Thompson, J.
— The plaintiffs are beneficiaries in a policy of insurance issued by the defendant upon the life of their son, LeRoy Leo Bill, who died on January 12, 1961. Liability being denied by the insurer, this action was brought by the plaintiffs. [1217]*1217The defendant alleged that the death of the insured was the result of' suicide, which raises the only substantial question in the case. There is no denial of the issuance of the policy or that it was otherwise in effect on the date of LeRoy Bill’s death; nor is there any contention that the policy was not voided under its terms if death was brought about by suicide. The trial court held that the question of suicide was for the determination of the jury and submitted it accordingly. The jury returned its verdict for the plaintiffs, judgment was rendered on the verdict, and we have this appeal. The defendant contends it was entitled to a peremptory verdict; it raised the question in various ways, and also challenges certain rulings on evidence and instructions given the jury.
The evidence disclosed that LeRoy, a 17-year-old boy approximately five feet eleven inches tall, weighing about two hundred and eight pounds, had been employed as a farmhand by Howard Niedert, a farmer residing near Riceville, Iowa, since September 21, 1960. He did chores and all types of fieldwork, usually working with Mr. Niedert. He was furnished a room of his own and spent his weekends at home. He was a good and willing worker and was careful with machinery and good to the stock. He got along well with the Niedert children and was treated like one of the family. He appeared happy and content with his work. He was exceptionally strong, and liked to display feats of strength, such as breaking binder twine and boards with his hands. He sometimes tried to do tasks Mr. Niedert himself had been unable to do. While he did not have many close friends, no one disliked him and he enjoyed his family and friends. On the day of his death he stopped at a neighbor’s home and asked them over to play cards. They could not come but made tentative arrangements to come over the next night. He had recently purchased his first automobile and, although it was a used model, was very proud of it. His health had been very good and he was not in debt. He had two or three guns and liked to hunt and fish. At a family gathering a few days before his death he made plans to do some ice fishing with his uncle.
On the late afternoon- of January 12, 1961, he was engaged in doing the chores and, when Mrs. Niedert arrived home about [1218]*1218five o’clock she talked with him. She observed nothing unusual about him and he went on about his tasks. She later saw him riding a saddle horse driving the cattle from the pasture, and that was the last anyone saw him alive. Apparently all the chores had been done except for the task of throwing down some hay or straw from the barn loft.
When Mr. Niedert arrived home about six o’clock that evening, LeRoy had not returned to the house for his evening meal. When the lad had not appeared by 6:30 Niedert went to look for him and observed a light on in the barn. Upon entering the door he saw LeRoy’s legs extending through a small opening 22"x20" in the floor of the haymow, used to lower bales of hay and straw for the stock. He thought LeRoy was sitting on the loft floor asleep, until he climbed the ladder in another chute to the floor above. Then “he could see the string to him and went over to him.” The “string” was a piece of binder twine tied to an overhead two- by eight-inch beam some five feet and eleven inches above the floor, and attached to LeRoy’s neck by a noose. Mr. Niedert felt the boy’s neck, realized it was too- late to give him aid and returned to the house. The authorities and LeRoy’s parents were called and arrived a short time thereafter.
LeRoy’s parents, the plaintiffs herein, arrived first but only Mr. Bill entered the barn. He went no1 closer than the top of the ladder to the second floor and then returned to the house. When Deputy Sheriff Don L. Powers and Dr. Willis K. Dankle, the county medical examiner, arrived they went to the bam loft and found LeRoy’s body as Mr. Niedert had discovered it. They cut the twine and laid the lad on the loft floor to await the undertaker. When they did so there was a sudden expulsion of air from the lungs indicating LeRoy had held his breath until a stricture on the windpipe caused by the twine prevented its escape. The noose was tied with a square knot, not a slipknot. The body was almost straight with the legs extending through the opening in the floor, and the hands to the side on or near the loft floor as though he had pushed' off from a sitting position. The body from approximately the knees -up was above the bottom' part of the opening. The noose around his head was 29 inches in circumference and the knot was against [1219]*1219bis cap, which was still on, not against his head or neck. There was no indication of a struggle and the chaff around the hole was not disturbed.
It also appeared there was another piece of binder twine attached to the same beam. It had been broken, and nearby was a piece of twine with a noose tied with a slipknot, which plaintiffs maintain disclosed a prior ^unpleasant experiment terminated by LeRoy’s ability to break the twine with his hands.
