1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 3:23-cv-1059-GPC-MSB ANGEL CHRISTOPHER CANALES, 12 CDCR# AT-3557, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR Plaintiff, FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 14 v. PURUSANT TO 28 U.S.C. 15 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b) JEFF MACOMBER, CAPTAIN 16 BOTELLO, B. STUMP, JOHN DOE #1, FIDENIO GUZMAN, Warden, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Plaintiff, Angel Christopher Canales (“Plaintiff” or “Canales”), an inmate at 22 Centinela State Prison (“CEN”) and proceeding pro se, filed a civil action pursuant to 42 23 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 2, 2023. ECF No. 1. On August 22, 2023, the Court granted 24 Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), dismissed the Complaint for 25 failure to state a claim and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. ECF No. 7. On November 11, 26 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 10. For the reasons 27 discussed below, the Court DISMISSES the FAC without prejudice. 1 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) AND § 1915A(b) 2 A. Legal Standards 3 Plaintiff’s FAC requires pre-answer screening. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 4 and 1915A(b), the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint that is 5 frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 6 immune. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 7 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 8 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 9 “The standard for determining whether [a] Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 10 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 11 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 12 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual 13 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Detailed factual 15 allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 16 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a 17 complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 18 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 19 possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 20 accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. 21 Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 23 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux 24 v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 25 substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 26 conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 40 U.S. 386 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation 27 marks omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation 1 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 2 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 3 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 4 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 5 In his FAC, Canales alleges that on December 8, 2021, a member of his family in 6 the Los Angeles area sent a parcel to him at CEN, via “certified United States mail.” ECF 7 No. 10 at 3. The package contained several items, including 40 postal stamps, 20 8 photographs, personal letters, greeting cards, a drawing worth $1600, and a poster signed 9 by Kobe Bryant worth $15,000. Id. When Plaintiff failed to receive the package, his mother 10 and fiancé contacted prison officials by telephone on at least two occasions to inquire about 11 its status. Ultimately, they were informed by a CEN staffer that there was “no record” that 12 the package was received. Id. According to U.S. Postal Service Tracking, however, the 13 package was delivered to CEN. Id.; see also ECF No. 10-1, Ex. D at 8. But Canales never 14 received it. ECF No. 10 at 3. 15 Canales filed an administrative grievance about the missing package. Id. at 4. In its 16 response, the CEN Office of Grievances noted that tracking information showed the 17 package had been delivered to CEN and a scanned image of the parcel showed it had been 18 properly addressed. ECF No. 10-1, Ex. G at 14. However, after a “thorough search of the 19 mailroom,” the package could not be found. Id. Plaintiff’s grievance was therefore 20 “granted.” Id. Plaintiff was advised he could seek reimbursement for the value of the items 21 in the package by submitting a claim with the Government Claims Program (“GCP”). Id. 22 Plaintiff alleges the mail was “stolen” and the California Department of Corrections 23 and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) “refused to . . . resolve [his] complaint,” thereby denying 24 him of his “personal property.” ECF No. 10 at 6. He seeks $15,000 in compensatory 25 damages, $4,000 in punitive damages, and an injunction requiring CDCR to refrain from 26 “bad treatment from the mishandling of U.S. Mail” and preventing “defendants from 27 retaliating.” Id. at 8. 1 C. Discussion 2 Canales raises three claims in his FAC. In claims one and two, he alleges he was 3 deprived of his personal property in violation of this right to due process. Id. at 3–5. In his 4 third claim, he contends his First Amendment rights were violated by “unjustified 5 governmental interference” with his mail. Id. at 6. He names five Defendants: CDCR 6 Secretary Jeff Macomber, Captain Botello, B. Stump, CEN Warden Fidenio Guzman, and 7 an unnamed Seargent “John Doe.” Id. at 2. 8 1. Due Process (Grounds One and Two) 9 In his first and second claims Canales alleges his right to due process was violated 10 by the “unlawful taking” of his personal property after Defendants “failed to safeguard” 11 his mail and failed to properly investigate the matter. See id. at 3, 5. 12 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from 13 state deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Supreme 14 Court has held that “[a]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state 15 employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process 16 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss 17 is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 3:23-cv-1059-GPC-MSB ANGEL CHRISTOPHER CANALES, 12 CDCR# AT-3557, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR Plaintiff, FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 14 v. PURUSANT TO 28 U.S.C. 15 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b) JEFF MACOMBER, CAPTAIN 16 BOTELLO, B. STUMP, JOHN DOE #1, FIDENIO GUZMAN, Warden, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Plaintiff, Angel Christopher Canales (“Plaintiff” or “Canales”), an inmate at 22 Centinela State Prison (“CEN”) and proceeding pro se, filed a civil action pursuant to 42 23 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 2, 2023. ECF No. 1. On August 22, 2023, the Court granted 24 Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), dismissed the Complaint for 25 failure to state a claim and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. ECF No. 7. On November 11, 26 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 10. For the reasons 27 discussed below, the Court DISMISSES the FAC without prejudice. 