319 Ga. 259 FINAL COPY
S24A0158. HARMON v. THE STATE.
PINSON, Justice.
Shanadore Harmon and Jermaz Lawson got into an argument
that ended with Harmon shooting into the car that Lawson was driv-
ing. The bullet struck and killed Brittany Trantham, who was sit-
ting in the passenger seat. Harmon was convicted of the malice mur-
der of Trantham, the aggravated assault of Lawson, and three fire-
arms offenses.1
1 Trantham was shot on October 24, 2015, and died two days later. On
January 20, 2016, a Richmond County grand jury returned an indictment charging Harmon with malice murder of Trantham (Count 1), felony murder of Trantham predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), two counts of posses- sion of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 3, 5), aggravated assault of Lawson (Count 4), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6). At a jury trial from May 7 to 9, 2018, the jury returned guilty ver- dicts on all counts. On May 10, 2018, the trial court entered a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1), consecutive sen- tences of five years for each of the firearm convictions (Counts 3, 5, 6), and a consecutive sentence of 20 years for aggravated assault (Count 4). The felony murder count (Count 2) was vacated by operation of law. New counsel for Har- mon entered an appearance and timely filed a motion for new trial; Harmon changed counsel and filed amendments to that motion several times. After a hearing on June 27, 2022, the trial court denied Harmon’s motion for new trial, as amended, on June 30, 2022. Harmon timely filed a notice of appeal on July On appeal, Harmon contends that the evidence was not consti-
tutionally sufficient to convict him of Trantham’s murder or the re-
lated firearms offenses, the trial court erred by denying his motion
for directed verdict on the aggravated assault and firearm offense
related to Lawson, and he received constitutionally ineffective assis-
tance of counsel because his trial counsel did not raise a hearsay
objection to the admission of Lawson’s recorded statement to police.
Each claim fails. The evidence, recounted below, was sufficient to
support each of Harmon’s convictions related to the murder of Tran-
tham and the denial of his motion for directed verdict on the counts
related to the assault of Lawson. Harmon also failed to establish
that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the admission
of Lawson’s statement to police, because even putting this statement
aside, the convictions were supported by strong evidence, including
testimony from two witnesses who saw Harmon stand behind Tran-
tham’s car (which Lawson was driving) and then heard gunshots, as
14, 2022. His appeal was docketed to the term of court beginning in December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2 well as evidence that Harmon was found soon after the shooting
with the gun that fired both the fatal bullet and all the bullets col-
lected from the crime scene. So we affirm Harmon’s convictions and
sentence.
1. The evidence at trial showed the following.2
On the night of October 24, 2015, Harmon, Lawson, Trantham,
and others went to the Limelite Café in Richmond County, where
Harmon and Lawson got into an argument. Their argument got so
“heated” that security told their group to leave. Lawson left with
Trantham and drove her car, Harmon left in another car, and their
group eventually met near Lawson’s grandmother’s home on Cun-
ningham Drive.
Trantham remained in the passenger seat of the parked car the
whole time she and Lawson were at Cunningham Drive that night.
Lawson, however, got out of the car, and he and Harmon resumed
2 Because this case involves a question of prejudice under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), we recount the trial evidence in some detail, weighing the evidence as we would expect rea- sonable jurors to have done rather than only in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Wood v. State, 316 Ga. 811, 812 (1) n.2 (890 SE2d 716) (2023). 3 their argument. Harmon pulled out a gun and was “waving it
around” during the argument, and the argument eventually esca-
lated into a fistfight.
Tammy Lawson, who was related to both Harmon and Lawson,
testified at trial that she was asleep at the Cunningham Drive home
and woke up when she heard arguing. She looked outside and saw
that Lawson and Harmon were arguing, and that Harmon had a
gun. She saw “a couple people” other than Harmon with guns but
did not think Lawson had one. Tammy went outside and told Law-
son to leave. He left, but came back less than five minutes later and
resumed arguing with Harmon.
Tammy testified at trial that she did not see Harmon fire the
gun, but she said that “[h]e was waving it around then he fired [it].”
In interviews recorded with police on the night of the shooting,
Tammy first told police that she woke up to loud music, heard two
gunshots, and went to the door and saw two cars driving by at a fast
speed. But once she and the officer resumed the interview outside
4 the presence of other family members, she told police the same ver-
sion of events she testified to at trial: that, while Harmon and Law-
son were arguing, she saw Harmon walk to the back of Trantham’s
car (which Lawson was driving) and “heard” him “fire” two shots. In
another interview recorded at the police station later that night,
Tammy told police that Harmon shot at the car twice and appeared
to be aiming for the trunk.
Lawson testified that he was standing by the driver’s side door
of the car when he heard gunshots from behind him, and he then got
into the car and drove away.
