BATTAGLIA, Judge.
This case arises out of a civil suit premised upon Section 14-3002 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code, which prohibits conspiring to disseminate unauthorized, false, [5]*5or misleading information via electronic mail (“e-mail”). Because we determine that Petitioner, Beyond Systems, Inc. (“BSI”), did not establish a prima facie case that Respondents, KDMS International, LLC (“KDMS”) and Realtime Gaming Holding Company, LLC (“Realtime Gaming”), possess the requisite minimum contacts amounting to purposefully availing themselves of the benefits of conducting business in Maryland, we agree with the Circuit Court’s ruling that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Respondents. Moreover, we conclude that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner discoveiy on the personal jurisdiction issue and striking the amended complaint.
Background
KDMS, a business that develops interactive 1 proprietary software2 used in the online gaming industry, is a limited liability company (“LLC”) formed under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Realtime Gaming, the holding company for KDMS, is a limited liability company formed under the laws of the State of Georgia with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. The two businesses share the same President and Chief Executive Officer, Michael Staw.
As part of Realtime Gaming’s sales and marketing strategy for the KDMS software, Realtime Gaming entered into an exclusive licensing agreement with Montana Overseas, a Panamanian corporation, by which Montana Overseas would be responsible for issuing licenses for the use of KDMS’s soft[6]*6ware. Through the licensing process with Montana Overseas, windowscasino.com, which is owned by ADLM Ltd. based in St. Helier, Jersey, United Kingdom, obtained the right to use the KDMS software in its online casino. Windowscasino.com is an interactive online casino that promotes only the games designed by KDMS.
In March of 2003, Travis Thom, a resident of Albuquerque, New Mexico, found an advertisement on the Internet for “www.windowscasino.com.” The advertisement explained how individuals could become “affiliates” of windowscasino.com for a small investment and make money by referring players to windowscasino.com’s website. During the first two weeks of March, Thom contacted windowscasino.com by telephone and spoke to a sales associate for windowscasino.com about becoming an “affiliate.” The employee described the relationship with windowscasino.com and informed Thom that he would have to purchase a “Casino-To-Go Private Label Package” for $999.00 plus applicable taxes.
Around March 14, 2003, Thom visited the www.windowscasino.com website and completed an “affiliate” application to make the purchase, which was confirmed the next day by a windowscasino.com employee through e-mail. Upon receipt of the “Casino-To-Go Private Label Package,” Thom created a name for his affiliate webpage, www.goldenrhinocasino.com, which he registered in his own name with Yahoo! Domains,3 a service that registers names of websites. Windowscasino.com then designed Thom’s webpage, with his input regarding the aesthetics, but not the content or function. Thom’s webpage directed players to the windowscasino.com website where gamblers downloaded the software designed by KDMS, which was retrieved from an IP address (Internet Protocol address) [7]*7registered to KDMS. In return for directing individuals to windowscasino.com, Thom would be compensated with 45% of referred players’ losses and up to a $40.00 “bounty” per player who deposited funds to gamble at windowscasino.com.
On April 14, 2003, Thom contracted with a bulk e-mail solicitation service, Omega One Media, Inc., to send 2.5 million unsolicited e-mail advertisements.4 He paid windowscasino.com an additional fee to write and design the e-mails. On April 26, 2003, sixteen e-mail addresses used by employees of BSI each received fifteen such unsolicited commercial e-mails over a twenty-four hour period, for a total of 240 e-mails, advertising the Golden Rhino Casino.
On December 31, 2003, BSI filed a complaint against Real-time Gaming, KDMS, and an unknown co-defendant in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and alleged violations of Maryland Code (2002, 2004 Cum.Supp.), Section 14-3002 of the Commercial Law Article.5 On April 16, 2004, Realtime [8]*8Gaming and KDMS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative a motion for summary judgment. In support of their motion, Realtime Gaming and KDMS attached an affidavit from their mutual President and CEO, Michael Staw (“Staw”) who asserted that Realtime Gaming functions solely as a holding company for KDMS and does not engage in any other business activities, and that KDMS has conducted no business in Maryland. BSI filed a memorandum in opposition to Realtime Gaming and KDMS’s motion and attached a supporting affidavit from BSI’s owner, Paul Wagner (“Wagner”), in which he asserts various conclusory statements concerning the existence of an agency relationship between Realtime Gaming, KDMS, and windowscasino.com.6 On May 21, 2004, Realtime Gaming and KDMS filed a reply memorandum, attempting to refute BSPs allegations.
