Blackburn, Judge.
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta (AHA) appeáls the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the issue of whether it had the duty to inspect for the presence of a smoke detector when qualifying a house for use under federal Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program for Existing Housing (Section 8).
Three-year-old Calvin Jefferson, Jr. was severely injured when his family’s home caught fire on January 3, 1990. The aunt who was babysitting Jefferson was able to escape the burning house, but Jefferson remained inside. He was later rescued by emergency personnel. Jefferson’s mother had leased the house approximately six months earlier. Prior to the rental, the house was inspected by AHA, acting in its capacity as the area Section 8 administrator. AHA found the house was suitable for participation in the program, and Jefferson’s family received Section 8 assistance to rent the dwelling.
Jefferson, acting through his guardian ad litem, filed the underlying action against AHA for approving the dwelling for Section 8 use even though it lacked a smoke detector. AHA filed a motion for summaty judgment asserting it had no duty to ensure that the dwelling contained a smoke detector and, alternatively, that the failure to comply with such duty was not the proximate cause of Jefferson’s injuries. The trial court denied AHA’s motion, and we granted AHA’s application for interlocutory appeal.
1. In its first two enumerations of error, AHA contends that it had no duty to inspect the dwelling for the presence of a smoke detector. While at the time of this incident, federal regulations did not directly impose a duty upon AHA to ensure the presence of a smoke detector in Jefferson’s dwelling, they did require compliance with state and local regulations which did impose such a duty.1 OCGA [61] § 8-3-1 et seq. is the legislation under which local housing authorities such as AHA are created and governed. OCGA § 8-3-7 provides: “All housing projects of an authority shall be subject to the planning, zoning, sanitary, and building laws, ordinances, and regulations applicable to the locality in which the housing project is situated.” (Emphasis supplied.) Under OCGA § 8-3-3 (10) a “housing project” is broadly defined as “[a]ny work or undertaking . . . [t]o provide decent, safe, and sanitary urban or rural dwellings, apartments, or other living accommodations for persons of low income.” AHA’s role in administrating the Section 8 program fits within this broad definition of a housing project, and consequently, AHA was obligated to ensure that all dwellings approved by AHA for Section 8 participation complied with local Atlanta ordinances.
One such ordinance, adopted in 1984, requires owners to provide a working smoke detector in all residential dwellings prior to their sale or lease. See Atlanta Ordinance § 11-3032.1 (b). Moreover, the ordinance defines an owner as: “Any person, corporation or other legal entity wbío has legal title or control, in whole or in part, of any real property” (emphasis supplied) within the city. Atlanta Ordinance § 11-3032.1 (a) (2). Clearly, in its capacity as the area administrator, AHA exercised significant control over the Jeffersons’ dwelling. It even had the power to review and approve the landlord’s proposed lease prior to its execution. 24 CFR § 882.209 (k). Consequently, for purposes of this ordinance, AHA would be considered an “owner” of the property, and thus it not only had the duty to inspect the dwelling for the presence of a smoke detector, it also had a duty, if necessary, to provide the dwelling with a smoke detector. Consequently, AHA breached its statutory duty by failing to ensure the presence of an operable smoke detector before allowing the house to participate in the Section 8 program. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that AHA owed such a duty to Jefferson.2
[62]*622. In its third enumeration, AHA contends that even if it had the duty to ensure the presence of a smoke detector, the breach of that duty was not the proximate cause of Jefferson’s injuries based upon our decision in Wilkerson v. Alexander, 208 Ga. App. 83, 85 (429 SE2d 685) (1993).
In Wilkerson, a six-year-old girl was killed in a fire while sleeping at a neighbor’s house. She had been sleeping on a couch in the den at the time the fire started, but her body was discovered behind the bathroom door. Several other children who had been in the house at the time of the fire were able to escape unharmed. In determining that the dead child’s survivors had no cause of action against the owners of the home where the fire occurred, this Court first determined that, unlike the instant case, the owners had no duty to provide a functional smoke detector for the benefit of the fire victim. Id. at 86. In dicta, the Court further noted that the plaintiffs had also failed to establish that the lack of a smoke detector was the proximate cause of the victim’s death.