It further appeared many pieces of twine were hung in the loft, for the bales of hay and straw were usually opened there. No rope was kept in the loft but some was in the barn, and Le-Roy knew where it was and how to use it. Thus plaintiffs contend if he had wished to hang himself he would not have depended upon small binder twine, but would have used a strong rope and a larger opening to have accomplished the deed.
The medical examiner testified the twine would have broken had LeRoy stepped off into the hole, and that he had to let himself down carefully, that death was caused by asphyxiation, that the asphyxiation was due to the constricting twine around the neck, that pressure on the throat applied in this manner “could cause practically immediate unconsciousness”, and that if the immediate unconsciousness had not ensued, there would have been a gradual strangulation, with ■ a struggle resulting. This a resolute will could overcome, but normally a person would struggle. It was the examiner’s opinion “that the injury involved was self-inflicted.”
The evidence further disclosed that LeRoy had finished the eighth grade with some difficulty, that intelligence tests showed him below average, that he desired to follow farm work, was a member of the Alta Yista Lutheran Church, and drank neither beer nor alcohol. He was a happy-go-lucky fellow, liked to watch television, and seemed to all witnesses who observed him near the date of this tragedy to then be his normal self. Mr. Niedert and Mr. and Mrs. Bill testified they knew of no reason why LeRoy might intentionally take'his'life.
I. Thé defendant contends that the record facts make such a clear case of suicide that it was entitled to a directed [1220]*1220verdict. The burden was upon it to support its affirmative defense, and it thinks it did so. We have held in proper cases that suicide may be so clearly shown that the trial court should hold it established as a matter of law. Inghram v. National Union, 103 Iowa 395, 72 N.W. 559; Beverly v. Supreme Tent, 115 Iowa 524, 88 N.W. 1054; Gavin v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 149 Iowa 152, 126 N.W. 906; Warner v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 219 Iowa 916, 258 N.W. 75,
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Thompson, J.
— The plaintiffs are beneficiaries in a policy of insurance issued by the defendant upon the life of their son, LeRoy Leo Bill, who died on January 12, 1961. Liability being denied by the insurer, this action was brought by the plaintiffs. [1217]*1217The defendant alleged that the death of the insured was the result of' suicide, which raises the only substantial question in the case. There is no denial of the issuance of the policy or that it was otherwise in effect on the date of LeRoy Bill’s death; nor is there any contention that the policy was not voided under its terms if death was brought about by suicide. The trial court held that the question of suicide was for the determination of the jury and submitted it accordingly. The jury returned its verdict for the plaintiffs, judgment was rendered on the verdict, and we have this appeal. The defendant contends it was entitled to a peremptory verdict; it raised the question in various ways, and also challenges certain rulings on evidence and instructions given the jury.
The evidence disclosed that LeRoy, a 17-year-old boy approximately five feet eleven inches tall, weighing about two hundred and eight pounds, had been employed as a farmhand by Howard Niedert, a farmer residing near Riceville, Iowa, since September 21, 1960. He did chores and all types of fieldwork, usually working with Mr. Niedert. He was furnished a room of his own and spent his weekends at home. He was a good and willing worker and was careful with machinery and good to the stock. He got along well with the Niedert children and was treated like one of the family. He appeared happy and content with his work. He was exceptionally strong, and liked to display feats of strength, such as breaking binder twine and boards with his hands. He sometimes tried to do tasks Mr. Niedert himself had been unable to do. While he did not have many close friends, no one disliked him and he enjoyed his family and friends. On the day of his death he stopped at a neighbor’s home and asked them over to play cards. They could not come but made tentative arrangements to come over the next night. He had recently purchased his first automobile and, although it was a used model, was very proud of it. His health had been very good and he was not in debt. He had two or three guns and liked to hunt and fish. At a family gathering a few days before his death he made plans to do some ice fishing with his uncle.
On the late afternoon- of January 12, 1961, he was engaged in doing the chores and, when Mrs. Niedert arrived home about [1218]*1218five o’clock she talked with him. She observed nothing unusual about him and he went on about his tasks. She later saw him riding a saddle horse driving the cattle from the pasture, and that was the last anyone saw him alive. Apparently all the chores had been done except for the task of throwing down some hay or straw from the barn loft.
