Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder

455 U.S. 40, 102 S. Ct. 835, 70 L. Ed. 2d 810, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 65, 50 U.S.L.W. 4144, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1183, 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,502

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: January 13, 1982
• Docket: 80-1350
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented in this case, in which the District Court for the District of Colorado granted preliminary in-junctive relief, is whether a “home rule” municipality, granted by the state constitution extensive powers of self-government in local and municipal matters, enjoys the “state action” exemption from Sherman Act liability announced in Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943).

I

Respondent city of Boulder is organized as a “home rule” municipality under the Constitution of the State of Colorado.¹ The city is thus entitled to exercise “the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters,” and with respect to such matters the City Charter and ordinances supersede the laws of the State. Under that Charter, all municipal legislative powers are exercised by an elected City Council.² In 1964 the City Council enacted an ordinance granting to Colorado Televents, Inc., a 20-year, revocable, nonexclusive permit to conduct a cable television business within the city limits. This permit was assigned to petitioner in 1966, and since that time petitioner has provided cable television service to the University Hill area of Boulder, an area where some 20% of the city’s population lives, and where, for geographical reasons, broadcast television signals cannot be received.

From 1966 until February 1980, due to the limited service that could be provided with the technology then available, petitioner’s service consisted essentially of retransmissions of programming broadcast from Denver and Cheyenne, Wyo. Petitioner’s market was therefore confined to the University Hill area. However, markedly improved technology became available in the late 1970’s, enabling petitioner to offer many more channels of entertainment than could be provided by local broadcast television.³ Thus presented with an opportunity to expand its business into other areas of the city, petitioner in May 1979 informed the City Council that it planned such an expansion. But the new technology offered opportunities to potential competitors, as well, and in July 1979 one of them, the newly formed Boulder Communications Co. (BCC),⁴ also wrote to the City Council, expressing its interest in obtaining a permit to provide competing cable television service throughout the city.⁵

The City Council’s response, after reviewing its cable television policy,⁶ was the enactment of an “emergency” ordinance prohibiting petitioner from expanding its business into other areas of the city for a period of three months.⁷ The City Council announced that during this moratorium it planned to draft a model cable television ordinance and to invite new businesses to enter the Boulder market under its terms, but that the moratorium was necessary because petitioner’s continued expansion during the drafting of the model ordinance would discourage potential competitors from entering the market.⁸

Petitioner filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, and sought, inter alia, a preliminary injunction to prevent the city from restricting petitioner’s proposed business expansion, alleging that such a restriction would violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.⁹ The city responded that its moratorium ordinance could not be violative of the antitrust laws, either because that ordinance constituted an exercise of the city’s police powers, or because Boulder enjoyed antitrust immunity under the Parker doctrine. The District Court considered the city’s status as a home rule municipality, but determined that that status gave autonomy to the city only in matters of local concern, and that the operations of cable television embrace “wider concerns, including interstate commerce . . . [and] the First Amendment rights of communicators.” 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1038-1039 (1980). Then, assuming, arguendo, that the ordinance was within the city’s authority as a home rule municipality, the District Court considered City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978), and concluded that the Parker exemption was “wholly inapplicable,” and that the city was therefore subject to antitrust liability. 485 F. Supp., at 1039.¹⁰ Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction was accordingly granted.

On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 630 F. 2d 704 (1980). The majority, after examining Colorado law, rejected the District Court’s conclusion that regulation of the cable television business was beyond the home rule authority of the city. Id., at 707. The majority then addressed the question of the city’s claimed Parker exemption. It distinguished the present case from City of Lafayette on the ground that, in contrast to the municipally operated revenue-producing utility companies at issue there, “no proprietary interest of the City is here involved.” 630 F. 2d, at 708. After noting that the city’s regulation “was the only control or active supervision exercised by state or local government, and . . . represented the only expression of policy as to the subject matter,” id., at 707, the majority held that the city’s actions therefore satisfied the criteria for a Parker exemption, 630 F. 2d, at 708.¹¹ We granted certiorari, 450 U. S. 1039 (1981). We reverse.

II

A

Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), addressed the question whether the federal antitrust laws prohibited a State, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, from imposing certain anticompetitive restraints. These took the form of a “marketing program” adopted by the State of California for the 1940 raisin crop; that program prevented appellee from freely marketing his crop in interstate commerce. Parker noted that California’s program “derived its authority . . . from the legislative command of the state,” id., at 350, and went on to hold that the program was therefore exempt, by virtue of the Sherman Act’s own limitations, from antitrust attack:

“We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.” Id., at 350-351.

