Brooks v. Weinberger

730 F. Supp. 1132, 30 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 300, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15391, 1989 WL 165319
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedDecember 20, 1989
DocketCiv. A. No. 85-0016
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 730 F. Supp. 1132 (Brooks v. Weinberger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brooks v. Weinberger, 730 F. Supp. 1132, 30 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 300, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15391, 1989 WL 165319 (D.D.C. 1989).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FLANNERY, District Judge.

The court must decide the correct way to figure overtime pay for certain security guards who work for the federal government’s General Services Administration (GSA). The issue arises on cross motions for summary judgment on stipulated facts. For the reasons stated below, the court grants defendants’ motion.

I.

These cross motions for summary judgment are really a sideshow to an action to collect overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Title 5 of the U.S.Code.1 In the main ring, the parties [1133]*1133are contesting whether defendant GSA owes plaintiff security guards overtime pay for hours when the guards were scheduled to work overtime but instead served on a jury, performed military service, took sick time, or used annual leave.2

As part of settlement talks, GSA reviewed past overtime payments to plaintiffs. By March 1989, GSA “discovered” it had been paying plaintiffs based upon a formula to figure overtime that differs from the one set out in 5 C.F.R. § 551.512.3 The “old” formula resulted in more money being paid for overtime than would be due under the § 551.512 method of figuring overtime pay. Arguing that § 551.512 states the law for figuring plaintiffs’ overtime pay entitlement, defendants counterclaimed for the difference between the overtime paid under the “old” formula and an amount that would have been paid under § 551.512. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to overtime payments in the amount based on the “old” formula, because that “old” formula is mandated by FLSA. To the extent that § 551.512 would yield less overtime pay than the “old” FLSA formula, plaintiffs argue that FLSA takes precedence over Title 5 regulations.

The court must rule on this subsidiary issue to get the parties back in the center ring.

II.

On July 6, 1989, the parties filed a stipulation stating how GSA has calculated plaintiffs’ overtime in the past under the “old” formula. The parties also stipulated to the mechanics of the method spelled out in 5 C.F.R. § 551.512. The stipulation is based upon the pay for Federal Protective Officer (FPO) Vernal Gabriel for the two-week pay period ending March 29, 1989. The relevant part of the stipulation is set out in the margin.4

[1134]*1134The parties stipulated as follows: Gabriel’s base pay for the two-week period was $720 for 80 hours of work. His hourly rate of basic pay was $9.00. For each hour Gabriel worked on a Sunday, he earned an add-on of 25% of his hourly rate of basic pay. That works out to a $2.25 per hour differential or premium for Sunday work. Similarly, he also got a 10% add-on for each hour worked at night, or an additional $0.90 per hour as night differential. Stip. at 3-4.

During the two-week period stipulated to, Gabriel worked a total of 160 hours. Of these, 32 hours were on Sundays, and 109 hours were at night. As a result, Gabriel earned a total of $170.10 in differential or premium pay. Thus, Gabriel earned the following nonovertime pay in the stipulated period:

1. 160 total hours @ base wage of $9.00 per hour = $1,440.00 +
2. 32 Sunday hours @ an additional $2.25 per hour = $ 72.00 +
3. 109 night hours @ an additional $0.90 per hour = $ 98.10 +
TOTAL NONOYERTIME PAY (Total remuneration): $1,610.10

[1135]*1135Both FLSA’s § 7 overtime provision and 5 C.F.R. § 551.512 state an employee’s overtime entitlement in terms of his regular rate of pay.5 This is distinguished from the “hourly rate of basic pay” or “straight time rate of pay” of $9.00 per hour.6

Gabriel’s hourly regular rate of pay is computed by dividing his “total remuneration” for a pay period by the total number of hours worked in the period to earn the total remuneration. 5 C.F.R. § 551.511.7 In this instance, Gabriel’s total remuneration is the $1610.10 that he received as his total nonovertime pay. He worked 160 hours to earn this remuneration. Therefore, his hourly regular rate of pay is $10.06, which is the quotient of $1610.10 in total remuneration divided by 160 hours.

The court can now state what each party contends. Citing 5 C.F.R. § 551.512, defendants argue that Gabriel’s overtime pay entitlement for the stipulated period is the following:

(1) straight time rate of pay for all hours in excess of 80 hours; plus
(2) one-half times the hourly regular rate of pay for all hours in excess of 85.5 hours, that is for 74.5 hours.

According to plaintiffs, Gabriel is entitled to:

(1) one and one-half times the hourly regular rate of pay for all hours in excess of 85.5 hours, or, for 74.5 hours.8

[1136]*1136While plaintiffs’ formula seems to reflect FLSA’s overtime entitlement, when added to nonovertime pay, it leads to overtime payments that exceed what the act requires. When overtime pay computed by the § 551.512 formula is added to nonover-time pay, plaintiffs get the full overtime pay that FLSA Section 7 mandates.

III.

At the outset, the court is not certain that the many pleadings in this case clearly explain what is disputed. The stipulation suggests that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the prerequisite for summary judgment under Rule 56(c), Fed. R.Civ.P., and the court so finds. Penetrating the seven veils of pleadings, the court does not believe that there is a genuine issue of law either. What issue there is, is one of mathematics.9 The court will explain why this is so.

Although the parties have argued as if they dispute the law, a close reading of their pleadings indicates that they do not. Both parties accept that plaintiffs’ overtime entitlement is governed by FLSA § 7(k), 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(k). As stated ear-Her, § 7(k) is a partial exception to § 7(a)’s requirement that employers covered by the act must pay an employee “compensation ... at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed” for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Section 7(k)’s exception applies to “employment by public agency engaged in fire protection or law enforcement activities.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(k).10 What is excepted, however, is not the rate at which overtime must be paid but when it must begin to be paid. Thus, § 7(k) retains § 7(a)’s requirement for compensation at one and one-half times the regular rate.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
730 F. Supp. 1132, 30 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 300, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15391, 1989 WL 165319, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brooks-v-weinberger-dcd-1989.