an armed robbery during which the victim was shot and
killed); Sosebee v. State, 317 Ga. 424, 432 (2023) (holding that the
defendant’s recidivist sentence of life without parole for felony
murder failed to raise an inference of gross disproportionality where
the defendant flipped his vehicle while fleeing from police, killing
the passenger). As such, we affirm Appellant’s sentence.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.