307 Ga. 625 FINAL COPY
S19A1187. DAVIS v. THE STATE.
WARREN, Justice.
Carlton Davis was convicted of felony murder in connection
with the death of Lakeitha Sims.1 On appeal, Davis argues that the
trial court erred by admitting a statement he made to a detective
that Davis contends he did not freely and voluntarily make; that the
trial court erred by improperly admitting into evidence a letter that
Davis contends violated his reasonable expectation of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment; and that his due process rights were
violated because of the 14-year delay between Davis’s jury verdict
and the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial. For the
1 On February 6, 2004, a Liberty County grand jury indicted Davis for malice murder and felony murder predicated on the aggravated assault of Sims. After a trial held from September 29 to 30, 2004, a jury found Davis guilty of felony murder, and the trial court sentenced Davis to life imprisonment on the same day. Davis filed a motion for new trial on October 5, 2004, and amended it twice through new counsel. After a February 26, 2018, hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Davis’s amended motion for new trial on September 18, 2018. Davis timely filed a notice of appeal on October 3, 2018, and the case was docketed in this Court for the August 2019 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm the trial court’s denial
of Davis’s motion for new trial.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence presented at Davis’s trial showed that on the evening of
August 16, 2003, Davis was at Sims’s mobile home with Sims and
Emanuel Tillman. Davis and Tillman were living with Sims, and
Davis and Sims were involved in a romantic relationship.
On the evening of August 16, Davis and Sims “got into an
argument over how the furniture was moved around” in the living
room. At some point after the argument, Davis and Tillman went to
a gas station to buy “a few beers.” After returning from the gas
station, both men began drinking and smoking marijuana in a car
outside of Sims’s home. When “it was starting to get dark out,”
Davis went inside. Tillman stayed in the car “listening to music”
and “drinking” and eventually fell asleep.
At some point later that night, Davis came back outside, woke
Tillman up, and said that “someone was coming looking for” them.
Davis was “in a rush,” and he and Tillman went inside, packed their
2 bags, and drove to the nearby mobile home of Lisette Rodriquez
around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m.2 When Davis and Tillman entered
Rodriquez’s home, Rodriquez was not there but two other people
were. Tillman “looked like he [had seen] a ghost,” and Davis “was
acting . . . edgy” and “pacing the floor back and forth.” Davis said
that he and Tillman had gotten into an argument at a nightclub in
Savannah a few weeks prior with a man called “TKO” and that TKO
was now coming after Davis and Tillman.3 Davis said that he and
Tillman were fleeing to Chicago, where Davis was originally from,
and that he needed to get in touch with Rodriquez in order to
retrieve some money she owed him for a television he gave to her.
After talking to Rodriquez by phone, Davis left to pick up Rodriquez
from a Holiday Inn, where she was with a friend after work, and
Rodriquez gave Davis the money he requested and filled his car with
2 While Davis was still living with and in a relationship with Sims, Davis
was also in a romantic relationship with Rodriquez starting in March or April 2003.
3 Tillman testified at trial that during this incident in Savannah, TKO
threatened to kill Davis and Tillman, claimed to know where Davis and Tillman lived, and “brandished a weapon” at Davis and Tillman. 3 gas. Tillman stayed behind at Rodriquez’s house. At this point, it
was “[c]lose to 4:00 or 5:00 in the morning, still dark.” Davis told
Rodriquez that there were men “chasing” him and Tillman before he
left to pick up Tillman from Rodriquez’s home. Davis and Tillman
then drove to Chicago, arriving around 9:00 or 10:00 that evening.
Later that morning, Sims’s mother, Delores, called Sims after
not receiving a call from her daughter. Sims and her mother were
close and talked on the phone every day, and Sims had made plans
to bring her three-month-old daughter to visit Delores that weekend.
Delores grew concerned when her repeated calls to Sims went
unanswered. Finally, after a day and a half of unanswered phone
calls, Delores decided to drive to Sims’s home to check on her
daughter, bringing her nephew along with her. When they arrived
at Sims’s home, they saw Sims’s car in the yard and Sims’s
pocketbook in the front seat of her car. After unsuccessfully calling
for Sims and knocking on her door, Delores called the police. A police
officer came by the house but eventually left. Finally, Delores’s
nephew was able to enter the house through a back window and let
4 Delores in the home. Inside, Delores found Sims’s daughter on the
bedroom floor crying, and Delores’s nephew found Sims’s body in the
bathroom “laying over the tub.” They called the police, and the
paramedics and police arrived on the scene shortly thereafter.