As Lawson drove toward home, he tried to get Trantham’s at-
tention, nudged her, and discovered that she was bleeding and un-
responsive. He immediately drove her to the hospital, where doctors
determined that Trantham’s wounds were fatal and placed her on
life support until her organs could be donated. She died two days
later.
Lawson spoke to police about the shooting twice: first after
bringing Trantham to the hospital, and again later that morning at
5 the police station. In the police station interview, Lawson said that
the night before, he and Harmon had been “talking trash” at Lime-
lite. Later, he and Trantham left Limelite and went back to his
grandmother’s home on Cunningham Drive. Harmon was already
there and stood outside Lawson’s front passenger door with a pistol
when Lawson got out of the car. Harmon’s pistol fell, and Harmon
picked it up and put it in his waistband. Harmon then “swung” at
Lawson, and Lawson fought back. During the fight, Harmon pulled
his pistol out more than once. Eventually, someone told Lawson he
needed to leave, and he did. Harmon “started shooting” and Lawson
heard two gunshots while he was still outside of the car and a third
shot as he was driving away. He drove toward home and, when he
tried to get Trantham’s attention, her head fell to the side, and he
saw blood, so he drove her to the hospital.
Meanwhile, back at Cunningham Drive, Tammy saw Harmon
“walk[ ] up the street” as Lawson drove away. A sheriff’s deputy,
responding to a report of shots fired on Cunningham Drive, saw a
man duck behind a tree, so he stopped, and he found Harmon on his
6 hands and knees under the tree with a pistol. The officer took a
Smith & Wesson 9-millimeter pistol from Harmon and detained
him.
After investigators connected the report of shots fired on Cun-
ningham Drive with Trantham’s shooting, Harmon’s hands were
swabbed for gunshot residue and his clothes were collected and
tested for gunshot residue. No gunshot residue was detected on the
swabs from his hands, and one particle characteristic of gunshot res-
idue was found on his shirt.
The autopsy and other forensic evidence showed that a bullet
passed through the back window of the car Trantham had been sit-
ting in, into the headrest of her seat, and through her neck, where
the bullet severed her spinal cord and lodged in her tongue. The
medical examiner testified that this gunshot wound was the sole
cause of Trantham’s death, and the fatal bullet was removed from
her tongue and submitted to the GBI for testing. That bullet, as well
as shell casings found at Cunningham Drive, were matched to the
firearm police found Harmon with when he was detained soon after
7 the shooting. The firearms expert also concluded that a bullet found
in the spare tire of Trantham’s car was consistent with being fired
from the same type of firearm, but she could not determine if the
bullet was fired from Harmon’s specific gun because the bullet was
damaged.
2. Harmon contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sup-
port his convictions for malice murder, possession of a firearm dur-
ing that crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon be-
cause the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that
Harmon, and not Lawson or someone else, fired the fatal shot. Har-
mon also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for directed verdict as to the aggravated assault against Lawson and
possession of a firearm during the commission of that crime because
there was no evidence that Lawson was ever in fear of being shot.
(a) We evaluate a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict. See Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412, 415 (2) (a) (897 SE2d 856)
(2024) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt
8 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). Viewing the evidence in that light, we
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crimes
of which he was convicted. See Lee, 318 Ga. at 415 (2) (a). In doing
so, “we leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies
in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences
to be derived from the facts.” Id. at 415-416 (2) (a) (citation and punc-
tuation omitted).
Applying that standard here, the evidence summarized above
and viewed in the proper light was sufficient for a rational trier of
fact to find Harmon guilty of each of the offenses he was convicted
of. As to malice murder, both Lawson and Tammy saw Harmon with
a gun when he was arguing with Lawson and heard gunshots while
Harmon stood behind Trantham’s car. Tammy also saw Harmon
shoot at the back of the car where Trantham sat.3 And, soon after
3 Harmon contends that he was not the shooter and does not specifically
address the element of malice. Although there is little evidence that Harmon intended to shoot and kill Trantham, there is ample evidence that he intended to shoot and kill Lawson, including their argument at the café earlier that
9 the shooting, police found Harmon hiding behind a tree nearby with
the gun that fired the fatal bullet, and forensic testing showed that
all the shell casings and bullets collected during the investigation
were or may have been fired from that same gun. See Morris v. State,
317 Ga. 87, 92-93 (2) (891 SE2d 859) (2023) (affirming malice mur-
der conviction where the evidence authorized the jury to conclude
that the defendant fired the fatal bullet, as the evidence showed he
possessed at least two guns on the night of the shooting, including
one from which the fatal bullet could have been fired, and his act of
shooting at the victim’s van was the proximate cause of the victim’s
death).
