[203]*203UNIS, J.
Defendant appeals from his convictions for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, ORS 475.992(4), and endangering the welfare of a minor, ORS 163.575. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. State v. Carlson, 100 Or App 261, 786 P2d 229 (1990). We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the Lane County Circuit Court.
FACTS
On August 3,1988, Officer Lewis was dispatched to an apartment in response to a report of a domestic dispute between defendant and his wife, Lisa. On his arrival, Lewis was met by Lisa, whom he later described as having a “very white” complexion, looking tired, “fairly depressed,” “distraught,” and “at her wit’s end,” being occasionally tearful, and “comingdown off of methamphetamine.” Also present were the minor daughter of Lisa and defendant, and Lisa’s sister and her minor daughter. Defendant was not in the apartment at that time.
Lewis asked Lisa if there were any methamphetamine in the apartment. She responded by saying that “he probably took it all, but go ahead and look around; I don’t care anymore.” During his search of the apartment, Lewis found traces of methamphetamine on a mirror in the master bedroom that defendant and Lisa shared.
About 15 to 20 minutes later, Lewis, accompanied by a second police officer, met defendant in the parking lot of the apartment complex. Lewis noticed what appeared to be needle marks on defendant’s arms. Without first advising defendant of his constitutional rights, Lewis asked defendant about the needle marks. Defendant initially responded, “Yeah, I got a few tracks,” and then said that the marks were injuries that he had received from working on a car. Lisa, who was present during the exchange and close enough to hear what was being said, broke in by yelling: “You liar, you got them from shooting up in the bedroom with all your stupid friends.” Defendant “hung his head and shook his head back and forth.”
Defendant was not placed under arrest at that time, although he was cited for endangering the welfare of a minor. [204]*204Defendant eventually was indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled substance and endangering the welfare of a minor.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements that he made about the marks on his arms, arguing that he was in custody when he spoke with the police and was not advised of his constitutional rights. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the interview was a “noncustodial interrogation” and admitted defendant’s statements. At trial, over defendant’s timely hearsay objection, the court also permitted Lewis to testify about Lisa’s statement, “You liar, you got [the marks on your arms] from shooting up in the bedroom [where the methamphetamine was found] with all your stupid friends” and defendant’s nonverbal reaction thereto.
SELF-INCRIMINATION ISSUE
Defendant claims that the admission of his statements to the police officer about marks on his arms violated his right against self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution,1 and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 He argues that he was “in custody” when the police officer questioned him about the marks on his arm and that, therefore, he was entitled to receive Miranda-like warnings.3 The admissibility of the statements requires separate inquiries under the Oregon and the United States Constitutions.
This court has stated that, “[i]n determining whether Miranda-like warnings were required by the Oregon Constitution, we must assess the extent to which defendant was ‘in custody.’ ” State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7, 791 P2d 836 (1990). A person who is in “full custody” must be given Miranda-like warnings before being questioned, and “such warnings may be required in circumstances that, although they do not rise to the [205]*205level of fall custody, create a ‘setting [that is] “compelling.” ’ ” Id. (citing State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 265, 744 P2d 250 (1987)).
Defendant was questioned in the parking lot of his apartment, a familiar setting. He was not under arrest and was free to refuse to answer questions. The record does not demonstrate that the police coerced or pressured defendant to answer questions. Although he was being questioned because the police suspected that he had possessed the methamphetamine found in the apartment, the fact that police question a person as a suspect in a crime “does not inherently create a ‘compelling’ setting for Oregon constitutional purposes.” State v. Smith, supra, 310 Or at 11. The circumstances of this case do not rise to the level of custody or compulsion that require Miranda-like warnings. Accordingly, the admission of defendant’s statements did not violate defendant’s rights under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution.
Federal law requires Miranda warnings when a person is subjected to “custodial interrogation.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 444, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). As we have noted, defendant was questioned in the presence of his wife at a familiar public location, was not under arrest, and was free to refuse to answer questions. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation under federal standards. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 US 492, 97 S Ct 711, 50 L Ed 2d 714 (1977) (defendant who voluntarily went to police station and was questioned by police held not to be “in custody”). See also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420, 441-42, 104 S Ct 3138, 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984) (motorist detained by a police officer pursuant to a routine traffic stop and subjected to roadside questioning and field sobriety tests was not taken into custody for purposes of th eMiranda doctrine); Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 US 9, 11, 109 S Ct 205, 102 L Ed 2d 172 (1988) (“Berkemer’s rule, that ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda,” applied).
