MORGAN, Justice.
The complaint in this action was amended and the only count which survived at the conclusion of the trial alleged a violation of SDCL ch. 37-1, South Dakota’s antitrust law. The jury awarded the plaintiff, Martin Byre (Byre), $40,500 in actual damages and under SDCL ch. 37-1 they trebled that amount. The trial judge signed a judgment against the city of Chamberlain, South Dakota (City), which awarded Byre $121,500. City appeals under SDCL 15-26A-3(1). We reverse and remand.
City provided garbage service for the residents and businesses of Chamberlain until 1960 when problems arose and City was unable to provide sufficient or efficient service. At that time, the city commissioners asked Byre to operate the garbage service as an employee of City. Byre refused to work for City but contracted to purchase City’s equipment and to provide garbage service for City’s residents and businesses as an independent contractor. The 1960 contract between Byre and City was periodically modified between 1965 and 1978 in order to increase Byre’s income. Byre operated the only garbage collection and disposal service within a thirty or for.ty-mile radius of Chamberlain.
Upon advice of counsel in March of 1978, Byre applied for city licenses for each of his three garbage trucks. Section 6 of City Ordinance 375 provides:
No person shall use the Streets or Alleys of the City of Chamberlain for the collection, removal or disposal of any garbage or trash without first having obtained a license to perform such services from the Commission.
In June of' 1978, Byre sought to increase the garbage service rates charged by City in order to increase his gross income. He asserted that increased costs made it difficult for him to operate. City asked Byre to present his records, books, and an explanation of his costs so it could determine how much to pay him. Byre refused or failed to furnish this information and negotiations broke down.
In September of 1978, City made Byre a final offer of $44,000 per year, $1,400 more than Byre’s original June request. Byre’s son, who is involved in the family waste disposal business, testified at trial that Byre declined the $44,000 offer on October 23,1978, because City failed to comply with the applicable bidding procedures set out in SDCL ch. 5-18.1 On October 19, 1978, Byre announced in the local newspaper that beginning November 1, 1978, residential garbage would be collected on a contract basis only. The residents of Chamberlain were requested to sign and return a form that was included in the newspaper announcement if they desired Byre’s service.
[72]*72On November 6, 1978, City attempted to provide garbage collection for all City residents through December 31, 1978, by offering Byre $3,000 if he would collect City’s residential garbage in November and $3,500 for December’s garbage collection. Byre refused this offer on November 14, apparently because City had again failed to comply with the bidding procedure set out in SDCL ch. 5-18.
Under this court’s decision in Northern Hills Sanitation v. Board of Com’rs., 272 N.W.2d 835 (S.D.1978), cities contracting for waste removal must comply with the bidding procedures set out in SDCL ch. 5-18. The city commission decided on November 20, 1978, to advertise for bids for the collection of all residential and commercial garbage and waste produced in City.
On November 23, 1978, Byre placed an announcement in the Chamberlain newspaper, which read:
Attention. Anyone who doesn’t have their residential contract signed and sent to us by December 1 will no longer have their garbage picked up. Martin Byre and Sons, (emphasis added)
City announced that on December 1, 1978, the date upon which Byre’s service to residents who were not contracted with him was to stop, City would collect the garbage. On December 1, 1978, City employees began collecting residential and commercial waste. City had no way of distinguishing at that time between Byre’s customers and residents or businesses which had not contracted with Byre; consequently, City attempted to collect all the garbage.
Two bids were received in response to the November bid notice. They were opened at the December 4, 1978, city commission meeting and neither met the advertised bid specifications; consequently, City re-let the bid. The bid specifications, however, were changed to request a five-year contract instead of three, and to allow for an alternative bid price based on a percentage of gross revenues collected by City for garbage collection and disposal. The same two parties who bid the first time around, Byre and the Stienfeld and Steckelberg partnership (S & S), bid again. Byre’s second bid, like his first, did not meet the bid specifications. He attempted to reserve his contracted pick ups as private customers. On December 29, 1978, City accepted S & S’s bid to collect the waste from city residences and businesses for eighty-three percent of City’s annual revenues collected for waste collection and disposal.