Davis was arrested on September 13, 2003, and eventually
indicted for malice murder and felony murder. At trial, the
paramedic who responded to the scene testified that he found Sims’s
body in the bathroom. Sims was “knelt down, bent over into the
bathtub” and had “obvious rigor mortis,” meaning that “she had
been dead for a while in order for her body to be stiff.”
The detective, who was the primary investigator on the case,
testified that Sims was “laying across the bathtub with her head into
the bathtub laying down.” He also testified that he noticed “some
blood” “down by her face” when he “looked into the bathtub.”
Although there were no signs of struggle elsewhere in the house, the
detective sealed the crime scene.
The medical examiner testified that Sims had abrasions on the
back of her left shoulder, her knees, and the top of the foot at her
5 ankle. Although the medical examiner testified that there were no
“significant areas of abrasion” or “remarkable external injuries” to
Sims’s neck area, Sims did suffer internal neck injuries, multiple
abrasions to her face and lips, a “large area of hemorrhage” in both
eyes, and a “bloody-mucussy discharge coming from the nose.” The
medical examiner ultimately concluded that Sims “died as a result
of manual strangulation with multiple perimortem blunt force
[injuries]” and that her manner of death was homicide.
At trial, Davis testified in his own defense. He testified that
on the evening of August 16, he and Sims were arguing because he
was planning to leave because TKO was after him and “the
relationship wasn’t working really to a point.” He remembered
arguing but could not remember how the argument “escalated” or
what “exactly . . . happened.” He denied ever meaning to harm or
kill Sims that night and said he “never meant for anything —
nothing like this to happen.”
Davis does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
Nevertheless, consistent with this Court’s practice in murder cases,
6 we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial
was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Davis was guilty of the crime for which he was
convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Davis contends that the trial court erred by admitting into
evidence the second statement Davis made to a detective because
that statement was not freely and voluntarily made. We disagree.4
During the course of the investigation into Sims’s death,
4 In his brief on appeal, Davis also appears to make an argument that
his second statement to law enforcement was inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). To the extent that Davis argues that his statement was inadmissible because Davis was in custody and his Miranda warnings were not administered again before Davis’s second interview, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it ruled that Davis “was not in custody” when he gave his statements to the detective. See Teasley v. State, 293 Ga. 758, 761-762 (749 SE2d 710) (2013) (“Unless a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive that he was in custody, Miranda warnings are not necessary [and in] reviewing a ruling on the admissibility of a defendant’s statements . . . we accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous.” (citation and punctuation omitted.)). See also, e.g., Rhynes v. State, 306 Ga. 412, 415-416 (831 SE2d 831) (2019); DeVaughn v. State, 296 Ga. 475, 479-480 (769 SE2d 70) (2015); Leslie v. State, 292 Ga. 368, 372 (738 SE2d 42) (2013). 7 Hinesville Police Department Detective Tracy Howard and another
detective traveled to Chicago to locate and interview Davis and
Tillman. On September 13, 2003, with the assistance of local police,
Detective Howard located the men in Matteson, Illinois, a Chicago
suburb. Detective Howard asked Davis if “he would agree to go”
with him to talk about “this particular investigation” at the Country
Club Hills police department. Davis agreed and followed the
detectives in his own vehicle. The detectives asked that “Tillman, if
he would agree to it, ride with [the detectives] in [their] vehicle just
to prevent any conversation between . . . Tillman and . . . Davis
regarding any type of questioning that . . . may occur.” Davis was
not under arrest at this time and charges were not pending against
him.
