Collie v. Hutson

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Collie v. Hutson

334 S.E.2d 13, 175 Ga. App. 672, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2136

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJuly 10, 1985

Docket70210

StatusPublished

Cited by23 cases

This text of 334 S.E.2d 13 (Collie v. Hutson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Collie v. Hutson, 334 S.E.2d 13, 175 Ga. App. 672, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).

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Opinions

Deen, Presiding Judge.

Claude Collie was shot and killed by one Franklin, an escaping felon, using a .357 magnum which he had wrested from a sheriffs deputy during a successful escape attempt shortly before the shooting incident. Collie’s widow brought a wrongful death action against, inter alios, appellees Hutson (the sheriff) and deputies King and Campbell, alleging that the proximate cause of her husband’s death was appellees’ negligence in permitting him to escape from custody while King and Campbell were transporting him to and from a dentist’s office.

The Cobb County Superior Court granted summitry judgment to [673]*673these three defendants on the grounds that they were not negligent; that they had not acted wilfully, corruptly, or maliciously; that the escapee’s act was unforeseeable; and that the defendants neither should have anticipated the killing nor had in any way been connected with it. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s rulings that, as a matter of law, (1) the death was not proximately caused by appellees’ negligence in permitting Franklin to escape, and (2) appellees were not negligent with reference to the events occurring subsequent to the escape, including Collie’s death. Held:

1. We are persuaded by the record in the instant case that there was sufficient evidence to authorize the trial court to find that appellees had no reason to expect that any of the prisoners transported to the dentist’s office on the day of the escape and fatal shooting would attempt an escape, and that appellees’ conduct did not constitute negligence as a matter of law. Appellant’s first enumeration is therefore without merit.

2. “Generally, an independent, intervening criminal act of a third party, without which the injury would not have occurred, will be treated as the proximate cause of the injury . . . superseding any negligence of the defendant. . . [unless] the intervening criminal act is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent [act]. ...” Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis, 168 Ga. App. 688, 689 (309 SE2d 865) (1983); see also OCGA §§ 51-12-8; 51-12-9; Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568 (28 SE 251) (1897). Although under Georgia law questions of negligence and proximate cause are ordinarily for the jury, plain and indisputable cases may be decided by the court as a matter of law. Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis, supra; Williams v. Kennedy, 240 Ga. 163 (240 SE2d 51) (1977); Bussey v. Dawson, 224 Ga. 191 (160 SE2d 834) (1968). In such plain cases “[t]he inquiry is not whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a cause in fact of the injury, but rather whether the causal connection between that conduct and the injury is too remote for the law to countenance a recovery.” Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis, supra at 689; McAuley v. Wills, 251 Ga. 3 (303 SE2d 258) (1983); Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., supra.

Our scrutiny of the record in the instant case, as well as of relevant statutory and case law, leads us to agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the fact pattern in the case sub judice is more analogous to that of Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., supra, than to that of, e.g., Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199 (296 SE2d 693) (1982) (hospital gave mental patient unrestricted pass despite actual knowledge of violent tendencies and homicidal designs towards ex-wife). The trial court was correct in holding that appellees’ conduct, while a cause in fact of the death of appellant’s decedent, was “too remote to be the basis of recovery . . .” OCGA § 51-12-8; see also OCGA § 51-12-9.

[674]*6743. In light of our holdings in Divisions 1 and 2, supra, we find that the judgment below is in compliance with the criteria for summary judgment set out in OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court awarding summary judgment to appellees.

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Carley, Sognier, Pope, and Benham, JJ., concur. Beasley, J., dissents.

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Deen, Presiding Judge.

Claude Collie was shot and killed by one Franklin, an escaping felon, using a .357 magnum which he had wrested from a sheriffs deputy during a successful escape attempt shortly before the shooting incident. Collie’s widow brought a wrongful death action against, inter alios, appellees Hutson (the sheriff) and deputies King and Campbell, alleging that the proximate cause of her husband’s death was appellees’ negligence in permitting him to escape from custody while King and Campbell were transporting him to and from a dentist’s office.

The Cobb County Superior Court granted summitry judgment to [673]*673these three defendants on the grounds that they were not negligent; that they had not acted wilfully, corruptly, or maliciously; that the escapee’s act was unforeseeable; and that the defendants neither should have anticipated the killing nor had in any way been connected with it. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s rulings that, as a matter of law, (1) the death was not proximately caused by appellees’ negligence in permitting Franklin to escape, and (2) appellees were not negligent with reference to the events occurring subsequent to the escape, including Collie’s death. Held:

1. We are persuaded by the record in the instant case that there was sufficient evidence to authorize the trial court to find that appellees had no reason to expect that any of the prisoners transported to the dentist’s office on the day of the escape and fatal shooting would attempt an escape, and that appellees’ conduct did not constitute negligence as a matter of law. Appellant’s first enumeration is therefore without merit.

2. “Generally, an independent, intervening criminal act of a third party, without which the injury would not have occurred, will be treated as the proximate cause of the injury . . . superseding any negligence of the defendant. . . [unless] the intervening criminal act is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent [act]. ...” Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis, 168 Ga. App. 688, 689 (309 SE2d 865) (1983); see also OCGA §§ 51-12-8; 51-12-9; Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568 (28 SE 251) (1897). Although under Georgia law questions of negligence and proximate cause are ordinarily for the jury, plain and indisputable cases may be decided by the court as a matter of law. Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis, supra; Williams v. Kennedy, 240 Ga. 163 (240 SE2d 51) (1977); Bussey v. Dawson, 224 Ga. 191 (160 SE2d 834) (1968). In such plain cases “[t]he inquiry is not whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a cause in fact of the injury, but rather whether the causal connection between that conduct and the injury is too remote for the law to countenance a recovery.” Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis, supra at 689; McAuley v. Wills, 251 Ga. 3 (303 SE2d 258) (1983); Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., supra.

Our scrutiny of the record in the instant case, as well as of relevant statutory and case law, leads us to agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the fact pattern in the case sub judice is more analogous to that of Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., supra, than to that of, e.g., Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199 (296 SE2d 693) (1982) (hospital gave mental patient unrestricted pass despite actual knowledge of violent tendencies and homicidal designs towards ex-wife). The trial court was correct in holding that appellees’ conduct, while a cause in fact of the death of appellant’s decedent, was “too remote to be the basis of recovery . . .” OCGA § 51-12-8; see also OCGA § 51-12-9.

[674]*6743. In light of our holdings in Divisions 1 and 2, supra, we find that the judgment below is in compliance with the criteria for summary judgment set out in OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court awarding summary judgment to appellees.

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Carley, Sognier, Pope, and Benham, JJ., concur. Beasley, J., dissents.

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334 S.E.2d 13, 175 Ga. App. 672, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2136, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/collie-v-hutson-gactapp-1985.

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