HALL, Chief Justice:
This matter is before us on certiorari to review the actions of the defendant Utah Liquor Control Commission which revoked plaintiff’s state liquor store lease.
Plaintiff, the owner of a private club in Salt Lake City, operated a state liquor store within the club under a lease granted by defendant.
On July 10, 1981, defendant held a public meeting at which it decided to revoke plaintiff’s lease. According to plaintiff, defendant made this decision without affording plaintiff any notice of the meeting and without conducting any evidentiary hearing. Claiming that it had been denied due process of law by defendant’s summary action, plaintiff also initiated a proceeding in the district court seeking a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why the court should not issue a preliminary injunction preventing defendant from enforcing its lease revocation. The court granted plaintiff’s motion but, after a hearing on the issue of the proposed preliminary injunction, determined that it did not have jurisdiction to grant such an injunction. Plaintiff has prosecuted a separate appeal from that ruling.
U.C.A., 1953, § 32-1-32.6 reads in part:
No court of this state (except the Supreme Court to the extent herein specified) shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul any order or decision of the commission, or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the performance of its official duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus shall lie from the Supreme Court to the commission in all proper cases.
No appeal may be taken, writ issued, or any review proceeding undertaken by the Supreme Court or any other court, of any action taken by the commission to suspend or remove a state store from the premises of any restaurant, social club or association licensed under the provisions of chapter 6, Title 16.
[Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff claims that the above statute violates Article VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah, which endows the district courts of this state with “original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law.”
Defendant maintains that the statute is constitutional and that the Commission’s actions were proper.
In briefing the constitutionality of § 32-1-32.6, both parties focus on the first sentence of the quoted language, which gives this Court exclusive power to review decisions and orders of defendant. However, our determination of the constitutionality of the statute must also focus upon its final sentence, which neither party mentions in its brief, although it constituted a principal topic of argument at the hearing giving rise to this appeal. That final sentence, which precludes review by
any
court of the suspension or revocation of a state liquor store lease, applies directly to the facts of the instant ease. Our review of the Commission’s ruling necessitates a determination concerning the constitutional validity of that final sentence.
In arguing in support of the constitutionality of § 32-1-32.6, defendant repeatedly asserts that although the statute deprives the district courts of jurisdiction to review decisions of defendant, it preserves the due process rights of those affected by such decisions by providing for Supreme Court review of those decisions. In so arguing, defendant ignores the fact that in cases such as the present one involving revocation of a liquor store lease, the statute expressly precludes such review by this Court or any other. According to the separate statutes which authorize defendant to regulate liquor store leases, defendant may withdraw such a lease at any time “with or without cause”
and without affording any type of
notice or hearing to the holder of the lease.
Thus, under § 32-1-32.6, a lease holder such as plaintiff may lose its lease without the benefit of even minimal due process and without receiving judicial review of even an arbitrary and capricious decision by defendant in this area.
The Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
This Court has explained the due process guarantee as follows:
[NJeither a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a person a constitutional right or deprive such person of a vested interest in property without any opportunity to be heard. To do so constitutes taking of property without due process of law.
Many attempts have been made to further define “due process” but they all resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day in court — that is each party shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his defense, after which comes judgment upon the record thus made.
Thus, the essential requirement of due process is that every citizen be afforded his “day in court.” “It has always been the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy.”
The Constitution of Utah, in addition to the general due process requirement contained in Article I, Section 7, provides a specific guarantee of access to the courts in Article I, Section 11:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
By allowing plaintiff to be deprived of its liquor store without notice, hearing or any judicial review, § 32-1-32.6 offends against both the Article I, Section 7 guarantee of due process and the Article I, Section 11 guarantee of access to the courts.
In arguing before the district court in the companion case before the Court, defendant contended that plaintiffs interest in its liquor store lease did not constitute “property” within the meaning of the above constitutional provisions. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s authorization to operate a liquor store constituted a “privilege” revocable at the pleasure or whim of defendant rather than a “right” protected by due process guarantees.
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HALL, Chief Justice:
This matter is before us on certiorari to review the actions of the defendant Utah Liquor Control Commission which revoked plaintiff’s state liquor store lease.
Plaintiff, the owner of a private club in Salt Lake City, operated a state liquor store within the club under a lease granted by defendant.
On July 10, 1981, defendant held a public meeting at which it decided to revoke plaintiff’s lease. According to plaintiff, defendant made this decision without affording plaintiff any notice of the meeting and without conducting any evidentiary hearing. Claiming that it had been denied due process of law by defendant’s summary action, plaintiff also initiated a proceeding in the district court seeking a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why the court should not issue a preliminary injunction preventing defendant from enforcing its lease revocation. The court granted plaintiff’s motion but, after a hearing on the issue of the proposed preliminary injunction, determined that it did not have jurisdiction to grant such an injunction. Plaintiff has prosecuted a separate appeal from that ruling.
U.C.A., 1953, § 32-1-32.6 reads in part:
No court of this state (except the Supreme Court to the extent herein specified) shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul any order or decision of the commission, or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the performance of its official duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus shall lie from the Supreme Court to the commission in all proper cases.
No appeal may be taken, writ issued, or any review proceeding undertaken by the Supreme Court or any other court, of any action taken by the commission to suspend or remove a state store from the premises of any restaurant, social club or association licensed under the provisions of chapter 6, Title 16.
[Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff claims that the above statute violates Article VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah, which endows the district courts of this state with “original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law.”
Defendant maintains that the statute is constitutional and that the Commission’s actions were proper.
In briefing the constitutionality of § 32-1-32.6, both parties focus on the first sentence of the quoted language, which gives this Court exclusive power to review decisions and orders of defendant. However, our determination of the constitutionality of the statute must also focus upon its final sentence, which neither party mentions in its brief, although it constituted a principal topic of argument at the hearing giving rise to this appeal. That final sentence, which precludes review by
any
court of the suspension or revocation of a state liquor store lease, applies directly to the facts of the instant ease. Our review of the Commission’s ruling necessitates a determination concerning the constitutional validity of that final sentence.
In arguing in support of the constitutionality of § 32-1-32.6, defendant repeatedly asserts that although the statute deprives the district courts of jurisdiction to review decisions of defendant, it preserves the due process rights of those affected by such decisions by providing for Supreme Court review of those decisions. In so arguing, defendant ignores the fact that in cases such as the present one involving revocation of a liquor store lease, the statute expressly precludes such review by this Court or any other. According to the separate statutes which authorize defendant to regulate liquor store leases, defendant may withdraw such a lease at any time “with or without cause”
and without affording any type of
notice or hearing to the holder of the lease.
Thus, under § 32-1-32.6, a lease holder such as plaintiff may lose its lease without the benefit of even minimal due process and without receiving judicial review of even an arbitrary and capricious decision by defendant in this area.
The Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
This Court has explained the due process guarantee as follows:
[NJeither a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a person a constitutional right or deprive such person of a vested interest in property without any opportunity to be heard. To do so constitutes taking of property without due process of law.
Many attempts have been made to further define “due process” but they all resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day in court — that is each party shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his defense, after which comes judgment upon the record thus made.
Thus, the essential requirement of due process is that every citizen be afforded his “day in court.” “It has always been the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy.”
The Constitution of Utah, in addition to the general due process requirement contained in Article I, Section 7, provides a specific guarantee of access to the courts in Article I, Section 11:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
By allowing plaintiff to be deprived of its liquor store without notice, hearing or any judicial review, § 32-1-32.6 offends against both the Article I, Section 7 guarantee of due process and the Article I, Section 11 guarantee of access to the courts.
In arguing before the district court in the companion case before the Court, defendant contended that plaintiffs interest in its liquor store lease did not constitute “property” within the meaning of the above constitutional provisions. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s authorization to operate a liquor store constituted a “privilege” revocable at the pleasure or whim of defendant rather than a “right” protected by due process guarantees.
Although it is true that the United States Supreme Court once recognized a distinction between “rights” and “privileges” in determining whether to afford due process protection to asserted property rights, that Court has now “fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘privileges.’ ”
In recent cases, the Court has expressed its preference for a more
flexible definition of “property” in this context:
“[Property” interests subject to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, “property” denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by “existing rules or understandings.”
It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.
In
City of Kenosha v. Bruno,
that Court recognized the possibility that the appellees’ interest in renewal of their state liquor licenses might constitute a “property” interest as described above, instructing the trial court on remand to evaluate “ ‘property’ or ‘liberty’ interests which might require a due process hearing” and to determine “the nature of such a hearing if it were required in the light of our opinions in
Both
[supra, note 12] and
Perry [supra,
note 11].”
In
Anderson v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners,
this Court rejected the assertion made in that case that the plaintiff held no “property” interest in the expected renewal of his county-granted beer license. In keeping with the United States Supreme Court’s position that the term “property” “denotes a broad range of interests,” this Court found that the plaintiff held a “substantial property interest” in the licensing of his business, which entitled him to receive the benefit of constitutional due process protections. The Court explained:
The spirit of enterprise which impels a person to initiate and develop a business which provides services to the public and employment for others is vital to the common welfare. By the same token that a business must operate in accordance with lawful regulations and requirements, it should be the policy of the law, and of officials charged with its administration, to encourage such initiative and enterprise by according it all proper protections of the law.
* * * * * sfc
We do not desire to be understood as saying that an operating business necessarily has any such vested or inviolable right in the renewal of its license that the licensing authority is without discretion in determining whether it should be renewed. On the other hand,
inasmuch as the licensing of his business does represent a substantial property interest to plaintiff, which also has its effect upon the public welfare, it should not be destroyed nor disrupted arbitrarily, nor without following fundamental standards of due process of law to guard against capricious or oppressive administrative action.
[Emphasis added.]
In the present case, plaintiff alleges that the future success of its private club depends greatly on the continuation of its liquor store lease and that revocation of the lease will result in severe financial loss to plaintiff. Moreover, plaintiff cannot successfully establish any other private club in
place of the present one unless defendant chooses to grant it another lease. Plaintiff’s position resembles that of the plaintiff in a Wisconsin case involving the nonrenewal of a state liquor license, in which the court described the importance of the plaintiff’s “property” interest in license renewal:
The plaintiff in this case has a substantial property interest in retention of his liquor license, since if the revocation is allowed, he will not only lose his sole source of income but will also lose a substantial sum of money which he has invested in physical improvements to his business establishment. In this context, loss of the liquor license forecloses the tavern owner’s freedom from taking advantage of other similar employment opportunities. This, in effect, is a bar to the plaintiff from all other employment in the tavern business.... [Plaintiff] cannot go anywhere in the state to exercise his profession without once again having to submit to the specified procedures for the acquisition of a liquor license....
... I am not persuaded that the local regulation of distribution of liquor by the drink is either an area for summary administrative action or an area so inherently discretionary that some form of hearing would interfere with this discretion. I further believe that society and the local citizenry have a basic interest in the regularity and fairness of local administrative proceedings. Society has an interest in insuring that liquor licenses are not revoked for reasons not made known to the parties involved, or on the basis of erroneous information. Confidence in local government is so important in a democracy that I do not think it unduly harsh to require local licensing bodies in these matters to respect the minimal dictates of procedural due process.
The above reasoning accords with that of this Court in
Anderson v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners, supra,
and supports the conclusion that plaintiff holds a property interest in its liquor store lease to which constitutional due process protections apply.
Defendant further contends that because its authority derives from that of the state, under the Twenty-first Amendment, to regulate distribution of alcoholic beverages, defendant has unlimited discretion to regulate all matters relating to the use or distribution of liquor in this state. This Court addressed a similar claim in
Anderson v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners, supra,
declaring:
The same considerations of fundamental fairness and justice which prevent an administrative body from acting in a capricious or arbitrary manner in other areas of the law also apply in a beer license, even though it is a business which is subjected to a high degree of supervision and regulation in the interest of the public welfare.
The United States Supreme Court has similarly held that “the Twenty-first Amendment [does] not abrogate a require
ment of procedural due process,”
observing:
These decisions [concerning the extent of state police power under the Twenty-first Amendment] did not go so far as to hold or say that the Twenty-first Amendment supersedes all other provisions of the United States Constitution in the area .of liquor regulations.
Although this Court has never directly ruled upon the constitutionality of § 32-1-32.6, the Court has tacitly recognized district court jurisdiction to review liquor store lease revocations by reviewing on their merits several district court decisions made pursuant to such jurisdiction.
In one such case, the Court referred in a footnote to the “power of a district court to issue mandamus in a proper case, irrespective of provisions of [the] Liquor Control Act (Sec. 32-1-32.6 U.C.A.1953).”
However, faced directly with the issue of the constitutionality of said § 32-1-32.6 in this case, further analysis is necessary.
It is perfectly obvious that the last sentence of § 32-1-32.6 cannot constitutionally preclude
a11
judicial review of the defendant Commission’s actions in terminating plaintiff’s state liquor store lease. However, it is axiomatic that statutes, where possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality. Accordingly, if a portion of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is unconstitutional, such should be done.
The first part of § 32-1-32.6 makes provision for the review of its proceedings in general, but limits that review to this Court and no other. It is only the final sentence of § 32-1-32.6 which precludes
any
judicial review of Commission actions having to do with the suspension or removal of state liquor stores from licensed premises. This sentence forbids review “by the Supreme Court,” as well as all other courts.
In keeping with the favored rule of statutory construction hereinabove referred to, we effect the minimum necessary disruption of the statutory scheme by holding only the final sentence of § 32-1-32.6 unconstitutional. In so doing, the statutory
ban on district court review of Commission action remains intact, as does the statutory pattern of direct review in this Court, which is now expanded to include review of actions pertaining to the suspension or removal of state liquor stores from leased premises, as the Constitution requires.
Accordingly, the Commission’s order of revocation is vacated and set aside as having been entered in violation of the due process protections of the Constitution of the State of Utah. No costs awarded.
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.