On May 26, 2004, the Circuit Court held a hearing and, at the hearing’s close, stated its intention to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. On June 2, 2004, the court issued a written order that dismissed BSPs complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over Realtime Gaming and KDMS and did not specify that BSI would have leave to amend the complaint.7 On June 11, 2004, BSI filed a motion [9]*9for reconsideration with an amended complaint attached. In the amended complaint, BSI made specific allegations regarding the connection between Realtime Gaming, KDMS, windowscasino.com, and Thom through a server and IP address registered to KDMS. It also alleged a significant relationship among Realtime Gaming, KDMS, and a network of sub-licensees, one of which assisted in the transmission of the emails at issue. Moreover, it named Travis Thom as an additional defendant who caused the e-mails in question to be sent.
Realtime Gaming and KDMS, in turn, filed a motion opposing BSPs motion for reconsideration and seeking to have the amended complaint stricken. In so doing, Realtime Gaming and KDMS asserted that BSI offered no new facts that would establish personal jurisdiction over them. On September 21, 2004, the Circuit Court denied BSPs motion for reconsideration and granted the motion to strike the amended complaint.
On October 20, 2004, BSI filed its notice of appeal.8 Prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, BSI, on [10]*10November 22, 2004, filed a petition for writ of certiorari containing the following questions:
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing Petitioner’s claims against Respondents under the Maryland anti-spam statute, § 14-8001 et seq. of the Commercial Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, for initiating, conspiring to initiate, or assisting in the transmission of 240 e-mails advertising Respondents’ business, for lack of personal jurisdiction?
2. Did the trial court err in denying Petitioner’s request to take discovery as to the nature and extent of Respondents’ contacts with Maryland for purposes of personal jurisdiction under the facts described above?
3. Did the trial court err in striking the amended complaint containing detailed allegations of fact, including facts relevant to the issue of personal jurisdiction?
On December 17, 2004, we granted the petition and issued the writ. Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Company, LLC, 384 Md. 448, 863 A.2d 997 (2004).9 Because [11]*11we concur with the trial court’s determination that BSI has failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, we hold that the Circuit Court properly determined that the action could not proceed to trial. Moreover, we determine that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in denying BSI’s request for discovery.
Standard of Review
The trial court dismissed BSI’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over Realtime Gaming and KDMS under Maryland Rule 2-322(a) and (c), which state in pertinent part:
(a) Mandatory. The following defenses shall be made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (2) improper venue, (3) insufficiency of process, and (4) insufficiency of service of process. If not so made and the answer is filed, these defenses are waived.
(c) Disposition. If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 2-501, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 2-501.
Md. Rule 2-322(a) and (c).
As Judge Paul V. Niemeyer notes in his Maryland Rules Commentary, Third Edition, all of the defenses listed in Maryland Rule 2-322(a) are collateral to the merits and raise [12]*12questions of law. Judge Paul Y. Niemeyér and Linda Shuett, Maryland Rules Commentary, Third Edition 205 (2003). If facts are necessary in deciding the motion, the court may consider affidavits or other evidence adduced during an evidentiary hearing. Id.10
Discussion
BSI argues that it has made a prima facie showing of minimum contacts with Maryland that is sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. To that end, BSI notes that it received 240 e-mails from an individual promoting goldenrhinocasino.com, a website that contained links to download KDMS’s software from an IP address assigned to KDMS, which corresponds to a server owned by KDMS and Realtime Gaming. BSI notes that the same IP address and server are also promoted on the windowscasino.com website, which powered the goldenrhinocasino.com web page. From these allegations, and windowscasino.com’s involvement in the design of the goldenrhinocasino.com website and the e-mails, BSI concludes that Realtime Gaming and KDMS are directly involved in running windowscasino.com, and therefore, were involved in the transmission of the e-mails in question. Thus, BSI asserts that it has satisfied the prima facie showing required for the Circuit Court to properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Realtime Gaming and KDMS pursuant to Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir.1989).