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. Adoptive Admission4
[206]*206The state first contends that Lewis’ testimony about Lisa’s accusatory statement (“[y]ou liar, you got [the marks on your arms] from shooting up in the bedroom [where the methamphetamine was found] with all your stupid friends”) and defendant’s nonverbal reaction thereto (“hung his head and shook his head back and forth”) was properly admitted in evidence as an “adoptive admission” under OEC 801(4)(b)(B). Defendant responds that Lewis’ testimony is inadmissible hearsay.5 See OEC 802 (rule against admission of hearsay). He argues, in essence, that his head shaking manifested his rejection, rather than his adoption, of his wife’s accusation.
OEC 801(4)(b)(B) recognizes that a party may make an admission by adopting the statement of another person:
“A statement is not hearsay if:
(($ % iji #
“(b) The statement is offered against a party and is:
U* ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡
“(B) A statement of which the party has manifested the party’s adoption or belief in its truth[.]”
In other words, a statement made by another person is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party who has manifested an adoption of the statement or a belief in its truth. State v. Severson, 298 Or 652, 656, 696 P2d 521 (1985); Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 507 (2d ed 1989). If a party manifests an adoption of a statement of another, the party is in the same position as if the party had personally made the [207]*207statement. The party becomes the declarant,6 and the statement of the other person becomes the party’s. Thus, the receipt in evidence of an adoptive admission involves (1) another person’s hearsay statement7 and (2) a party’s own manifested adoption of the statement.
If a party manifests a belief in the truth of another’s statement, the party is, in effect, expressing the belief that what the person said is true. Thus, the receipt in evidence of a party’s manifested belief in the truth of another’s statement involves (1) another person’s hearsay statement and (2) a party’s own manifested belief in the truth of the statement.
Manifestation of an adoption or belief in the truth of a hearsay statement of another may occur “expressly, impliedly, by conduct or, in a civil case, by silence.” State v. Severson, supra, 298 Or at 657. A party adopts the proffered statement of another person when that party’s words or conduct “indicate that [he or she] ‘intended’ to adopt the statement.” Id. at 660. A party manifests a belief in the truth of another’s statement when the party intends to embrace the truth of the statement, i.e., intends to agree with or approve the contents of the statement. Id. at 658. If a party never intended to adopt, agree with or approve of the contents of a hearsay statement of another person, the party has neither manifested an adoption of it or a belief in its truth. Id. at 658-59. A mere listening presence does not indicate that a party has manifested an adoption of or a belief in the truth of another person’s statement. Louisell & Mueller, 4 Federal Evidence 265, § 524.
When a party unambiguously manifests, by words or conduct, an adoption of or belief in the truth of another’s statement, little difficulty arises in the application of OEC [208]*208801(4)(b)(B). When it is claimed, however, that a party-litigant has manifested an adoption or a belief by nonverbal conduct and the conduct is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the analysis is more complex. In that circumstance, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the hearsay declaration and the party’s nonverbal behavior to determine whether the party intended to adopt, agree with or approve the contents of the declaration. State v. Severson, supra, 298 Or at 657-58.
The proponent of evidence under OEC 801(4)(b)(B) has the burden, after appropriate objection has been raised, of establishing the factual precondition of intent to adopt, agree, or approve. See id. at 658-60; Kirkpatrick, supra, at 508. Whether a party intended to adopt, agree with or approve another person’s statement is a preliminary question of fact to be determined by the trial judge under OEC 104:
“ (1) Preliminaiy questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege or the admissibility of evidence shall he determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. In making its determination, the court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
“(2) When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.”
A threshold question in this case is whether the intent to adopt, agree or approve is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge to decide under OEC 104(1) or a question of conditional relevancy under OEC 104(2).
On all OEC 104(1) preliminary questions, “the judge, on request, will hold a hearing in which each side may produce evidence.” McCormick, Evidence 136, § 53 (3d ed 1984). The judge, who is not bound by evidentiary rules “except those with respect to privileges,” determines the weight and credibility of the evidence and decides whether the standard of proof to be observed in deciding such preliminary questions has been met.