Wilkers'on is inapposite. In the subject case, a police officer who initially arrived on the scene after receiving an emergency call averred that she could not reach Jefferson due to the fire’s intense heat. Jefferson was not rescued until later when the fire department arrived and a fireman went into the burning house with the aid of special equipment including “a breathing apparatus and full protective turnout gear.”
The purpose of a smoke detector is to provide an early warning of fire and to reduce the damages and injury resulting therefrom. Whether or not the lack of a smoke detector delayed Jefferson’s rescue and contributed to his injuries is a jury question. Had a smoke detector been present to provide an early alarm, it is possible that Jefferson would have been rescued sooner, thereby avoiding or lessening the extent of his injuries. See Seibers v. Dixie Speedway, 220 Ga. App. 811 (470 SE2d 452) (1996) (summary judgment denied based on possibility that defendant’s actions or omissions worsened injury).
Because questions of fact exist as to whether the presence of a smoke detector may have prevented or lessened Jefferson’s injuries, the trial court correctly denied summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause.
3. In its final enumeration of error, AHA asserts that the trial court erred in denying AHA’s motion for summary judgment because Jefferson’s mother had equal or superior knowledge that the resi[63] dence lacked a smoke detector when she rented the house. This argument is without merit..
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Blackburn, Judge.
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta (AHA) appeáls the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the issue of whether it had the duty to inspect for the presence of a smoke detector when qualifying a house for use under federal Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program for Existing Housing (Section 8).
Three-year-old Calvin Jefferson, Jr. was severely injured when his family’s home caught fire on January 3, 1990. The aunt who was babysitting Jefferson was able to escape the burning house, but Jefferson remained inside. He was later rescued by emergency personnel. Jefferson’s mother had leased the house approximately six months earlier. Prior to the rental, the house was inspected by AHA, acting in its capacity as the area Section 8 administrator. AHA found the house was suitable for participation in the program, and Jefferson’s family received Section 8 assistance to rent the dwelling.
Jefferson, acting through his guardian ad litem, filed the underlying action against AHA for approving the dwelling for Section 8 use even though it lacked a smoke detector. AHA filed a motion for summaty judgment asserting it had no duty to ensure that the dwelling contained a smoke detector and, alternatively, that the failure to comply with such duty was not the proximate cause of Jefferson’s injuries. The trial court denied AHA’s motion, and we granted AHA’s application for interlocutory appeal.
1. In its first two enumerations of error, AHA contends that it had no duty to inspect the dwelling for the presence of a smoke detector. While at the time of this incident, federal regulations did not directly impose a duty upon AHA to ensure the presence of a smoke detector in Jefferson’s dwelling, they did require compliance with state and local regulations which did impose such a duty.1 OCGA [61] § 8-3-1 et seq. is the legislation under which local housing authorities such as AHA are created and governed. OCGA § 8-3-7 provides: “All housing projects of an authority shall be subject to the planning, zoning, sanitary, and building laws, ordinances, and regulations applicable to the locality in which the housing project is situated.” (Emphasis supplied.) Under OCGA § 8-3-3 (10) a “housing project” is broadly defined as “[a]ny work or undertaking . . . [t]o provide decent, safe, and sanitary urban or rural dwellings, apartments, or other living accommodations for persons of low income.” AHA’s role in administrating the Section 8 program fits within this broad definition of a housing project, and consequently, AHA was obligated to ensure that all dwellings approved by AHA for Section 8 participation complied with local Atlanta ordinances.