Detective Howard then interviewed Davis in an interview room
at the Country Club Hills police department. The room was “boxed
in shape” with a table “against the wall and pretty much . . . in the
middle of [the] room.” Davis and Detective Howard were sitting at
the table, with Detective Howard seated on the side closest to the
8 door. Prior to interviewing Davis, Detective Howard advised Davis
that he was not in custody and also advised Davis of the Miranda5
warnings. Davis indicated that he understood his rights, initialed
and signed the waiver form, and agreed to speak with Detective
Howard. After Davis and Detective Howard talked for a “little
while,” Detective Howard started recording audio of Davis’s
statement, which was approximately 13 minutes long and ended at
3:03 a.m.
Davis then “indicated he wanted to make an additional
statement,” which began at 4:02 a.m., 59 minutes after the
conclusion of his first statement. In that 59-minute interval
between recorded interviews, Davis and Detective Howard took at
least one smoke break and the two continued to talk; they discussed
baseball, talked about the Chicago area, and Detective Howard told
Davis that he did not believe Davis was telling the truth. Before
Davis gave his second recorded statement, Detective Howard
“reassured on the tape that [Davis] understood [that] . . . his rights
5 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
9 were still in place” and “[t]hat [Davis] didn’t have to talk to [Howard]
if he didn’t choose to and to [e]nsure that the tape was being freely
and voluntarily given.”
“To determine whether a confession was voluntarily made, a
trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances, and
unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s credibility determinations
and factual findings relating to the admissibility of a confession
must be upheld on appeal.” Turner v. State, 287 Ga. 793, 794 (700
SE2d 386) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). “However,” on
appeal we “independently apply the law to the facts.” Id. (citation
and punctuation omitted).
During a pretrial Jackson-Denno6 hearing on the admissibility
of the second recorded statement, the trial court found “by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Davis] was advised of each of
his Miranda rights”; “[t]hat he understood them”; and that he
“voluntarily waived them and he then thereafter gave his statement
freely and voluntarily . . . not only as to the initial statement but as
6 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
10 to the second statement also.”
Here, the evidence presented at the Jackson-Denno hearing
showed that Davis voluntarily agreed to go to the police station for
questioning; drove to the station in his own car; was told he was not
in custody and did not have to talk to law enforcement; and initiated
his second statement to the detective. The evidence also showed
that Davis was able to read and write, was educated, had additional
education through the military, and appeared to understand his
Miranda rights. Moreover, no evidence was presented that Davis
was ever restrained, was told he was not free to leave, or was under
the influence of any alcohol or drugs. See, e.g., Hopwood v. State,
307 Ga. __ (835 SE2d 627) (2019) (affirming that the trial court did
not err by admitting the defendant’s statements to an investigator
where the defendant “did not appear to be intoxicated or otherwise
unable to voluntarily waive her rights,” the record did not show the
defendant suffered from “any mental incapacity at the time she
made her statement,” and the defendant “appeared to understand
and voluntarily waive her rights”); Turner, 287 Ga. at 794-795
11 (affirming that the trial court did not err by admitting the
defendant’s statements where the defendant could read and write,
was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, was never
handcuffed, was free to leave at any time, and voluntarily
accompanied the interrogating officers to the sheriff’s office).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in ruling that, under the
totality of the circumstances, Davis gave his statements “freely and
voluntarily” and by admitting those statements at trial. See
Hopwood, 307 Ga. at __; Turner, 287 Ga. at 794-795.
3. Davis argues that the trial court improperly admitted as
evidence at trial a letter that Liberty County jail personnel opened,
violating his reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. However, because the record shows that opening the
letter was for security and maintenance purposes, rather than for
prosecutorial purposes, the search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, and Davis’s contention fails.
On March 15, 2004, Sergeant Delores Wilson, the office
manager at Liberty County jail who handles all of the incoming
12 mail, received an envelope addressed to “PFC Robert R. Thompson”
at a Fort Stewart address from “Jerome Smith” with a return
address from Liberty County jail. When Sergeant Wilson saw the
letter, it was marked “return to sender” because it could not be
delivered to the designated Fort Stewart recipient. Sergeant Wilson
realized that the letter had originally been sent from the jail, as
evidenced by the Liberty County jail return address and the Liberty
County jail stamp on the back of the envelope — a stamp that marks
every piece of outgoing mail pursuant to the jail’s policy.