The question of what standard of proof the judge is to use in determining preliminary questions of fact is not specified in OEC 104(1) or in any other provision of the Oregon [209]*209Evidence Code. The Supreme Court of the United States in Bourjaily v. United States, supra, 483 US 171, 175-76, 107 S Ct 2775, 2778-79, 97 L Ed 2d 144 (1987), resolved that issue as to FRE 104(a),8 the federal counterpart to OEC 104(1), holding that the standard is preponderance of the evidence.9 This court has employed the preponderance standard when the preliminary question is for the court under OEC 104(1). See State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 109-10, 806 P2d 110 (1991) (prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that evidence of other crimes is probative of identity based on modus operandi). We also have applied the preponderance test in other contexts. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 137, 806 P2d 92 (1991) (state must prove voluntariness of a consent to search or of a defendant’s statement by a preponderance of the evidence). Accordingly, we hold that the judge is to use the preponderance standard in deciding preliminary questions of fact under OEC 104(1).
“[W]hen dealing with a matter of ‘conditional relevancy,’ [under OEC 104(2)] the judge still has a role, albeit a somewhat limited one, in determining whether the foundation evidence is sufficient for the jury to reasonably find the condition fulfilled.” Cleary, Strong, Brown & Mostellar, Evidence, Cases and Materials 17 (4th ed 1988). If so, the item of evidence is admitted; if not, the evidence is not admitted. Legislative Commentary to Oregon Evidence Code, 40 (1981). In determining a matter of conditional relevancy under OEC 104(2),
“[the judge] ‘neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the [party] has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. * * *’ Huddleston v. United States, [210]*210485 US 681, [690,] 108 S Ct 1496, 1501, 99 L Ed 2d 771, 782-83 (1988). In performing this [Rule 104(2)] function, the court may consider only evidence admissible under the rules of evidence since the jury will have only such evidence before it when it makes the final determination of the existence of the preliminary fact. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 104.2, at 43 (2d ed 1986).”
Cleary, Strong, Brown & Mostellar, supra, at 17.
After the judge decides that the disputed OEC 104(1) preliminary fact has been established by a preponderance of the evidence or that the foundation evidence is sufficient for the jury reasonably to find the contested fact under OEC 104(2), either party may introduce evidence before the jury that is relevant to weight and credibility of the evidence. OEC 104(5).10
Few courts have addressed the issue whether manifestation of an adoption or a belief is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge under a provision comparable to OEC 104(1) or a question of conditional relevancy under a provision comparable to OEC 104(2). Louisell & Mueller, supra, at 294, § 424. Courts, scholars and commentators who have spoken on the issue disagree on the answer. Some suggest that the question is one of conditional relevancy. See, e.g., United States v. Sears, 663 F2d 896, 905 (9th Cir 1981), cert den 455 US 1027, 102 S Ct 1731, 72 L Ed 2d 148 (1982); United States v. Barletta, 652 F2d 218, 219-20 (1st Cir 1981); Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 784, § 801.20 (3d ed 1991); McCormick, supra, at 799 n 14, § 269; but see id. at 135-36, § 53 (author’s language suggests adoption is a question for the trial judge).
Others take the view that the issue is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge under the federal counterpart to OEC 104(1). See, e.g., Wright & Graham, 21 Federal Practice and Procedure 260, § 5053 (judge determines issues including the admissibility of hearsay); McCormick, Evidence 527, § 246 (1954) (implicit in principles stated); Garland & Schmitz, Of Judges and Juries: A Proposed Revision of [211]*211Federal Rule of Evidence 104, 23 UC Davis L Rev 77, 84 (1989).11
For reasons that follow, we hold that whether the party intended to adopt, agree with or approve of the contents of the statement of another, a precondition to the admissibility of evidence offered under OEC 801(4)(b)(B), is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge under OEC 104(1).
First, the wording of OEC 104(1) and the Legislative Commentary to that rule suggest that result. OEC 104(1) assigns to the trial judge the responsibility for making preliminary determinations regarding, inter alia, the “admissibility of evidence.” Intent to adopt, agree or approve is a preliminary fact within the scope of OEC 104(1), because its proof concerns “the admissibility of evidence.” The Legislative Commentary to OEC 104(1) suggests that the admissibility of hearsay is an issue of that kind. Legislative Commentary to Oregon Evidence Code at 39. Two illustrations in the Legislative Commentary of the preliminary decisions to be made by the trial judge under OEC 104(1) are whether a witness whose former testimony is offered under OEC 804(3) (a) is unavailable, as that term is defined in OEC 804(1) and (2), and whether a hearsay statement offered under OEC 804(3)(c) is against the declarant’s interest. Id. The Legislative Commentary also says that “[OEC 104(1)] is consistent with ORCP 59B and ORS 136.310, which provide that the [212]*212Court shall decide ‘all questions of law, including the admissibility of testimony [and] the facts preliminary to such admission[.T ” (Emphasis added.) Id.
