ENOCH, Justice.
This case presents us with two issues: 1) What constitutes a report “to an appropriate law enforcement authority” sufficient to fall within the protection afforded by the Texas ■Whistleblower Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 6252-16a, § 2 (Vernon 1983)1, and 2) Does Texas recognize an implied private right of action for damages arising under the free speech and assembly clauses of the Texas Constitution against governmental entities. The trial court and the court of appeals both upheld a jury award for the plaintiffs below. 873 S.W.2d 425. Because we hold that the conduct in the present case falls outside the ambit of the 'Whistleblower Act, and that there is no implied cause of action for damages against governmental entities for violations of the free speech and free assembly clauses of the Texas Constitution, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment for the defendants.2
I. Facts
Woodford D. Bouillion, Cecil E. Rush, John G. Parsons, Charles A. Perricone and Eugene T. Corder, former employees of the Beaumont Police Department, claim they were constructively discharged from their jobs for reporting official misconduct to an authority and for exercising their constitutional rights to free speech and free assembly.
The City Charter of Beaumont provides that when the qualifications of applicants for city employment are equal, Beaumont residents shall be given preference. Albert Haines, the Beaumont City Manager during the relevant times involved in this case, had the authority to appoint and remove the heads of the city departments. Haines appointed nonresidents to fill several department head positions, including Max Patterson as City Resource Manager. When the position of Police Chief came open in late 1986, Haines appointed Patterson to act as the interim chief while a search was carried out for a permanent chief. Patterson carried out significant departmental reforms while serving as interim chief.
The plaintiffs in this case were police officers in the Beaumont Police Department in 1987. The extent of the reforms instituted by Patterson led the officers to conclude that Patterson’s appointment was more than merely provisional. They believed that Patterson was less qualified to serve as chief than some members of the Beaumont police force and that the temporary appointment was made to give Patterson an opportunity to become a local citizen, thus making him eligible for permanent appointment.
On January 19, 1987, twenty-one police officers held a press conference and issued a press release. In their statement to the press, the officers asserted that there were several viable candidates for the position of police chief from inside and outside the department. They further complained about how Interim Chief Patterson was running the department, and challenged Patterson’s qualifications. They also called upon Haines to form a blue ribbon committee to help select the new chief.
[145]*145To respond to the concerns expressed in the press release, Haines scheduled a series of executive meetings with the members of the force to discuss the day-to-day operations of the police department. One such meeting was scheduled for February 3, 1987. The officers arrived at that meeting with an attorney and a court reporter to transcribe the meeting. Haines refused to discuss the internal operation of the police department with the officers’ attorney present, but offered to meet later with the officers and their attorney to discuss their grievances. Two days later, Haines issued written reprimands to the officers for inviting their attorney and court reporter to the executive staff meeting to discuss items not on the agenda. The reprimand concluded that such actions “completely lack[ed] judgment and management sense.”
In the spring of 1987, the City hired George Schuldt, a Beaumont resident and an officer with the Beaumont Police Department who had signed the press release, as permanent Chief of Police. His administration instituted department-wide reforms. These reforms affected the entire department, including the officers bringing this suit. The rank of Major was eliminated in the reorganization. Eventually all but Bouillion took retirement packages and left the department; Bouillion left the Department after this suit was filed.
In 1989, the officers sued the City of Beaumont and other individuals in their official capacity for constructive discharge. The suit claimed that because the officers disclosed a violation of the City Charter, the City retaliated against them by instituting the departmental reorganization, which actions violated both the Texas Whistleblower Act and their rights under the Texas Constitution. The jury returned a verdict for the officers, and the court of appeals affirmed. 873 S.W.2d at 447.
II. Texas Whistleblower Act
The Texas Whistleblower Act in effect at all pertinent times provided that:
A state or local governmental body may not suspend or terminate the employment of, or otherwise discriminate against, a public employee who reports a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority if the employee report is made in good faith.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-16a, § 2 (Vernon 1983). A public employee may sue the governmental body for injunctive relief or damages, or both, for a violation of the Act. Id. § 3. To demonstrate a violation of the Whistleblower Act, a plaintiff must, among other things, prove that the plaintiff reported a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority. Id. § 2; see Kirk & Snell, The Texas Whistleblower Act: A Time for Change, 26 Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 75, 88-90 (1995) (surveying cases discussing appropriate law enforcement authority). Our disposition of the whistleblower issue focuses exclusively on this element of the Act. The problems between the officers and the City eventually resulted in two confrontational occurrences that underlie this suit: the press conference and the subsequent meeting resulting in the reprimands. The press conference is not a protected act under the statute. See Garay v. County of Bexar, 810 S.W.2d 760, 766-67 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied) (statute not applicable to nurse who reported alleged violations to newspaper columnist who later published them). The media clearly is not an appropriate “law enforcement authority” under the Whistleblower Act.
