Alamo v. United States

122 Fed. Cl. 638, 2015 WL 4915150
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedAugust 18, 2015
Docket13-211C
StatusPublished

This text of 122 Fed. Cl. 638 (Alamo v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alamo v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 638, 2015 WL 4915150 (uscfc 2015).

Opinion

Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; Federal Employee Pay Act (Title V), 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-5550; Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Rule 56.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, current and former paramedics and emergency medical technicians, bring this back pay action against the United States, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012), and the Federal Employee Pay Act (“Title V”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-5550 (2012). Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the government has improperly calculated their regularly scheduled overtime pay under the FLSA and Title V. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on this question, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1

A. Factual Background

The material facts in this case are undisputed. Plaintiffs are 29 current or former employees of the United States Department of the Army assigned to Fort Stewart, Liberty, Georgia. Joint Stip. at 2. Plaintiffs are, or have previously been, employed as Emergency Medical Technicians (“EMT”) and/or Paramedics. Id.

All but four plaintiffs are classified as nonexempt under the FLSA (“Non-exempt Plaintiffs”). Id. at 3; 29 U.S.C. § 213(a). No plaintiffs have engaged in fire suppression or law enforcement activities. Joint Stip. at 3.

At all times relevant here, plaintiffs received pay at pay grade GS-10 (or its equivalent) or below. Id. During the relevant time period, the Non-exempt Plaintiffs also received standby duty premium pay at a rate of 10 percent of their annual salary pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5545(c)(1). Id.; Compl. at 5.

Generally, plaintiffs work a compressed work schedule, consisting of two 24-hour shifts per week. Joint Stip. at 3. Plaintiffs’ work schedules consist of hours beyond eight hours per day, or 40 hours per week. See generally Compl. Plaintiffs’ overtime hours consist of those hours that are regularly scheduled in advance (“regularly scheduled overtime”) and those hours that have not been scheduled in ádvance (“unscheduled overtime”). Joint Stip. at 5.

The government calculates the Non-exempt Plaintiffs’ pay for regularly scheduled overtime, by adding the Non-exempt Plaintiffs’ weekly basic pay 2 and weekly standby *640 duty premium pay. 3 Id. at 4-5. This result, known as the total remuneration, is then divided by the total number of hours worked during the week to derive the Non-exempt Plaintiffs’ hourly regular rate. Id. The government then multiplies the hourly regular rate by 0.5 (“FLSA half-time pay”). This figure is then multiplied by the total number of regularly scheduled overtime hours worked during the week to arrive at plaintiffs’ regularly scheduled overtime pay. 4 Id. /

B. Procedural Background

On September 18, 2014, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment (“Pis. Mot”) upon the ground that .the government has improperly calculated their overtime pay under the FLSA and Title V. Pis. Mot. at 1. On November 5, 2014, defendant responded to plaintiffs’ motion and also moved for summary judgment (“Def. Mot.”) upon the ground that the government has properly calculated plaintiffs’ overtime pay under these statutes. Def. Mot. at 3-4. On December 22, 2014, plaintiffs filed their reply and response to defendant’s cross-motion (“Pis. Rep.”), in which they withdrew the claim for back pay with respect to the four plaintiffs who are exempt from coverage under the FLSA. Pis. Rep. at 3. And so, the remaining issue in this case is whether the government has properly calculated the overtime pay for the Non-exempt Plaintiffs.

On March 16, 2015, the Court requested supplemental briefing on this issue and the parties subsequently filed supplemental briefs on April 3, 2015, April 17, 2015 and April 24, 2015. See generally Pis. Supp. Br. 1; Def. Supp. Br. 1; Pis. Supp. Br. 2; Def. Supp. Br. 2; Pis. Supp. Br. 3; Def. Supp. Br. 3. The Court held oral argument in this case on July 16, 2015. See generally Oral Argument Transcript.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Jurisdiction And RCFC 56

The Tucker Act grants this Court jurisdiction over non-tort monetary claims “against the United States founded ... upon ... any Act of Congress-” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2011). The FLSA is a money-mandating statute, and so, claims may be brought pursuant to the FLSA in this Court due to the Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see Abbey v. United States, 745 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2014); Zumerling v. Devine, 769 F.2d 745, 748 (Fed.Cir.1985) (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976)).

In addition, summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RCFC 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Biery v. United States, 753 F.3d 1279, 1286 (Fed.Cir.2014). A dispute is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A fact is “material” if it could “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law....” Id.

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Bluebook (online)
122 Fed. Cl. 638, 2015 WL 4915150, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alamo-v-united-states-uscfc-2015.