HILL, Chief Justice.
[T1] Petitioners, who we will refer to collectively as Natrona County, challenge the district court's order denying their motion to dismiss the wrongful death action filed by Respondent, Jeffery A. Blake (Blake), who is the personal representative of the estate of Daniel O'Brien (O'Brien). On or about September 12, 1999, O'Brien was murdered in Denver, Colorado, by an inmate, Samuel Graumann (Graumann), who escaped from the Natrona County Detention Center (NCDC) on September 10, 1999. Natrona County asserted that it owed no duty to O'Brien and, hence, it was entitled to a ruling that the complaint be dismissed. The district court denied that motion by order entered on September 11, 2002. Natrona [950]*950County filed a Petition for Writ of Review seeking this Court's consideration of that order.
[12] Finding the question to be of significant consequence to the expeditious and economical resolution of this matter, we issued the writ on October 15, 2002, in order that the question be brought before us at an early stage of the proceedings. W.R.A.P. 18.02. Argument was heard on this matter, and it was taken under advisement on April 15, 2008. We will affirm the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss.
ISSUES
[T3] Natrona County articulates the issue in this fashion:
Samuel Graumann escaped from the Na-trona County Detention Center (NCDC) on September 10, 1999. Approximately two (2) days later. Graumann murdered Daniel O'Brien in Denver, Colorado, approximately 280 miles away from the NCDC. Under these circumstances, did the County Defendants owe a legal duty to Daniel O'Brien to protect him from the intentional eriminal acts of Samuel Grau mann?
Blake rephrases that issue in these terms:
Did petitioners owe a duty to Daniel O'Brien, an innocent citizen killed by a poorly supervised jail inmate [who] petitioners allowed to escape because they, among other failings, ignored a report that a jailbreak was in progress?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[14] Natrona County sought dismissal of Blake's claims under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and (e):
Rule 12. Defenses and objections; when and how presented; by pleading or motion; motion for judgment on pleadings.
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(b) How Presented. -Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (8) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; (5) insufficiency of service of process; (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. [Emphasis added.]
[15] In addressing the issue before us, this Court accepts the facts stated in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Such a dismissal will be sustained only when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts that [951]*951would entitle him to relief. Story v. State, 2001 WY 3, ¶ 19, 15 P.3d 1066, ¶ 19 (Wyo.2001). Dismissal is a drastic remedy and is sparingly granted; nevertheless, we will sustain a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any set of facts that would entitle that plaintiff to relief. Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1135-36 (Wyo.2000); and see Van Riper v. Oedekoven, 2001 WY 58, ¶ 24, 26 P.3d 325, ¶ 24 (Wyo.2001); and Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 575 (Wyo.1996). For purposes of resolving the issues raised in this appeal, we apply the same standard of review with respect to Rule 12(c) as we do to Rule 12(b)(6). 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1369 (1990 and Supp.2003).
[16] In order to state a claim under a negligence/tort theory, a plaintiff must establish these elements: (1) The defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the defendant breached the duty of care, (8) the defendant's breach of the duty of care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensa-ble by money damages. Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 113, ¶ 8, 50 P.3d 697, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2002). Further,
"Essential to any negligence cause of action is proof of facts which impose a duty upon defendant. The question of the existence of a duty is a matter of law for the court to decide." Hamilton v. Natrona County Education Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo.1995) (quoting Goodrich v. Seamands, 870 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo.1994)). A duty may arise by contract, statute, common law, or when the relationship of the parties is such that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the protection of the plaintiff. Hamilton, 901 P.2d at 384; Goodrich, 870 P.2d at 1064; Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Wyo.1983).
Hulse v. First American Title Company of Crook County, 2001 WY 95, ¶ 36, 33 P.3d 122, ¶ 36 (Wyo.2001); Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 741-42 (Wyo.1999).
" [Dluty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." Gates, 719 P.2d at 195; see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54 at 357-58 (5th ed.1984).
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HILL, Chief Justice.
