Robertson v. Wegmann

436 U.S. 584, 98 S. Ct. 1991, 56 L. Ed. 2d 554, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 31

Opinions

Mr. Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In early 1970, Clay L. Shaw filed a civil rights action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Four years later, before trial had commenced, Shaw died. The question presented is whether the District Court was required to adopt as federal law a Louisiana survivorship statute, which would have caused this action to abate, or was free instead to create a federal common-law rule allowing the action to survive. Resolution of this question turns on whether the state statute is “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988.¹

I

In 1969, Shaw was tried in a Louisiana state court on charges of having participated in a conspiracy to assassinate President John F. Kennedy. He was acquitted by a jury but within days was arrested on charges of having committed perjury in his testimony at the conspiracy trial. Alleging that these prosecutions were undertaken in bad faith, Shaw’s § 1983 complaint named as defendants the then District Attorney of Orleans Parish, Jim Garrison, and five other persons, including petitioner Willard E. Robertson, who was alleged to have lent financial support to Garrison’s investigation of Shaw through an organization known as “Truth or Consequences.” On Shaw’s application, the District Court enjoined prosecution of the perjury action, Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (1971), and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 467 F. 2d 113 (CA5 1972).²

Since Shaw had filed an action seeking damages, the parties continued with discovery after the injunction issued. Trial was set for November 1974, but in August 1974 Shaw died. The executor of his estate, respondent Edward F. Wegmann (hereafter respondent), moved to be substituted as plaintiff, and the District Court granted the motion.³ Petitioner and other defendants then moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it had abated on Shaw’s death.

The District Court denied the motion to dismiss. It began its analysis by referring to 42 U. S. C. § 1988; this statute provides that, when federal law is “deficient” with regard to “suitable remedies” in federal civil rights actions, federal courts are to be governed by

“the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of [the] civil . . . cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

The court found the federal civil rights laws to be “deficient in not providing for survival.” Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1361 (1975). It then held that, under Louisiana law, an action like Shaw’s would survive only in favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings. Since no person with the requisite relationship to Shaw was alive at the time of his death, his action would have abated had state law been adopted as the federal rule. But the court refused to apply state law, finding it inconsistent with federal law, and in its place created “a federal common law of survival in civil rights actions in favor of the personal representative of the deceased.” Id., at 1368.

On an interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first noted that all parties agreed that, “if Louisiana law applies, Shaw’s § 1983 claim abates.” 545 F. 2d 980, 982 (1977). Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals applied 42 U. S. C. § 1988, found federal law “deficient” with regard to survivorship, and held Louisiana law “inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes embodied in the Civil Rights Acts.” 545 F. 2d, at 983. It offered a number of justifications for creating a federal common-law rule allowing respondent to continue Shaw’s action: Such a rule would better further the policies underlying § 1983, 545 F. 2d, at 984r-985; would “foste[r] the uniform application of the civil rights laws,” id., at 985; and would be consistent with “[t]he marked tendency of the federal courts to allow actions to survive in other areas of particular federal concern,” ibid. The court concluded that, “as a matter of federal common law, a § 1983 action instituted by a plaintiff prior to his death survives in favor of his estate.” Id., at 987.

We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 983 (1977), and we now reverse.

II

As both courts below held, and as both parties here have assumed, the decision as to the applicable survivorship rule is governed by 42 U. S. C. § 1988. This statute recognizes that in certain areas “federal law is unsuited or insufficient 'to furnish suitable remedies’ ”; federal law simply does not “cover every issue that may arise in the context of a federal civil rights action.” Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 703, 702 (1973), quoting 42 U. S. C. § 1988. When federal law is thus “deficient,” § 1988 instructs us to turn to “the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the [forum] State,” as long as these are “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” See n. 1, supra. Regardless of the source of the law applied in a particular case, however, it is clear that the ultimate rule adopted under § 1988 “ 'is a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired.’ ” Moor v. County of Alameda, supra, at 703, quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 240 (1969).

As we noted in Moor v. County of Alameda, and as was recognized by both courts below, one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to “the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.” 411 U. S., at 702 n. 14.⁴ State statutes governing the survival of state actions do exist, however. These statutes, which vary widely with regard to both the types of claims that survive and the parties as to whom survivorship is allowed, see W. Prosser, Law of Torts 900-901 (4th ed. 1971), were intended to modify the simple, if harsh, 19th-century common-law rule: “[A]n injured party’s personal claim was [always] extinguished . . . upon the death of either the injured party himself or the alleged wrongdoer.” Moor v. County of Alameda, supra, at 702 n. 14; see Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 67 (1913). Under § 1988, this state statutory law, modifying the common law,⁵ provides the principal reference point in determining survival of civil rights actions, subject to the important proviso that state law may not be applied when it is “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Because of this proviso, the courts below refused to adopt as federal law the Louisiana survivorship statute and in its place created a federal common-law rule.