1 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) AND § 1915A(b) 2 A. Legal Standards 3 Plaintiff’s FAC requires pre-answer screening. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 4 and 1915A(b), the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint that is 5 frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 6 immune. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 7 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 8 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 9 “The standard for determining whether [a] Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 10 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 11 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 12 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual 13 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Detailed factual 15 allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 16 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a 17 complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 18 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 19 possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 20 accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. 21 Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 23 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux 24 v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 25 substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 26 conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 40 U.S. 386 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation 27 marks omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation 1 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 2 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 3 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 4 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 5 In his FAC, Canales alleges that on December 8, 2021, a member of his family in 6 the Los Angeles area sent a parcel to him at CEN, via “certified United States mail.” ECF 7 No. 10 at 3. The package contained several items, including 40 postal stamps, 20 8 photographs, personal letters, greeting cards, a drawing worth $1600, and a poster signed 9 by Kobe Bryant worth $15,000. Id. When Plaintiff failed to receive the package, his mother 10 and fiancé contacted prison officials by telephone on at least two occasions to inquire about 11 its status. Ultimately, they were informed by a CEN staffer that there was “no record” that 12 the package was received. Id. According to U.S. Postal Service Tracking, however, the 13 package was delivered to CEN. Id.; see also ECF No. 10-1, Ex. D at 8. But Canales never 14 received it. ECF No. 10 at 3. 15 Canales filed an administrative grievance about the missing package. Id. at 4. In its 16 response, the CEN Office of Grievances noted that tracking information showed the 17 package had been delivered to CEN and a scanned image of the parcel showed it had been 18 properly addressed. ECF No. 10-1, Ex. G at 14. However, after a “thorough search of the 19 mailroom,” the package could not be found. Id. Plaintiff’s grievance was therefore 20 “granted.” Id. Plaintiff was advised he could seek reimbursement for the value of the items 21 in the package by submitting a claim with the Government Claims Program (“GCP”). Id. 22 Plaintiff alleges the mail was “stolen” and the California Department of Corrections 23 and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) “refused to . . . resolve [his] complaint,” thereby denying 24 him of his “personal property.” ECF No. 10 at 6. He seeks $15,000 in compensatory 25 damages, $4,000 in punitive damages, and an injunction requiring CDCR to refrain from 26 “bad treatment from the mishandling of U.S. Mail” and preventing “defendants from 27 retaliating.” Id. at 8. 1 C. Discussion 2 Canales raises three claims in his FAC. In claims one and two, he alleges he was 3 deprived of his personal property in violation of this right to due process. Id. at 3–5. In his 4 third claim, he contends his First Amendment rights were violated by “unjustified 5 governmental interference” with his mail. Id. at 6. He names five Defendants: CDCR 6 Secretary Jeff Macomber, Captain Botello, B. Stump, CEN Warden Fidenio Guzman, and 7 an unnamed Seargent “John Doe.” Id. at 2. 8 1. Due Process (Grounds One and Two) 9 In his first and second claims Canales alleges his right to due process was violated 10 by the “unlawful taking” of his personal property after Defendants “failed to safeguard” 11 his mail and failed to properly investigate the matter. See id. at 3, 5. 12 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from 13 state deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Supreme 14 Court has held that “[a]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state 15 employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process 16 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss 17 is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). And if a prison official is 18 alleged to have merely acted negligently, there can be no due process violation. See Daniels 19 v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated 20 by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or 21 property.”) (emphasis in the original). 22 Here, Canales fails to state a plausible due process claim based on deprivation of his 23 property. While it appears clear Plaintiff never received his package, he offers only 24 speculation as to how it was lost. Canales contends his mail was “stolen” and states that 25 Stump, Botello, Sergeant John Doe, Macomber, and Guzman were responsible. ECF No. 26 10 at 3. But he provides no support for this allegation. He merely states generally that 27 Defendants, collectively, failed to “safeguard” his personal mail. Id. at 5. Canales, 1 however, provides no factual allegations specific to any individual Defendant’s conduct 2 which suggests they stole his property or otherwise caused him to be deprived of his 3 package, intentionally or otherwise. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) 4 (stating an inmate “allege facts which demonstrate that a[] particular prison official was 5 the actual and proximate cause of [the] constitutional violation”). Such speculative and 6 conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also 7 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328. 8 Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendants Macomber and Guzman, CDCR 9 Secretary and CEN Warden, respectively, are liable in their supervisory capacities he also 10 fails to state a claim. Under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that the defendants holding 11 supervisory positions personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. 