[T1] Petitioners, who we will refer to collectively as Natrona County, challenge the district court's order denying their motion to dismiss the wrongful death action filed by Respondent, Jeffery A. Blake (Blake), who is the personal representative of the estate of Daniel O'Brien (O'Brien). On or about September 12, 1999, O'Brien was murdered in Denver, Colorado, by an inmate, Samuel Graumann (Graumann), who escaped from the Natrona County Detention Center (NCDC) on September 10, 1999. Natrona County asserted that it owed no duty to O'Brien and, hence, it was entitled to a ruling that the complaint be dismissed. The district court denied that motion by order entered on September 11, 2002. Natrona [950]*950County filed a Petition for Writ of Review seeking this Court's consideration of that order.
[12] Finding the question to be of significant consequence to the expeditious and economical resolution of this matter, we issued the writ on October 15, 2002, in order that the question be brought before us at an early stage of the proceedings. W.R.A.P. 18.02. Argument was heard on this matter, and it was taken under advisement on April 15, 2008. We will affirm the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss.
ISSUES
[T3] Natrona County articulates the issue in this fashion:
Samuel Graumann escaped from the Na-trona County Detention Center (NCDC) on September 10, 1999. Approximately two (2) days later. Graumann murdered Daniel O'Brien in Denver, Colorado, approximately 280 miles away from the NCDC. Under these circumstances, did the County Defendants owe a legal duty to Daniel O'Brien to protect him from the intentional eriminal acts of Samuel Grau mann?
Blake rephrases that issue in these terms:
Did petitioners owe a duty to Daniel O'Brien, an innocent citizen killed by a poorly supervised jail inmate [who] petitioners allowed to escape because they, among other failings, ignored a report that a jailbreak was in progress?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[14] Natrona County sought dismissal of Blake's claims under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and (e):
Rule 12. Defenses and objections; when and how presented; by pleading or motion; motion for judgment on pleadings.
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(b) How Presented. -Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (8) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; (5) insufficiency of service of process; (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. [Emphasis added.]
[15] In addressing the issue before us, this Court accepts the facts stated in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Such a dismissal will be sustained only when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts that [951]*951would entitle him to relief. Story v. State, 2001 WY 3, ¶ 19, 15 P.3d 1066, ¶ 19 (Wyo.2001). Dismissal is a drastic remedy and is sparingly granted; nevertheless, we will sustain a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any set of facts that would entitle that plaintiff to relief. Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1135-36 (Wyo.2000); and see Van Riper v. Oedekoven, 2001 WY 58, ¶ 24, 26 P.3d 325, ¶ 24 (Wyo.2001); and Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 575 (Wyo.1996). For purposes of resolving the issues raised in this appeal, we apply the same standard of review with respect to Rule 12(c) as we do to Rule 12(b)(6). 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1369 (1990 and Supp.2003).
[16] In order to state a claim under a negligence/tort theory, a plaintiff must establish these elements: (1) The defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the defendant breached the duty of care, (8) the defendant's breach of the duty of care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensa-ble by money damages. Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 113, ¶ 8, 50 P.3d 697, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2002). Further,
"Essential to any negligence cause of action is proof of facts which impose a duty upon defendant. The question of the existence of a duty is a matter of law for the court to decide." Hamilton v. Natrona County Education Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo.1995) (quoting Goodrich v. Seamands, 870 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo.1994)). A duty may arise by contract, statute, common law, or when the relationship of the parties is such that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the protection of the plaintiff. Hamilton, 901 P.2d at 384; Goodrich, 870 P.2d at 1064; Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Wyo.1983).
Hulse v. First American Title Company of Crook County, 2001 WY 95, ¶ 36, 33 P.3d 122, ¶ 36 (Wyo.2001); Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 741-42 (Wyo.1999).
" [Dluty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." Gates, 719 P.2d at 195; see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54 at 357-58 (5th ed.1984).
When this Court has considered whether a duty should be imposed based on a particular relationship, we have balanced numerous factors to aid in that determination: "(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (8) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 203, 206 (Wyo.1995) (quoting Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo.1987), citing to Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo.1986), quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (1976)). Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 744 (Wyo.1999) (footnote omitted).
Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 44, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶ 44 (Wyo.2002).