The availability of this exemption to a State’s municipalities was the question presented in City of Lafayette, swpra. In that case, petitioners were Louisiana cities empowered to own and operate electric utility systems both within and beyond their municipal limits. Respondent brought suit against petitioners under the Sherman Act, alleging that they had committed various antitrust offenses in the conduct of their utility systems, to the injury of respondent. Petitioners invoked the Parker doctrine as entitling them to dismissal of the suit. The District Court accepted this argument and dismissed. But the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a “subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws,” City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F. 2d 431, 434 (1976) (footnote omitted), and directing the District Court on remand to examine “whether the state legislature contemplated a certain type of anti-competitive restraint,” ibid.12

This Court affirmed. In doing so, a majority rejected at the outset petitioners’ claim that, quite apart from Parker, “Congress never intended to subject local governments to the antitrust laws.” 435 U. S., at 394. A plurality opinion for four Justices then addressed petitioners’ argument that Parker, properly construed, extended to “all governmental entities, whether state agencies or subdivisions of a State, . . . simply by reason of their status as such.” 435 U. S., at 408. The plurality opinion rejected this argument, after a discussion of Parker, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977).¹³ These precedents were construed as holding that the Parker exemption reflects the federalism principle that we are a Nation of States, a principle that makes no accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of States. The plurality opinion said:

“Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of the States that create them. Parser’s limitation of the exemption to ‘official action directed by a state,’ is consistent with the fact that the States’ subdivisions generally have not been treated as equivalents of the States themselves. In light of the serious economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to place their own parochial interests above the Nation’s economic goals reflected in the antitrust laws, we are especially unwilling to presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive municipal action from their reach.” 435 U. S., at 412-413 (footnote and citations omitted).

The opinion emphasized, however, that the State as sovereign might sanction anticompetitive municipal activities and thereby immunize municipalities from antitrust liability. Under the plurality’s standard, the Parker doctrine would shield from antitrust liability municipal conduct engaged in “pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.” 435 U. S., at 413. This was simply a recognition that a State may frequently choose to effect its policies through the instrumentality of its cities and towns. It was stressed, however, that the “state policy” relied upon would have to be “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed.” Id., at 410. This standard has since been adopted by a majority of the Court. New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 105 (1980).¹⁴

B

Our precedents thus reveal that Boulder’s moratorium ordinance cannot be exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless it constitutes the action of the State of Colorado itself in its sovereign capacity, see Parker, or unless it constitutes municipal action in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, see City of Lafayette, Orrin W. Fox Co., and Midcal. Boulder argues that these criteria are met by the direct delegation of powers to municipalities through the Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado Constitution. It contends that this delegation satisfies both the Parker and the City of Lafayette standards. We take up these arguments in turn.

(1)

Respondent city’s Parker argument emphasizes that through the Home Rule Amendment the people of the State of Colorado have vested in the city of Boulder “ ‘every power theretofore possessed by the legislature ... in local and municipal affairs.’”¹⁵ The power thus possessed by Boulder’s City Council assertedly embraces the regulation of cable television, which is claimed to pose essentially local problems.¹⁶ Thus, it is suggested, the city’s cable television moratorium ordinance is an “act of government” performed by the city acting as the State in local matters, which meets the “state action” criterion of Parker.¹⁷

We reject this argument: it both misstates the letter of the law and misunderstands its spirit. The Parker state-action exemption reflects Congress’ intention to embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution. But this principle contains its own limitation: Ours is a “dual system of government,” Parker, 317 U. S., at 351 (emphasis added), which has no place for sovereign cities. As this Court stated long ago, all sovereign authority “within the geographical limits of the United States” resides either with

“the Government of the United States, or [with] the States of the Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two. There may be cities, counties, and other organized bodies with limited legislative functions, but they are all derived from, or exist in, subordination to one or the other of these.” United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 379 (1886) (emphasis added).

