321 Ga. 390 FINAL COPY
S25A0398. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Chief Justice.
Michael Williams is appealing his convictions for malice
murder and other offenses for the fatal shooting of Tomas Gooden at
a house party.1 Williams asserts (1) plain error in the trial court’s
failure to instruct the jury that the State bore the burden to disprove
Williams’s justification defense and (2) ineffective assistance of
1 Gooden was shot on the night of December 8, 2017. On March 5, 2018,
a Coweta County grand jury returned an indictment charging Williams with malice murder, felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, aggravated assault (of Armon Tucker), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Tried by a jury from January 28 to February 5, 2019, Williams was found guilty of all counts. On February 5, 2019, the trial court sentenced Williams to life in prison for malice murder, 20 years concurrent for aggravated assault, five years concurrent for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. Williams filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended by appellate counsel on September 19, 2023. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in an order entered on January 25, 2024. The order denying the motion for new trial was vacated on Williams’s motion on March 1, 2024, and reentered on June 20, 2024. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. Williams specifies that he is not appealing his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. counsel in failing to investigate and introduce evidence of Gooden’s
reputation for violence. Because we conclude that Williams has not
met his burden to show that the omission in the jury charge or the
alleged deficient performance of counsel affected the outcome of the
case, we affirm.
The evidence presented at trial may be summarized as follows.2
On the night of December 8, 2017, Williams and Gooden were at a
house party in Coweta County. At the party, Williams, Gooden and
others played a gambling game in the garage. After Williams and
Gooden argued over the pot of money and Gooden pushed Williams
to the floor of the garage, Williams fired a gun once at Gooden,
fatally striking him in the head. Williams then fled outside. Police
later encountered Williams walking along the side of the road on the
morning after the shooting.
Responding police found Gooden’s dead body in a corner of the
2 Because Williams does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as
to his convictions, and because we evaluate a claim of plain trial court error in the light of the overall strength of the State’s case, we do not present this in the light most favorable to the verdicts. 2 garage, near the garage door. Blood reached from the floor to about
30 inches up the wall of the garage. The medical examiner opined
that a bullet traveled through Gooden’s head in a downward
trajectory, from the top, right, front part of Gooden’s head to the left,
bottom, back side of his head. Gooden was at least eight inches taller
than Williams. The medical examiner said that the chances that the
bullet had ricocheted off another surface before hitting Gooden were
“minimal to none,” and Williams testified that he did not notice the
bullet ricochet off anything. Gooden would have died almost
instantly and would not have been able to take additional steps after
being shot, the medical examiner testified. The medical examiner
testified that Gooden probably left the blood on the garage wall
when he collapsed and hit his head against it. A spent shell casing
was found on the floor of the garage, near the doorway leading to the
kitchen, approximately 12 feet from the corner of the garage where
Gooden’s body was found. A firearms examiner was able to
determine that the casing was ejected from a firearm found in a well
where Williams said he had hidden it.
3 Williams had gone to the party with Darius Martin and Xavier
Phillips. Martin testified that Gooden was winning at the gambling
game, and Williams was losing, and Gooden twice had tried to pick
up money over Williams’s protests. Martin testified that, after
Gooden pushed Williams to the ground, Martin and Phillips tried to
help Williams up, but Williams “got up quick” and “with the gun in
hand.” Martin testified that once Williams stood up, Gooden was
“[b]acking off of him” toward a corner of the garage. Martin testified
that he saw Gooden reaching for the waistband of his pants as
Williams was standing up but did not see Gooden with a gun. Martin
testified that he heard a gunshot “immediately” after Williams stood
up. At that time, Martin said, Gooden’s “back was in the corner” of
the garage, and Williams was standing right in front of the doorway
out of the garage, about 12 feet away. On cross-examination, Martin
agreed that after Williams was pushed down, people were “moving
towards him” but suggested those were people “trying to help him
up.”
Phillips also testified, recalling that Williams pulled out his
4 firearm as he was getting off the ground after Gooden pushed him.
Phillips testified that Williams was standing near the door into the
house at the time. Phillips said he did not see a firearm in Gooden’s
possession. Phillips testified that Williams had appeared afraid of
Gooden after an incident earlier in the evening when Gooden “got
loud with” Williams. Later, during the argument that led to Gooden
pushing Williams, Phillips testified, Gooden threatened to beat up
Williams. Phillips said Williams looked afraid when he got up with
his gun. Phillips testified that, in the times that he had seen
Williams and Gooden around one another before the night of the
shooting, he had never seen them have problems with one another,
and that Williams had not appeared scared of Gooden when they
had seen one another at another house party a month prior.