FACTS PLEADED BY BLAKE
[47] Resolution of the issues presented must rely on the well-pleaded factual allegations contained in Blake's amended complaint. At least two of the prisoners who escaped on September 10, 1999, including Graumann, were dangerous criminals who had a history of escaping from incarceration. Graumann and several other prisoners were permitted to go into the exercise yard, having in their possession objects fashioned for the purpose of an escape. It was nighttime and the prisoners were unsupervised. Both NCDC and the prisoners knew that there were blind spots in the video monitoring system for the exercise area. The prisoners [952]*952gathered in one of the blind spots and remained there for a protracted length of time, unguarded and unmonitored. The prisoners had enough time to attach a heavy rope made of bed sheets to the fenced top of the exercise area. They took turns climbing to the top of the exercise area. They cut a hole through the wire fencing that covered the top of the exercise area that was large enough so that they could pass through the wire, and then cut through the razor wire at the top of the jail. A citizen called to notify NCDC that a jailbreak was in progress, but that warning was ignored for 15 to 20 minutes. The prisoners climbed down the outside wall of the jail and proceeded to steal a 20-foot-long moving van parked nearby.
[18] Blake alleged that personnel of NCDC knew that, given an opportunity, Graumann would attempt to escape, as well as that if he did escape, he would likely commit other crimes to obtain vehicles, cash, credit cards, clothing, and other items necessary to avoid recapture. Graumann posed a high risk of serious injury or death to citizens who crossed his path if he did escape. Natrona County was aware that Graumann, and one of the other inmates involved in the escape, had escaped from other penal institutions and were dangerous criminals.
[19] As mentioned, during the escape a citizen called NCDC to report that the escape was in progress. The citizen then called a second time to report that prisoners had actually succeeded in escaping from the jail. These warnings were ignored. Natro-na County authorities were then made aware that the prisoners had stolen a conspicuous white van with bold black lettering on the side panels "HOME INSULATION." The authorities were given the license plate number of that vehicle. Law enforcement agencies outside of Wyoming were not notified of the stolen van or that it was driven by two dangerous prison escapees. Once in Colorado, the prisoners were not actively pursued by police officials. In Colorado, Graumann murdered O'Brien and stole his car, cash, credits cards, and other items to further his escape. Graumann was eventually arrested in Missouri driving O'Brien's car and in possession of other items that had belonged to O'Brien.
DISCUSSION
[110] Pertinent to this appeal, Blake's wrongful death claim was brought under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-89-112 (F... tortious conduct of peace officers acting within the scope of their duties.") (LexisNexis 2003). The purpose of the WGCA is set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-102 (LexisNexis 2008):
(a) The Wyoming legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity and is cognizant of the Wyoming Supreme Court decision of Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners 575 P.2d 1155 (1978). It is further recognized that the state and its political subdivisions as trustees of public revenues are constituted to serve the inhabitants of the state of Wyoming and furnish certain services not available through private parties and, in the case of the state, state revenues may only be expended upon legislative appropriation. This act is adopted by the legislature to balance the respective equities between persons injured by governmental actions and the taxpayers of the state of Wyoming whose revenues are utilized by governmental entities on behalf of those taxpayers. This act is intended to retain any common law defenses which a defendant may have by virtue of decisions from this or other jurisdictions.
(b) In the case of the state, this act abolishes all judicially created categories such as "governmental" or "proprietary" functions and "discretionary" or "ministerial" acts previously used by the courts to determine immunity or lability. This act does not impose nor allow the imposition of striet Hability for acts of governmental entities or public employees.
Although the WGCA was intended to abrogate governmental immunity in significant part, the statutes begin with the proposition that entities of government are granted immunity from liability, except as further pro[953]*953vided by the statutes, such as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-89-104 (LexisNexis 20083):
§ 1-39-104. Granting immunity from tort liability; liability on contracts; exceptions.
