State v. Brantley

914 S.E.2d 807, 321 Ga. 370

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: April 8, 2025
• Docket: S25A0208
• Status: Published

Opinion

321 Ga. 370 FINAL COPY

S25A0208. THE STATE v. BRANTLEY.

PETERSON, Chief Justice.

The State appeals an order excluding incriminating phone calls

Barron Brantley made while incarcerated in jail before his trial; the

State brings that appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4). As an initial

matter, we conclude that our unchallenged precedent permits the

State to appeal this order under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4). And on the

merits, the trial court made two errors. It erred in holding that the

District Attorney’s access to the recorded calls violated Brantley’s

state and federal rights to privacy, because our precedent makes

clear Brantley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in recorded

jail calls not made to counsel. And the trial court also erred in

holding that Brantley’s equal protection rights were violated when

compared to nonincarcerated people; Brantley is incarcerated, and

so is not similarly situated to such people, and the State has a

rational basis to treat him differently. We reverse. 1. Brantley is charged with malice murder, felony murder,

aggravated assault, false imprisonment, concealing a death, rape,

and aggravated sexual battery in connection with the sexual assault

and murder of Alexis Janaé Crawford. While awaiting trial,

Brantley was incarcerated in the Fulton County jail, where he made

multiple incriminating statements to others on the jail phones. None

of the calls were to his attorney. The jail phones are monitored and

recorded by the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office, and an automated

message at the beginning of each call informed Brantley that his

calls were monitored and recorded. The Fulton County District

Attorney’s Office reviewed Brantley’s calls and sought to use three

calls at trial.

Three weeks before his scheduled trial, Brantley filed a

“motion in limine to exclude jail telephone calls” arguing that the

use of the calls by the District Attorney’s Office violated the Due

Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and the right to

privacy in the Georgia Constitution and under the Fourth

2 Amendment to the United States Constitution. Brantley also argued

that the calls should be excluded because they referenced

inadmissible evidence, such as Brantley’s prior criminal history,

Brantley’s previous statements to police, and news media reports.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted Brantley’s motion

to exclude the jail phone calls, reasoning that the District Attorney’s

Office’s “acquisition” of, and “access” to, Brantley’s jail phone calls

violated his federal equal protection rights and right to privacy

under the federal and state constitutions. The State filed a timely

notice of appeal, citing OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4) as the statutory basis

for its appeal.

2. As a preliminary matter, we address Brantley’s argument

that the State’s appeal should be dismissed because (1) the State is

not authorized to appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4) and (2) it failed

to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5). “The State’s

right to appeal in criminal cases is derived from Georgia’s statutory

law,” specifically OCGA § 5-7-1 (a). State v. Wheeler, 310 Ga. 72, 74

(1) (849 SE2d 401) (2020). OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5) provides that the

3 State may appeal

[f]rom an order, decision, or judgment excluding any other evidence to be used by the state at trial on any motion filed by the state or defendant at least 30 days prior to trial and ruled on prior to the impaneling of a jury or the defendant being put in jeopardy, whichever occurs first, if: (A) Notwithstanding the provisions of Code Section 5-6-38, the notice of appeal filed pursuant to this paragraph is filed within two days of such order, decision, or judgment; and (B) The prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial court that such appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a material fact in the proceeding[.]

The State did not comply with the requirements of paragraph (a) (5)1

and instead asserts that its notice of appeal is proper under

paragraph (a) (4). Because unchallenged precedent supports the

State’s argument, we agree.

OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4) provides that the State may appeal “[f]rom

an order, decision, or judgment suppressing or excluding evidence

illegally seized . . . in the case of motions made and ruled upon prior

1 Because Brantley’s motion in limine was filed less than 30 days before

the trial’s scheduled start date, the State’s appeal of the order granting that motion would not be permitted under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5). Additionally, the State did not include the certifications required by OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5) (B). 4 to the impaneling of a jury or the defendant being put in jeopardy,

whichever occurs first[.]” This Court repeatedly has held that

paragraph (a) (4) authorizes the State to appeal from orders

suppressing or excluding evidence on the basis that “it was obtained

by unlawful means.” See State v. Andrade, 298 Ga. 464, 464-465 (782

SE2d 665) (2016) (collecting cases), disapproved on other grounds by

State v. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. 442, 448-449 (1) n.11 (826 SE2d 18)

(2019); State v. Strickman, 253 Ga. 287, 288 (319 SE2d 864) (1984)

(holding that an order granting a motion “to exclude evidence on the

ground that it was obtained in violation of law” is appealable under

the materially identical predecessor to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4)).

It seems doubtful that, as a textual matter, the statutory right

to appeal from an order suppressing or excluding evidence illegally

“seized” extends to appealing an order suppressing or excluding

evidence on the basis that it was illegally “obtained.” See, e.g.,

Andrade, 298 Ga. at 464-465 (holding that OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4)

authorizes an appeal of an order suppressing a defendant’s

statement as involuntary). But our controlling case law is clear on

5 this point, Brantley does not ask us to reconsider this precedent, and

stare decisis considerations might well warrant retaining it even if

we did reconsider it. See Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 421 (6) (851

SE2d 541) (2020) (“‘Even those who regard “stare decisis” with

something less than enthusiasm recognize that the principle has

even greater weight where the precedent relates to interpretation of

a statute.’” (quoting Etkind v. Suarez, 271 Ga. 352, 358 (5) (519 SE2d

210) (1999))). Accordingly, we faithfully apply it here.

The trial court order in this case excluded the jail phone calls

on the basis that the District Attorney’s Office unlawfully

“acqui[red]” and “access[ed]” — i.e., obtained — those calls. Thus,

the State was permitted to appeal under paragraph (a) (4). See

Anderson v. State, 267 Ga. 116, 116-117 (1) (475 SE2d 629) (1996)

(holding that the State’s appeal of an order suppressing

incriminating phone conversations “on the basis that the taped

conversations were published to the agent and republished to other

IRS officials in violation of” the wiretap statute was appealable

under the predecessor to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4)). See also Andrade,

6 298 Ga. at 464-465 (holding that the State is authorized to appeal

from an order suppressing a statement as involuntary under OCGA

§ 5-7-1 (a) (4)). Because the State’s appeal was authorized under

paragraph (a) (4), it was not required to appeal under paragraph (a)

(5). See Andrade, 298 Ga. at 466 (holding that the State is required

to bring its appeal under paragraph (a) (5) only if the appeal “could

not be brought under” paragraph (a) (4)).

3. We now turn to the trial court’s ruling on Brantley’s motion

in limine. The trial court excluded Brantley’s jail phone calls on the

basis that the use of the calls at trial violated Brantley’s reasonable

expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We

reverse the trial court’s order.

(a) First, the trial court erred in concluding that the Sheriff’s

practice of sharing jail phone calls with the District Attorney’s Office

7 violated the Fourth Amendment.2 In Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210

(647 SE2d 260) (2007), we unequivocally held that there is no

reasonable expectation of privacy in a jail phone call (at least when

the call was not with counsel). Id. at 214 (4) (considering calls with

the defendant’s mother). See also Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 497

(2) (b) (842 SE2d 22) (2020) (holding that the defendant did not have

a reasonable expectation of privacy in a jail phone call made to his

ex-wife and thus counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress the jail

phone calls was not deficient performance). Because pretrial

detainees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their

jail phone calls, the Sheriff’s practice of sharing recorded calls with

the District Attorney’s Office and the use of those calls at trial does

not violate the Fourth Amendment.

