Casey v. Parts Authority, LLC

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 14, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2659
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CECILE CASEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 24-cv-2659 (DLF)

PARTS AUTHORITY, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs Cecile Casey and Rodney Foust, automotive parts delivery drivers for defendants

Parts Authority, LLC and Parts Authority, Inc. (collectively, Parts Authority), bring this action

against Parts Authority and two delivery driver contractors, Northeast Logistics, Inc. d/b/a

“Diligent Delivery Systems” (Diligent), and DAO Logistics, Inc. The plaintiffs claim that the

defendants engaged in a policy and practice of misclassifying drivers as independent contractors

and failing to pay minimum wage and overtime, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act

(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the state wage laws of D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. Before

the Court is the plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class, Dkt. 26. For the reasons that follow, the Court

will grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Parts Authority, an automobile parts and sales distributor with stores located in the District

of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, Compl. ¶ 1, Dkt. 1, employs drivers to deliver car parts to

customers, id. ¶¶ 32–33. Although some drivers are hired directly by Parts Authority, others are

hired through staffing agencies like Diligent. Id. ¶ 2. Diligent in turn hires subcontractors, including DAO Logistics, to help provide drivers to Parts Authority. Fernando Decl. ¶ 12, Dkt.

31-1.

Plaintiffs Casey and Foust were hired by DAO Logistics to work as delivery drivers at six

Parts Authority locations in D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7; Foust Decl. ¶¶ 4, Dkt.

27-4; Casey Decl. ¶¶ 3–4, Dkt. 27-5. When hired, they were classified as independent contractors,

rather than employees, and paid a flat rate for their work, regardless of hours. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, 35–

39. Because the plaintiffs allegedly worked 60 hours per week and were required to use their own

cars without reimbursement for mileage, their effective pay rate was lower than the minimum wage

required by D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. Id. ¶¶ 39, 51. The plaintiffs claim that they were

improperly classified as independent contractors and not paid minimum wage and overtime, in

violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the state wage laws

of D.C., Maryland, and Virginia.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The FLSA authorizes plaintiffs to pursue a collective action by suing on behalf of “other

employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The FLSA's collective action procedures are

minimal and require only that (1) employees be similarly situated, and (2) other employees who

seek to be a party to the collective action opt in to the lawsuit by filing a written consent in the

court where it is pending. Id. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which generally

governs class-action lawsuits, does not apply to FLSA collective actions. See, e.g., Thompson v.

Linda And A., Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143 (D.D.C. 2011). The D.C. Minimum Wage Act

permits collective actions that are “[c]onsistent with the collective-action procedures of the Fair

Labor Standards Act.” D.C. Code § 32-1308(a)(1)(C)(iii); D.C. Code § 32-1012(a).

2 Courts follow a two-stage process to assess whether an FLSA collective action should be

certified. Castillo v. P & R Enterprises, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 440, 445 (D.D.C. 2007). In the first

stage, referred to as “conditional certification,” “the court mak[es] an initial determination to send

notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs who may be ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs with

respect to whether a FLSA violation has occurred.” Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 (2d

Cir. 2010). At this stage, the plaintiffs need only make a “modest factual showing that they and

potential opt-in plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the

law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). All that is required is “some evidence,

beyond pure speculation, of a factual nexus between the manner in which the employer’s alleged

policy affected a plaintiff and the manner in which it affected other employees.” Ayala v. Tito

Contractors, 12 F. Supp. 3d 167, 170 (D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up) (alteration in original). The

standard of proof is low at this stage because its purpose is “merely to determine whether ‘similarly

situated’ plaintiffs do in fact exist.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555. “If a plaintiff can make this showing,

a court will conditionally certify the class.” Ayala, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 170. If the court conditionally

certifies the class, the second stage tasks the court with determining, “on a fuller record,” whether

the collective action “may go forward by determining whether the plaintiffs who have opted in are

in fact ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555. If the opt-in plaintiffs

turn out not to be similarly situated, the court may dismiss their claims without prejudice and “de-

certif[y]” the lawsuit. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Conditional Certification

To obtain conditional certification, the plaintiffs must make “a modest factual showing”

that they and the other potential class members “were victims of a common policy or plan that

3 violated the law.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the

conditional-certification standard turns on whether plaintiffs have “put forth a common legal

theory upon which each member is entitled to relief.” Stephens v. Farmers Rest. Group, 291 F.

Supp. 3d 95, 109 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court finds

that the plaintiffs have cleared the low hurdle to show that other delivery drivers who worked at

the same stores were unlawfully classified as independent contractors and paid less than minimum

wage without overtime pay.