At the December 29 meeting, Byre and his supporters submitted a petition to initiate a new ordinance to permit the private collection of garbage and to prohibit City from charging residents and businesses contracted with private garbage collectors. The city commission, on January 8, 1979, began to formulate its own modification of the city garbage ordinance. It directed the city attorney to modify the garbage ordinances to establish a dumping fee for private collectors who deposited waste in the city landfill. The city commission awarded 5 & S the bid on January 17, 1979, because the S & S bid was the only one that conformed to the advertised specifications. S 6 S began performing as City’s contracted garbage collector on February 1, 1979.
On March 6, 1979, City residents adopted the initiated ordinance to prevent City from charging City residents and businesses for waste disposal services provided under contracts with private garbage collectors. The ordinance was retroactive to March 1, 1979. The city commission decided on March 19 to bill all city residents and businesses for waste disposal services furnished in December 1978 and January and February 1979 and to continue billing each resident or business until a signed private contract was filed with City. This decision was based upon City’s interpretation of Ordinance 375. Section 9 of that ordinance reads:
The City shall make a charge of $6.00 per each quarter for the collection of garbage from each family domestic unit.... The City shall make a charge, to be determined by the Commission for each month to each place of business.... Such charge ... shall be noted on the [73]*73quarterly water bill of each unit and shall immediately become due and payable _
As a result of City’s decision to comply with the literal meaning of the ordinance, some residents and businesses under contract with Byre were billed by both Byre and City for waste disposal services furnished by Byre during those three months.
When Byre delivered garbage collection contracts to City for his customers, City stopped billing contract customers for garbage collection after March 1, 1979. The garbage charges for December 1978 and January and February 1979 continued to appear on the quarterly water bills mailed to residents who had not paid City for garbage collection for those months. City ordinance required payment of all outstanding indebtedness prior to transfer of licenses and water service.
Byre filed a complaint against City and initiated this lawsuit on December 4, 1978. He predicated his damages on loss of one-half of the total Chamberlain garbage collection market and the start-up costs of a private landfill. After both sides rested their cases, the trial court dismissed all counts except the question of City’s antitrust liability and submitted that to the jury. The jury awarded Byre $23,000 for lost profits, $17,500 for the costs of opening a landfill, and trebled the actual damages awarded, for a total award of $121,-500.
City has appealed and raises five issues: (1) Whether City is immune from state antitrust liability when providing for waste collection and disposal; (2) whether City violated state antitrust laws by letting bids, contracting for waste collection and disposal and continuing to bill all city residents when City had issued a license to a private collector who had private contracts with some city residents; (3) whether an initiated ordinance, petitioned for by city residents to except residents who had contracted with a private collector from an ordinance requiring City to mandatorily bill all residents for waste collection and disposal, is a valid use of the initiative power; (4) whether it was reversible error to admit exhibits and testimony based on hearsay, speculation and self-serving time and motion studies, all of which demonstrated City’s actions as evidence of Byre’s alleged damages; and (5) whether, under the facts of this case, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury properly.
The first issue raises the question of City’s immunity from state antitrust laws in its role as waste collector. Byre’s announcement placed City in a dubious situation. The announcement clearly implied that garbage would not be collected from residents who did not contract with Byre. He apparently expected to break his connection with City and take advantage of his position as the only garbage collector in the market area in order to keep the entire market while simultaneously and unilaterally raising the monthly rate for garbage collection.