This evidence was also sufficient to support Harmon’s convic-
tion for possession of a firearm during the commission of malice
night, their physical altercation at Cunningham Drive, and evidence that Har- mon shot at the car as Lawson entered it. Under the doctrine of transferred intent, a person who intends to, for example, shoot one person and uninten- tionally strikes another cannot avoid wrongdoing by claiming that he did not intend to shoot that victim; his intent is transferred from the person he in- tended to shoot to the person whom he actually shot. See Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 364-365 (4) (882 SE2d 289) (2022). So the element of malice is sup- ported by the evidence that Harmon intended to shoot and kill Lawson, and that intent was transferred to Trantham, whom Harmon actually shot. Id. 10 murder. See Hill v. State, 276 Ga. 220, 221 (3) (576 SE2d 886) (2003)
(“Evidence that the defendant . . . carried or was within arm’s length
of a weapon during the commission of a crime authorizes a finding
of guilt” for possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime).
Combined with the evidence of Harmon’s three earlier felony convic-
tions,4 this evidence also supported the conviction for possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon. See Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 165
(10) (c) (635 SE2d 740) (2006) (certified copies of prior felony convic-
tion combined with evidence supporting convictions for malice mur-
der and possession of a firearm during commission of a crime were
sufficient to support conviction for possession of a firearm by a con-
victed felon).
(b) The standard for review of the constitutional sufficiency of
the evidence also governs our review of the denial of a motion for
directed verdict. See Rashad v. State, 318 Ga. 199, 206 (2) (897 SE2d
760) (2024).
4 The State introduced certified copies of Harmon’s three prior felony
convictions, which were admitted into evidence during the bifurcated portion of the trial. 11 To convict someone of aggravated assault (or deny them a di-
rected verdict on that count), as relevant here, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a deadly weapon
“to commit an act which places another person in reasonable appre-
hension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” Jackson v. State,
315 Ga. 543, 549 (1) (a) (883 SE2d 815) (2023) (citation and punctu-
ation omitted). See OCGA §§ 16-5-20; 16-5-21. Whether the victim
was placed “in reasonable apprehension of injury” is a question of
fact, and “[t]he presence of a deadly weapon would normally place a
victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently.” Jack-
son, 315 Ga. at 549 (1) (a) (quoting Stewart v. State, 299 Ga. 622,
626 (2) (a) (791 SE2d 61) (2016)).
The evidence at trial authorized the jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Lawson was placed in reasonable apprehen-
sion of receiving a violent injury when he heard gunshots from be-
hind him after seeing Harmon with a gun. See Jackson, 315 Ga. at
549 (1) (a). This, combined with the evidence that Harmon was the
12 shooter, which we discussed in Division 2 (a), was sufficient to sup-
port the denial of a motion for directed verdict on the aggravated
assault count and, ultimately, to support Harmon’s conviction for
that crime. See, e.g., Gobert v. State, 311 Ga. 305, 309-310 (1) (b)
(857 SE2d 647) (2021) (sufficient evidence to support an aggravated
assault conviction where there was evidence that the defendant
fired multiple shots into the car where the victim was riding); Pyatt
v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 742-743 & n.1, 744-745 (1) (784 SE2d 759)
(2016) (sufficient evidence to support aggravated assault convictions
where defendant and others shot into the car where the victims were
riding). This evidence was also sufficient to support the denial of a
motion for directed verdict on, and a conviction for, possession of a
firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault. See Hill,
276 Ga. at 221 (3).
3. Harmon contends that his trial counsel provided constitu-
tionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of
Lawson’s police statement. He asserts that Lawson’s police state-
ment was hearsay that did not fall within any exception, and he was
13 prejudiced by its admission because the statement served only to
improperly bolster Lawson’s and Tammy’s trial testimony.5
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a de-
fendant must show that his counsel’s performance both was defi-
cient (objectively unreasonable under the circumstances) and caused
him prejudice (shown by establishing a reasonable probability that
the result of the trial would have been different absent counsel’s de-
ficient performance). See Lee, 318 Ga. at 420 (6) (citing Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
(1984); Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218, 221 (2) (892 SE2d 744) (2023)).
When evaluating whether an appellant has established prejudice
5 Harmon also takes issue with the wording of several questions the
State asked Lawson on cross-examination about whether Lawson told police that he saw Harmon fire the gun (which Lawson denied saying). Harmon con- tends that the State asked these questions to “mislead” the court into admit- ting the challenged recording of Lawson’s interview with police as a prior in- consistent statement. But Harmon does not appear to claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to these questions. In any event, for the rea- sons we discuss later in this opinion, Harmon has not shown that he was prej- udiced by the admission of Lawson’s police interview, during which Lawson told police he saw Harmon with a gun and later heard gunshots but did not say he saw Harmon fire the gun. 14 under Strickland, “we review the record de novo and weigh the evi-
dence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done” rather
than in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Wood v. State,
316 Ga. 811, 812 (1) n.2 (890 SE2d 716) (2023) (quoting Draughn v.
State, 311 Ga. 378, 382-383 (2) (b) (858 SE2d 8) (2021)).