(a) A governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the seope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-89-112 and limited by W.S. 1-839-121. Any immunity in actions based on a contract entered into by a governmental entity is waived except to the extent provided by the contract if the contract was within the powers granted to the entity and was properly executed and except as provided in W.S. 1-89-121. The claims procedures of W.S. 1-39-113 apply to contractual claims against governmental entities.
(b) When liability is alleged against any public employee, if the governmental entity determines he was acting within the seope of his duty, whether or not alleged to have been committed maliciously or fraudulent ly, the governmental entity shall provide a defense at its expense.
(c) A governmental entity shall assume and pay a judgment entered under this act against any of its public employees, provided:
(1) The act or omission upon which the claim is based has been determined by a court or jury to be within the public employee's seope of duties;
(i) The payment for the judgment shall not exceed the limits provided by W.S. 1-89-118; and
(ifi) All appropriate appeals from the judgment have been exhausted or the time has expired when appeals may be taken.
(d) A governmental entity shall assume and pay settlements of claims under this act against its public employees in accordance with W.S. 1-39-115, 1-41-106 or 1-42-107.
The "Public Duty" Rule
[111] Natrona County contends that the public duty rule precludes Blake from maintaining this action. As early as 1925, this Court alluded to what has grown into the "public duty" rule in reversing a directed verdict in favor of a governmental entity in a negligence case:
In New Jersey it is held that the exemption of municipal corporations from liability for negligence in performance of public duties does not extend to cases of active wrong-doing chargeable to the corporation.... In Hart v. Freeholders of Union, 57 N.J.L. 99, 29 A. 490, it is said that there is no reason arising out of public policy why a municipal corporation should be shielded from liability when a private injury arises from wrongful acts as distinguished from mere negligence. We fear that the term "active wrong-doing" is of doubtful meaning. The cases show, however, that the courts of New Jersey refuse to grant absolute immunity to municipal corporations in the exercise of governmental powers.
Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710, 713-14 (1925).
[T12] We have found no precedents of this Court that specifically adopted the public duty rule or even discuss its application in a general sense. For general background on the public duty rule, see Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 271 at 7238-25 (2000); 57 Am.Jur. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 88-90 (2001). In DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 652-53 (Wyo.1986) we held:
The State of Wyoming and Officers Baltimore and Keigley have appealed the court's finding that in the absence of qualified immunity, a duty was owed DeWald. They contend that the duty owed by the officers is a public duty only-that, therefore, no duty was owed to DeWald individually and the officers cannot be liable for his death. The source of the "public duty only" rule seems to be Cooley on Torts § 800 at 389 (4th ed.1982) wherein, referring to policemen's duty, it is stated:
"His duty is to serve criminal warrants, to arrest persons who commit offenses in his view, to bring nightwalkers to account, and to perform various offices of similar nature. Within his beat he [954]*954should watch the premises of individuals, and protect them against burglaries and arsons. But suppose he goes to sleep on his beat, and while thus off duty a robbery is committed or a house burned down, either of which might have been prevented had he been vigilant -who shall bring him to account for this neglect of duty? Not the individual who has suffered from the crime, certainly, for the officer was not his policeman; was not hired by him, paid by him, or controlled by him; and consequently owed to him no legal duty." (Footnote omitted)
The public-duty/special-duty rule was in essence a form of sovereign immunity and viable when sovereign immunity was the rule. The legislature has abolished sovereign immunity in this area. The public duty only rule, if it ever was recognized in Wyoming, is no longer viable.
In Schear v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County, 101 NM. 671, 687 P.2d 728, 731 (1984), the court stated:
"[The development in the law has been to abolish it in those jurisdictions where the matter has been more recently considered or reconsidered. See Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982) (overruling Massengill), Adams v. State; Martinez v. City of Lakewood [655 P.2d 1388 (Colo.App.1982)]; Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County [371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979)] (declaring Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So.2d 70 (Fla.1967) to have no effect following legislative waiver of governmental immunity); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976). [The trend in this area is toward liability. The "public duty" doctrine has lost support in four of the eight jurisdictions relied upon by the city [for its argument that it owed no duty of ordinary care to an individual citizenl' Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d at 667. Those courts have demonstrated a reasoned relue-tance to apply a doctrine that results in a duty to none where there is a duty to all. See Adams v. State [Alaska, 555 P.2d 235 (1976)] * * *."