12 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There is no respondeat superior liability, and 13 each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. A 14 supervisor may be held liable for the constitutional violations of his or her subordinates 15 only if he or she “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and 16 failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Corales 17 v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). 18 The FAC lacks any facts suggesting Macomber or Guzman personally participated 19 in the purported deprivation of his property. Plaintiff alleges that Macomber, as Secretary 20 of the CDCR, is responsible for the “efficient and effective management of all facets of the 21 Correctional system.” ECF No. 10 at 5. He further states that both Guzman and Macomber 22 “had sole discretion to determine when and how to resolve [his] stolen U.S. mail.” Id. at 2. 23 However, the FAC contains no allegations suggesting that Macomber, Guzman (or any 24 Defendant), “participated in or directed” the deprivation of Canales’ property or knew of 25 it and failed to prevent it. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. 26 Finally, even assuming Canales could plausibly allege an intentional, unauthorized 27 deprivation on the part of an individual defendant, there is no due process violation when 1 an available state common law tort claim procedure provides an adequate remedy. See 2 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128–29 (1990). Here, Canales pursued relief from the 3 California’s GCP. See ECF No. 10-1, Ex. I at 19. Although GCP denied Plaintiff’s claim 4 as overly “complex,” he had another avenue for relief. As the GCP notified him, Canales 5 was still free to file a claim in state court under California Government Code § 945.6. See 6 id. Because an adequate state remedy was available to Canales, he cannot state a cognizable 7 due process claim. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533; see also Arnold v. Williams, No. 08-cv- 8 2886-DAD, 2009 WL 3710522, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2009) (stating California 9 Government Code §§ 900, et seq., provides a sufficient post-deprivation remedy for the 10 purposes of due process). 11 In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim for deprivation of property 12 against any defendant. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 13 678; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. 14 2. First Amendment (Claim Three) 15 In his third claim, Canales contends his First Amendment rights were violated by 16 alleged “unjustified governmental interference with [his] intended communications.” ECF 17 No. 10 at 6. Prisoners have a First Amendment right to “send and receive mail.” Witherow 18 v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). However, “negligent” mishandling of an inmate’s 19 mail does not amount to a constitutional violation. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334–35 (stating 20 mere negligence is not actionable under § 1983); see also Luca v. Lutz, 17 F.3d 395, 1994 21 WL 47981, at *2 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (“Negligence does not suffice to state a 22 constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Moreover, an isolated incident of delay or 23 other mail interference without evidence of improper motive does not violate a prisoner’s 24 First Amendment rights. See Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 25 Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding an “isolated incident [of 26 mail mishandling], without any evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with 27 [the plaintiff]’s right to counsel or to access to the courts, does not give rise to a 1 constitutional violation”); Bach v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1974) (concluding 2 the mishandling of mail on a single occasion insufficient to show constitutional violation); 3 Watkins v. Curry, No. 10-cv-2539-SI (PR), 2011 WL 5079532, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 4 2011) (“Absent evidence of a broader plan or course of conduct to censor plaintiff’s mail 5 unconstitutionally, an honest error by prison officials does not justify relief under § 6 1983.”). As discussed above, while Canales alleges the mail was “stolen,” he provides no 7 factual support for his claim he was intentionally deprived of his mail by any individual 8 Defendant. ECF No. 10 at 6. He merely surmises “there was no reason to take Plaintiff’s 9 U.S. Mail but theft.” Id. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a 10 plausible First Amendment claim.1 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 11 Thus, for the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is 12 dismissed for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1); 13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. 14 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 16 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint sua sponte and in its entirety 17
18 1 While not entirely clear, Canales also appears to allege his constitutional rights were 19 violated when the “CDCR refused and denied [sic] to resolve [his] complaint” about his missing 20 mail. ECF No. 10 at 6. However, Plaintiff’s administrative grievance was “granted” and CEN officials acknowledged his mail had been delivered to the facility but, after a search of the 21 mailroom, could not be found. ECF No. 10-1, Ex. G at 14–15. That Canales did not obtain the relief that he sought through the grievance procedure does not amount to a First Amendment or 22 due process violation. Prisoners have no stand-alone rights related to the administrative grievance 23 process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); see also, e.g., Wright v. Shannon, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 24 2010) (finding plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a cognizable claim under the First Amendment); Walker v. Vazquez, 2009 WL 25 5088788, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009) (concluding plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials 26 failed to properly process his inmate appeals failed to a state cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment). 27 1 || based on his failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2 1188 1915(e)(2)(B)a1) and 1915A(b)(1); and the Court finds further amendment would be 3 futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) 4 || (‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of . . . leave to amend.’’’) (quoting 5 || Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)). 6 The Clerk of Court shall close the file. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: December 19, 2023 (2 opto Cs A ) 9 Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27