SDCL ch. 37-1, Restraint of Trade, Monopolies and Discriminatory Trade Practices, is taken directly from the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. SDCL 37-1-22 permits this court to use federal and other state court interpretations in our construction of SDCL ch. 37-1, provided those cases are based on similar antitrust statutes. The United States Supreme Court stated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-1, 63 S.Ct. 307, 313, 87 L.Ed.2d 315, 326 (1943), that “nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history ... suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later held in City of Lafayette, La. v. La. Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976) aff'd 435 U.S. 389, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978), that
[a] subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws. Rather, [the question is,] whether the state legislature contemplated a certain type of anti-competitive restraint_ It is not necessary to point to an express statutory [74]*74mandate for each act which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will suffice if the challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent.
The Lafayette Court also stated that a trial judge may ascertain from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of. Id.
Some state courts have noted that the Parker exclusion for state action is based on the principle of federalism and a general deference to acts by the sovereign states. This concept cannot be extended to a state-city relationship because a city is not a sovereign, but rather a creature of state statute. See, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 102 S.Ct. 835, 70 L.Ed.2d 810 (1982). We agree with the Iowa Supreme Court that because of the similarity of language between the federal and state antitrust statutes and because of the legislative suggestion for interpretation found in SDCL 37-1-22, great weight should be given to the federal cases interpreting the federal statute. Neyens v. Roth, 326 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1982).
The test for exclusion under the Parker state action exemption, as applied to cities, requires that the action be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy. Community Communications Co., supra; Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Alum., 445 U.S. 97, 100 S.Ct. 937, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 99 S.Ct. 403, 58 L.Ed.2d 361 (1978); City of Lafayette, La. v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978).
In this case, City was operating under specific statutory authority, SDCL 34A-6-1 and SDCL ch. 9-32, which we find to be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed. SDCL 34A-6-1 provides:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state to regulate and control the collection ... and disposal of solid wastes in a manner that will protect the public health and safety, conserve our natural resources, enhance the beauty and quality of our environment, prevent air pollution or water pollution, and prevent the spread of disease and creation of nuisances. It is also declared that local and regional solid waste management systems be supported to the extent practicable for the efficient and economical development of such systems....
Article III, section 1 of the South Dakota Constitution empowers the state legislature to enact laws for the preservation of the public peace, health or safety. The legislature, in order to ensure the health and safety of the state’s citizens, also enacted SDCL ch. 9-32, Sanitation and Health Measures.
SDCL 9-32-1 grants City the power to take necessary or expedient steps to promote health and suppress disease within the community. City is specifically empowered to collect and dispose of garbage and other waste material. SDCL 9-32-11. In the exercise of its power, City was statutorily permitted to acquire and operate equipment and dump grounds and to contract with one or more persons for the collection and hauling of garbage and other wastes. SDCL 9-32-11. Similar statutory grants of power for regulation of waste removal have been interpreted to permit municipalities to contract with private organizations for the exclusive right to collect and dispose of waste and to allow municipalities to provide this service exclusively themselves. City of Hobbs v. Chesport Ltd., 76 N.M. 609, 417 P.2d 210, 213 (1966); 83 A.L.R.2d 819 (1978). Statutes and ordinances that deal with the collection and disposal of waste are health measures. Id. The statutes give municipalities the authority to exercise the powers conferred by law and to provide by ordinance the proper measures to preserve the health and welfare of the community. Id. The trial court below properly took judicial notice of the fact that a health hazard arises when garbage is not properly collected and disposed of. The right of municipalities to exclusively regulate this area has been upheld as a proper [75]*75exercise of the municipalities’ police or other powers. Id. Whether or not City was statutorily compelled to act and the extent of City’s duties under the South Dakota Code, or under our case law, are irrelevant questions under the facts of this case.