The dissent in the Court of Appeals correctly discerned this limitation upon the federalism principle: “We are a nation not of ‘city-states’ but of States.” 630 F. 2d, at 717. Parker itself took this view. When Parker examined Congress’ intentions in enacting the antitrust laws, the opinion, as previously indicated, noted: “[NJothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history . . . suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. . . . [And] an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.” 317 U. S., at 350-351 (emphasis added). Thus Parker recognized Congress’ intention to limit the state-action exemption based upon the federalism principle of limited state sovereignty. City of Lafayette, Orrin W. Fox Co., and Midcal reaffirmed both the vitality and the intrinsic limits of the Parker state-action doctrine. It was expressly recognized by the plurality opinion in City of Lafayette that municipalities “are not themselves sovereign," 435 U. S., at 412, and that accordingly they could partake of the Parker exemption only to the extent that they acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, 435 U. S., at 413. The Court adopted this view in Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S., at 109, and Midcal, 445 U. S., at 105. We turn then to Boulder’s contention that its actions were undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.

(2)

Boulder first argues that the requirement of “clear articulation and affirmative expression” is fulfilled by the Colorado Home Rule Amendment’s “guarantee of local autonomy.” It contends, quoting from City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at. 394, 415, that by this means Colorado has “comprehended within the powers granted” to Boulder the power to enact the challenged ordinance, and that Colorado has thereby “contemplated” Boulder’s enactment of an anticompetitive regulatory program. Further, Boulder contends that it may be inferred, “from the authority given” to Boulder “to operate in a particular area” — here, the asserted home rule authority to regulate cable television — “that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.” (Emphasis supplied.) Boulder therefore concludes that the “adequate state mandate” required by City of Lafayette, supra, at 415, is present here.¹⁸

But plainly the requirement of “clear articulation and affirmative expression” is not satisfied when the State’s position is one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive. A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be said to have “contemplated” the specific anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is sought. Nor can those actions be truly described as “comprehended within the powers granted,” since the term, “granted,” necessarily implies an affirmative addressing of the subject by the State. The State did not do so here: The relationship of the State of Colorado to Boulder’s moratorium ordinance is one of precise neutrality. As the majority in the Court of Appeals below acknowledged: “[W]e are here concerned with City action in the absence of any regulation whatever by the State of Colorado. Under these circumstances there is no interaction of state and local regulation. We have only the action or exercise of authority by the City.” 630 F. 2d, at 707. Indeed, Boulder argues that as to local matters regulated by a home rule city, the Colorado General Assembly is without power to act. Cf. City of Lafayette, supra, at 414, and n. 44. Thus in Boulder’s view, it can pursue its course of regulating cable television competition, while another home rule city can choose to prescribe monopoly service, while still another can elect free-market competition: and all of these policies are equally “contemplated,” and “comprehended within the powers granted.” Acceptance of such a proposition — that the general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances — would wholly eviscerate the concepts of “clear articulation and affirmative expression” that our precedents require.

HH HH

Respondents argue that denial of the Parker exemption m the present ease will have serious adverse consequences for cities, and will unduly burden the federal courts. But this argument is simply an attack upon the wisdom of the longstanding congressional commitment to the policy of free markets and open competition embodied in the antitrust laws.¹⁹ Those laws, like other federal laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon “persons,” of course apply to municipalities as well as to other corporate entities.²⁰ Moreover, judicial enforcement of Congress’ will regarding the state-action exemption renders a State “no less able to allocate governmental power between itself and its political subdivisions. It means only that when the State itself has not directed or authorized an anticompetitive practice, the State’s subdivisions in exercising their delegated power must obey the antitrust laws.” City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 416. As was observed in that case:

“Today’s decision does not threaten the legitimate exercise of governmental power, nor does it preclude municipal government from providing services on a monopoly basis. Parker and its progeny make clear that a State properly may . . . direct or authorize its instru-mentalities to act in a way which, if it did not reflect state policy, would be inconsistent with the antitrust laws. . . . [Assuming that the municipality is authorized to provide a service on a monopoly basis, these limitations on municipal action will not hobble the execution of legitimate governmental programs.” Id., at 416-417 (footnote omitted).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the action is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

1 The Colorado Home Rule Amendment, Colo. Const., Art. XX, § 6, provides in pertinent part:

“The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand inhabitants ... , are hereby vested with, and they shall always have, power to make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.

“Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.

“It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters ....

“The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.”