Second, “[b]asically, Rule 104 divides the determination of preliminary facts between judge and jury along the rough line between ‘competence’ and ‘relevance,’ though it does not use this terminology.” Wright and Graham, supra, at 259, § 5053. “ ‘Competency,’ [in this context,] refers to whether evidence is admissible under one of the policy-based exclusionary rules[, such as the rule against hearsay.]” Garland & Schmitz, supra, at 93. The intent to adopt, agree or approve involves a prehminary question of fact on which the competency, and thus the admissibility, of the evidence depends.
There exists an even more persuasive reason for holding that the predicate for admissibility of evidence under OEC 801(4)(b)(B) is an OEC 104(1) preliminary question of fact. The objection to admissibility, based on the rule against hearsay, furthers an important legal policy of preventing the trier of fact from considering the possible truthfulness of out-of-court statements, unless the statements have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. The purpose of the hearsay rule is to guard against the risks of misperception, misrecollection, misstatement, and insincerity, which are associated with statements of persons made out of court. Safeguards in the trial procedure, such as the immediate cross-examination of the witness and the opportunity of the trier of fact to observe the demeanor of the witness who swears or affirms under the penalty of perjury to tell the truth, are designed to reduce those risks.
There are several difficulties with leaving the question of intent to adopt, agree or approve to the jury as a question of conditional relevancy under OEC 104(2). If the OEC 104(2) conditional relevancy standard is employed, the legal policy underlying the hearsay rule would be furthered incompletely, if at all. The jury passing on the admission by conduct will have to hear not only evidence about the conduct and the surrounding circumstances, but also the out-of-court statement, as necessary predicates for understanding what the party allegedly adopted. For example, in the present case, the wife’s accusatory statement, to which defendant’s nonverbal conduct is a response, would have to be admitted to [213]*213give meaning to defendant’s conduct, and the accusation is relevant to prove the truth of the accusation even though it may not be admissible for that purpose. A juror could (a) overlookthe question of intent to adopt, agree or approve, and consider the truth of the matter asserted in the out-of-court statement, (b) use the out-of-court statement before considering and resolving the preliminary question of intent to adopt, agree or approve, or (c) consider the hearsay statement regardless of what conclusion is reached on the preliminary question of adoption or belief. See Garland & Schmitz, supra (pointing out these potential risks). If the evidence is inadmissible, i.e., the jury does not find the prefiminary fact (intent to adopt, agree or approve) to exist, preventing jury contamination may prove impossible. Garland & Schmitz, supra, at 94. Additionally, a general verdict would not indicate the jury’s resolution of whether intent to adopt existed. A record for appellate review would require a special set of preliminary jury findings. Id.
In short, we believe that judicial intervention is required to prevent improper use of evidence. The.preliminary question of intent to adopt, agree or approve, therefore, should be left to the trial judge under OEC 104(1).12
In the present case, the preliminary question of fact for resolution by the trial judge under OEC 104(1) was whether the proponent of the evidence, the state, had established by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not) that defendant’s nonverbal reaction to his wife’s accusatory statement manifested defendant’s intention to adopt, agree with or approve of the statement.
In the face of his wife’s accusatory statement, defendant “hung his head and shook his head back and forth.” Although the record discloses that Lewis twice demonstrated defendant’s nonverbal reaction, it does not disclose whether defendant’s shaking his head back and forth was positive or [214]*214negative in character. Defendant essentially testified that he had not intended to adopt, agree with or approve of his wife’s remarks and that he did not see any benefit in arguing with an irrational, mentally ill and angry woman.
Various factual hypotheses are suggested by defendant’s ambiguous, nonverbal reaction. Head shaking back and forth generally means a negative reply. Village of New Hope v. Duplessie, 304 Minn 417, 231 NW 2d 548, 552 (1975) (quoting Bill v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 254 Iowa 1215, 119 NW2d 768, 773 (1963). “[T]he lateral motion might * * * mean merely bewilderment or confusion, an ‘I don’t know’ answer,” id., a reluctance to engage in, or to continue, a dispute with his wife, a decision to stand mute in a situation that was intimidating by the presence of a police officer, or, as the state asserts in this case on appeal, an expression of dismay or resignation that his wife told the police the truth about how defendant obtained the needle marks on his arms.