There is no doubt that under SDCL ch. 9-32 and SDCL ch. 34A-6 a municipality may restrain trade by granting one or more parties a substantial portion or even 100% of a city’s garbage market. See Springs Ambulance Service, Inc. v. City of Rancho Mirage, 745 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1984); Catalina Cablevision Associates v. City of Tucson, 745 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1984). “Where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action no violation of the Sherman Act can be made out.” Westborough Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau, Mo., 693 F.2d 733, 746 (8th Cir.1982). This principle parallels the “state action exemption” and it applies to municipal action that furthers or implements clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. Id.; Springs Ambulance Service, Inc., supra; Community Communications Co., supra. SDCL ch. 9-32 and SDCL eh. 34A-6 clearly and articulately delineate the state’s waste disposal policy and affirmatively set out the parameters of City’s power. City has historically furnished waste disposal services. The effective city ordinance, No. 375, was adopted in 1974 and was apparently an amendment of an earlier ordinance, No. 352. Furthermore, during a period of nearly eighteen years under the forerunner of those ordinances City had handled the garbage problem by contracting for pick up and by operating its own dump. The trial court instructed the jury that such ordinances have the force and effect of law.
When Byre publicly announced that after December 1, 1978, he would not collect waste from city residents who were not contracted to him, he breached his 1960 agreement with City by anticipatory repudiation. City was free to contract with one or more parties for the collection and disposal of waste and to charge and collect from every residence and business without subjecting itself to the antitrust laws. See SDCL 9-32-11.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly instructed the jury:
You are instructed that every municipality shall have power to collect and dispose of and regulate the manner of handling of garbage and other waste material and for such purpose to acquire, establish, maintain, operate and regulate equipment and garbage disposal plants, incinerators and dumping grounds and to fix and collect chrages (sic) for such services, and to contract with one or more persons for the collection and hauling of garbage and other waste material from the municipality or districts established therein.
You are instructed that a municipality which lawfully complies with the preceding paragraph does not violate the antitrust laws.
The court further properly instructed:
Every municipality in the State of South Dakota has the power to enact, make, amend, reissue, or repeal all such ordinances and regulations as may be proper and necessary to carry into effect the plenary power granted to it by the State Legislature. The South Dakota Legislature has granted to every municipality the power to collect and dispose of garbage, regulate the manner of handling garbage with the city, and to fix and collect charges for such services.
You are instructed that when a municipality passes ordinances regulating garbage collection and the charges to be collected therefor, the said ordinances have the force and effect of law.
Byre has not challenged either of these instructions by notice of review. They are therefore the law of this case and not subject to review.
The second question thus becomes whether City, by its official acts or by conduct of its officers, agents, and employees, exceeded its state action exemption, and thereby subjected itself to the antitrust laws. The initiated ordinance, passed on [76]*76March 6, 1978, and designated Ordinance 416, was made effective retroactive to March 1. Under SDCL 9-32-11, City’s ordinances and the “state action exemption,” City could have lawfully monopolized the Chamberlain waste removal market up until March 6, 1979.
Ordinance 416 expressly permitted private contracting for garbage collection and prohibited City from charging residents who were privately contracted. After that date, any official actions by the city commission or any acts by city employees while in the scope of their employment that prevented Byre from running his business or restrained his trade and were the product of a conspiracy may trigger liability under SDCL 37-1-3.1. City may also be liable under SDCL 37-1-3.2 if, after March 6, 1978, the city commission or city employees acting within the scope of their employment monopolized, or attempted to monopolize, or conspired to monopolize the waste removal market in Chamberlain.
City, prior to December 1, 1978, monopolized the garbage service market. Byre was merely a contractor obligated to pick up the garbage and deposit it in the city-owned dump. Byre furnished the equipment, labor and gas and received a set amount of money per month in payment thereof.
When Byre decided to become an entrepreneur and strike out on his own to furnish garbage service to the businesses and residences of Chamberlain, he had no vested right in the market. The evidence at trial indicated that there were approximately six hundred customers. Byre secured contracts to service approximately one-half of that market. According to Byre’s advertisement in the Chamberlain newspaper, the other one-half would have been without waste removal services after December 1 if City had not decided to stay in the waste removal business.