Ill

In resolving questions of inconsistency between state and federal law raised under § 1988, courts must look not only at particular federal statutes and constitutional provisions, but also at “the policies expressed in [them].” Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., supra, at 240; see Moor v. County of Alameda, supra, at 703. Of particular importance is whether application of state law “would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action under consideration.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 465 (1975). The instant cause of action arises under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, one of the “Reconstruction civil rights statutes” that this Court has accorded “ 'a sweep as broad as [their] language.’ ” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 97 (1971), quoting United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 801 (1966).

Despite the broad sweep of § 1983, we can find nothing in the statute or its underlying policies to indicate that a state law causing abatement of a particular action should invariably be ignored in favor of a rule of absolute survivorship. The policies underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting under color of state law. See, e. g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 254 (1978); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 238-242 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172-187 (1961). No claim is made here that Louisiana’s survivorship laws are in general inconsistent with these policies, and indeed most Louisiana actions survive the plaintiff’s death. See La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 428 (West 1960); La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2315 (West 1971). Moreover, certain types of actions that would abate automatically on the plaintiff’s death in many States — for example, actions for defamation and malicious prosecution — would apparently survive in Louisiana.⁶ In actions other than those for damage to property, however, Louisiana does not allow the deceased’s personal representative to be substituted as plaintiff; rather, the action survives only in favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings. See 391 F. Supp., at 1361-1363; La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2315 (West 1971); J. Wilton Jones Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 1970 and 1971) (en banc).⁷ But surely few persons are not survived by one of these close relatives, and in any event no contention is made here that Louisiana’s decision to restrict certain survivorship rights in this manner is an unreasonable one.⁸

It is therefore difficult to see how any of § 1983’s policies would be undermined if Shaw’s action were to abate. The goal of compensating those injured by a deprivation of rights provides no basis for requiring compensation of one who is merely suing as the executor of the deceased’s estate.⁹ And, given' that most Louisiana actions survive the plaintiff’s death, the fact that a particular action might abate surely would not adversely affect § 1983’s role in preventing official illegality, at least in situations in which there is no claim that the illegality caused the plaintiff’s death. A state official contemplating illegal activity must always be prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action being filed against him. In light of this prospect, even an official aware of the intricacies of Louisiana survivorship law would hardly be influenced in his behavior by its provisions.¹⁰

It is true that § 1983 provides “a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation.” Mitchum v. Foster, supra, at 239. That a federal remedy should be available, however, does not mean that a § 1983 plaintiff (or his representative) must be allowed to continue an action in disregard of the state law to which § 1988 refers us. A state statute cannot be considered “inconsistent” with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If success of the § 1983 action were the only benchmark, there would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate rule would then always be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would be essentially irrelevant. But § 1988 quite clearly instructs us to refer to state statutes; it does not say that state law is to be accepted or rejected based solely on which side is advantaged thereby. Under the circumstances presented here, the fact that Shaw was not survived by one of several close relatives should not itself be sufficient to cause the Louisiana survivorship provisions to be deemed “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988.¹¹

IY

Our holding today is a narrow one, limited to situations in which no claim is made that state law generally is inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions and in which the particular application of state survivorship law, while it may cause abatement of the action, has no independent adverse effect on the policies underlying § 1983. A different situation might well be presented, as the District Court noted, if state law “did not provide for survival of any tort actions,” 391 F. Supp., at 1363, or if it significantly restricted the types of actions that survive. Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S., at 258 (failure of common law to “recognize an analogous cause of action” is not sufficient reason to deny compensation to § 1983 plaintiff). We intimate no view, moreover, about whether abatement based on state law could be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused death. See supra, at 592, and n. 10; cf. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F. 2d 401 (CA5 1961) (deceased allegedly beaten to death by policemen; state survival law applied in favor of his widow and estate).

Here it is agreed that Shaw’s death was not caused by the deprivation of rights for which he sued under § 1983, and Louisiana law provides for the survival of most tort actions. Respondent’s only complaint about Louisiana law is that it would cause Shaw’s action to abate. We conclude that the mere fact of abatement of a particular lawsuit is not sufficient ground to declare state law “inconsistent” with federal law.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Footnotes

1

Title 42 U. S. C. § 1988 provides in pertinent part:

“The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so- far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party -found guilty.”

2

The Court of Appeals held that this Court's decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), did not bar the enjoining of the state perjury prosecution, since the District Court’s “finding of a bad faith prosecution establishes irreparable injury both great and immediate for purposes of the comity restraints discussed in Younger." 467 F. 2d, at 122.

3

See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 25 (a)(1). As the Court of Appeals observed, this Rule “does not resolve the question [of] what law of survival of actions should be applied in this case. [It] simply describes the manner in which parties are to be substituted in federal court once it is determined that the applicable substantive law allows the action to survive a party’s death.” 545 F. 2d 980, 982 (CA5 1977) (emphasis in original).