Both Casey and Foust attest that they were directly controlled by Parts Authority. Foust

Decl. ¶¶ 15–17; Casey Decl. ¶¶ 14–16, 18. For instance, Parts Authority orchestrated route

assignments, determined the order of deliveries, provided training, and required drivers to obtain

permission before taking breaks. Foust Decl. ¶¶ 15–17; Casey Decl ¶¶ 14–16, 18. Casey and

Foust observed the same treatment for the other DAO delivery drivers at the six stores where they

worked. Foust Decl. ¶¶ 5, 22; Casey Decl. ¶¶ 4, 21. These facts support their claim that Parts

Authority had a policy of treating DAO delivery drivers as employees.

The plaintiffs also state that they worked greater than 40 hours but were paid a flat rate

without overtime pay. Foust Decl. ¶ 7; Casey Decl. ¶ 6. In addition, they observed other DAO

delivery drivers working similar hours. Foust Decl. ¶ 8; Casey Decl. ¶ 7. In other words, the

plaintiffs, along with other delivery drivers the plaintiffs observed, were not paid the equivalent of

minimum wage and overtime for their work. Taken together, these facts establish a nexus between

plaintiffs’ treatment and the treatment of other delivery drivers at the same store locations where

the plaintiffs worked.

On the other hand, the plaintiffs have not adequately supported their claim that delivery

drivers servicing other store locations were also obligated to work long hours without adequate

4 pay. The plaintiffs rely primarily on a deposition of Parts Authority’s Vice President, Yaron

Rosenthal, taken during separate proceedings. Rosenthal testified that, among other things, Parts

Authority designated the number of workers and hours needed a particular day to Diligent, who

then provided the fill-in delivery drivers. Rosenthal Decl. at 33, Dkt. 27-3. But Rosenthal also

testified that Parts Authority was not in charge of whether the temp drivers split shifts or which

stores they were sent to on a particular day. Id. And nothing about the Parts Authority policies for

temp drivers at other locations supports the claim those drivers worked over 40 hours without

overtime pay. Indeed, the Court can identify nothing in the record that addresses delivery drivers’

hours at other stores. To support their FLSA claim, the plaintiffs must establish not only that

drivers at other stores should have been classified as employees, but also that they were paid less

than the required minimum wage and overtime pay. The plaintiffs fail to show that drivers working

at other store locations were inadequately paid.

The cases the plaintiffs point to are not to the contrary. In Castillo, the plaintiffs alleged

that the defendant had a “centralized operation for all [relevant] employees.” 517 F. Supp. 2d at

446. This centralized payroll approach supported a class for all employees, even though they

worked in different buildings. Id. Here, by contrast, temp delivery drivers signed individual

contracts with Diligent—not with Parts Authority—and it is unclear whether the named plaintiffs’

experiences align with those of drivers at other stores. See Pls.’ Ex. 11, Dkt. 27-11; Pls.’ Ex. 12,

Dkt. 27-12. The plaintiffs in the other cases were similarly able to establish identical unlawful

policies that impacted workers across various locations. E.g., Guarriello v. Asnani, 517 F. Supp.

3d 1164, 1173 (D.N.M. 2021) (noting that restaurant waiters at Denny’s locations were “subject

to identical policies of being allowed or required to perform off the clock work”); Kasten v. Saint-

Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 956–57 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (denying

5 motion to decertify class when all plaintiffs were denied compensation for time spent walking to

work areas and putting on protective gear). But here, the plaintiffs cannot point to a company-

wide policy that required temp delivery drivers to work without overtime pay or adequate

minimum wage.

The defendants argue the plaintiffs’ declarations lack sufficient detail to support their claim

that delivery drivers working at the same six stores were similarly situated. Defs.’ Opp’n at 8–9,

Dkt. 31. But the plaintiffs’ declarations, which are based on the plaintiffs’ personal observations

of other drivers, see, e.g., Foust Decl. ¶ 8; Casey Decl. ¶ 7, are not purely speculative, see Ayala,

12 F. Supp. 3d at 170. At least at this stage, the pleadings and affidavits are sufficient to meet the

“low standard of proof,” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555, that delivery drivers who performed the same

job at the same Parts Authority stores as the plaintiffs received the same treatment.

On this record, the Court will conditionally certify a class of delivery drivers who were

subject to the same allegedly illegal policies. It will, however, exclude from the class delivery

drivers who worked at store locations other than the plaintiffs. See Stephens, 291 F. Supp. 3d at

112 (limiting class to employees who worked at restaurants in D.C. and Maryland when the

plaintiffs failed to present evidence of a similar policy at Virginia locations); Dinkel v. MedStar

Health, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55 (D.D.C. 2012) (excluding employees who worked at six

hospitals from a purported class where the plaintiffs failed to “present any evidence that there was

a common practice at those six hospitals”). Accordingly, the Court will conditionally certify a

class of delivery drivers employed by DAO who worked at the same locations as the plaintiffs and

were subject to the same independent contractor classifications and wage payments.

6 B. Proposed Collective Action Notice

The plaintiffs also request that the Court approve their proposed notice to potential opt-in

plaintiffs, which is attached to their motion as Exhibit 19. Dkt. 27-19. “Decisions as to whether

to facilitate notice to potential plaintiffs, and how to facilitate it, are matters entrusted to the district

court’s discretion.” Guevara v. Spartan Enters. LLC, No. 20-cv-1383 (JEB), 2020 WL 6870007,

at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 23, 2020) (quoting Engers v. AT&T, No. 98-cv-3660 (SRC), 2007 WL

1557163, at *1 (D.N.J. May 24, 2007). The Court has a managerial role in “monitoring preparation

and distribution of the notice” to “ensure that it is timely, accurate, and informative.” Hoffmann–

La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 172 (1989).

While the plaintiffs’ proposed notice provides most of the necessary information, its format

and structure are less than clear, and the notice includes plaintiffs that the Court will not certify.

In addition to excluding those individuals, the revised notice shall make clear that it is a notice of

a collective action lawsuit against the defendants and that its contents have been authorized by the

Court. The revised notice also shall also explain the applicable statute of limitations to potential

opt-in plaintiffs and include appropriate headings. See, e.g., Notice, Izaguirre v. Hunter Allied of

Maryland, Inc., No. 18-cv-0965 (DLF) (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2018), Dkt. 17. Accordingly, the parties

shall confer about the contents of the revised notice. Thereafter, the plaintiffs shall refile a revised

proposed notice that conforms with this opinion.

C. Production of Contact Information

To provide notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs, the plaintiffs seek an order requiring the

defendants to produce “the names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, and employment

dates” of all potential class members. Pls.’ Mot. at 27.

7 “Decisions in this Circuit have reached different conclusions on whether email addresses

and phone numbers are discoverable in connection with collective-action notice

procedures.” Stephens, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 121. Although “[t]he trend appears to be toward

ordering the production of at least some of this information,” id., courts have rejected requests for

telephone numbers and email addresses when there has been no showing of need and when

nondisclosure is “in the interest of protecting the privacy interests of the members of the proposed

collectives,” Freeman v. MedStar Health Inc., 187 F. Supp. 3d 19, 32 (D.D.C. 2016); see

also Blount v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., 945 F. Supp. 2d 88, 97 (D.D.C. 2013) (concluding that “the

disclosure of phone numbers and dates of birth implicates privacy concerns and, in the Court's

view, should not be required absent particularized need”); Galloway v. Chugach Gov’t Servs., Inc.,

263 F. Supp. 3d 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2017) (limiting production to names and residential addresses).

This Court has previously authorized notice by mail and email. See Guzman v. GF, Inc.,

No. 19-cv-2338 (DLF), 2021 WL 2439277, at *6 (D.D.C. June 14, 2021). But the Court did so

due to the “special characteristics of the restaurant industry.” Id. (quoting Stephens, 291 F. Supp.

3d at 122). The plaintiffs have presented no such special characteristics here. Because the

plaintiff’s motion does not adequately explain why they need the requested email addresses and

telephone numbers, the Court will limit the production of contact information to names, addresses,

and dates of employment.

The parties also dispute who should be obligated to produce the information. Parts

Authority and Diligent both represent that they do not maintain records of delivery drivers supplied

by DAO, see Jarquin Decl. ¶ 21; McMullen Decl. ¶ 14, Dkt. 31-6, and DAO has not yet appeared

in this matter. But the defendants agree that subpoenaing DAO would allow for the necessary

information. Defs.’ Opp’n at 3; Pls.’ Reply at 17, Dkt. 32. Because Parts Authority and Diligent

8 are unable to provide the necessary records, and expanding the notice to Parts Authority’s full list

of delivery drivers would risk the “stirring up of litigation,” see D’Anna v. M/A-COM, Inc., 903 F.

Supp. 889, 893–94 (D. Md. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), the Court will

order Diligent to request the information from DAO, see Defs.’ Ex. C, at 5, Dkt. 31-4 (allowing

Diligent to request documents from DAO). If DAO does not cooperate, the Court will entertain a

motion for a third-party subpoena. See Davis v. Dynata, LLC, No. 22-cv-1062 (SVN), 2023 WL

6216809, at *20 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2023).

D. Notice Method

For the reasons stated above, the Court approves notice by U.S. mail. If the plaintiffs are

unable to contact specific potential plaintiffs based on this information, they may renew their

motion for the provision of telephone numbers or email addresses. The Court will allow one

reminder notice by U.S. mail.

E. Opt-In Method

Finally, the Court will approve the plaintiffs’ proposal to allow potential plaintiffs 60

days to opt in to the lawsuit. See Ayala, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 173.

9 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs’

Motion to Certify Class, Dkt. 26. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this

memorandum opinion.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge May 14, 2025