In effect, City replaced Byre with another contractor in order to preserve the pickup service it had furnished for eighteen years. Byre contends that even though City was authorized to continue contracting for pick up, the City’s specific actions were, in this case, outside the limits of its author: ity, and that such actions evidenced a conspiracy to ruin him and drive him out of business by monopolizing the city garbage market.
Byre first claims a nefarious alteration of the specifications between the first and second bid lettings. He contends that the alteration was the result of S & S’s bank loan. Gary Busack, the bank loan officer and the City Garbage Commissioner, processed the loan. As previously noted, neither Byre nor S & S met the specifications of the first bid notice. Two changes were then made in the bid specifications, the term of the contract was changed from three to five years and the opportunity to submit an alternate bid for a percentage of the City’s garbage revenue rather than a flat monthly payment was added. Byre’s bid again failed to meet specifications. S & S was the successful low bidder on the second letting. Byre’s claim of illegality points to Busack’s position as the bank loan officer who handled S & S’s loan and as the garbage commissioner who changed the bid specifications from three to five years to coincide with the term of S & S’s bank loan. Byre suggests this is in violation of SDCL 6-1-1, which prohibits “any officer of a ... municipality ... to be interested, either by himself or agent, in any contract entered into by said ... municipality^]” We disagree.
First of all, Byre would stretch the application of the statute far beyond its specific plain language. The garbage collection contract was between City and S & S. The loan was between Bank and S & S. Busack had no direct connection with S & S and we presume he conducted himself properly in his role as a city commissioner and in his role as bank loan officer. The specification change from three years to five years did not preclude Byre from bidding the second time, in fact, he did so. He simply did not bid according to the specifications nor was he the low bidder. There is no evidence that this change constituted any bidding advantage to S & S over Byre. Although [77]*77the change did allow S & S to spread payments on its start-up loan over five years instead of three and thereby improve its chances for success in the event it was awarded the bid, this is not evidence of favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud or corruption. Northern Hills Sanitation, supra.
The second specification change when the bids were re-let added the possibility of an alternative bid based on a percentage of the gross revenue collected by City for waste disposal. The first bidding procedure was conducted before the initiated ordinance was even presented to City. Before the second bids were requested, City apparently realized that regardless of who won the bid, if Byre maintained his privately contracted customers City could not guarantee any city contractor for waste disposal a set annual fee as it had in the past. As long as a private contractor was providing a service similar to what City offered, City could not anticipate what its gross income from that service would be. On its face, this specification change would appear to be a matter of good fiscal responsibility on the part of City and as between the competing bidders, perhaps more advantageous to Byre who was striving to keep his privately contracted customers separate and apart from city-serviced customers.
We next examine what appears to be one of Byre’s principal complaints, the fact that City billed Byre’s privately contracted customers for garbage service until March 1, 1979. Byre refers to an advertisement run by City in the Chamberlain paper on November 30,1978, which read as follows:
GARBAGE COLLECTION
As it is the city’s responsibility for sanitation effective December 1 we will be collecting the garbage. Regardless if you go with Byre and Son you will be billed $3.00 a month until the first of the year. We ask that you put your garbage in plastic bags so it will be easier for the city to handle as we do not have a garbage truck yet. Please go along with us as we are working in your best interest.
Thank you,
City Commission
Byre complains that this discouraged contracted customers and potential customers from contracting with him because they were to be billed by City regardless of who actually collected their garbage. He waxes vociferously that City did in fact bill his customers and collect the $3.00 per month fee without accounting to him for such collection. In this vein, he also complains that City refused to approve certain license transfers for some of his customers who had refused to pay City garbage bills..