We view the record consistent with the trial court’s ruling on a preliminaiy question of fact under OEC 104(1), accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices that the trial judge could have made. See State v. Stevens, supra, 311 Or at 127 (if the trial court does not make findings on pertinent historical facts and there is evidence from which those facts could be decided more than one way, this court will presume that the trial court found facts in a manner consistent with its ultimate conclusion); Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968) (same principle). In the circumstances of this case, defendant’s nonverbal reaction is so ambiguous that it cannot reasonably be deemed sufficient to establish that any particular interpretation, consistent with the trial judge’s ruling, is more probably correct. We hold, therefore, that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant intended to adopt, agree with or approve the contents of his wife’s accusatory statement. Accordingly, we hold that evidence of his wife’s hearsay statement and defendant’s nonverbal reaction thereto was not admissible under OEC 801(4)(b)(B).
[215]*215B. Excited Utterance
The state next argues that defendant’s wife’s accusatory statement is admissible as an excited utterance. OEC 803 provides:
“The following are not excluded by [OEC 802, the hearsay rule,] even though the declarant is available as a witness:
£<‡ * * * *
“(2) A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”
Three requirements must be satisfied for a hearsay statement to qualify as an excited utterance: (1) a startling event or condition must have occurred; (2) the statement must have been made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition; and (3) the statement must relate to the startling event or condition. Kirkpatrick, supra, at 533.
Excited utterances are received against a hearsay objection for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated, whether or not the declarant is available as a witness, on the rationale that the excitement caused by the startling event or condition temporarily stills the capacity for reflection and thus produces statements free of conscious fabrication. Legislative Commentary to Oregon Evidence Code at 154; McCormick, supra, at 855, § 297. See also State v. Hutchison, 222 Or 533, 537, 353 P2d 1047, 1049 (1960) (preOregon Evidence Code case stating essentially same rationale). The Supreme Court of the United States recently expressed the rationale:
“The basis for the ‘excited utterance’ exception * * * is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous.”
Idaho v. Wright, 497 US_,_, 110 S Ct 3139, 3149, 111 L Ed 2d 638, 655 (1990).13
[216]*216As is true of statements of a party opponent, the admissibility of a hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception is to be resolved by the trial judge. Legislative Commentary to Oregon Evidence Code at 155; Kirkpatrick, supra, at 533; Louisell & Mueller, supra, at 517, § 439. The trial judge, in other words, must determine whether the proponent of the evidence has established that the three requirements to the excited utterance exception have been met. Kirkpatrick, supra, at 533. Once again the procedure is that which OEC 104(1) prescribes. Id.
In this case, as previously stated, the trial court admitted Lisa’s accusatory hearsay statement, over defendant’s inadmissible hearsay objection. The trial court did not, however, make findings on the preliminary questions of admissibility under OEC 104(1). We assume, therefore, that the trial judge concluded that the evidence, more likely than not, established the necessary predicate facts for admitting Lisa’s hearsay statement as an excited utterance under OEC 803(2). That is to say, we assume that the trial judge concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a startling event, that Lisa’s statement was made while she was under the stress of excitement caused by the event, and that Lisa’s statement related to the event.
The “startling event or condition” “is the catalyst that shocks the witness’ senses, thereby rendering the witness’ resulting statement sincere and trustworthy.” Rice, Evidence: Common Law and Federal Rules of Evidence 517 (2d ed 1990). The “startling-event-or.-condition” prerequisite has two components: the occurrence of an event or condition and its startling nature. Whether an event or condition is sufficiently startling cannot be determined from the nature of the event or condition itself. For the purposes of the excited utterance exception, an event or condition is not inherently startling. The startling-nature component is a relational concept, i.e., whether an event is sufficiently startling to qualify cannot be determined without focusing on the event’s effect on the declarant.
Often, the very nature of the event or condition (e.g., a violent criminal assault or an automobile accident) will indicate its startling character. The sufficiency of those events or conditions to qualify as startling is, therefore, [217]*217seldom questioned. McCormick, supra, at 855. An event or condition that does not by its nature indicate a startling quality may, nevertheless, qualify. In determining whether a particular event or condition is startling, the standard is primarily subjective, i.e., the trial judge should “look primarily to the effect [of the event or condition] upon the declarant.” Id.; Louisell & Mueller, supra, at 495, § 439; Rice, supra, at 517; United States v. Napier, 518 F2d 316 (9th Cir), cert den 423 US 895, 96 S Ct 196, 46 L Ed 2d 128 (1975). According to Rice, supra, at 517:
“The court * * * must focus on the effect of an event on the individual declarant. The fact that some individuals might not have been excited by the incident does not bar admission under the [excited utterance] exception. The contrary is also true. If the declarant was not excited by the event, it is irrelevant that most individuals would have been. Of course, the courts use events that are generally considered to be exciting as objective guideposts. Consequently, courts consider accidents and altercations to be exciting, and absent special circumstances or evidence to the contrary, will assume a declarant’s reaction to them to he that of the average person.”