BSI further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying it discovery concerning personal jurisdiction. According to BSI, the jurisdictional issue is inextricably inter[13]*13twined with the merits of the case, and therefore, the court should have permitted the action to proceed with discovery. BSI states that to do otherwise is inequitable.
Finally, BSI asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in striking the amended complaint because the facts alleged therein and supporting materials showed that Realtime Gaming and KDMS had sufficient contacts with Maryland to support personal jurisdiction. BSI contends that permitting the amended complaint to stand would not have prejudiced Realtime Gaming or -KDMS, and that the court ignored the principle that leave to amend generally should be granted.
Conversely, Realtime Gaming and KDMS argue that BSI has not demonstrated a prima facie case of specific personal jurisdiction or general personal jurisdiction. Realtime Gaming and KDMS assert that BSI has not pointed to any evidence showing an agency or subsidiary relationship between them and windowscasino.com or Travis Thom, the individual who arranged for the e-mails to be sent. Moreover, Realtime Gaming and KDMS contend that neither company has any contacts with the State of Maryland, i.e., are not incorporated in Maryland, do not conduct business in Maryland, and were not involved in the transmission of the e-mails at issue, and as such, are not subject to specific or general personal jurisdiction.
Realtime Gaming and KDMS also argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied BSI’s request for discovery. They assert that BSI provided no basis upon which to grant discovery beyond conclusory allegations and bald-faced assertions of jurisdiction. Ultimately, Realtime Gaming and KDMS characterize BSI’s desire for discovery as a fishing expedition.
Finally, in response to BSI’s arguments concerning the striking of the amended complaint, Realtime Gaming and KDMS contend that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied BSI’s request for leave to amend. They argue that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion because the amended complaint was based on facts that were already [14]*14before the court, and therefore, could not cure the fatal defects in BSI’s action.
Conditions for Personal Jurisdiction
Whether a court may exert personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant entails dual considerations. First, we consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized under Maryland’s long arm statute, Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 6-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.11 See [15]*15Lamprecht v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 262 Md. 126, 130, 277 A.2d 272, 275 (1971); Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir.2003); Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir.2001). Our second task is to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lamprecht, 262 Md. at 130, 277 A.2d at 275; Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 396; Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., 259 F.3d at 215. We have consistently held that the purview of the long arm statute is coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction set by the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. See e.g., Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md. 653, 657, 370 A.2d 551, 553 (1977); Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 224, 352 A.2d 818, 821 (1976); Lamprecht, 262 Md. at 130, 277 A.2d at 275.
BSI alleges that the e-mails at issue in the present case violate the Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail Act (“MCEMA”), Md.Code (2002, 2004 Cum.Supp.), §§ 14-3001 to 14-3003 of the Commercial Law Article, which provides for a private cause of action to seek redress for tortious injury arising from the receipt of misleading or fraudulent, unsolicited, commercial e-mail. Section 14-3002 provides in pertinent part:
(b) Prohibition. — A person may not initiate the transmission, conspire with another person to initiate the transmission, or assist in the transmission of commercial electronic mail that:
(1) Is from a computer in the State or is sent to an electronic mail address that the sender knows or should have known is held by a resident of the State; and
[16]*16(2)(i) Uses a third part’s Internet domain name or electronic mail address without the permission of the third party;
(ii) Contains false or misleading information about the origin or the transmission path of the commercial electronic mail; or
(iii) Contains false or misleading information in the subject line that has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving the recipient.
Md.Code (2002, 2004 Cum Supp.), § 14-3002 if the Commercial Law Article. This statute was enacted in 2002 by the General Assembly in an effort to curb the dissemination of false or misleading information through unsolicited, commercial e-mail, as a deceptive business practice. Economic Matters Committee, FI. Rpt., HB 915, at 2. At the time of the statute’s enactment, twenty-one other states had already enacted some form of statutory scheme to address the proliferation of “spam.” 12 See Spam Laws: Summary, Bill File, HB 915. Thus, BSI asserts that the e-mails and their content [17]*17provide the basis for the trial court to assert personal jurisdiction through the long arm statute.
