Canales v. Guzman

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 3:23-cv-1059-GPC-MSB ANGEL CHRISTOPHER CANALES, 12 ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTIONS Plaintiff, 13 TO PROCEED IN FORMA v. PAUPERIS [ECF Nos. 2, 5] and 14

GUZMAN, Warden, GOVERNMENT 15 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR CLAIMS OFFICIAL, MAIL ROOM FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 16 SERGEANT, PURUSANT TO 28 U.S.C. 17 Defendants. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b) 18 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 On June 2, 2023, Plaintiff, Angel Christopher Canales (“Plaintiff” or “Canales”), an 22 inmate at Centinela State Prison (“CEN”) and proceeding pro se, filed a civil action 23 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. On June 13, 2023, the Court dismissed the action 24 because Canales had not prepaid the $402 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 25 and had not filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1915(a). In its Order, the Court gave Canales 45 days to either pay the fee or move for 27 1 IFP, and he has now filed two IFP applications.1 ECF Nos. 2, 4. For the reasons discussed 2 below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motions and DISMISSES the Complaint without 3 prejudice and with leave to amend. 4 II. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 5 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 6 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 7 $402.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A party may initiate a civil action without prepaying the 8 required filing fee if the Court grants leave to proceed IFP based on indigency. 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915(a); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 To proceed IFP, plaintiffs must establish their inability to pay by filing an affidavit 11 regarding their income and assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 12 Cir. 2015). Prisoners seeking to establish an inability to pay must also submit a “certified 13 copy of the [prisoner’s] trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . 14 the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial 16 payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, 17 or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is 18 greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1) & (4). Prisoners 19 who proceed IFP must repay the entire fee in installments regardless of whether their action 20 is ultimately dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016). 21 22 23 1 On June 15, 2023, after the Court issued its June 13, 2023 dismissal Order, Plaintiff’s first Application to Proceed IFP was docketed nunc pro tunc to June 12, 2023, the day it was received 24 in the Court’s mailroom. See ECF Nos. 2–4.