Even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently by fail-
ing to object to the admission of Lawson’s statement to police, Har-
mon has not established that he was prejudiced by that failure. See
Lee, 318 Ga. at 420 (6). Even without Lawson’s statement to the po-
lice, the evidence against Harmon was still very strong. Lawson tes-
tified that he saw Harmon with a gun when they were arguing and,
even though he did not see Harmon fire the gun, he heard gunshots
from behind as he entered the driver’s side of the car. Tammy also
testified that immediately before shots were fired, she saw Harmon
with a gun and saw him walk to the back of Trantham’s car as Law-
son entered the driver’s seat. Although it is unclear whether Tammy
15 only heard the gunshots or also saw them,6 her testimony—that
Harmon had a gun and was standing behind Trantham’s car when
gunshots rang out—was largely consistent with Lawson’s testimony.
Their testimony about the shooting was further supported by evi-
dence that police found Harmon hiding near the crime scene with a
gun soon after the shooting, and forensic evidence that the fatal bul-
let, and all the bullets and shell casings collected at the crime scene,
matched Harmon’s gun. Given this evidence, Harmon has not estab-
lished a reasonable probability of a different result absent trial coun-
sel’s assumed error of not objecting to the admission of Lawson’s
statement to police.7 See Henderson v. State, 304 Ga. 733, 738 (3) (d)
6 Tammy testified that she did not see Harmon fire the gun but saw him
“waving it around then he fired [it].” But she told police during her third inter- view on the night of the shooting that Harmon shot at the car twice and ap- peared to be aiming for the trunk. 7 A word about preserved hearsay objections to the admission of prior
statements to police that were “consistent” with the speaker’s trial testimony but were not “prior consistent statements” within the meaning of the Evidence Code. We have evaluated whether admitting such statements was harmless error by disregarding both the inadmissible hearsay statement and the trial testimony that the improperly admitted hearsay statement repeated, and then applying the standard for non-constitutional harmless error. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 315 Ga. 524, 535 (5) (883 SE2d 746) (2023); McGarity v. State, 311 Ga. 158, 167-168 (3) (856 SE2d 241) (2021); Davis v. State, 307 Ga. 746, 751 (2) (b)
16 (822 SE2d 228) (2018) (concluding that defendant failed to establish
Strickland prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to hearsay be-
cause, given the strong evidence against him, he failed to show that
there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different if the jury had not heard the hearsay). See
(838 SE2d 263) (2020) (decided under the old Evidence Code). We have ex- plained that whether admitting the hearsay statement was harmless error de- pends on whether it is “highly probable that the error did not contribute to the jury’s guilty verdict,” so we do not “look to [the witness’s] improperly bolstered testimony to show that the bolstering error was harmless.” Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 341-342 (4) (b) (751 SE2d 399) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). In doing so, we may have conflated the improper admission of hear- say statements that repeated the live witness’s testimony with “bolstering”— a term that more precisely describes the scenario of one witness vouching for the credibility of the other. See Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 460-461 (2) (b) (807 SE2d 369) (2017) (“When a witness’s statement does not directly address the credibility of another witness . . . there is no improper bolstering.”). But we need not decide here whether this approach is correct, because Harmon’s ar- gument about admitting this prior statement is made as part of an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland. Under Strickland’s prejudice standard, we ask if the defendant has established a “reasonable probability” that the result of the trial would have been different absent counsel’s deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (III) (B). Here, had Harmon’s counsel raised a hearsay objection when the State moved to admit Lawson’s police interview and the objection were sustained, the jury would not have heard Lawson’s po- lice interview. But the jury still would have heard Lawson’s and Tammy’s live testimony and the evidence that Harmon was found with the gun that matched all the bullets at the crime scene, all of which, as discussed above, was very strong evidence of his guilt. 17 also Wood, 316 Ga. at 812 (1) n.2; Morris, 317 Ga. at 92-93 (2); Go-
bert, 311 Ga. at 309 (1) (a); Pyatt, 298 Ga. at 742-743 & n.1, 744-745
(1); Walker, 281 Ga. at 165 (10) (c).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided June 11, 2024.
Murder. Richmond Superior Court. Before Judge Jolly.
Lucy D. Roth, for appellant.
Jared T. Williams, District Attorney, John M. Kraft, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.
Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill,
Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Eric C. Peters, Assistant Attor-
ney General, for appellee.