The Maryland long arm statute, Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Supp.), Section 6-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, was first enacted in 1964 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).13 This statute, codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Cum.Supp.), Article 75 Section 96, provided:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s
(1) transacting any business in this State;
(2) contracting to supply services in this State;
(3) causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission in this State;
(4) causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in this State or derives substantial revenue from food or services used or consumed in this State;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State; [or]
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of contracting;
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely on this section.
[18]*18In 1965, the Section was amended to add language to subsection (b) that had been omitted inadvertently, see 1965 Md. Laws, Chap. 749, so that subsection (b) read:
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.
Md.Code (1957, 1965 Cum.Supp.), Art 75 § 96(b). In 1968, subsection (a)(6) was amended to state:
(a)(6) contracting to insure or act as a surety for, or on, any person, property, or risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed or to be performed within this State at the time of contracting, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
Md.Code (1957, 1968 Repl.Vol.), Art. 75 § 96(a)(6). As part of the recodification effort, in 1973, the General Assembly revised this Section and renumbered it as Section 6-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article:
(a) Condition. If jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, he may only be sued on a cause of action arising from any act enumerated in this section.
(b) In general. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or by an agent:
(1) transacts any business or performs any character of work or services in this State;
(2) contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in the State;
(3) causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission in this State;
(4) causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods, food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed in the State;
(5) has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property in the State; or
[19]*19(6) Contracts to insure or act as a surety for, or on, any person, property, risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within the State at the time the contract is made, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
Md.Code (1973), § 6-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. According to the commentary published with the statute, the long arm statute was intended to give Maryland courts jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Federal Constitution. 1973 Md. Laws, 1st Sp. Sess., Chap. 2 § 1.
In 2000, the General Assembly amended the long arm statute for the final time with the Maryland Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act and, added current subsection (c) to expand the courts’ jurisdiction over “computer information” and “computer programs.” 2000 Md. Laws, Chap. 11 (“specifying that provisions of law granting jurisdiction over a person in a cause of action include certain computer information and computer information transactions”). Current subsection (c) of the long arm statute provides:
(c) Applicability to computer information and computer programs. — (l)(i) In this subsection the following terms have the meanings indicated.
(ii) “Computer information” has the meaning stated in § 22-102 of the Commercial Law Article.
(iii) “Computer program” has the meaning stated in § 22-102 of the Commercial Law Article.
(2) The provisions of this section apply to computer information and computer programs in the same manner as they apply to goods and services.
Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 6-103(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. “Computer information” and “computer program” are defined as follows under the Maryland Code:
(10) “Computer information” means information in electronic form which is obtained from or through the use of a computer or which is in a form capable of being processed by a computer. The term includes a copy of the information [20]*20and any documentation or packaging associated with the copy.
* * *
(12) “Computer program” means a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result. The term does not include separately identifiable informational content.
Md.Code (2004 Cum.Supp.), §§ 22-102(10) and (12) of the Commercial Law Article.
Although e-mails brought the present case to court, the gravamen of the personal jurisdiction issue for the purposes of the long arm statute arise out of advertisements for licensed proprietary software for use on computers, which require the user to download the program from a remote source. The software at issue “consists only of machine-readable code” to execute a certain action on the user’s computer. Black’s Law Dictionary, “proprietary software” (8th ed.2004). Thus, conducting business in Maryland that involves supplying computer programs or information to Maryland residents will be treated in the same manner as if the programs and information were tangible goods or services provided by a business. Advertising the software at issue may form the basis of personal jurisdiction under the Maryland long arm statute based upon the definition of “computer program.” Before we explore the issue of whether the minimum contacts test has been met, however, a discussion of the characteristics of the Internet is warranted.
The Internet
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997), the Supreme Court provided its explanation of the Internet as:
an international network of interconnected computers. It is the outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called “ARPANET,” [an acronym for the network developed by the Advanced Research Project Agency] which was [21]*21designed to enable computers operated by the military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to communicate with one another by redundant channels even if some portions of the network were damaged in a war.