Gooden’s friend, Armon Tucker, testified that Gooden did not
have a gun that night. Tucker testified that he dove to the ground
when a gun was pointed at him. Tucker was an uncooperative
witness, saying multiple times that he wanted to “plead the Fifth,”
and never testified directly that Williams was the one who pointed
5 a gun at him. But Tucker appeared to address Williams at the end
of his testimony, saying, “Basically, . . . all this man did was push
this man. And this man got killed. . . . Your life . . . wasn’t in danger
. . . or none of that, man. You done killed my brother, man.” Tucker
indicated that he was standing near Gooden in a corner of the
garage, while Williams was standing near a door leading to the
kitchen.
In a statement to officers, a recording of which was played for
the jury, Williams repeatedly denied shooting Gooden or knowing
who did. About 85 minutes into the interview, Williams
acknowledged that he shot Gooden after he was pushed, saying,
“That’s, like, self-defense.” Williams acknowledged that he had
pulled his gun while Gooden was pushing him.
Testifying in his own defense at trial, Williams said that he had
accused Gooden of “cheating” while gambling. Williams testified
that Gooden had “snatched” $20 of Williams’s money from the floor,
at which point Williams decided to quit the game rather than “start
something” over $20, given that Gooden was bigger than Williams
6 and Williams was in someone else’s house. Williams said that, while
Williams was counting his money and preparing to leave, Gooden
called him a “p***y n****r” before “snatch[ing]” additional money
out of Williams’s hand. Williams testified that he was afraid for his
life when Gooden pushed him across the garage, because Gooden
had four other gang members around him who were moving toward
him, so Williams anticipated that he was about to be the victim of a
five-on-one beating. Williams said he had seen Gooden “fixing his
pants” earlier in the evening and thought Gooden might be reaching
for a gun when Williams shot Gooden, while acknowledging he had
not seen Gooden with a gun. Asked specifically why he shot Gooden,
Williams responded, “Because I was scared for my life[,]” although
on cross-examination Williams indicated that he said in his police
interview that he shot Gooden “[b]ecause he snatched my money and
then pushed me down.” Williams testified that he aimed for
Gooden’s shoulder and was shooting upward from the ground
toward the ceiling, standing about five feet away from Gooden.
Williams denied that Gooden was in the corner of the garage when
7 he was shot.
1. Williams argues that the trial court plainly erred in failing
to instruct the jury that the State was required to disprove
Williams’s justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. We
conclude that although the trial court erred in omitting this
language from the instruction, Williams has not met his burden to
show plain error.
The trial court instructed the jury generally on justification,
the State’s burden of proof, and the presumption of innocence,
including that “[t]here is no burden of proof upon the defendant
whatsoever and the burden never shifts to the defendant to
introduce evidence or to prove innocence.” But the court’s
instruction did not specify that it was the State’s burden to disprove
justification beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams’s trial counsel did
not object to this omission prior to the jury beginning deliberations.
Therefore, as Williams acknowledges, his claim may be reviewed on
appeal only for “plain error.” OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). See also State v.
Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 31-32 (1) (718 SE2d 232) (2011) (establishing
8 plain-error review for unpreserved jury instruction claims). This
Court applies the following test for determining whether there is
plain error in jury instructions under OCGA § 17-8-58 (b):
First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted;
emphasis in original). If one prong of the plain error test is not
satisfied, we need not address the other prongs of the test. See id. at
34 (2) (b) n.5. Satisfying this high standard “is difficult, as it should
be.” Id. at 33 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, the State does not contest that the first two prongs of the
plain-error test are satisfied here. Indeed, we have held that it is a
clear and obvious error to omit the sort of language at issue here. 9 See State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 215 (1) (790 SE2d 66) (2016). But
Williams has not met his burden to show that the error affected his
substantial rights.
Most significantly, the prosecutor specifically told the jury that
the State bore the burden to prove that Williams “intended to kill
[Gooden], it was unlawful, meaning it was without justification.”
This affirmative statement by the prosecutor acknowledging to the
jury that the State bore the burden to disprove justification lessened
the possibility that the omission of the State’s specific burden on
justification from the jury charge affected the outcome of the trial.