The uniquely subjective nature of the determination of what constitutes a sufficiently startling event is vividly illustrated in United States v. Napier, supra. In Napier, about one week after returning home from seven weeks of hospitalization necessitated by an assault, the victim, on being shown a newspaper article, said, “[h]e killed me, he killed me.” The Napier court held that “[t]he display of the photograph * * * qualifie[d] as a sufficiently ‘startling’ event” and admitted the victim’s statement as an excited utterance under FRE 803(2), the federal counterpart to OEC 803(2). Id. at 318.
In the present case, evidence in the record supports a finding that defendant’s statement to Lewis, that the marks on defendant’s arms were not needle marks but were “injuries [that] he [had] received from working on a car[,]” was a falsehood. Although the expression of that falsehood does not by its nature indicate excitement, its apparent actual effect on Lisa, on the facts of this case, qualifies it as a sufficiently “startling event.” Lisa, who was described by Lewis as “being tired,” “fairly depressed,” “distraught,” “at wit’s end,” being occasionally tearful, and “coming down off of methamphetamine,” was present during the conversation that [218]*218took place between defendant and Lewis and close enough to hear what was being said. According to Lewis, she did not seem to care whether Lewis found drugs in her home or arrested her. She did not react to or interrupt the conversation between defendant and Lewis until she heard defendant utter the falsehood. Upon hearing that falsehood, she immediately became ‘ ‘upset” and broke in by yelling her accusatory statement.
The spontaneity-of-the-utterance requirement, i.e., the requirement that the statement of the declarant be “made while the declarant was under the stress caused by the event or condition,” has both a causal and a temporal dimension. The declarant’s excitement must have been caused by the startling event, and the declarant’s statement must have been made while the excitement persisted. OEC 803(2). See State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 59, 786 P2d 111 (1990) (“OEC 803(2) * * * creates an exception to the hearsay rule for statements by a person laboring under the stress of an event or condition which caused excitement”).14 Criteria that bear on the trial court’s determination of the spontaneity of the utterance are “lapse of time, place, content of the utterance, physical or mental condition of the declarant, whether made in response to an inquiry, and presence or absence of a motive to fabricate.” Cleary, Strong, Brown & Mosteller, supra, at 752. See Graham, supra, at 839, § 803.2 (stating essentially the same criteria).
As we observed in our discussion of the “startling event” prerequisite, there is ample evidence in the record to support a finding that Lisa’s excitement was caused by the startling event (defendant’s expression of the falsehood) and that Lisa’s accusatory statement was made while that excitement persisted. Her accusatory statement was a contemporaneous, unsolicited, spontaneous reaction, rather than the result of reflective thought. Arguably, Lisa was motivated to deflect suspicion from herself to defendant. Testimony that Lisa did not care whether the officer found drugs in her home [219]*219or arrested her justify a rejection of that inference, however. Evidence in the record, therefore, supports a finding that Lisa’s statement was made while she was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event.
Finally, Lisa’s statement related to the startling event. The admissibility of Lisa’s statement as an excited utterance under OEC 803(2) is not defeated because it contains a conclusion or opinion, State v. Moen, supra, 309 Or at 61; Graham, supra, at 839, or accuses defendant of committing a crime. Graham, supra; State v. Hutchison, supra, 222 Or at 533.
Evidence in the record supports the conclusion, therefore, that, more likely than not, Lisa’s accusatory statement was made while she was under the stress of excitement caused by the event and that Lisa’s statement related to the event. The trial court did not, therefore, err in permitting Lewis to testify, over defendant’s inadmissible hearsay objection, about Lisa’s statement.
In stating his objection to the trial court, defendant did not segregate inadmissible portions of Lewis’ testimony about defendant’s nonverbal reaction from Lisa’s accusatory statement. An objection to evidence as a whole is insufficient as a basis for reversal on appeal when any part of the evidence objected to is admissible. State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 358-59, 800 P2d 259 (1990); State v. Madison, 290 Or 573, 580, 624 P2d 599 (1981).
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.