When Mr. Niedert arrived home about six o’clock that evening, LeRoy had not returned to the house for his evening meal. When the lad had not appeared by 6:30 Niedert went to look for him and observed a light on in the barn. Upon entering the door he saw LeRoy’s legs extending through a small opening 22"x20" in the floor of the haymow, used to lower bales of hay and straw for the stock. He thought LeRoy was sitting on the loft floor asleep, until he climbed the ladder in another chute to the floor above. Then “he could see the string to him and went over to him.” The “string” was a piece of binder twine tied to an overhead two- by eight-inch beam some five feet and eleven inches above the floor, and attached to LeRoy’s neck by a noose. Mr. Niedert felt the boy’s neck, realized it was too- late to give him aid and returned to the house. The authorities and LeRoy’s parents were called and arrived a short time thereafter.
LeRoy’s parents, the plaintiffs herein, arrived first but only Mr. Bill entered the barn. He went no1 closer than the top of the ladder to the second floor and then returned to the house. When Deputy Sheriff Don L. Powers and Dr. Willis K. Dankle, the county medical examiner, arrived they went to the bam loft and found LeRoy’s body as Mr. Niedert had discovered it. They cut the twine and laid the lad on the loft floor to await the undertaker. When they did so there was a sudden expulsion of air from the lungs indicating LeRoy had held his breath until a stricture on the windpipe caused by the twine prevented its escape. The noose was tied with a square knot, not a slipknot. The body was almost straight with the legs extending through the opening in the floor, and the hands to the side on or near the loft floor as though he had pushed' off from a sitting position. The body from approximately the knees -up was above the bottom' part of the opening. The noose around his head was 29 inches in circumference and the knot was against [1219]*1219bis cap, which was still on, not against his head or neck. There was no indication of a struggle and the chaff around the hole was not disturbed.
It also appeared there was another piece of binder twine attached to the same beam. It had been broken, and nearby was a piece of twine with a noose tied with a slipknot, which plaintiffs maintain disclosed a prior ^unpleasant experiment terminated by LeRoy’s ability to break the twine with his hands.
It further appeared many pieces of twine were hung in the loft, for the bales of hay and straw were usually opened there. No rope was kept in the loft but some was in the barn, and Le-Roy knew where it was and how to use it. Thus plaintiffs contend if he had wished to hang himself he would not have depended upon small binder twine, but would have used a strong rope and a larger opening to have accomplished the deed.
The medical examiner testified the twine would have broken had LeRoy stepped off into the hole, and that he had to let himself down carefully, that death was caused by asphyxiation, that the asphyxiation was due to the constricting twine around the neck, that pressure on the throat applied in this manner “could cause practically immediate unconsciousness”, and that if the immediate unconsciousness had not ensued, there would have been a gradual strangulation, with ■ a struggle resulting. This a resolute will could overcome, but normally a person would struggle. It was the examiner’s opinion “that the injury involved was self-inflicted.”
The evidence further disclosed that LeRoy had finished the eighth grade with some difficulty, that intelligence tests showed him below average, that he desired to follow farm work, was a member of the Alta Yista Lutheran Church, and drank neither beer nor alcohol. He was a happy-go-lucky fellow, liked to watch television, and seemed to all witnesses who observed him near the date of this tragedy to then be his normal self. Mr. Niedert and Mr. and Mrs. Bill testified they knew of no reason why LeRoy might intentionally take'his'life.
I. Thé defendant contends that the record facts make such a clear case of suicide that it was entitled to a directed [1220]*1220verdict. The burden was upon it to support its affirmative defense, and it thinks it did so. We have held in proper cases that suicide may be so clearly shown that the trial court should hold it established as a matter of law. Inghram v. National Union, 103 Iowa 395, 72 N.W. 559; Beverly v. Supreme Tent, 115 Iowa 524, 88 N.W. 1054; Gavin v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 149 Iowa 152, 126 N.W. 906; Warner v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 219 Iowa 916, 258 N.W. 75,
But generally the question of suicide has been held to be for the jury. The plaintiffs’ case is fortified by the presumption against suicide. We have said “The presumption against suicide is a strong one.” Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 233 Iowa 5, 10, 7 N.W.2d 21, 24. We have also held that it has the effect of evidence. Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra; Allison v. Bankers Life Co., 230 Iowa 995, 999, 299 N.W. 889, 891; Reddick v. Grand Union Tea Co., 230 Iowa 108, 119, 296 N.W. 800, 805.