4

The dissenting opinion argues that, despite this lack of coverage, “the laws of the United States” are not necessarily “[un] suitable” or “deficient in the provisions necessary.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988; see post, at 595. Both courts below found such a deficiency, however, and respondent here agrees with them. 545 F. 2d, at 983; Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-1361 (1975); Brief for Respondent 6.

There is a survivorship provision in 42 U. S. C. § 1986, but this statute applies only with regard to “the wrongs . . . mentioned in [42 U. S. C.] section 1985.” Although Shaw’s complaint alleged causes of action under §§ 1985 and 1986, the District Court dismissed this part of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 391 F. Supp., at 1356, 1369-1371. These dismissals were not challenged on the interlocutory appeal and are not at issue here.

5

Section 1988’s reference to “the common law” might be interpreted as a reference to the decisional law of the forum State, or as a reference to the kind of general common law that was an established part of our federal jurisprudence by the time of § 1988’s passage in 1866, see Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842); cf. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S., at 702 n. 14 (referring to the survivorship rule “at common law”). The latter interpretation has received some judicial and scholarly support. See, e. g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d 74, 85-86, n. 10 (CA3 1965); Theis, Shaw v. Garrison: Some Observations on 42 U. S. C. § 1988 and Federal Common Law, 36 La. L. Rev. 681, 684-685 (1976). See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 258 n. 13 (1978). It makes no difference for our purposes which interpretation is the correct one, because Louisiana has a survivor-ship statute that, under the terms of § 1988, plainly governs this case.

6

An action for defamation abates on the plaintiff’s death in the vast majority of States, see W. Prosser, Law of Torts 900-901 (4th ed. 1971), and a large number of States also provide for abatement of malicious prosecution actions, see, e. g., Dean v. Shirer, 547 F. 2d 227, 229-230 (CA4 1976) (South Carolina law); Hall v. Wooten, 506 F. 2d 564, 569 (CA6 1974) (Kentucky law). See also 391 F. Supp., at 1364 n. 17. In Louisiana, an action for defamation or malicious prosecution would apparently survive (assuming that one of the relatives specified in La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2315 (West 1971), survives the deceased, as discussed in text infra); such an action seems not to fall into the category of “strictly personal” actions, La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 428 (West 1960), that automatically abate on the plaintiff’s death. See Johnson, Death on the Calíais Coach: The Mystery of Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 La. L. Rev. 1, 6 n. 23, 52, and n. 252 (1976). See also Official Revision Comment (c) to La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 428.

7

For those actions that do not abate automatically on the plaintiff’s death, most States apparently allow the personal representative of the deceased to be substituted as plaintiff. See 391 F. Supp., at 1364, and n. 18.

8

The reasonableness of Louisiana’s approach is suggested by the fact that several federal statutes providing for survival take the same approach, limiting survival to specific named relatives. See, e. g., 33 U. S. C. § 908 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. V) (Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act); 45 U. S. C. § 59 (Federal Employers’ Liability Act). The approach taken by federal statutes in other substantive areas cannot, of course, bind a federal court in a § 1983 action, nor does the fact that a state survivorship statute may be reasonable by itself resolve the question whether it is “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988.

9

This does not, of course, preclude survival of a § 1983 action when such is allowed by state law, see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S., at 702-703, n. 14, nor does it preclude recovery by survivors who are suing under § 1983 for injury to their own interests.

10

In order to find even a marginal influence on behavior as a result of Louisiana’s survivorship provisions, one would have to make the rather farfetched assumptions that a state official had both the desire and the ability deliberately to select as victims only those persons who would die before conclusion of the § 1983 suit (for reasons entirely unconnected with the official illegality) and who would not be survived by any close relatives.

11

In addition to referring to the policies underlying § 1983, the Court of Appeals based its decision in part on the desirability of uniformity in the application of the civil rights laws and on the fact that the federal courts have allowed survival “in other areas of particular federal concern . . . where statutory guidance on the matter is lacking.” 545 F. 2d, at 985; see supra, at 588. With regard to the latter point, however, we do not find “statutory guidance . . . lacking”; § 1988 instructs us to turn to state laws, unless an “inconsistency” with federal law is found. While the courts below found such an inconsistency, we do not agree, as discussed in text supra, and henee the survivorship rules in areas where the courts are free to develop federal common law — without first referring to state law and finding an inconsistency — can have no bearing on our decision here. Similarly, whatever the value of nationwide uniformity in areas of civil rights enforcement where Congress has not spoken, in the areas to which § 1988 is applicable Congress has provided direction, indicating that state law will often provide the content of the federal remedial rule. This statutory reliance on state law obviously means that there will not be nationwide uniformity on these issues.