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 375 mandated a charge for the collection of garbage from each family domestic unit and each place of business, such charge to be noted on the quarterly water bill. In Owens v. City of Beresford, 87 S.D. 8, 201 N.W.2d 890 (1972), this court held that an ordinance which mandates billings to every residence in order to finance a city-wide garbage collection and disposal system is valid and enforceable whether or not services are provided. The ad was obviously run in response to Byre’s announcement that non-contracted garbage collection would end on December 1, 1978. City’s ad advised residents that City would continue to pick up garbage and warned them of the ordained mandatory billing requirement. It merely “told it like it was.” After enactment of Ordinance No. 416, City made arrangements to exempt Byre’s customers from billing after March 1, 1979.2 The entire issue is laid to rest on this appeal by the trial court’s Instruction 21 which provided:
[78]*78You are instructed that the chief fiscal officer of the city of Chamberlain had an affirmative duty to bill for garbage service as previously set out in these instructions until the passage of said city ordinance no. 416 on March 6, 1979, which relieved the said officer of such duty. However you are further instructed that the passage of city ordinance no. 416 did not relieve the chief fiscal officer from collecting garbage service fees which accrued prior to March 6, 1979.
Byre failed to file a notice of review to challenge the propriety of this instruction so it becomes the law of the case. Any argument regarding the facts of billing, the effect of billing or the consequence thereof is wholly without merit.
Byre complains that a conspiracy to put him out of the garbage business can be demonstrated through an examination of City’s conduct. City changed the padlocks on gates to the city dump ground on February 1, 1978, when S & S’s contract began. As the city contractor, Byre was given a key and allowed entry at will. During that time he was also exempt from dumping fees, that were charged to private citizens who made use of the dump. It is undisputed that City did in fact change the padlock. It is further undisputed that City also enacted Ordinance 417, which provided for a dumping fee for all persons except the city contractor. The evidence discloses, however, and Byre’s brief admits, that Byre anticipated this and had made arrangements for opening his own dump site across the river. There is further evidence that Byre could have received a key but eschewed that opportunity in favor of developing his own dump site. The operation of a landfill dump site obviously entailed some expense to City for labor and equipment. Byre’s expectation of free access to the city dump as a private contractor when other private users were required to pay, is untenable. The fact that the city contractor was exempt is understandable in that City retains seventeen percent of the waste disposal revenue for the purpose of dump site maintenance. Byre enjoyed this same exemption during the time he held the city contract.
The most serious claim of misconduct on the part of City, its officers, or employees and perhaps the only valid one, is Byre’s claim that the City Finance Officer, who was also the mother of one of the S & S partners, told city employees that City’s policy required all city employees to go with S & S’s service. Although there is no evidence in the record that this was, in fact, an adopted city policy, it was nevertheless stated by an agent and employee of City. We note first that there is no evidence that the statement had any effect on Byre’s business. The number of city employees involved is not even shown. Furthermore, as an isolated instance to show a conspiracy to ruin Byre and drive him out of business, it is pathetically weak. It does, however, show evidence of one instance of over-reaching, which would be outside City’s State Action exemption and could subject it to some liability if some cause and effect relationship could be established.
The third issue City raises on this appeal is whether an initiated ordinance, petitioned for by the electorate to exempt certain residents from mandatory municipal billing for waste disposal service is a valid use of the initiative power. Byre and his supporters circulated and presented a petition to exempt Byre’s private customers from the mandatory billing requirement. Initiated ordinances are permitted under Article III, section 1 of the South Dakota Constitution, which states, in part “[t]hat the people expressly reserve to themselves the right to propose measures, which ... the Legislature shall submit to a vote of the electors.... This section shall apply to municipalities.” The initiated ordinance questioned here was submitted to City’s electorate on March 6, 1979, and passed. The ordinance was retroactive to March 1 and double billing for waste disposal was not allowed after that date.
City contends that the mandatory billing ordinance dealt with a necessary governmental function, and as a police power reg[79]*79ulation, could not properly be changed by an electoral petition. In its brief to this court, City specified that function as “the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.”