The presumption is based on inferences arising from the known love of life and the instinct of self-preservation, the fact that suicide is opposed to- the general conduct of mankind and that it involves moral turpitude. While the presumption is not conclusive and may in exceptional cases be overcome as a matter of law, this is not ordinarily so ; and it may be strengthened by other evidence tending to show lack of motive for suicide or other facts which would make it unlikely.
We have discussed this question often. Holloway v. Bankers Life Co., 248 Iowa 517, 527, 81 N.W.2d 453, 459; Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra; Michalek v. Modern Brotherhood of America, 179 Iowa 33, 42, 43, 161 N.W. 125, 129; Tackman v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 132 Iowa 64, 68, 106 N.W. 350, 351, 8 L. R. A., N. S., 974. In the latter case the facts were to a considerable extent similar to those in the case at bar. There the decedent-insured was found hanging in the barn from a harness strap. There was some evidence that he had some financial and health difficulties; but we held the question of suicide was for the jury.
In the -instant case, the facts would undoubtedly support a verdict of suicide; but they do not require it. No motive [1221]*1221for suicide appears. There is evidence that LeRoy Bill was proud of his strength; that he had made plans for the ensuing evening; he had no worries, financial or otherwise; he seemed to enjoy or at least be satisfied with his work. An inference that he was trying some sort of experiment to test and prove his strength in breaking the twine placed around his neck, and that it in some manner went wrong, is not too remote. To strengthen this there is the medical testimony that it would be possible the pressure on the throat could have caused instant unconsciousness. And it is also a fair argument that if he had intended suicide he would have used a stronger rope rather than the binder twine. All of these things strengthen the presumption against suicide, and support the trial court in its submission of the case to the jury. We find no error at this point.
II. Further error is assigned upon the refusal of the trial court to admit the testimony of the medical examiner, Dr. Willis K. Dankle, as to a conversation he had with plaintiff Ernest Bill in the presence of the other plaintiff, Norma Bill. Doctor Dankle testified that he had such a conversation at the Niedert farm on the evening after the death of LeRoy Bill. To the question “What was said at that time?” he answered “I asked him if there were any doubt in his mind that his son committed suicide.” Then came a motion from plaintiffs’ counsel to strike “as a conclusion and opinion on his part, in no way binding on this plaintiff, and certainly improper in a civil suit, what the man said at the time, what the doctor said.” The court said: “Well, I think that originated with this witness and not with the plaintiffs. I think under the — ”. Taking this as an expression of intent to sustain the motion to strike, defendant’s counsel said “Your Honor, we would like to make an offer of proof in chambers.” This was agreed to by the court, and later, in chambers, Doctor Dankle was interrogated in this way:
“Q. Doctor, did you have a conversation with Ernest Bill in the presence of Norma Bill at the Niedert farmhouse just before you left on the night of January 12th? A. Yes. Q. What did that conversation consist of m your part and on his? A. I said to Mr. Bill, Ts there any doubt in your mind that your son committed suicide?’ and if I might describe the sitúa[1222]*1222tion, lie and his wife were sitting at the table, mourning and tearful, and he just shook his head. Q. In what direction, Doctor, if you will say it so that the record can pick it up? A. A lateral motion of the head. Q. That is commonly interpreted as a negative sign? A. Which I interpreted as a negative sign.”
No objections were lodged by the plaintiffs until all of the foregoing questions had been asked and answered. Then counsel for plaintiffs said:
“We object to the proposed offer because there is no question that he died by his own hand. The issue in the case is whether his death was intention or unintentional.”
After some discussion not material here, the court ruled:
“Well, I will tell you, I am going to follow my judgment on this. I think that if the plaintiff had volunteered that there wasn’t any doubt in his mind the boy committed suicide that would be perfectly admissible but here we have got an entirely negative approach; somebody puts this subject of suicide out there in the form of a question; he doesn’t make any audible answer to it at all. I think there is too much ground for conjecture there on the part of the jury as to the implications they can draw from that. If this goes into the record it surely would be argued to the jury that he admitted that it was suicide and I don’t believe that is a fair inference to draw from this sort of thing. Now, if he had said, ‘No, there isn’t any doubt in my mind but what the boy committed suicide, everything tends to show that’, then I think you would have a different situation but here he doesn’t say anything. He shakes his head; maybe it was a negative shake, but he was under stress and strain here. The record shows that there was some mourning; there was some crying going on there at the table where the husband and wife sat. I just don’t believe that is enough that I dare let that go to the jury.