2 Boulder, Colo., Charter §11 (1965 rev. ed.).

3 The District Court below noted:

“Up to late 1975, cable television throughout the country was concerned primarily with retransmission of television signals to areas which did not have normal reception, with some special local weather and news services originated by the cable operators. During the late 1970’s however, satellite technology impacted the industry and prompted a rapid, almost geometric rise in its growth. As earth stations became less expensive, and ‘Home Box Office’ companies developed, the public response to cable television greatly increased the market demand for such expanded services.

“The ‘state of the art’ presently allows for more than 35 channels, including movies, sports, FM radio, and educational, children’s, and religious programming. The institutional uses for cable television are fast increasing, with technology for two-way service capability. Future potential for cable television is referred to as ‘blue sky’, indicating that virtually unlimited technological improvements are still expected.” 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1036-1037 (1980).

4 BCC was a defendant below, and is a respondent here.

5 Regarding this letter, the District Court noted that “BCC outlined a proposal for a new system, acknowledging the presence of [petitioner] in Boulder but stating that ‘(w)hatever action the City takes in regard to [petitioner], it is the plan of BCC to begin building its system as soon as feasible after the City grants BCC its permit.’” Id., at 1037.

6 “The . . . City Council . . . initialed] a' review and reconsideration of cable television in view of the many changes in the industry since . . . 1964.... Accordingly, they hired a consultant,. . . and held a number of study meetings to develop a governmental response to these changes. The primary thrust of [the consultant’s] advice was that the City should be concerned about the tendency of a cable system to become a natural monopoly. Much discussion in the City Council centered around a supposed unfair advantage that [petitioner] had because it was already operating in Boulder. Members of the Council, and the City Manager, expressed fears that [petitioner might] not be the best cable operator for Boulder, but would nonetheless be the only operator because of its head start in the area. The Council wanted to create a situation in which other cable companies could make offers and not be hampered by the possibility that [petitioner] would build out the whole area before they even arrived.” Ibid.

7 The preamble to this ordinance offered the following declarations as justification for its enactment:

“[C]able television companies have within recent months displayed interest in serving the community and have requested the City Council to grant [them] permission to use the public right-of-way in providing that service; and

“ . . . the present permittee, [petitioner], has indicated that it intends to extend its services in the near future . . . ; and

“ . . . the City Council finds that such an extension . . . would result in hindering the ability of other companies to compete in the Boulder market; and

“ . . . the City Council intends to adopt a model cable television permit ordinance, solicit applications from interested cable television companies, evaluate such applications, and determine whether or not to grant additional permits . . . [within] 3 months, and finds that an extension of service by [petitioner] would result in a disruption of this application and evaluation process; and

“ . . . the City Council finds that placing temporary geographical limitations upon the operations of [petitioner] would not impair the present services offered by [it] to City of Boulder residents, and would not impair [its] ability ... to improve those services within the area presently served by it.” Boulder, Colo., Ordinance No. 4473 (1979).

8 The Council reached this conclusion despite BCC’s statement to the contrary, see n. 5, supra.

9 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... , is declared to be illegal.”

Petitioner also alleged, mter alia, that the city and BCC were engaged in a conspiracy to restrict competition by substituting BCC for petitioner. The District Court noted that although petitioner had gathered some circumstantial evidence that might indicate such a conspiracy, the evidence was insufficient to establish a probability that petitioner would prevail on this claim. 485 F. Supp., at 1038.

10 The District Court also held that no per se antitrust violation appeared on the record before it, and that petitioner was not protected by the First Amendment from all regulation attempted by the city. Id., at 1039-1040.

11 The majority cited California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), as support for its reading of City of Lafayette, and concluded “that City of Lafayette is not applicable to a situation wherein the governmental entity is asserting a governmental rather than proprietary interest, and that instead the Parker-Midcal doctrine is applicable to exempt the City from antitrust liability.” 630 F. 2d, at 708.

The dissent urged affirmance, agreeing with the District Court’s analysis of the antitrust exemption issue. Id., at 715-718 (Markey, C. J., United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation, dissenting). The dissent also considered the city’s actions to violate “[c]om-mon principles of contract law and equity,” id., at 715, as well as the First Amendment rights of petitioner and its customers, both actual and potential, id., at 710-714. The petition for certiorari did not present the First Amendment question, and we do not address it in this opinion.