2 Because neither the parties nor the trial court distinguished Brantley’s

federal privacy claim from his state privacy claim and because Brantley does not argue that the Georgia Constitution provides more protections than the United States Constitution in this context, we limit our analysis to a pretrial detainee’s expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Regan v. State, 317 Ga. 612, 612 n.2 (894 SE2d 584) (2023) (declining to consider the defendant’s equal protection claims under the Georgia Constitution where neither the defendant nor the trial court distinguished between the defendant’s claims under the federal and state constitutions). 8 Brantley does not challenge Preston’s holding but suggests

there is an exception. Citing several cases, Brantley argues that

when a search is initiated solely for the purpose of bolstering the

prosecution’s case against the pretrial detainee, the detainee retains

a limited expectation of privacy. See Davis v. State, 307 Ga. 625, 631

(3) (837 SE2d 817) (2020) (citing Leslie v. State, 301 Ga. 882, 887 (3)

(804 SE2d 351) (2017); State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264 (517 SE2d

61) (1999)). But here, Brantley concedes that the recording served a

legitimate security measure, and he points to no evidence that the

recording was done solely for the purpose of uncovering

incriminating evidence that could be used against him.

Nevertheless, Brantley argues that the “sharing” of his calls with

the District Attorney’s Office violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Not so. Once Brantley talked to a third party on the jail’s recorded

phone system, he “necessarily risk[ed]” that this information would

be disclosed to law enforcement. See United States v. White, 401 U.S.

745, 751 (91 SCt 1122, 28 LE2d 453) (1971). See also Smith v.

Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-744 (99 SCt 2577, 61 LE2d 220) (1979)

9 (The Supreme Court has “consistently . . . held that a person has no

legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns

over to third parties.”). In short, our precedent directly on point

about jail calls applies, and it requires us to conclude that Brantley,

who was explicitly warned that his calls would be monitored and

recorded, did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy in the

calls he placed . . . from jail.” Preston, 282 Ga. at 214 (4).

(b) Second, the trial court erred in concluding that recording

Brantley’s jail phone calls for use at trial violated the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the

trial court reasoned that, unlike a defendant who is in custody, a

defendant who is out on bond “has the ability to call his family and

friends without his calls being monitored by the State” absent a

wiretap warrant; thus, the trial court concluded that, because

Brantley was treated differently than a defendant who is out on

bond, the State’s access to Brantley’s jail phone calls violated his

equal protection rights.

The Equal Protection Clause requires that “similarly situated

10 persons be treated alike[.]” See Regan v. State, 317 Ga. 612, 616 (3)

(b) (894 SE2d 584) (2023). Although it prohibits classifications that

fail to promote a legitimate state purpose, the Equal Protection

Clause does not forbid all classifications. See id. at 616-617 (3) (b).

Thus, to prevail on an equal protection challenge, a claimant must

demonstrate that the classification scheme at issue “bears no

rational relationship to a legitimate government interest,” when, as

is the case here, the claimant is not a member of a suspect class and

a fundamental right is not at stake.3 See Reyes v. State, 318 Ga. 340,

345-346 (2) (a) (i)-(ii) (898 SE2d 473) (2024) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

Here, the trial court erred; a nonincarcerated defendant is not

similarly situated to an incarcerated defendant as relevant to

Brantley’s claims here. And the State’s differing treatment is

rationally related to a legitimate purpose, namely maintaining jail

security. Accordingly, recording Brantley’s jail phone calls for use at

3 Brantley does not argue on appeal that he is a member of a suspect

class or that the State’s practice of recording incarcerated defendants’ phone calls implicates a fundamental right. 11 trial does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. We reverse the

trial court’s order. On remand, the trial court should consider the

remaining grounds Brantley raised for excluding portions of his jail

calls to the extent that Brantley still asserts those grounds and the

trial court has not yet reached them.

Judgment reversed. Warren, PJ, and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.

Decided April 8, 2025.

Murder, etc. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Edwards.

Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Michael S. Carlson, Kevin C.

Armstrong, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,

Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan

H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Stephen R. Scarborough, Jennifer Lubinsky, for appellee.