“My ruling is going to be that it is not going to be admitted.”
' It will be noted that no objections were made until all of the questions put to Doctor- Dankle had been asked and answered. There is no' doubt that the matter inquired into was [1223]*1223a proper one, and the doctor should have been permitted to answer all of the questions with the possible exception of the final one, which dealt with his interpretation of the negative sign, the headshake. That plaintiff Ernest Bill had no doubt his son had committed suicide was an admission against interest ; and the error of the court in excluding it was further compounded by the fact that both plaintiffs were permitted to testify, over objection, that they knew of no reason why their son should have intentionally taken his life. The excluded testimony would not only have shown an admission against interest, but would have tended to counter and contradict the testimony last above referred to.
Neither the plaintiffs’ motion to strike nor their objection made after all the offered questions had been answered raised any real or substantial question as to the validity of the testimony. Neither raised the point decided by the court, which seems to have been that the lateral motion of the head made by Ernest Bill was too uncertain in its meaning and so was so speculative the jury should not have been permitted to pass upon it. With this we do not agree. A nod of the head is universally understood to be an affirmative or “yes” answer; a shake of the head is equally well understood to mean a negative or “no” reply. It is true the lateral motion might in some circumstances mean merely bewilderment or confusion, an “I don’t know” answer. But this was an interpretation to be made by the jury.
However, although the point was not considered by the trial court and is not raised or argued by the plaintiff's here, it is suggested in this court that the offer of proof was an offer in bulk; and so, there being one question and answer ■ — -the last one — which was not competent, the entire offer was properly refused. It is true that although no proper objection is made, and even though the trial court gives a wrong reason for excluding evidence, if there is a valid basis for denying it admission, its exclusion is not reversible error. It is also correct that when an offer of proof is in bulk and some parts are improper, all may be excluded. Vandell v. Roewe, 232 Iowa 896, 898, 6 N.W.2d 295, 296, 297; Bates v. Brooks, 222 Iowa 1128. 1142. 270 N.W. 867. 874. 109 A. L. R. 1371.
[1224]*1224But in the instant ease the offer was by question and answer. Each question was tendered separately, and no objection was made until all had been offered. We know of no way in which the tendered evidence could have been further separated. The plaintiffs had their opportunity to object to each question as it was asked and before it was answered; and the court had the same opportunity to make its ruling on each question and answer, instead of excluding all of them as it did. It may be true that in Vandell v. Roewe, supra, the testimony was offered also by question and answer, and we said it was an offer in bullí; but we do not now agree with this holding. The evidence here was offered by separate questions and answers, readily subject to separate objections and separate rulings by the court.
The evidence was on an important point, and we cannot say it was not sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. An admission by one of the plaintiffs, in the presence of the other, who made no objection or comment, that he had no doubt his son committed suicide, if so interpreted by the jury, would certainly have been an important matter for its consideration. Error appears at this point.
III. Further error is assigned by the defendant upon the giving of Instruction No. 3. The material part of the instruction is this: “In this connection you are instructed that in order to overcome the legal presumption against suicide the defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of such circumstances and conditions concerning the death of the insured that every other cause of death than suicide has been excluded by the testimony and that no other reasonable hypothesis or theory as to the cause of death exists, among reasonable minds, except suicide; or, in other words, the testimony or proof produced by the defendant in order to overcome the legal presumption against suicide must be such that among reasonable minds every reasonable hypothesis or theory of death inconsistent with suicide has been excluded by the preponderance of defendant’s testimony.”