While the ARPANET no longer exists, it provided an example for the development of a number of civilian networks that, eventually linking with each other, now enable tens of millions of people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information from around the world.
Id. at 849-50, 117 S.Ct. at 2334, 138 L.Ed.2d at 884.
Because the Internet is a global network of computers, “each computer connected to the Internet must have a unique address,” Rus Shuler, How Does the Internet Work? (White-paper 2002),14 known as an Internet Protocol Address, which “can be used to identify the source of the connection” to the Internet. United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 625 n. 4 (8th Cir.2005).
When connected to the Internet, computers communicate with each other through the use of a “protocol[15] stack,” which is usually the “TCP/IP protocol stack.” For example, when someone is sending an e-mail, the e-mail message enters through the Application Protocols Layer, which corresponds to specific programs such as browsers for using the World Wide Web and e-mail. The message then enters the Transmission Control Protocol (“TCP”), which directs certain information to a specific application or program on a computer using a port. From the TCP layer of the protocol stack, the message then moves into the Internet Protocol Layer, which directs the message to a specific computer using an IP address. The final step in the process prior to entering the Internet is for [22]*22the Hardware Layer to convert the message from binary data to network signals.
The message is then transmitted via an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) which examines the IP address of the message and routes the information to the computer with the proper IP address. When the message reaches its intended recipient, the receiving computer reverses the TCP/IP protocol stack and the message is decoded.
Constitutional Considerations in Personal Jurisdiction
Because we have consistently held that the reach of the long arm statute is coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction delineated under the due process clause of the Federal Constitution, our statutory inquiry merges with our constitutional examination. See Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md. at 656, 370 A.2d at 553; Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 396-97. A court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies due process requirements if the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum, so that to require the defendant to defend its interests in the forum state “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945).
General Personal Jurisdiction
The standard for determining the existence of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant depends upon whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum state also provide the basis for the suit. If the defendant’s contacts with the State are not the basis for the suit, then jurisdiction over the defendant must arise from the defendant’s general, more persistent contacts with the State. “To establish general jurisdiction, the defendant’s activities in the State must have been ‘continuous and systematic.’ ” Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 397, quoting ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105, 123 S.Ct. 868, 154 L.Ed.2d 773 (2003); see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & n. 9, 104
[23]*23S.Ct. 1868, 1872 & n. 9, 80 L.Ed.2d 404, 411 & n. 9 (1984). BST has alleged both general and specific personal jurisdiction over Realtime Gaming and KDMS.
With respect to Maryland’s ability to exercise general personal jurisdiction over Realtime Gaming and KDMS, BSI alleges that Realtime Gaming’s website is “highly interactive” and permits the corporation to solicit business in Maryland, enter contracts, conduct sales, and accrue profits. Moreover, BSI asserts that the fact that the site links to other websites that have links to download KDMS’s gaming software, which may be in use in Maryland, creates lines of communication with people in Maryland and sources of substantial revenue.
The first case explicating a model framework for exploring whether websites on the Internet can be used as a basis for conferring personal jurisdiction on the courts is Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa.1997). See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir.2003) (stating that Zippo “has become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an Internet website”); Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 399 (noting that Zippo “first enunciated that court’s influential ‘sliding scale’ model” for applying personal jurisdiction requirements to electronic commerce); Sublett v. Wallin, 136 N.M. 102, 94 P.3d 845, 851 (App.2004) (observing that the sliding scale of interactivity was first articulated in Zippo). In Zippo, an action arising out of a trademark violation alleged by Zippo Manufacturing Co., which produces lighters, against Zippo Dot Com, Inc., an online news service, the court suggested the use of a “sliding scale” of personal jurisdiction that is “directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1124. The Zippo court described it as a “spectrum” which:
[a]t one end ... are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. E.g., [24]*24CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.1996). At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posed information on an Internet Website which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Website that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. E.g., Bensusan Restaurant Coiy. v. King, 937 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.1996). The middle ground is occupied by interactive Websites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site. E.g., Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 1328 (E.D.Mo. 1996).
Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1124.
In Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 1328 (E.D.Mo.1996), the defendant hosted a website as a promotion for the launch of its Internet service. Although the service was not operational, visitors to the site were encouraged to add their address to a mailing list to receive its updates about the service. Id. at 1330. The plaintiff brought suit to recover for copyright infringement based upon the website’s availability to consumers in Missouri. In rejecting the defendant’s contention that it operated a “passive website,” the court reasoned that the defendant’s conduct amounted to “active solicitations” and “promotional activities” designed to “develop a mailing list of Internet users” and that the defendant “indiscriminately responded to every user” who accessed the site. Id. at 1333-34.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the court in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.1996), concluded that the website at issue in that case did not enable the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The Internet website in issue contained general information about the defendant’s club, a calendar of events, and ticket information. Id. at 297. The site was not interactive, and if a user wanted to go to the club, she would have to call or visit a [25]*25ticket outlet and then pick up tickets at the club on the night of the show. Id.
BSI contends that it has established a prima facie case for general jurisdiction based upon the Zippo sliding scale of interactivity of websites. In the proceedings before the trial court, BSI alleged that Realtime Gaming and KDMS’s website is highly interactive without further factual support illustrating its interactivity or its use by residents of Maryland. In light of the dearth of evidence to the contrary, we find that the trial court’s determination that Realtime Gaming and KDMS’s website is not “highly interactive” is not clearly erroneous. Moreover, the Zippo scale is not particularly well-suited for use in the general personal jurisdiction inquiry16 because “even repeated contacts with forum residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute the requisite substantial, continuous and systematic contacts required for a finding of general jurisdiction.” Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2000) (“[Ejngaging in commerce with residents of the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical presence within the state’s borders”).
Irrespective of the sliding scale delineated in Zippo, the question of general jurisdiction is not difficult to resolve. Though the maintenance of a website is, conceivably, a continuous presence everywhere, the existence of a website alone is not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction in Maryland over Realtime Gaming and KDMS. BSI provided the trial court with no evidence beyond Realtime Gaming and KDMS’s website, to establish substantial, continuous, systematic contacts with Maryland. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that it lacked general jurisdiction over Realtime Gaming and KDMS.
[26]*26Specific Personal Jurisdiction
If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state form the basis for the suit, however, they may establish “specific jurisdiction.” Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 397. In determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, we consider (1) the extent to which the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable. Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 397; ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 711-12; see Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 & n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at 1872 & n. 8, 80 L.Ed.2d at 411 & n. 8.
BSI asserts that it has established a prima facie case for specific jurisdiction over Realtime Gaming and KDMS because it has alleged that Realtime Gaming and KDMS own or control windowscasino.com, the company that assisted Thom in designing the website for the Golden Rhino Casino and the unsolicited commercial e-mails that BSI received. In support of this assertion, BSI notes that windowscasino.com has a link that leads to an IP address that is registered to Realtime Gaming and KDMS and that the e-mails at issue contained a link which ultimately led to the same IP address.
Specifically, BSI must make a prima facie showing that an agency or contractual relationship exists between Realtime Gaming and KDMS and windowscasino.com. See Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 6-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. An agency relationship “is a legal concept which depends upon the existence of required factual elements: the manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent’s acceptance of the undertaking and the understanding of the parties that the principal is to be in control of the undertaking.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1, cmt. (1958); see Insurance Company of North America v. Miller, 362 Md. 361, 373, 765 A.2d 587, 593 (2001); Green v. H & R Block, Inc., 355 Md. 488, 503, 735 A.2d 1039, 1047 (1999). Although such a relationship is not necessarily [27]*27contractual in nature, it is always consensual. Insurance Co. Of N. Amer., 362 Md. at 373, 765 A.2d at 593, citing Lohmuller Bldg. Co. v. Gamble, 160 Md. 534, 539, 154 A. 41, 43 (1931). The ultimate question is one of intent, of both the principal and the agent. Id.; Howard Cleaners v. Perman, 227 Md. 291, 295, 176 A.2d 235, 237 (1961). We have recognized three factors as having particular relevance to the determination of an agency relationship. These factors are:
(1) The agent’s power to alter the legal relations of the principal;
(2) The agent’s duty to act primarily for the benefit of the principal; and
(3) The principal’s right to control the agent.
