Anderson v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners

589 P.2d 1214, 1979 Utah LEXIS 786

• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Decided: January 4, 1979
• Docket: 15653
• Status: Published

Opinions

CROCKETT, Justice:

Plaintiff Eldon L. Anderson appeals from an order of the district court which sustained the denial of his application for the renewal of his Class “B” beer license by the defendant Utah County Commission. He contends: (1) that the court failed to make adequate findings of fact to support its affirmance of the Commission’s action, and (2) that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to renew his license.

The plaintiff is the owner and operator of the Silver Dollar Lounge near Provo. On December 12,1975, he applied for a renewal of his beer license. The Commission denied that application on July 12, 1976, and the plaintiff was given 30 days to appear before the Commission and present evidence to persuade the Commission that that action should be set aside and the license granted.

Pursuant to hearings before the County Commission, it made findings which, it is significant to note, are not the findings of the district court, nor incorporated therein; and denied plaintiff’s application for the renewal of his license.

Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action in the district court for a review of the action of the County Commission, contending that the Commission’s findings were not supported by the evidence and that it “abused its discretion by arbitrarily and capriciously denying the application.”

The entire findings of the district court are as follows:

1. Pursuant to Court order, the Utah County Commission transmitted to the Court for its review, a certified copy of its proceedings in the matter of the application of the Plaintiff, Eldon L. Anderson, for a Class “B” beer license.

2. The Court received and reviewed the above-described proceedings of the Utah County Commission.

3. The Court further considered the pleadings on file, oral and written stipulations entered into by the parties, and memoranda and oral arguments of counsel.

We agree with the plaintiff’s contention that the foregoing are not really “findings of fact” but are simply recitals of procedure. They do not constitute findings as required by Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., which provides:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . ., the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon [Emphasis added.]

It is true that we indulge the presumption of regularity in the proceedings before the trial court. But this does not suffice when the record itself exposes essential deficiencies. With certain exceptions, not applicable here, the just-quoted rule must be complied with and a judgment cannot stand unless there are findings which will justify it.¹

The failure of the trial court to enter adequate findings requires that the judgment be vacated. In so ruling, it is appropriate that we make some observations regarding the plaintiff’s claim that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously.²

The spirit of enterprise which impels a person to initiate and develop a business which provides services to the public and employment for others is vital to the common welfare. By the same token that a business must operate in accordance with lawful regulations and requirements, it should be the policy of the law, and of officials charged with its administration, to encourage such initiative and enterprise by according it all proper protections of the law. In harmony with that purpose there should be considerable difference in determining whether an application for a new license should be granted, as compared with the renewal of a license where the business has been established and operating for a number of years.³

There are respected authorities which affirm the proposition that the administrative body (the County Commission here) should not have the same breadth of discretion in refusing the renewal of the license of an operating business as it would in passing on an application for the establishment of a new business.⁴ The reasonableness and justice of such a rule is apparent when one reflects on the practicalities of the situation where the business has been established and operating for some years and thus represents a substantial commitment in the time, effort and expense by the owner.⁵

We do not desire to be understood as saying that an operating business necessarily has any such vested or inviolable right in the renewal of its license that the licensing authority is without discretion in determining whether it should be renewed.⁶ On the other hand, inasmuch as the licensing of his business does represent a substantial property interest to the plaintiff, which also has its effect upon the public welfare, it should not be destroyed nor disrupted arbitrarily, nor without following fundamental standards of due process of law to guard against capricious or oppressive administrative action.⁷

It is further pertinent to observe that because beer licenses are available on a quota system it seems especially reasonable and proper that a business which has had a license and has been in operation should have some preference over any new application; and that the operating business should have its license renewed unless there is some reasonable basis for denying it.⁸ The same considerations of fundamental fairness and justice which prevent an administrative body from acting in a capricious or arbitrary manner in other areas of the law also apply in a beer license, even though it is a business which is subjected to a high degree of supervision and regulation in the interest of the public welfare.⁹

Because the record of the trial court, and particularly its findings upon which the judgment is based, fail to demonstrate any reasonable ground for the refusal to renew the license, it is our conclusion that the judgment should be and is hereby vacated. No costs awarded.

MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.

1 . LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966) and cases therein cited.

2 . That it is our duty to pass on matters which may become material when a case is remanded for further proceedings, see Rule 76(a), U.R. C.P.; LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, supra note 1.

3 . Charles D. Kaier Co. v. Doran, 42 F.2d 923 (E.D.Pa.1930).

4 . 45 Am.Jur.2d, Intoxicating Liquors, section 175; 2 A.L.R.2d 1239, section 4.

5 . Charles D. Kaier Co. v. Doran, supra, note 3.

6 . City of Manitou Springs v. Walk, 149 Colo. 43, 367 P.2d 744 (1962); Nechi v. Daley, 40 Ill.App.2d 326, 188 N.E.2d 243 (1963).

7 . Manos v. City of Green Bay, 372 F.Supp. 40 (E.D.Wis.1974); Bundo v. City of Walled Lake, 395 Mich. 679, 238 N.W.2d 154 (1976).

8 . City of Manitou Springs v. Walk, supra, note 6; Dadiskos v. Liquor Control Comm., 150 Conn. 422, 190 A.2d 490 (1963); Pomponio v. City Council, Colo.App., 526 P.2d 681 (1974).

9 . The Rogue v. Utah Liquor Control Comm., 28 Utah 2d 212, 500 P.2d 509 (1972).