We are in agreement with these statements. The duty owed in the circumstances of this case has been clearly stated by us and need not be restated now.
Following the DeWald decision, we had this to say about the public duty rule in Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 774 (Wyo.1991):
The Soleses cite case law from several jurisdictions which they claim supports the conclusion that the inspections performed by the Department of Fire Prevention & Electrical Safety should be encompassed by § 1-389-106. We have recognized the main thrust of these cases in DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo.1986). The basic message conveyed by DeWald and the cases cited by the Soleses, as it pertains to this case, is that the doctrine distinguishing between the public-duty rule and the special-duty rule is no longer recognized. The concept that a governmental entity may have a duty to the public in general but no special duty to individual citizens is no longer viable. That holding is not relevant here, for the question is not whether the State owed a duty to the Soleses; rather, it is whether the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act abrogated sovereign immunity under the circumstances of this case.
[113] In his treatise on Torts, Professor Dobbs comments with respect to a trend toward rejection of the public duty doctrine:
Rejection of the doctrine. In a few states, contemporary courts have rejected the public duty doctrine altogether. Some have restricted it to special cases. For example, Georgia uses the public duty doe-trine only to exclude liability for failure of police protection. In Rhode Island, the rule seems to be only a way of describing the discretionary immunity. Where the common law public duty doctrine is rejected or limited by judicial decision, statutes sometimes provide for similar results in particular cases. For instance, the statute may exclude liability for failure to make an arrest. Even without such statutes, rejec[955]*955tion of the doctrine does not automatically result in liability. The plaintiff must establish a duty under ordinary tort principles, and then prove negligence, cause in fact, and proximate cause, as in all other negligence cases.
Rationale and comment. The logic of the public duty rule is formally different from the logic of immunity. It is that the statute creates no duty to act and hence, regardless of immunity, the public entity cannot be liable. Which statutes create a tort duty and which do not? Courts talk as if the answer lay in statutory construction. If the statutory duty is narrowed to protect a particular class of persons, it may create a tort duty, otherwise not. Little statutory construction is possible in most cases and courts sometimes implicitly admit that it is less a matter of construction than a matter of judicial policy. They have thus suggested numerous reasons to exempt public entities from the obligations apparently imposed by statutes.
One minor argument offered in support of the public duty rule is that non-tort mechanisms exist to deal with official negligence. For example, a negligent officer might be suspended. Another minor argument that could only be applied to a case of police failure to arrest or otherwise protect against a dangerous person is that the offender, not the public entity, should be accountable. Neither argument offers comfort to the victim. More importantly, both arguments are dependent upon the assumption of what is in issue-whether public entities are entitled to some special exemption from tort rules applied to private defendants. That assumption can be seen by noticing that such arguments do not relieve private enterprise. No matter how confident judges might be that a private company would discharge an employee who failed to comply with a statute, judges do not relieve companies of their obligations.
A much more serious argument is essentially the same argument presented for the discretionary immunity. Expressed in various ways, the core proposition is that courts should leave allocation of resources to the legislature or to the executive. The argument is persuasive in some cases, but not all cases involve allocation of substantial resources. Some involve simply bad mistakes or horrendous negligence. The officer who simply watches a drunk driver go through dangerous antics for a substantial period without attempting to deal with the situation is not allocating resources; he is behaving very negligently indeed. The resources argument is puzzling, too, when compared to the same argument on the issue of discretionary immunity. A statutory directive to act in a particular way-to investigate reports of child abuse, for example-seems to remove all discretion. Yet the public duty doctrine is intended to foster and protect discretion in the very case where statutes seemed to have removed it.
A third argument seems to be predicated upon a deep distrust of the judicial system itself. The argument implicitly asserts that courts cannot formulate and administer an appropriate rule about the scope of liability. An officer should have no duty to arrest a drunk driver he encounters, one court said, because if he tries "to avoid liability by removing from the road all persons who pose any potential hazard, he may find himself liable in many instances for false arrest." It is hard to believe that courts would administer the reasonable care rule of negligence law to require the arrest of every hazardous driver from the road in the first place. If courts did such an unprecedented thing, they could hardly impose liability for doing what they required.