The second confrontational act complained of by the officers was the February 3 meeting and the reprimand the officers received on February 5. The reprimands themselves and any consequences stemming from them, however, are not acts of employment discrimination under the Whistleblower Act because the reprimands did not stem from the report of a violation to an appropriate law enforcement agency. At the February 3 meeting, the officers made no report of any violation of law.3 The transcript of the [146]*146meeting indicates that the meeting was one of several scheduled by Haines, and not the officers, to respond to the concerns the officers expressed in their press conference. The February 3 meeting had nothing to do with the officers’ allegation that the City violated its hiring practice, but instead concerned the internal operation of the Beaumont Police Department. The reprimands were issued not because of anything that was reported, but because the officers brought “outsiders” to the meeting. Had they reported an illegal act to the city manager and had they proved that there was, in fact, a suspension, discharge or discrimination caused by their report, the Whistleblower Act would have provided the officers with an adequate remedy. Tex.Rev.Giv.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-16a, § 3. Under these facts, however, the officers’ meeting with the City Manager does not bring their complaint within the realm of the Whistleblower Act.
The court of appeals concluded that the jury could have found that the officers had been retaliated against for reporting a violation of the law. We disagree. First, as a matter of law, the Whistleblower Act is not implicated merely by reports made to the press. Second, there was no report to an appropriate law enforcement authority. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals under the Whistleblower Act.
III. State Constitutional Tort
Alternatively, the officers ask us to recognize an implied private right of action for damages for the violation of their constitutional rights. The officers claimed that their rights under the Texas Constitution were violated by the City and its officers because they were retaliated against for exercising their free speech rights under Article 1, section 8 of the Texas Constitution and for exercising their right to assemble under Article 1, section 27 of the Texas Constitution.4 They ask us to find a state analog to the federal Bivens-type cause of action. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).5
In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court recognized an implied private cause of action against a federal agent acting under color of authority who violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. at 2001. This remedy has also been [147]*147applied to the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection component, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2278, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24-25, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1474-75, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has come to refer generically to causes of action for damages for the violation of constitutional rights as Bivens-type causes of action. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 377, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2411, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (referring to Bivens, Davis, Carlson, and other cases seeking damages for violation of constitutional right as “Bivens-type actions based directly on the Constitution.”). The Court in Bush held a Bivens-type action would not lie where a federal statutory scheme provided a remedy for the violation of a particular constitutional right, in that case, the First Amendment right to free speech. Id. at 390, 103 S.Ct. at 2417.
The Bivens implied cause of action against federal officers complements the statutory § 1983 cause of action which lies against state or other non-federal government officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The deterrent effect provided by Bivens-type, actions works similarly to that provided by § 1983. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-22, 100 S.Ct. at 1472-73; Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 1995, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978). Section 1983 provides that one who under the color of any state law deprives another of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution shall be Hable in an action at law or equity. Id.6 Our analysis focuses on two questions. First, we must determine whether there is an impUed private right of action for damages against governmental entities for violations of the Texas Constitution. Second, we must decide whether we may look to the Constitution to define the element of duty for a Texas common law cause of action.
A.
Because Texas has no provision comparable to § 1983, the first question must be answered by determining whether a private right of action for damages can be imphed under the Texas Constitution. We hold there is no impUed private right of action for damages arising under the free speech and free assembly sections of the Texas Constitution.
InitiaUy, the officers argue that other jurisdictions have recognized state causes of action based on Bivens. Several states faced with the issue before us have found an im-pUed cause of action while others have rejected such an action. There is Uttle uniformity in how other jurisdictions have addressed the issue. Several jurisdictions have foUowed the approach used by the United States Supreme Court in the Bivens line of cases, and have based their decisions on the presence or absence of alternative remedial schemes. See, e.g., Dick Fischer Dev. No. 2, Inc. v. Dep’t of Admin., 838 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1992) (expressing reluctance to extend Bivens to the realm of state constitutional violations except in cases of flagrant constitutional violations where Uttle or no alternative remedies are available); Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal.3d 458, 156 Cal.Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592 (1979) (finding an impUed cause of action appropriate because of absence of other remedies); Kelley Property Dev. v. Town of Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 627 A.2d 909 (1993) (holding that because of statutory remedial scheme, court would not imply a cause of action arising directly under the state constitution); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Management Servs., Inc., 408 So.2d 711 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982), approved, 432 So.2d 567 (Fla.1983) (because the Florida Constitution is self-executing, remedy can be afforded absent statutory authorization); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 479 A.2d 921 (1984) (holding that because common law provides remedies, an impUed cause of action is not necessary); Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 390 Mass. 652, 459 N.E.2d 453 (1983) (holding that when there are no other remedies, it is appropriate for the courts to imply one under the state constitution); Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Ass’n v. Town of Conway, 127 N.H. 593, 503 A.2d 1385 (1986) (refusing to imply a cause of action when a [148]*148statutory remedial scheme exists); Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (holding that in the absence of an adequate state remedy, one whose constitutional rights are violated has a direct claim against the state under the State constitution) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 493,121 L.Ed.2d 431 (1992); Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 64 Ohio St.3d 252, 594 N.E.2d 959 (1992) (holding that where statutory remedies exist, private employees do not have a private cause of action for violation of state constitutional rights).
Other jurisdictions have based their determination on the ground of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Hawaii, 61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198 (1979) (noting that Tort Liability Act does not make state liable in money damages for violation of state constitution); Smith v. Dept, of Public Health, 428 Mich. 540, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987) (holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights conferred by constitution, governmental immunity is not available in state court action, but declining to infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the Michigan constitution), aff'd, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); City of Mound Bayou v. Roy Collins Const. Co., 457 So.2d 337 (Miss.1984) (holding that state liability only accrues as expressly authorized by law); Rockhouse, 503 A.2d at 1385 (noting the sovereign immunity scheme cuts against the creation of a state cause of action); Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183 (N.D.1991) (holding that state sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims).
Similarly, other courts have based their determination on either the text of the state constitutions or the relationship between those constitutions and other bodies of state laws. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 508, 125 Cal.Rptr. 365, 542 P.2d 237 (1975) (noting that the remedy for improper legislative acts is undoing the wrongful act and not in money damages), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976); Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 921 (holding that where an individual is deprived of liberty or property interests in violation of article of the state Declaration of Rights, he may enforce those rights by a common law action for damages); Anderson v. Dep’t of Revenue, 313 Or. 1, 828 P.2d 1001 (1992) (noting that taxpayer claims against state for damages based only on state constitutional violations do not state cognizable claims for relief).
As we consider the reasoning underpinning these decisions, we recognize them as persuasive authority, but we also recognize that we are not controlled by any one approach used by other states interpreting specific provisions of their constitutions. Because our Bill of Rights is “based on a myriad of sources,”7 ultimately we must interpret our particular Texas Constitution. To interpret our Constitution, we give effect to its plain language. Dawkins v. Meyer, 825 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex.1992). We presume the language of the Constitution was carefully selected, and we interpret words as they are generally understood. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.1972). Thus, we turn our attention to our Constitution.
As we begin, we note that we have been presented no authority, and our research has revealed no authority, that would indicate that at the time the Constitution was written, it was intended to provide an implied private right of action for damages for the violation of constitutional rights. See Jones v. Ross, 141 Tex. 415, 173 S.W.2d 1022, 1024 (1943) (constitutional provisions must be construed in light of conditions existing at the time of adoption). Accordingly, we find no historical basis to create the remedy sought.
Additionally, the text of the Texas Bill of Rights cuts against an implied private right of action for the damages sought because it explicitly announces the consequences of unconstitutional laws. The guarantees found in the Bill of Rights are excepted from the general powers of government; the State has no power to commit acts contrary to the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights. Tex. Const, art. 1, § 29. Section 29 has been interpreted as follows: any provision of the Bill of Rights is self-executing to the extent [149]*149that anything done in violation of it is void. Hemphill v. Watson, 60 Tex. 679, 681 (1884). When a law conflicts with rights guaranteed by Article 1, the Constitution declares that such acts are void because the Bill of Rights is a limit on State power. Id. The framers of the Texas Constitution articulated what they intended to be the means of remedying a constitutional violation. The framers intended that a law contrary to a constitutional provision is void. There is a difference between voiding a law and seeking damages as a remedy for an act. A law that is declared void has no legal effect. See Cain v. Fry, 86 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1935, no writ). Such a declaration is different from seeking compensation for damages, or compensation in money for a loss or injury. Thus, suits for equitable remedies for violation of constitutional rights are not prohibited. Section 29 does not support the officers’ claim that a private right of action for damages is implied under the Texas Constitution.
The officers rely on Article 1, section 17 as evidence that this Court has approved actions for damages arising under the Constitution before. Their reliance on that section is misplaced. Section 17 provides that no person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed or applied to public use without adequate compensation. Tex. Const, art. 1, § 17. The converse of the provision is that if property is taken, the owner is entitled to adequate payment. Section 17 provides a textual entitlement to compensation in its limited context. The officers focus on language from Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1980), where we stated: “The Constitution itself is the authorization for compensation for the destruction of property and is a waiver of governmental immunity for the taking, damaging or destruction of property for public use.” However, this language cannot be interpreted beyond its context. The text of section 17 waives immunity only when one seeks adequate compensation for property lost to the State. We are not persuaded that a right to damages for injuries to constitutional interests can be implied solely from a limited explicit entitlement for compensation for the loss of property.
The court of appeals below rejected the City’s reliance on Bagg v. Univ. of Texas Medical Branch, 726 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.), a case in which the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of a constitutional tort for damages. The court of appeals below distinguished Bagg, stating that Bagg turned on the issue of immunity and not on a holding that there is no state constitutional tort. 873 S.W.2d at 440. However, the plaintiff in Bagg pursued causes of action for violations of both his federal and state constitutional rights. With respect to his claims under the state constitution, the Bagg court did recognize that although Texas has a strong bill of rights, “no Texas statute or case ... provides a citizen the kind of redress afforded by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or by Bivens — There is no state ‘constitutional tort.’ ” Bagg, 726 S.W.2d at 584 n. 1. Therefore, because the state claims were rejected, the immunity discussion was necessary only to dispose of the federal causes of action.
The court of appeals was also persuaded by Jones v. Memorial Hospital Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). In Jones, the court of appeals held that Article 1, section 8 of the Texas Constitution provides an independent legal basis for a cause of action. However, Jones is not inconsistent with our holding today to the extent Jones is understood as approving suits for injunctive relief. Jones is not to be read as implying from the Constitution a cause of action for damages for the violation of free speech rights.
The officers fail to satisfy their burden to relate to this Court any textual basis for their argument that the Constitution affords more than equitable relief for a violation of its provisions. Our review of the language of the Constitution leads us to conclude that there is no basis from the text of the Constitution to assume a party is given more than equitable protection. Accordingly we hold that there is no implied private right of action for damages under the Texas Constitution when an individual alleges the violation of speech and assembly rights.
[150]*150B.
Alternatively, we also ask whether we may look to the Constitution to define the element of duty for a Texas common law cause of action. We answer this in the negative as well. Other jurisdictions split on whether a common law cause of action is implied to remedy the violation of constitutional rights. At common law, the violation of a right such as those protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was viewed as a trespass, giving rise to an action for damages for trespass. For example, the United States Supreme Court in Bivens referred to the principle that the essence of liberty consists in the right of individuals to claim protection of the laws when injured, 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)), and thus held that a cause of action existed to remedy a violation of the Fourth Amendment by the federal government. Yet, even given the imperative from Marbury v. Madison, the same Court refused to imply a cause of action for the violation of an employee’s First Amendment rights in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2417, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983). There, the Court recognized that Congress had crafted a remedy for the misconduct alleged, and deferred to Congress to decide whether to create a cause of action. Congressional action, in effect, precluded a finding of a common law remedy.
States have turned to the common law to allow an action for trespass when individual rights analogous to those protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated. See Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 927 (following Bivens). North Carolina recognized that the common law can provide a remedy for the violation of free speech, but also noted that the trial judge must craft the appropriate remedy, and that remedy may include injunctive relief, such as reinstatement, and backpay. Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 290-91. Ohio, on the other hand, did not establish a common law cause of action for the violation of free speech because the legislature was viewed to be the more appropriate body to provide those remedies. Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 962. Our State does not recognize a common law cause of action for damages to enforce constitutional rights.
Historically Texas common law has not provided a cause of action for damages for the violation of constitutional rights. The only Texas case we can find that can be read to allow an award of damages for the violation of constitutionally protected rights is Gold v. Campbell, 54 Tex.Civ.App. 269, 117 S.W. 463 (El Paso 1909, no writ). There, the court of appeals recognized that a victim of false imprisonment could pursue a tort cause of action against an officer. However, the cause of action alleged in Gold was the traditional common law tort of false imprisonment, not a tort for the violation of constitutional rights. Gold did not create a new cause of action; rather, it recognized that an officer who acts outside the scope of his authority is amenable to suit under a traditional common law cause of action. We disapprove of any interpretation of Gold that concludes it authorized a constitutional tort cause of action.
IV. Conclusion
Because the actions of the officers do not fall under the Texas Whistleblower Act, and because there is no independent cause of action for damages against governmental entities for violations of the free speech and assembly clauses of the Texas Constitution, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing.
PHILLIPS, C.J., and HIGHTOWER, HECHT, CORNYN, GAMMAGE and OWEN, JJ., join.
GONZALEZ, J., filed a concurring opinion.
SPECTOR, J., joins in the judgment only.