Sergeant Wilson then checked the jail’s computer database and
discovered that the jail had never housed a “Jerome Smith” as an
inmate. Because she was unsure to whom she should return the
letter, she opened the letter to determine its author. She then
brought it to Doug Franks, the jail administrator in charge of daily
jail operations. Based on the content of the letter, Franks instructed
that the letter be turned over to Detective Howard.7
7 In essence, the letter asked its intended recipient to force Tillman to
confess to the murder of Sims and then to kill Tillman and make his death look
13 At a hearing on the admissibility of the letter, Sergeant Wilson
testified that she opened the letter to “verify who actually [wrote it]
since we knew it came out of the Liberty County Jail [and] we knew
that it had to have been one of our inmates that had written the
letter” and “to know whose file — to put [the letter] in because we
don’t just leave the mail — you know, there’s nowhere to put this
and so it has to be filed away in the proper place.” She confirmed
that she was “basically investigating to try and find out who to give
the letter back to.”
Franks testified that “[i]n all cases, . . . all mail that comes into
the jail is [opened and] monitored for contraband . . . unless it’s
marked from an attorney.” He also confirmed that, in this case,
what they “essentially . . . were concerned with . . . [was]
investigating inside the letter to find out who the letter actually
like a suicide. The letter instructed the recipient to capture this “confession” on videotape. The letter also cautioned the recipient to “[m]ake sure you got your alibis covered” and contained statements like: “Plan this out perfectly and look at all angles. They could get me for conspiracy but not unless they got hard evidence.” To facilitate the plan, the letter included Tillman’s cell phone number, home phone number, home address, and a map to his house. It also provided the work schedule of Tillman’s mother and her husband and explained that “[n]either one of them possesses a firearm.” 14 belonged to” and “who [they] could return it to.”
As an initial matter, the trial court ruled that “under [this] set
of circumstances [Davis] was a [pretrial] detainee” because “[h]e had
not been convicted of a crime” when the letter was opened by Liberty
County jail personnel. It further concluded that “any expectation of
privacy by this defendant, if he in fact did mail this letter, was
waived when he put somebody else’s name on the address,” and that,
“as a security and administrative process of the jail,” jail personnel
“had a right to open the letter to determine who it should be
returned to.” As a result, it ruled that “the letter [was] admissible
providing there’s some testimony that would tie it to this defendant.”
At trial, Rodriquez testified that she recognized the letter’s
handwriting as belonging to Davis, and the letter was admitted over
objection.
“A pre-trial detainee’s Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy in his cell and personal effects ‘is necessarily diminished.’”
Leslie v. State, 301 Ga. 882, 887 (804 SE2d 351) (2017) (quoting
Thomas v. State, 263 Ga. 85, 87 (428 SE2d 564) (1993)); see
15 Armstead v. State, 293 Ga. 243, 246 (744 SE2d 774) (2013) (“Pretrial
detainees have a substantially diminished expectation of privacy for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”). “Consequently, items found
during searches conducted for security and maintenance purposes
are not within the scope of protection of the Fourth Amendment.”
Leslie, 301 Ga. at 887; see also State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 266
(517 SE2d 61) (1999) (“[Our prior case law] thus stands for the
proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search
by jail officials of a pre-trial detainee’s cell for security and
maintenance purposes.”). “However, where a search is not initiated
for legitimate prison objectives, but instead is instigated by the State
for the purposes of bolstering the prosecution’s case against a pre-
trial detainee, then the pre-trial detainee ‘retains a limited but
legitimate expectation of privacy’ and is protected from an
unreasonable search.” Leslie, 301 Ga. at 887 (quoting Henderson,
271 Ga. at 267).
Here, the record supports the trial court’s ruling that the letter
was recovered during a search conducted for security and
16 maintenance purposes. At the hearing on the admissibility of the
letter, the State presented evidence that Sergeant Wilson opened
the letter for the administrative purpose of processing the mail
because she did not know to whom the letter should be routed.
Indeed, even Davis admits in his appellate brief that the “jailers
opened the letter . . . to determine how to file it.” Moreover, Franks
testified that “all mail” is opened and monitored “for contraband.”