That the court was here following a rule of law laid down in several cases of this nature, involving defenses of suicide in [1225]*1225actions on life insurance policies, cannot be doubted. Stephenson v. Bankers Life Association, 108 Iowa 637, 641, 79 N.W. 459, 460; Wood v. Sovereign Camp of W. O. W., 166 Iowa 391, 399, 147 N.W. 888, 891; Michalek v. Modern Brotherhood of America, supra, loc. cit. 179 Iowa 40, 161 N.W. 128; Green v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 Iowa 32, 39, 182 N.W. 808, 811 ; Wilkinson v. National Life Association, 208 Iowa 246, 248, 225 N.W. 242, 243. The frustration of a trial Judge who meticulously follows the law as laid down in the books, and then meets with reversal because the appellate court has changed its mind, is understandable. The rule of stare decisis, usually a dependable support for the trial court, on occasion proves to be a snare and a delusion. But this is an occupational hazard for trial Judges. Such is the situation here.
It will be noted that the evidence of suicide produced by the defendant, under this instruction and the last-cited cases, must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis or theory of death inconsistent with suicide. Evidence tending to show suicide is in almost all cases circumstantial; and our general rule has been for many years that one who seeks to establish his case by such evidence is not required to exclude all other reasonable theories or hypotheses; only to prove his theory by evidence which makes it reasonably probable, and more probable than any other hypothesis based on such evidence. Almost innumerable cases might be cited on this point; but see Brower v. Quick, 249 Iowa 569, 575, 88 N.W.2d 120, 123; Bokhoven v. Hull, 247 Iowa 604, 607, 75 N.W.2d 225, 227; Soreide v. Vilas & Co., 247 Iowa 1139, 1150, 78 N.W.2d 41, 47; Hackman v. Beckwith, 245 Iowa 791, 795, 64 N.W.2d 275, 278; Allison v. Bankers Life Co., 230 Iowa 995, 1001, 299 N.W. 889, 893; and Latham v. Des Moines Electric Co., 229 Iowa 1199, 1207, 296 N.W. 372, 375.
The rule laid down by the court’s Instruction No. 3 seems to have come into our law first as a general rule of circumstantial evidence in Asbach v. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co., 74 Iowa 248, 250, 37 N.W. 182, 184. It has long been abrogated in all civil cases involving circumstantial evidence, except in those involving the defense of suicide in actions on [1226]*1226life insurance policies. Why it has remained here is not clear, except that the question has apparently not been raised or considered. We see no reason why the insurer defending against a claim on a policy of life insurance on the ground that death resulted from suicide should be held to a rule so much stricter than any other litigant who relies on circumstantial evidence. In all other eases the circumstantial evidence need show only a hypothesis which is reasonably probable, not merely possible, and which is more probable than any other hypothesis based on such evidence; but the insurer in this class of cases must entirely exclude every other reasonable hypothesis.
The injustice of such a situation is apparent. The burden thrown on the defendant-insurer is much heavier than any other litigant is compelled to bear in establishing a theory by circumstantial evidence. We now overrule the holding of the Asbach case, supra; and the cited cases holding that an insurer defending on the ground of suicide must prove its theory by circumstantial evidence which excludes every other reasonably probable theory rather than by evidence which makes its theory not only reasonably probable, but more probable than any other theory based on such evidence.
IV. The offered certificate of the medical examiner should have been admitted in evidence, under Code section 339.9. It is true we held in Holloway v. Bankers Life Co., supra, loc. cit. 248 Iowa 528, 81 N.W.2d 460, that a coroner’s report was not admissible. But this was before the enactment of the County Medical Examiners law by the Fifty-eighth General Assembly. This Act went into effect on January 1, 1961, and is now found in chapter 339 of the Code. Section 339.9, supra, expressly provides that reports of investigations by the county medical examiner, and records and reports of autopsies made under his authority, shall be received in evidence. The trial court was of the opinion that any error arising from the denial of admission in evidence of the report offered here was not prejudicial, because the medical examiner testified that death was caused by asphyxiation, due to the constricting rope around the deceased’s neck; and “It is my opinion that the injury involved was self-inflicted.” We do not have the offered medical [1227]*1227report in evidence, and so cannot say whether it was in substantially the same terms as the admitted testimony, as the trial court thought. But in view of a possible retrial of the case, we deem it proper to say that a “self-inflicted injury” is not necessarily the same as an “intentionally self-inflicted injury.”
V. We have reviewed the other errors assigned, and do not find them meritorious. For the reasons set out in Divisions II and III the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. — Reversed and remanded.
Garfield, C. J., and Thornton, Moore and Stuart, JJ., concur.
Snell, J., concurs except to Division I to which he dissents.
Larson, Hays and Peterson, JJ., dissent.