Although the arguments do not seem broad enough to support a public duty rule, they rightly point to particular instances in which liability is inappropriate. For instance, if an officer must choose when to arrest a dangerous person, appropriate caution may counsel delay. If so, he cannot be found negligent. In the same way, a busy precinet may have no officers to spare for the protection of every person within its jurisdiction. If not, it cannot be found negligent. Ordinary negligence rules appropriately exclude liability in such cases, but they leave open the possibility of [956]*956liability when police officers unprofessionally shirk their duty and when administrative bumbling sends officers to the wrong place. The public duty doctrine, in contrast, excludes liability in all cases in which agencies fail to enforce or obey a statutory directive that is deemed to create a duty to the public at large.
The Law of Torts, supra, § 271 at 725-27.
[T 14] In the treatise, 18 Eugene MceQuil-lin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §§ 53.04.25 and 58.04.30 (8rd ed.2003), a similar discussion can be found. In most pertinent part:
But even public duty rule has been abrogated or limited in a number of jurisdictions. The states have rejected the public duty rule because the rule is, in effect if not in theory, a continuation of the abolished governmental immunity doctrine. The rule also creates confusion in the law and produces uneven and inequitable results in practice. Courts abrogating the rule reject the contention that the public duty rule is the only principle protecting municipalities from massive Habilities; these courts maintain that ordinary tort rules, such as the rule requiring foreseeability of harm, will adequately limit the scope of municipal liability. These courts also remind us that abrogation of the doe-trine of municipal governmental immunity merely removes the defense of immunity and does not create any new liability for a municipality.
Courts that have considered, but rejected, abrogation of the rule have pointed out that jurisdictions that have abrogated the rule have had other immunity rules that protect municipalities. For example, a state may decline to adopt the public duty doctrine as a means of limiting the liability of government employees who are already protected to some extent by the doctrine of qualified official immunity. Of course, where the jurisdiction has not rejected government immunity in any form, there is no reason to abrogate the public duty doe-trine.
Some courts have retained the public duty rule, but have eroded it by adding further exceptions. For example, an exception may be made where the municipality's actions were particularly "egregious."
Id., § 58.04.25, at 206-9; also see 2 J.D. Lee and Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law, § 16:9 (2002); John H. Derrick, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental Unit from Tort Liability on Theory that Only General, not Particular, Duty Was Owed under Circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194, § 4 (1985 and Supp.2002).
[T15] Of course, there remain pockets of continued recognition of the public duty rule. However, our confidence that the public duty rule should no longer have vitality in cireum-stances such as those presented here is strengthened by similar conclusions reached by many of our sister jurisdictions. Wallace v. Ohio Department of Commerce, 2002-Ohio-4210, 96 Ohio St.3d 266, 773 N.E.2d 1018, 1022-32 (2002) (collecting and analyzing cases); Beaudrie v. Henderson, 465 Mich. 124, 631 N.W.2d 308, 311-17 (2001); Doucette v. Town of Bristol, 138 N.H. 205, 635 A.2d 1387, 1388-91 (1993); Jordan v. City of Rome, 203 Ga.App. 662, 417 S.E.2d 730, 733-34 (1992); McQueen v. Williams, 587 So.2d 918, 925-28 (Miss.1991) (dissenting opinion); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 155-60 (Colo.1986); and Schear v. Board of County Commissioners, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728, 730-34 (1984).
[116] We continue to hold that the concept of public duty does not bar an action such as the instant case under governing Wyoming law.
Did Blake's Complaint State a Cause of Action Sounding in Tort
[117] Natrona County asserts that even if the "public duty" rule is not viable, nonetheless no duty was owed by it to O'Brien. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-608(a) provides:
(a) Each sheriff has charge of the jail and the prisoners therein confined in his county. The prisoners shall be kept by the sheriff or by a deputy or detention officer appointed for that purpose, and for whose acts he and his sureties are liable. The sheriff shall provide three (8) nutritionally balanced meals each day for each prisoner. [957]*957Each sheriff shall make a monthly accounting to the board of county commissioners to show that the expenditures have actually been made.