One such ordinance, adopted in 1984, requires owners to provide a working smoke detector in all residential dwellings prior to their sale or lease. See Atlanta Ordinance § 11-3032.1 (b). Moreover, the ordinance defines an owner as: “Any person, corporation or other legal entity wbío has legal title or control, in whole or in part, of any real property” (emphasis supplied) within the city. Atlanta Ordinance § 11-3032.1 (a) (2). Clearly, in its capacity as the area administrator, AHA exercised significant control over the Jeffersons’ dwelling. It even had the power to review and approve the landlord’s proposed lease prior to its execution. 24 CFR § 882.209 (k). Consequently, for purposes of this ordinance, AHA would be considered an “owner” of the property, and thus it not only had the duty to inspect the dwelling for the presence of a smoke detector, it also had a duty, if necessary, to provide the dwelling with a smoke detector. Consequently, AHA breached its statutory duty by failing to ensure the presence of an operable smoke detector before allowing the house to participate in the Section 8 program. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that AHA owed such a duty to Jefferson.2
[62]*622. In its third enumeration, AHA contends that even if it had the duty to ensure the presence of a smoke detector, the breach of that duty was not the proximate cause of Jefferson’s injuries based upon our decision in Wilkerson v. Alexander, 208 Ga. App. 83, 85 (429 SE2d 685) (1993).
In Wilkerson, a six-year-old girl was killed in a fire while sleeping at a neighbor’s house. She had been sleeping on a couch in the den at the time the fire started, but her body was discovered behind the bathroom door. Several other children who had been in the house at the time of the fire were able to escape unharmed. In determining that the dead child’s survivors had no cause of action against the owners of the home where the fire occurred, this Court first determined that, unlike the instant case, the owners had no duty to provide a functional smoke detector for the benefit of the fire victim. Id. at 86. In dicta, the Court further noted that the plaintiffs had also failed to establish that the lack of a smoke detector was the proximate cause of the victim’s death.
Wilkers'on is inapposite. In the subject case, a police officer who initially arrived on the scene after receiving an emergency call averred that she could not reach Jefferson due to the fire’s intense heat. Jefferson was not rescued until later when the fire department arrived and a fireman went into the burning house with the aid of special equipment including “a breathing apparatus and full protective turnout gear.”
The purpose of a smoke detector is to provide an early warning of fire and to reduce the damages and injury resulting therefrom. Whether or not the lack of a smoke detector delayed Jefferson’s rescue and contributed to his injuries is a jury question. Had a smoke detector been present to provide an early alarm, it is possible that Jefferson would have been rescued sooner, thereby avoiding or lessening the extent of his injuries. See Seibers v. Dixie Speedway, 220 Ga. App. 811 (470 SE2d 452) (1996) (summary judgment denied based on possibility that defendant’s actions or omissions worsened injury).
Because questions of fact exist as to whether the presence of a smoke detector may have prevented or lessened Jefferson’s injuries, the trial court correctly denied summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause.
3. In its final enumeration of error, AHA asserts that the trial court erred in denying AHA’s motion for summary judgment because Jefferson’s mother had equal or superior knowledge that the resi[63] dence lacked a smoke detector when she rented the house. This argument is without merit..
AHA relies on the general law that the owner or occupier of land has no duty to warn against obvious or patent dangers which may be readily observed. See Commerce Properties v. Linthicum, 209 Ga. App. 853, 854 (434 SE2d 769) (1993). Similarly, AHA also contends that a landlord is not liable for injuries to his tenant resulting from a patent defect existing at the time of the rental agreement as to which both the landlord and tenant had equal knowledge. See Hyde v. Bryant, 114 Ga. App. 535, 536 (151 SE2d 925) (1966). These general rules have no application in the face of a specific duty imposed on AHA by statute. “[Ljandlords may not hide behind this general principle to avoid duties mandated by statutes or housing codes.” Roth v. Wu, 199 Ga. App. 665, 666 (405 SE2d 741) (1991); see also Bastien v. Metro. Park Lake Assoc., L.P., 209 Ga. App. 881 (434 SE2d 736) (1993). Furthermore, pursuant to OCGA § 51-2-1 (b), the alleged negligence of Jefferson’s mother cannot be imputed to Jefferson, her minor child, and would not bar his recovery in any event.
In light of the above, the trial court did not err in denying AHA’s motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Senior Appellate Judge Harold R. Banke concurs. Beasley, C. J., concurs specially.