25 2 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 26 fee of $52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2021)). The additional $52 administrative fee does not apply to 27 persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id. 1 In support of his IFP Motions, Plaintiff provided copies of his trust account 2 statements. ECF Nos. 3, 6. During the six months prior to filing suit, Plaintiff had an 3 average monthly balance of $219.04, average monthly deposits of $225.67, and an 4 available account balance of $0.00 at the time he filed suit. ECF No. 3 at 1. The Court finds 5 Plaintiff has established an inability to pay the required $350 filing fee and GRANTS his 6 IFP motion. While the Court assesses no initial payment, Plaintiff will be required to pay 7 the full $350 filing fee in installments to be collected from his trust account as set forth in 8 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 9 III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) AND § 1915A(b) 10 A. Legal Standards 11 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), the Court must screen a 12 prisoner’s IFP complaint and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous, 13 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 14 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 15 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for determining whether Plaintiff has 16 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the 17 same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 18 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a 19 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible 20 on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements 22 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a 23 claim. Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully- 24 harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. 25 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 26 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux 27 v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 1 substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 2 conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 40 U.S. 386 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation 3 marks omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation 4 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 5 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 6 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 7 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 8 Canales alleges that on December 8, 2021, an “outside correspondent” mailed a 9 package to him, via “priority first class mail.” ECF No. 1 at 3. The package was received 10 at CEN on December 10, 2021, but after fourteen days of waiting, it was never delivered 11 to Canales by CEN staff. Initially, Canales submitted several informal “Inmate 22 12 Requests,” inquiring about the package. Id. CEN staff told Canales that “no such mail” was 13 received. Id. Plaintiff states CEN mailroom staff were “highly disrespectful” and routinely 14 careless with inmate mail. Id. On January 26, 2022, Canales filed a formal grievance about 15 the missing package. Id. at 3, 6. He stated the package had contained “decorative stationary, 16 family photos, 40 stamps, various drawings, all irreplaceable with personal semimetal 17 value.” ECF No. 1-2 at 5. Along with his grievance, Canales included the U.S. Postal 18 Service tracking confirmation receipt, showing that the package had indeed been delivered 19 to CEN on December 10, 2021. Id. at 5, 10; see also ECF No. 1 at 3. 20 On February 19, 2022, Canales’ grievance was “granted.” ECF No. 1 at 3. In its 21 response, CEN informed Canales that a “thorough search of the mailroom was conducted” 22 but the package was not found. ECF No. 1-2 at 3. Canales was advised to utilize the 23 “Government Claims Program” to request reimbursement for the value of the items 24 contained in the package. Id. at 3, 7. 25 Canales filed a claim with the Government Claims Program (“GCP”) on March 18, 26 2022, along with a request to waive the $25 filing fee. ECF No. 1 at 4. On November 23, 27 2022, the GCP informed Plaintiff he did not meet the requirements for a fee waiver. Id., 1 see also ECF No. 1-2 at 14. Canales then submitted the filing fee. ECF No. 1 at 4. On 2 January 4, 2023, the GCP notified Canales that his claim was rejected because it involved 3 “complex issues that are beyond the scope of analysis and interpretation typically 4 undertaken by the GCP.” ECF No. 1-2 at 12. In its letter, the GCP stated that “claims 5 involving such complex issues are best determined by the courts.” Id. Information in the 6 letter also referred Plaintiff to California Government Code sections 945.6 and 955.4 for 7 information on the procedure for filing such an action. Id. 8 C. Discussion 9 In his Complaint, Canales raises three claims and names Guzman, Warden of CEN, 10 an unnamed “Government Claims Official,” and an unnamed “Mail Room Sergeant” as 11 Defendants. ECF No. 1 at 2. In his first and third claims, he alleges Defendants Guzman 12 and “Mail Room Sergeant” violated his due process and First Amendment rights by failing 13 to ensure delivery of his mail. In his second claim, he contends the GCP staffer who denied 14 his claim despite his being told it had “already been approved,” violated his due process 15 rights. ECF No. 1 at 3–5. He seeks $19,000 in money damages and an injunction 16 prohibiting Defendants from retaliating against him. Id. at 7. 17 1. Due Process and First Amendment (Grounds One and Three) 18 Because Canales’ first and third claims both raise due process and First Amendment 19 claims related to his undelivered package, the Court will address them together. As to both 20 claims, Canales alleges CEN mail staff were untruthful when they told him initially that 21 CEN had not received the package. ECF No. 1 at 3, 5. He further alleges his right to receive 22 mail was compromised by the “negligence and abuse of power” of CEN mailroom staff 23 and Warden Guzman. Id. at 2, 5. 24 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from 25 state deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. With respect to a 26 prisoner’s property, the Supreme Court has held that “an unauthorized intentional 27 deprivation of property” by a prison official constitutes a violation of due process if a 1 meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is unavailable. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 2 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). If, however, a prison official merely acts negligently in losing a 3 prisoner’s property, there is no due process violation. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 4 327, 328 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of 5 an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”) (emphasis in 6 the original). 7 Here, Canales fails to state a plausible due process claim. First, he provides no facts 8 to suggest Guzman or the Mailroom Sergeant intentionally deprived him of his package. 9 Indeed, Plaintiff states the deprivation was due to “negligence.” ECF No. 1 at 3, 5. Second, 10 Canales provides no factual allegations specific to either Defendant’s individual conduct 11 which suggests either caused him to be deprived of his package, intentionally or otherwise. 12 See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating an inmate “allege facts 13 which demonstrate that a[] particular prison official was the actual and proximate cause of 14 [the] constitutional violation”). Canales merely asserts, without any factual support, that 15 the unnamed “Mail Room Sergeant”3 and Warden Guzman4 were somehow responsible for 16

17 3 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize or prohibit the use of unnamed 18 parties, but Rule 10 does require a plaintiff to include the names of all parties in his complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). “A plaintiff may refer to unknown defendants as Defendant John Doe 19 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and so on, but he must allege specific facts showing how each particular doe defendant violated his rights.” Cuda v. Employees/Contractors/Agents at OR 20 OCCC, No. 19-cv-00084-DKW-KJM, 2019 WL 2062945, at *4 (D. Haw. May 9, 2019). Courts 21 disfavor Doe pleading in an IFP case because in the event the plaintiff’s complaint alleges a plausible claim for relief, it is effectively impossible for the United States Marshal or deputy 22 marshal to fulfill his or her duty to serve an unnamed defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that in order to properly effect service under Rule 4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to “furnish the 24 information necessary to identify the defendant.”).

