Soreide v. Vilas & Company

Supreme Court of Iowa

Soreide v. Vilas & Company

78 N.W.2d 41, 247 Iowa 1139, 1956 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 369

CourtSupreme Court of Iowa

DecidedJuly 26, 1956

Docket48951

StatusPublished

Cited by71 cases

This text of 78 N.W.2d 41 (Soreide v. Vilas & Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Soreide v. Vilas & Company, 78 N.W.2d 41, 247 Iowa 1139, 1956 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 369 (iowa 1956).

Pincite

Opinions

G-areibld, J.

These two law actions, consolidated for trial, resulted from a nighttime collision of two automobiles at or near a “Y” intersection of paved primary highways on May 21, 1954. One action is for damages to the Chevrolet car of plaintiff Standard Oil Company, the other for damages to the estate of the employee-driver of that vehicle, Edwin S. Soreide, killed in the collision. Defendants are Vilas & Company, owner, and Oliver W. Vilas, driver, of the other car, a Cadillac. There was a jury verdict and judgment for each plaintiff from which defendants have appealed.

The collision occurred on east-and-west U. S. Highway 20 near the place where the west branch of the “Y” approach from Iowa Highway 110 joins 20 from the north. Highway 110 does not go farther south. The Vilas Cadillac was proceeding east on 20. Mr. Vilas intended to turn north onto 110 over the west branch of the “Y.” Vilas, sole surviving eyewitness to the crash, testifies the Chevrolet came down the west fork of 110, “didn’t stop at the intersection, came right through onto 20, across in my (south) lane and crashed into my car.”

Plaintiffs’ cases necessarily rest on circumstantial evidence consisting primarily of tire and other marks upon, or near Highway 20 and physical facts at the scene of the collision from which plaintiffs claim the jury could properly find the Chevrolet did not come down the west branch of the “Y” as Vilas testifies but was traveling west on 20 and Vilas negligently caused the collision by driving on the wrong (north) side of the center line where the cars collided.

Questions presented on appeal are whether the court erred in admitting evidence of marks upon the highway and in overrul[1143]*1143ing defendants’ motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding verdict, and new trial. It is also claimed the judgment on the verdict for $50,000 in the Soreide case is excessive.

I. Of course plaintiffs had the burden to prove the collision and resulting damage were caused by the negligence of Vilas in one or more of the respects alleged by them and that Soreide was free from contributory negligence.

Since the parties disagree as to the requisite degree of proof in a ease resting on circumstantial evidence we will repeat what so many recent decisions say on that point. The evidence must be such as to make plaintiffs’ theory of causation reasonably probable, not merely possible, and more probable than any other theory based on such evidence.' It is not necessary the testimony be so clear as to exclude every other possible theory. Turner v. Hansen, 247 Iowa 669, 677, 75 N.W.2d 341, 345; Bokhoven v. Hull, 247 Iowa 604, 607, 75 N.W.2d 225, 227, and citations; Whiting v. Stephas, 247 Iowa 473, 479, 74 N.W.2d 228, 231, 232; Shinofield v. Curtis, 245 Iowa 1352, 1357, 66 N.W.2d 465, 468, 50 A. L. R.2d 964, and citations.

Hackman v. Beckwith, 245 Iowa 791, 795, 64 N.W.2d 275, 278, adds following the statement of the above rule: “But this means only the evidence must be such as to raise a jury question within the limits of the foregoing rule; it need not be conclusive.”

In considering defendants’ contention the testimony is insufficient for submission to the jury of course we view it in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Weilbrenner v. Owens, 246 Iowa 580, 582, 68 N.W.2d 293, 294, and citation; Hackman v. Beckwith, supra.

II. We disagree with the contention defendants stress that an inference may not be based upon another inference or upon a fact the existence of which itself rests upon an inference. While some authorities use substantially the statement defendants urge upon us it is unsound and, like many other courts, we have rejected it. Inferences may legitimately rest on facts established by other inferences. What is meant by the alleged rule for which defendants contend is merely that an inference may not be based upon evidence which is too un[1144]*1144certain or speculative or raises only a conjecture or possibility. See Martin v. Bankers Life Co., 216 Iowa 1022, 1036-38, 250 N.W. 220, 226, 227; Welsch v. Charles Frusch L. & P. Co., 197 Iowa 1012, 1021-22, 193 N.W. 427, 431; Fegles Constr. Co. v. McLaughlin Constr. Co., 9 Cir., Mont., 205 F.2d 637, 640, and citations; Toliver v. United States, 9 Cir., Cal., 224 F.2d 742, 745; annotations 95 A.L.R. 162, 182, 187, 188; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., section 41; 1 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, 2d Ed., section 364; 31 C. J. S., Evidence, section 116b, page 730; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, section 165, page 169.

Fegles Constr. Co. v. McLaughlin Constr. Co., supra, cites numerous decisions from different jurisdictions for the statement “The fallacy that an inference may not be based on another inference has been frequently repudiated by the courts * >£ >%

III. Defendants argue it was error to admit evidence, said to be “inherently improbable or impossible”, of marks upon and near Highway 20 which plaintiffs claim show the Chevrolet was traveling west on 20 in its right (north) lane and the collision occurred there. The evidence referred to describes a fresh tire mark 74 feet 10 inches long in the north lane of 20, starting 4% feet west of a V-shaped blacktop area north of Highway 20 and southeast of the west approach from 110. The west three feet of the mark were smeared. The mark is shown by the broken line designated “B” on the accompanying plat, prepared from an exhibit. About three feet south of the west end of the long tire mark, a little south of the center of the north lane, there was a fresh crescent-shaped gouge in the concrete pavement, about two feet long and one-fourth inch deep. “It was bright and new. Just happened.” This gouge is marked “A” on the accompanying plat. Northwest of the gouge there was a fresh tire mark, designated “C” on the plat, on the north curb of 20 at the west side of a lane leading to a farmstead. “It looked similar to this long skid mark.” The Soreide car came to rest where the rectangle north of the highway, marked “S”, appears on the plat. On a directTine between the tire mark “C” and the wrecked Chevrolet the sod was freshly torn in several places. “It looked as though an object had skidded across the grass and plowed it out.”

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