Additionally, Williams’s justification defense was weak. The
trial court presented the jury with a few different bases for
justification, instructing the jury that a person is justified in using
deadly force “if that person reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself” or “to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony[,]” including specifically
robbery by sudden snatching or aggravated assault. Regarding the
defense of justification to prevent a forcible felony, Williams testified
10 that Gooden had “snatched” Williams’s money, and defense counsel
argued in closing that Williams acted to prevent the crime of robbery
by sudden snatching. But it is highly unlikely that, had the trial
court properly instructed the jury about the State’s burden to
disprove justification, the jury would have acquitted Williams on the
theory that the shooting was justified to prevent the commission of
the forcible felony of robbery by sudden snatching, given that
Williams specifically testified that he shot Gooden because he was
in fear for his life. Cf. Holmes v. State, 273 Ga. 644, 647 (4) (543
SE2d 688) (2001) (rejecting argument that trial court erred in failing
to give unrequested charge on prevention of robbery by sudden
snatching as part of justification instructions, where the defendant
testified that he would not have fired the fatal shots if the victim
had not drawn a gun, such that “the prevention of robbery . . . by
sudden snatching was not reasonably raised by the evidence”
(citation and punctuation omitted)).
As for theories that Williams shot Gooden to prevent an
aggravated assault or otherwise prevent his own death or great
11 bodily injury, very little evidence supported Williams’s justification
defense beyond his own self-serving testimony and evidence
supporting his general belief that Gooden had a violent character.
Although Martin testified that he had seen Gooden reaching for his
waistband just before he was shot, and Phillips testified that Gooden
had threatened to beat up Williams, both Martin and Phillips
testified that they did not see Gooden with a gun. Williams’s self-
defense claim was undermined by internal inconsistencies; Williams
maintained for a significant portion of his police interview that he
did not shoot Gooden and did not know who did, but later stated in
the interview that he shot Gooden merely because he had been
pushed, without claiming that he was afraid or thought Williams
had a gun. The physical evidence also did not support Williams’s
claim that he shot Gooden from the ground and that Gooden was not
in the corner of the garage, as the evidence showed that Gooden was
found in the corner of the garage, he would not have been able to
move once shot, the bullet moved in a downward trajectory, he was
taller than Williams, and the bullet did not ricochet. Additionally,
12 Williams’s flight from the scene of the crime and attempt to hide the
murder weapon can themselves be evidence of guilt. See Martin v.
State, 306 Ga. 538, 539 (1), 541-542 (2) (832 SE2d 402) (2019) (citing
evidence of consciousness of guilt, which included attempts to
destroy evidence of the shooting, in evaluating strength of evidence
in case where the defendant claimed self-defense for purposes of
harmless-error review); Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. 59, 65 (3) n.4 (829
SE2d 81) (2019) (“The fact that a suspect flees the scene of a crime
points to the question of guilt in a circumstantial manner.” (citation
and punctuation omitted)). Given these considerations, Williams
has failed to carry his burden to show that the omission from the
charge to the jury affected the outcome of his trial, and his claim of
plain error fails.3
3 Williams relies on Alvarez, in which we concluded that the trial court
plainly erred in failing to give the instruction at issue here. But in Alvarez we said that the trial court’s instructional error “was all the more harmful” because the State in closing argument referenced the absence of a key witness at trial and implied that the defendant had a duty to present this testimony if it would have supported the justification defense. 299 Ga. at 215 (1). Here, although the prosecutor in closing argument generally referenced that Williams was claiming that Gooden was “coming after him” “with no other support of any other evidence,” the prosecutor did not imply that the defendant
13 2. Williams also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because she failed to investigate and introduce evidence about
Gooden’s character. We conclude that Williams has not shown that
he was prejudiced by any deficient performance.
At trial, the jury heard evidence that Williams and Gooden
were each associated with a different street gang.4 During the
recording of Williams’s interview by police, an officer is heard
describing Gooden as “a very well-known Blood.” Additionally, the
defense introduced various evidence about Gooden’s prior gang and
criminal activity. Williams testified that he knew that Gooden was
a member of the Bloods gang and had heard Gooden brag about
violent acts. Williams said he was aware of Gooden’s prior
involvement in violence and gang activity, including seeing in a
newspaper that Gooden had been convicted of “[g]ang charges and
shooting” and hearing from a fellow jail inmate that the inmate had
should have presented any particular evidence. Rather, as noted above, the prosecutor specifically told the jury that the State bore the burden to disprove justification. 4 The State’s gang expert testified that he did not believe that the
shooting was carried out to further the interests of Williams’s gang. 14 been sent by Gooden to rob a woman, resulting in the woman being
shot. During Williams’s testimony, the trial court admitted redacted
certified copies of several of Gooden’s convictions under the Georgia
Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (OCGA § 16-15-1 et seq.).