25 4 In addition, to the extent Canales names Guzman solely because of his supervisory role as 26 warden, he fails to state a claim because he has not plausibly alleged causation. To state a claim against a supervisor, a plaintiff must allege “(1) his or her personal involvement in the 27 constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 1 the loss of the package. Such speculative and conclusory allegations are insufficient to state 2 a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328. 3 Further, even if Plaintiff had plausibly alleged an intentional, unauthorized 4 deprivation, an available state common law tort claim procedure to recover the value of 5 property is an adequate remedy. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128–29 (1990). To 6 the extent Plaintiff alleges he was denied an adequate remedy because his claim was denied 7 reimbursement by the GCP, he fails to do so because he could still seek relief in state court 8 pursuant to California Government Code § 945.6. See Arnold v. Williams, No. 08-cv-28886 9 DAD, 2009 WL 3710522, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2009) (California Government Code 10 §§ 900, et seq. provide a sufficient post-deprivation remedy for the purposes of due 11 process). Indeed, the letter informing Canales his GCP claim was denied as complex, 12 directed him to California law under which he could file an action in state court. See ECF 13 No. 1-2 at 12–13. Because an adequate remedy was available to Canales, he cannot state a 14 cognizable due process claim. 15 Finally, to the extent Canales alleges his First Amendment rights were also violated 16 by the loss of his package, he also fails to state a claim. Prisoners have a First Amendment 17 right to “send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). 18 However, “negligent” mishandling of an inmate’s mail does not amount to a constitutional 19 violation. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334–35 (stating mere negligence is not actionable under 20 § 1983); see also Luca v. Lutz, No. 93-17191, 17 F.3d 395, 1994 WL 47981, at *2 (9th Cir. 21 1994) (unpublished) (“Negligence does not suffice to state a constitutional claim under 42 22 U.S.C. § 1983.”). And an isolated incident of delay or other mail interference without 23 evidence of improper motive does not violate a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. See 24 Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Smith v, Maschner, 899 F.2d 25

26 conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) 27 (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). 1 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding an “isolated incident [of mail mishandling], without any 2 evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with [the plaintiff]’s right to counsel 3 or to access to the courts, does not give rise to a constitutional violation”); Bach v. Illinois, 4 504 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1974) (concluding the mishandling of mail on a single 5 occasion insufficient to show constitutional violation); Watkins v. Curry, No. 10-cv-2539- 6 SI (PR), 2011 WL 5079532, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011) (“Absent evidence of a broader 7 plan or course of conduct to censor plaintiff’s mail unconstitutionally, an honest error by 8 prison officials does not justify relief under § 1983.”). Here, Canales merely alleges a single 9 incident of negligence by Defendants in failing to deliver his package. ECF No. 1 at 2, 3, 10 5. This is insufficient to state a plausible First Amendment claim. 11 In sum, based on the above, Plaintiff’s Due Process and First Amendment claims, 12 raised against Defendants Guzman and Unnamed Mailroom Sergeant are dismissed for 13 failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. 15 2. Due Process (Ground Two) 16 In his second ground for relief, Canales alleges his due process rights were violated 17 by unnamed Defendant “Government Claims Program Official” when the official denied 18 his GCP claim for reimbursement for the value of the items in the lost package. ECF No. 19 1 at 4. As discussed above, neither negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations of 20 property give rise to a violation of the Due Process Clause if the state provides an adequate 21 post-deprivation remedy. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 533 n. 14. Here, Canales does not allege the 22 unnamed GCP Defendant deprived him of his property; rather, he states the official unfairly 23 denied his GCP claim. See ECF No. 1 at 4. But there is no due process right to a favorable 24 outcome under California’s GCP, or any other grievance process. Cf. Ramirez v. Galaza, 25 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating “inmates lack a separate constitutional 26 entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure”); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 27 (9th Cir. 1988); Garcia v. Podsakoff, No. 1:16-cv-00394-BAM, 2017 WL 1375222, at *3 1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2017) (“Prison officials are not required under federal law to . . . 2 respond to [grievances] in a favorable manner.). Moreover, while the GCP denied Canales’ 3 claim because it was overly complex, it advised Canales that he was free to seek relief in 4 the state courts under California’s Government Code. See ECF No. 1-2 at 12–13. Thus, 5 Canales was not without an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 6 128–29. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible due process claim against the 7 unnamed GCP official. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. 9 D. Leave to Amend 10 In light of his pro se status, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff an opportunity to amend 11 his complaint. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district 12 court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 14 could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 15 Cir. 2012)). 16 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 17 For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby: 18 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 19 (ECF No. 2). 20 2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 21 Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly 22 payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 23 month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 24 the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 25 MUST CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE NAME AND CASE NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 26 THIS ACTION. 27 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeff 2 || Macomber, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001, by 3 Mail, or by forwarding an electronic copy to trusthelpdesk @cdcr.ca.gov. 4 4. DISMISSES the Complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend 5 || pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) qa). 6 5. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 7 || which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted in 8 ||this Order. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without 9 ||reference to any previous version of his pleading; Defendants not named and any claims 10 || not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 11 || 15.1; Hal Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 12 || dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 13 || “considered waived if not repled’’); Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 14 || F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989). If Plaintiff fails to timely amend, the Court will enter a 15 || final Order dismissing this civil action. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 16 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a 17 || district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire 18 || action.”). 19 6. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide Plaintiff with a blank, court- 20 || approved, form Amended Civil Rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his use 21 convenience. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 ||Dated: August 22, 2023 (2 sake (0 24 Hon. Gonzalo P. Curtel 5 United States District Judge 26 27