[T18]) In Restatement (Second) of the Law, Torts § 319 (1965 and Appendix 1999, Supp.2008) we find this recitation of a basic principle of tort law:
§ 319. Duty of Those in Charge of Persons Having Dangerous Propensities One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.
[119] The subject at hand has been well annotated, though no clear thread may be gleaned from the cases in point. Several courts have affirmed the dismissal or grant of summary judgment in such cases, and the "public duty" rule has been relied upon in many of those instances. In others, statutory immunity has been the deciding point. In several others, courts have held that a duty does lis and that proximate cause and foreseeability are questions for the jury to decide. We join with this latter group in our decision today. See generally, Don F. Vacea-ro, Annotation, Liability of Public Officer or Body for Harm Done by Prisoner Permitted to Escape, 44 A.L.R.3d 899 (1972 and Supp 2001).
[120] As a point of embarkation, we look to the Supreme Court of Arizona's decision in Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982). In Ryan a 17-year-old inmate escaped from the Arizona Youth Center. After his escape, the youth robbed a convenience store and shot the proprietor at point-blank range with a shotgun. The victim sustained permanent and disabling injuries That court determined that it would define the limitations of immunity as it pertains to the executive branch of government "on the basis of concrete, factual situations as they come before us." Id., at 600. In conclusion, it held that it would "endorse the use of governmental immunity as a defense only when its application is necessary to avoid a severe hampering of a governmental function or thwarting of established public policy. Otherwise, the state and its agents will be subject to the same tort law as private citizens." Id. Thus, summary judgment for the state defendants was reversed.
[121] In the case, Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (collecting cases), the Supreme Court of Kansas dealt with a case where a police officer was severely wounded by gunfire from several inmates who escaped from the Kansas State Penitentiary. Cansler's complaint suggested the escape could and should have been prevented and, although efforts had been made to send out an alarm to the surrounding area, a computer was down and the message did not go out. No notification was given to a neighboring county, in which the victim worked as a police sergeant. Id., at 60-61. After summarizing the law extant at that time, the Kansas court concluded that "Cansler has adequately alleged a duty on the part of the State, a breach thereof, and a causal connection between the breach of that duty and the injuries and damages sustained." Id., at 66. The Cansler case was before the court on an interlocutory appeal similar to the posture of this case.
[122] The Supreme Court of Louisiana has also spoken directly to the issue we address today. In the case, Marceaux v. Gibbs, 699 So.2d 1065, 1069-70 (La.1997), the court set this standard for such cases:
In order to recover for injuries caused by an escaped prisoner, an injured plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) negligence on the part of the custodian in managing the facility;
(2) that this negligence facilitated the escape;
(8) that the escapee's actions caused the harm complained of; and,
(4) that the risk of harm encountered by the plaintiff falls within the seope of duty owed by the custodian.
The Louisiana court also held that to determine the scope of the duty owed by the custodians, the question that must be answered is whether the offense occurred during or as an integral part of the escape. An offense committed 18 days after the escape was held to be "a necessary and integral [958]*958component of the escape process." Id., at 1070. Also see, Wilson v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 576 So.2d 490, 492-95 (La.1991); and Edwards v. State, 556 So.2d 644, 649-50 (La.App. 2 Cir.1990).
[123] The Supreme Court of Texas has given general recognition to the Restatement (Second) of Torts cited above, in cireum-stances involving the escape of a juvenile mental patient who had been transferred to a private care facility. Texas Home Management, Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 36 n. 5 (Tex.2002) (collecting cases).
[T 24] We conclude that a duty does exist under the circumstance pleaded by Blake, and that other questions presented by this case are appropriate for resolution by a jury.
CONCLUSION
[125] The order of the district court denying Natrona County's motion to dismiss is affirmed.
GOLDEN, Justice, filed a dissenting opinion, in which LEHMAN, Justice, joins.