Green, 355 Md. at 503, 735 A.2d at 1048, citing United Capitol Ins. v. Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488, 498 (4th Cir.1998); Proctor v. Holden, 75 Md.App. 1, 20, 540 A.2d 133, 142, cert. denied sub nom., 313 Md. 506, 545 A.2d 1343 (1988); Schear v, Motel Management Corp., 61 Md.App. 670, 687, 487 A.2d 1240, 1248 (1985) (stating the factors derive from sections 12-14 of the Restatement); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 12-14 (1958). The three factors are evaluated within the totality of the circumstances. Green, 355 Md. at 506, 735 A.2d at 1049. The presence of all three factors is not required for a finding of an agency relationship. Id.
The only evidence of any kind of relationship between Realtime Gaming and KDMS and windowscasino.com is the fact that the windowscasino.com website contains a link to an IP address registered to KDMS where customers can download the gaming software. This does not establish or even indicate a relationship, principal-agent or contractual, between Realtime Gaming and KDMS, on the one hand, and windows-casino.com on the other in which windowscasino.com is empowered to act on Realtime Gaming and KDMS’s behalf or whether Realtime Gaming and KDMS control windowscasino.com. BSI does not provide any evidence of mutual corporate officers, board members, owners, or other such controlling individuals or entities to show anything more than that [28]*28windowscasino.com has obtained a sub-license from Montana Overseas. A mere link with no more compelling evidence is insufficient to create the necessary nexus between Realtime Gaming and KDMS, and windowscasino.com and Thom.17
Because BSI has failed to provide any evidence of a relationship among Realtime Gaming, KDMS, windowscasino.com, and Thom, that is either governed by a contract or possesses those qualities characteristic of agency relationships, we fail to see any substantive contact with Maryland or connection with the conduct giving rise to this suit, and as such find that it would not be constitutionally reasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction over Realtime Gaming and KDMS on these facts.
The Denial of Discovery
BSI claims that the trial judge abused his discretion in ruling on the motion to dismiss at the May 26, 2004 hearing and in denying its request for discovery. We review the denial of discovery under the abuse of discretion standard and will only conclude that the trial court abused its discretion “ ‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court[ ]’ ... or when the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding principles,’ and the ruling under consideration is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court[ ]’ ... or when the ruling is ‘violative of fact and logic.’ ” Wilson v. Crane, 385 Md. 185, 198, 867 A.2d 1077, 1084 (2005), quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312-13, 701 A.2d 110, 118-19 (1997) (citations omitted). We do not find that the trial court’s decision in the present case is beyond the decision that a reasonable person would make in light of the fact that BSI was unable to produce any evidence of a connection between Realtime Gaming and KDMS, on the one hand, and [29]*29windowscasino.com and Thom, on the other, beyond a link leading to an IP address at which individuals could download the software designed by KDMS.
Striking the Amended Complaint
On June 2, 2004, the trial court issued an order dismissing BSPs complaint that was silent as to whether the complaint was dismissed with or without prejudice. BSI argues that the trial court abused its discretion in striking the amended complaint that it filed and cites a number of this Court’s cases for the proposition that a dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise specified in the order of dismissal. See, e.g., Williams v. Snyder, 221 Md. 262, 157 A.2d 265 (1960); State ex rel. Lennon v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 627 A.2d 1055 (1993). BSI also notes that Maryland Rule 2-341(c) provides that “[a]mendments shall be freely allowed when justice so permits.” Despite the preference for freely permitted amendments, BSI failed to introduce any new facts to cure its inability to produce prima facie evidence of Maryland’s personal jurisdiction over Realtime Gaming and KDMS. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration and striking BSI’s Amended Complaint.
Conclusion
Because we find that the trial court properly concluded, based on the evidence introduced, that BSI failed to establish a pnma facie case for general or specific personal jurisdiction over Realtime Gaming and KDMS, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint. Moreover, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying BSI discovery or denying the motion for reconsideration and striking the amended complaint.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER.