Brezina Construction Co. v. South Dakota Department of Transportation
This text of 297 N.W.2d 168 (Brezina Construction Co. v. South Dakota Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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Appellant, the South Dakota Department of Transportation (Department), appeals from the judgment of the circuit court in favor of appellee, Brezina Construction Company (Brezina). We reverse and remand.
Brezina entered into a highway construction contract with the Department for the construction of a small bridge and the reconstruction of a portion of Route 403 near Nemo in Lawrence County. The original contract called for the completion of work within eighty-five days; however, an addi[169]*169tional thirty-nine days were subsequently allowed as the result of construction change orders. Brezina’s request for additional time in which to complete the project was denied by the Board of Transportation. The Department ultimately determined that Brezina had exceeded the allowable time by 110 days and withheld liquidated damages in the amount of $33,000.00.
As one of the principal work items, the contract called for the displacement of some 8,200 cubic yards of “unclassified excavation” at a contract price of three dollars and fifty cents per cubic yard. Required “rock excavation” was to be paid for at a price five times the contract price for unclassified excavation. The contract further provided that Brezina was to notify the Department in writing when large quantities of rock were encountered so that the Department could measure the amount of rock to determine the proper amount of payment.1
After beginning work on the project, Brezina encountered substantial quantities of unexpected rock excavation, necessitating delay and increased expense. Pursuant to the contract, Brezina notified the Department of the existence of rock excavation on August 1, 1974. Notification was received by the Department on August 5, 1974. On August 6, 1974, and again on August 30,1974, the Department’s engineer cross-sectioned various portions of the project area to measure the extent of rock excavation.
Disagreement arose between the Department and Brezina with respect to the amount of rock excavation required to be performed and hence the amount Brezina was to be paid for that excavation.
The circuit court found in favor of Brezi-na in the amount of $76,965.97. The judgment included $24,052 for uncompensated rock excavation, the $33,000 in liquidated damages withheld by the Department, $7,901.92 withheld by appellant as a setoff against another construction contract between the parties,2 and $12,012.05 in interest.
ISSUE I
The Department argues that the circuit court erred in making a de novo determination of the factual classification of the excavation inasmuch as the contract vested the authority to make this determination solely in the Department’s engineer.
In Kyburz v. State, 79 S.D. 114, 117, 108 N.W.2d 645, 647 (1961), we stated:
The rule appears to be well established that parties to a building or construction contract may designate an engineer or other person to determine questions relat[170]*170ed to its execution and that the parties are bound by [the] determination of matters within the scope of [that] authority and when made in good faith.
Another statement of the general rule on this issue is as follows:
We find neither defendant nor plaintiff has correctly stated the law applicable to the case at hand. The pertinent rule ... is to the effect that a contract clause providing the architect or engineer shall be the final arbiter of disputes is binding upon the parties unless the architect or engineer’s decision is manifestly arbitrary or rendered in bad faith.
J. H. Jenkins Contractor, Inc. v. City of Denham Springs, 216 So.2d 549, 553 (La.App.1968). See Annot. 54 A.L.R. 1255 (1928), 110 A.L.R. 137 (1937).
Without detailing the evidence, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the Department was arbitrary and capricious and guilty of an abuse of discretion in making its determination regarding the nature and extent of the rock excavation. Suffice it to say that there is evidence that the Department’s project engineer was less than candid in his communications with Brezina concerning this matter. Moreover, it appears that he deliberately delayed in making his measurements of the area of the rock in order to frustrate Brezina’s attempts to obtain full compensation for the rock it found necessary to excavate. Given this behavior on the part of its employee, the Department will not be heard to complain of the trial court’s ruling. Cf. Northern Improvement Co. v. S. D. State Hwy., 267 N.W.2d 208 (S.D.1978).
ISSUE II
The Department challenges the finding that Brezina removed 1,718 additional cubic yards of rock excavation after it gave written notice to the Department. The record contains sufficient evidence upon which the circuit court could properly base this finding. Accordingly, we cannot say that the finding of the'circuit court in determining the amount of rock excavation is clearly erroneous. SDCL 15-6-52(a); In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 282, 181 N.W.2d 455 (1970).
ISSUE III
The Department contends that the trial court erred in not applying the liquidated damages provision of the contract. We agree.
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract, the Department added thirty-three working days to the completion time based upon the proportional cost of the increased work for rock excavation.3 The trial court, [171]*171however, found that the eighty-five-day completion period was specifically premised on the existence of unclassified excavation only. The trial court also found that rock excavation was not extra work within the contract definition of that term.4
We conclude that the trial court erred in holding that the liquidated damages clause of the contract did not apply. The contract provisions cited above indicate that the parties recognized the possibility that rock excavation might be necessary to the completion of the contract. Indeed, Brezina’s compliance with the notification requirements of the contract after it encountered large masses of rock belies its present contention that the time allowed for completion of .the contract was premised upon the existence of unclassified excavation only. Accordingly, the trial court should not have disregarded the liquidated damages provision of the contract.
The Department has treated the rock excavation as extra work that entitled Brezi-na to an additional thirty-three working days. Under the Department’s interpretation of the contract, Brezina would be entitled to fourteen additional working days if the trial court’s finding regarding the additional rock excavation is upheld. In view of our holding that the eighty-five working day completion date, as modified by the extensions, is applicable, we are not disposed to question whether the rock excavation truly met the definition of extra work as that term is used in the contract. Accordingly, on remand Brezina should be given credit for fourteen additional working days when the amount of its liability for liquidated damages is computed.
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297 N.W.2d 168, 1980 S.D. LEXIS 405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brezina-construction-co-v-south-dakota-department-of-transportation-sd-1980.