12 The Court of Appeals described the applicable standard as follows:

" [lit is not necessary to point to an express statutory mandate for each act which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will suffice if the chai-lenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent. Thus, a trial judge may ascertain, from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of. On the other hand, the connection between a legislative grant of power and the subordinate entity’s asserted use of that power may be too tenuous to permit the conclusion that the entity’s intended scope of activity encompassed such conduct. ... A district judge’s inquiry on this point should be broad enough to include all evidence which might show the scope of legislative intent.” 532 F. 2d, at 434-435 (footnote and citation omitted).

13 The Chief Justice, in a concurring opinion, focused on the nature of the challenged activity rather than the identity of the parties to the suit. 435 U. S., at 420. He distinguished between “the proprietary enterprises of municipalities,” id., at 422 (footnote omitted), and their “traditional government functions,” id., at 424, and viewed the Parker exemption as extending to municipalities only when they engaged in the latter.

14 In Midcal we held that a California resale price maintenance system, affecting all wine producers and wholesalers within the State, was not entitled to exemption from the antitrust laws. In so holding, we explicitly adopted the principle, expressed in the plurality opinion in City of Lafayette, that anticompetitive restraints engaged in by state municipalities or subdivisions must be “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy” in order to gain an antitrust exemption. Midcal, 445 U. S., at 105. The price maintenance system at issue in Midcal was denied such an exemption because it failed to satisfy the “active state supervision” criterion described in City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 410, as underlying our decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977). Because we conclude in the present case that Boulder’s moratorium ordinance does not satisfy the “clear articulation and affirmative expression” criterion, we do not reach the question whether that ordinance must or could satisfy the “active state supervision” test focused upon in Midcal.

15 Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P. 2d 1374, 1381 (1980), quoting Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement District v. Board of County Comm’rs, 149 Colo. 284, 294, 369 P. 2d 67, 72 (1962) (emphasis in original). The Byrne court went on to state that “by virtue of Article XX, a home rule city is not inferior to the General Assembly concerning its local and municipal affairs.” 618 P. 2d, at 1381. Petitioner strongly disputes respondent city’s premise and its construction of Byrne, citing City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 48, 329 P. 2d 441, 445 (1958), City and County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 219-220, 235 P. 777, 780-781 (1925), and 2 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 9.08a, p. 638 (1979), as contrary authority. But it is not for us to determine the correct view on this issue as a matter of state law. Parker affords an exemption from federal antitrust laws, based upon Congress’ intentions respecting the scope of those laws. Thus the availability of the Parker exemption is and must be a matter of federal law.

16 Boulder cites the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Manor Vail Condominium Assn. v. Vail, 199 Colo. 62, 66-67, 604 P. 2d 1168, 1171-1172 (1980), as authority for the proposition that the regulation of cable television is a local matter. Petitioner disputes this proposition and Boulder’s reading of Manor Vail, citing in rebuttal United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 168-169 (1968), holding that cable television systems are engaged in interstate communication. In this contention, petitioner is joined by the State of Colorado, which filed an amicus brief in support of petitioner. For the purposes of this decision we will assume, without deciding, that respondent city’s enactment of the moratorium ordinance under challenge here did fall within the scope of the power delegated to the city by virtue of the Colorado Home Rule Amendment.

17 Respondent city urges that the only distinction between the present case and Parker is that here the “act of government” is imposed by a home rule city rather than by the state legislature. Under Parker and Colorado law, the argument continues, this is a distinction without a difference, since in the sphere of local affairs home rule cities in Colorado possess every power once held by the state legislature.

18 Boulder also contends that its moratorium ordinance qualifies for antitrust immunity under the test set forth by The Chief Justice in his City of Lafayette concurrence, see n. 13, supra, because the challenged activity is clearly a “traditional government function,” rather than a “proprietary enterprise.”

19 “Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete — to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.” United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972).

20 See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 394-397.

We hold today only that the Parker v. Brown exemption was no bar to the District Court’s grant of injunctive relief. This case’s preliminary posture makes it unnecessary for us to consider other issues regarding the applicability of the antitrust laws in the context of suits by private litigants against government defendants. As we said in City of Lafayette, “[i]t may be that certain activities which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a local government.” 435 U. S., at 417, n. 48. Compare, e. g., National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 687-692 (1978) (considering the validity of anticompetitive restraint imposed by private agreement), with Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 133 (1978) (holding that anticompetitive effect is an insufficient basis for invalidating a state law). Moreover, as in City of Lafayette, supra, at 401-402, we do not confront the issue of remedies appropriate against municipal officials.