The defense also introduced and the trial court admitted several
social media posts by Gooden that Williams testified influenced his
decision to shoot Gooden; the posts showed Gooden describing
himself as “loyal” and “a [b]oss,” bragging about gang activity, and
deriding police; and they showed pictures of Gooden, including in
prison, displaying cash, and making a hand signal that Williams
said was a Blood gang sign.
Notwithstanding the admission of this evidence at trial,
Williams in his motion for new trial raised a claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and introduce
evidence of Gooden’s violent character. In support, Williams offered
testimony from a private investigator who had discussed with trial
counsel the possibility of working on the case but had not been hired
to do so; the investigator happened to be familiar with Gooden
15 through their personal interactions related to court cases and
through other community ties. The investigator testified at the
motion-for-new-trial hearing that Gooden “was known to have
violent tendencies” and had “a reputation of violence” in the
community. Trial counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial
hearing that she did not have adequate time to prepare for trial and
that, had she secured more time, she would have “looked into hiring
an investigator” to look into Gooden’s character, and she
“[a]bsolutely” would have introduced admissible evidence of
Gooden’s character had it been available. The trial court rejected the
ineffectiveness claim on the basis that “[a]ny testimony from [the
investigator] about the victim’s character would have been
inadmissible (only Defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s character
being relevant) or merely cumulative.”
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and
that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d
16 674) (1984). “If [a defendant] fails to establish one of these two
prongs, we need not examine the other.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322,
328 (3) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).
“To show deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate
that counsel performed counsel’s duties in an objectively
unreasonable way, considering all of the circumstances and in the
light of prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 328-329 (3). “To
establish prejudice, [a defendant] must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 329
(3) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a ruling on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we defer to the trial court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply the
law to the facts de novo.” Id. at 329 (3) (citation and punctuation
omitted). In particular, when evaluating whether a defendant has
established prejudice, we “weigh the evidence as we would expect
reasonable jurors to have done rather than in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Harmon v. State, 319 Ga. 259, 265 (3) (903
17 SE2d 28) (2024) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Here, even assuming deficient performance in counsel’s failure
to investigate Gooden’s character further or present the testimony
about his reputation in the community, Williams has not shown a
reasonable probability of a different result had that testimony been
presented. A variety of evidence about Gooden’s character —
including his membership in a gang, bravado about gang activities,
Williams’s understanding that Gooden had been convicted of “gang
charges and shooting,” documentary evidence of convictions for gang
charges, and evidence that Gooden had been in prison — was
admitted at trial. Williams testified about his personal knowledge of
criminal activity by Gooden, and an officer was heard on the
recording of Williams’s interview that Gooden was a well-known
gang member. Taken together, this evidence about Gooden that
Williams was permitted to introduce at trial reasonably supported
an inference that Gooden had a reputation for violence. And there is
not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different had counsel introduced at trial the investigator’s
18 reputation and opinion testimony, given that the jury heard
evidence of particular violent acts by Gooden. See Mohamud v.
State, 297 Ga. 532, 535 (2) (b) (773 SE2d 755) (2015) (defendant not
prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses who would have
testified to the victim’s general reputation for violence in the
community where jury heard evidence that the victim had violently
assaulted the defendant in the past).5 Thus, this claim fails.
Judgment affirmed. Warren, PJ, and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.
5 Williams argues in a footnote that the Court should consider whether
the cumulative effect of the trial court’s instructional error and counsel’s alleged deficient performance would support reversal under State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). We conclude that Williams has failed to establish that the combined prejudicial effect of the trial court’s instructional error and the assumed deficient performance of trial counsel denied him a fundamentally fair trial. See Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 799, 808 (4) n.10 (896 SE2d 484) (2023). 19 Decided April 8, 2025.
Murder. Coweta Superior Court. Before Judge Palmer.
The Bullard Firm, Brandon A. Bullard, Audra M. Murphey, for
appellant.
John H. Cranford, Jr., District Attorney, Robert W. Mooradian,
Laura K. Lukert, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan
H. Hill, Clint C. Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General,
Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.