There is no record evidence showing that the opening of the letter
was instigated for prosecutorial purposes or “for the purposes of
bolstering the prosecution’s case against [Davis].”8 See Leslie, 301
Ga. at 887. Compare Henderson, 271 Ga. at 267-268 (holding a
warrant was required to search a pre-trial detainee’s cell where “the
evidence adduced in the case at bar establishe[d] uncontrovertedly
that the sole purpose of the search of [the detainee’s] cell was to
further the prosecution’s effort to obtain a conviction against [the
8 Davis’s argument that the jailers did not testify they had a particularized concern about this letter containing contraband does not amount to evidence that the jailers opened the letter for prosecutorial purposes. 17 pre-trial detainee]”). To the contrary, the Liberty County jail
personnel did not even know the identity of the letter’s author or
sender when they opened the letter. And because Rodriquez
testified at trial that she recognized the letter’s handwriting as
belonging to Davis, a sufficient connection between Davis and the
letter was made for the trial court to admit the letter into evidence.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it ruled that Davis’s
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and by admitting the
letter into evidence at trial.
4. Davis contends that the 14-year delay between his jury
verdict and the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial violates
his due process rights. We have admonished that long post-
conviction delays ‘put at risk the rights of defendants and crime
victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial,’ and
have “‘reiterate[d] that it is the duty of all those involved in the
criminal justice system . . . to ensure that the appropriate post-
conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided without
unnecessary delay.’” Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (811 SE2d
18 420) (2018) (quoting Shank v. State, 290 Ga. 844, 849 (725 SE2d 246)
(2012)). Even so, Davis’s due process claim fails here because, as
explained below, he has failed to demonstrate any prejudice caused
by the delay. See Norman v. State, 303 Ga. 635, 641-642 (814 SE2d
401) (2018); Owens, 303 Ga. at 258-259; Shank, 290 Ga. at 849.
“Substantial delays in the appellate process implicate due
process rights, and we review appellate due process claims under
the four-factor analysis used for speedy trial claims set forth in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (92 SCt 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972).”
Veal v. State, 301 Ga. 161, 167 (800 SE2d 325) (2017). The four
Barker factors include the length of the delay, the reason for the
delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant. Barker, 407 U. S. at 530. “However, in determining
whether an appellate delay violates due process, prejudice, unlike in
the speedy trial context, is not presumed but must be shown.”
Glover v. State, 291 Ga. 152, 155 (728 SE2d 221) (2012) (citation and
punctuation omitted). “‘[A]ppellate delay is prejudicial when there
is a reasonable probability that, but for the delay, the result of the
19 appeal would have been different.’” Norman, 303 Ga. at 642
(citation omitted).
Davis argues that the first three Barker factors weigh in his
favor and that he has also proven prejudice through his presentation
of meritorious claims on appeal. However, even assuming that the
first three Barker factors weigh in Davis’s favor, his due process
claim nevertheless fails because Davis has failed to show that he
was prejudiced by the delay. See Norman, 303 Ga. at 642. (“But
where prejudice is clearly lacking, we will not reverse a conviction,
even if the other factors favor the defendant.”); Veal, 301 Ga. at 168-
169 (noting that this Court has “repeatedly found that the failure to
make [a showing of prejudice] in an appellate delay claim to be fatal
to the claim, even when the other three factors weigh in the
appellant’s favor”). Here, Davis only points to his enumerations of
error on appeal as evidence that he has suffered prejudice. But
considering that his enumerations are without merit — as we have
concluded above — our decision would have been the same
regardless of when Davis brought his appeal and thus Davis has
20 failed to demonstrate prejudice. See Norman, 303 Ga. at 642;
Loadholt v. State, 286 Ga. 402, 406 (687 SE2d 824) (2010) (“[W]here
‘the enumerations . . . raised on appeal are without merit[,] there
can therefore be no prejudice in delaying a meritless appeal.’”
(citation omitted)). Accordingly, Davis cannot establish a due
process violation, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying relief on this ground. See Norman, 303 Ga. at 642.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JANUARY 13, 2020. Murder. Liberty Superior Court. Before Judge Stewart. Rouse & Copeland, Amy L. Copeland, for appellant. Tom Durden, District Attorney, Alexis M. Antonucci, Sandra Dutton, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
21 General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M. Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.