CBS Corp. v. United States

90 Fed. Cl. 456, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 683, 2009 WL 4729668
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedDecember 8, 2009
DocketNo. 01-79C
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 90 Fed. Cl. 456 (CBS Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CBS Corp. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 456, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 683, 2009 WL 4729668 (uscfc 2009).

Opinion

OPINION

NANCY B. FIRESTONE, Judge.

This is another in a series of decisions involving the segment closing calculations triggered by the sale and closing of two CBS Corporation (“CBS”) business segments under original Cost Accounting Standard (“CAS”) 413.50(c)(12), 4 C.F.R. § 413(e)(12) (1994) (“original CAS 413”), and the revised version of this provision, found at 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-50(c)(12) (1995) (“revised CAS 413”). CBS and the defendant, the United States (“government”) have filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), which require this court to determine first the scope of the segment closing adjustment and then the government’s payment obligation with regard to the closing of one of these segments, the Electronic Systems Group (“ESG”).1

The segment closing calculation at issue in the parties’ cross-motions was triggered by the sale of ESG to Northrop Grumman Corporation (“Northrop Grumman”) in 1997. The segment closing calculation revealed that ESG’s pension assets were not sufficient to meet ESG’s pension liabilities and therefore [458]*458ESG had a pension deficit. In the court’s prior decision, the court held that the government was liable to CBS for the share of the pension deficit attributable to CAS-covered federal government contracts. Viacom, Inc. v. United States, 70 Fed.Cl. 649, 655, 660 (2006). However, the court did not address whether the segment closing calculation must include the pension assets and liabilities transferred to Northrop Grumman or the extent of the government’s liability where pension assets and liabilities are transferred in a segment sale. In particular, the court did not address whether CBS could seek payment from the government for the portion of the ESG pension deficit that CBS transferred to Northrop Grumman in connection with the ESG sale.

CBS argues in the pending motion that the transferred pension assets and liabilities must be included in the segment closing calculation and that the government is liable to it for the government’s share of the pension deficit that CBS both retained and transferred to Northrop Grumman, the segment buyer. CBS agrees that if it succeeds in this motion, it must transfer some of the amount it receives to Northrop Grumman, but argues that it is entitled to keep some portion of the payment attributable to the transferred pension deficit.2

The government argues that the segment closing calculation should not include any of the pension assets or liabilities transferred to Northrop Grumman. In the alternative, the government argues that even if the segment closing calculation is performed on all of ESG’s pension assets and liabilities at the time of the segment closing, including those transferred to Northrop Grumman as part of the ESG sale, CBS can only seek reimbursement for the portion of the pension deficit that CBS retained after the sale. The government argues that under the Allowable Cost and Payment Clause, Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 52.216-7, 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-7 (2002),3 CBS cannot claim reimbursement for pension costs attributable to the pension deficit CBS transferred to Northrop Grumman as part of the ESG sale.

For the reasons set forth below, the court holds that the CAS 413 segment closing calculation must include all of the pension assets and liabilities of the ESG segment at the time of the segment closing for pension costs attributable to contracts subject to original CAS 413, including those assets and liabilities that were transferred to Northrop Grumman.4 The court further holds that [459]*459CBS is entitled to seek pension costs from the government only for the portion of the pension deficit retained by CBS.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

The following facts are not disputed. CBS’s predecessor, Westinghouse Electric Company (“Westinghouse”),5 had a business segment known as ESG that performed CAS-covered firm-fixed price, fixed-price incentive and cost-type contracts for the government. ESG was established in 1951 to provide services for defense-related electronic systems and subsystems.

Most of ESG’s employees were covered under the Westinghouse Qualified Pension Plan (“WPP”), a qualified pension plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). ESG executives were covered under the Westinghouse Executive Pension Plan (“WEPP”), which was a non-qualified plan under ERISA and the IRC.

After the promulgation of the CAS in the mid-1970s, Westinghouse classified ESG as a “segment” for CAS-eomplianee purposes with the knowledge and approval of the government. ESG’s government contracts required compliance with CAS 413 and at least seven of ESG’s contracts were subject to revised CAS 413, 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413 due to the fact that they were entered into after revised CAS 413 was promulgated. In addition, ESG’s cost-type contracts issued after the implementation of the Allowable Cost and Payment Clause, FAR 52.216-7, 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-7, contained that clause, which governs which costs incurred in performance of a cost-type government contract (including pension costs) are reimbursable.

In February 1996, Westinghouse sold the ESG segment to Northrop Grumman. This sale constituted a segment closing and triggered a CAS 413 segment closing calculation. As part of the ESG sale, Westinghouse also transferred certain WPP and WEPP pension assets and liabilities to Northrop Grumman while retaining the remaining WPP and WEPP pension assets and liabilities.

In July 1996, Westinghouse submitted segment closing claims to the government for the pension deficits in the WPP and WEPP purportedly attributable to ESG (i.e., pension costs incurred for those workers while performing government contracts). In July 1997, Westinghouse submitted a revised segment closing claim for the WEPP.

In both the 1996 segment closing claims and the 1997 revisions to the WEPP claim, CBS calculated the segment closing adjustment amount based upon the pension assets and liabilities retained by Westinghouse at the time of the segment closing. CBS further stated that these claims were made pursuant to revised CAS 413, 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413.

On April 30, 1998, CBS, Northrop Grumman and the government entered into a no-vation agreement, which provided that Northrop Grumman would assume all obligations and liabilities associated with ESG’s government contracts, including pension liabilities.

In July 1999, Northrop Grumman merged the pension assets and liabilities CBS transferred to it with an existing Northrop Grumman pension plan. It is not disputed that Patrick Ring, an actuary for the Defense Contract Management Agency, sent a memorandum to the Defense Corporate Executive in which he stated that “the advantages clearly outweigh any disadvantages of merging the pension plans.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
90 Fed. Cl. 456, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 683, 2009 WL 4729668, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cbs-corp-v-united-states-uscfc-2009.