Initiative is the constitutional reservation of power in the people to propose bills and laws and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. Referendum, on the other hand, is a right constitutionally reserved to the people of the state or local subdivisions thereof to have submitted for their approval or rejection any act, or part of any act, passed by the legislature which in most cases would, without action on the part of the electorate, become a law. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 115 (1953). The purpose of the initiative is not to curtail or limit legislative power to enact laws, but rather to compel enactment of measures desired by the people, and to empower the people, in the event the legislature fails to act, to enact such measures themselves. The purpose of referendum is to suspend or annul laws which are not yet effective in order to provide the people a means of expressing their desire regarding a legislative proposition. Id. at 116. When the referendum is triggered, the people must approve a legislative proposition before it becomes operative as a law. Id.
It has been said that the initiative power extends to all types of legislation. Id. at 119 citing Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 24 N.W.2d 737 (1946); Mitchell v. Walker, 140 Cal.App.2d 239, 295 P.2d 90 (1956); State ex rel. Andersen v. Leahy, 189 Neb. 92, 199 N.W.2d 713 (1972). As a general rule, all legislative matters in which the voters have an interest are subject to the referendum unless they are excepted by constitutional provisions. A state constitutional exception which reserves power to the legislature and precludes review by the people under the referendum is an expression, within sound rules of construction, of a reservation to pass on all things not so specified. Exceptions to the right should not be denied the people unless the act in question is plainly included in one of the excepted classes. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 121; Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966).
Article III, section 1 of our state constitution, which vests the legislative powers of the state in a legislature, expressly reserves the right to propose measures to the people, which measures the legislature shall enact and submit to a vote of the electors of the state. Article III, section 1, also reserves the right to require that any act which the legislature may have enacted shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state before going into effect, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions. Clearly, the latter exception applies only to referendum. It was, therefore, clearly within the power of the voters of the City of Chamberlain to initiate the ordinance which permits private contracting for garbage collection and the city council properly and legally enacted the same and submitted it to a vote of the people.
We next examine City’s complaint that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence regarding Byre’s claim for damages. The first evidence complained of involves the so-called double billing. The trial court admitted the testimony of numerous residents that City had billed them for garbage collection even though they had paid Byre for that service. In light of the trial court’s determination that this billing was mandated by statute as discussed in the second issue above, such evidence was wholly immaterial to show conspiracy or to show damages to Byre. The evidence of double billing was obviously, however, highly prejudicial to City.
City next complains of the trial court’s admission of evidence which showed Byre’s loss of the balance of the Chamberlain garbage market over and above Byre’s contracted customers. We first look at the appropriate measure of [80]*80damages. City contends that liability must be based on a causal connection between alleged unlawful conduct and the loss sustained. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric, 538 F.Supp. 1344 (N.D.Ohio 1981). Byre, on the other hand, argues that there must merely be some reasonable basis between the conduct and the loss, citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Company, 273 U.S. 359, 379, 47 S.Ct. 400, 405, 71 L.Ed. 684, 689-91 (1927). We find the Eastman Kodak case particularly inappropriate since plaintiff in that case had a going business with a record of product sales prior to defendant’s alleged unlawful acts. In the present case, to the contrary, Byre did not have any business until he breached his contract with City and endeavored to privately contract with the various residential and business customers in Chamberlain. The trial court admitted evidence that at the two relevant times, in the fall of 1978 and at the time of trial, Byre had contracts with approximately one-half of the residential market and one-half of the commercial market, with some decline in the latter category. The trial court then admitted evidence in the form of testimony and exhibits by Byre’s expert which alleged that Byre’s damages included the loss of the other one-half of the market. Byre had the whole market only indirectly, as the city contractor. In effect, Byre would have the courts grant him a monopoly of the market, which we decline to do. The assumption that Byre’s damage was one-half of the market was groundless. The evidence relating thereto was wholly without foundation. It was obviously prejudicial.
We reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial in conformance with our decision.
FOSHEIM, C.J., and WOLLMAN, J., concur.
HENDERSON, J., and DUNN, Retired Justice, dissent.