GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal by June Phillips from the denial of her motion to intervene, individually and on behalf of a class of black parents and children, in this long-pending litigation concerning the desegregation ■ of the Caddo Parish school system. We sustain the district court’s ruling, holding that it did not abuse its discretion in determining that Ms. Phillips’ motion was untimely.
This litigation began in 1965 when seven black school children and their parents filed a complaint against the Caddo Parish School Board alleging the school system was operated on a biracial basis, in violation of their rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiffs sought to represent themselves and a class of “Negro children and their parents in Caddo Parish,” pursuant to [925]*925Rule 23(a)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P., as then in effect.1 Later the same year, the United States sought to intervene as a party plaintiff pursuant to Title IX of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2.2 We held it was entitled to do so, United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 896 (5th Cir.1966), aff'd with modifications, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840, 88 S.Ct. 77, 19 L.Ed.2d 104 (1967), and thereafter the United States has participated as a party to the case.
As set out in more detail below, in 1973 the district court approved and made “the order of this Court” a school desegregation plan developed after several public hearings by a biracial Citizens Committee which the court had appointed on the motion of the United States. The Committee’s unanimous report stated that the plan’s full implementation would convert “the school district to a unitary system.” The United States approved implementation of the plan, but did not commit itself, one way or the other, as to whether the plan would achieve unitary status. The plaintiffs, however, not only requested implementation of the plan, but also specifically took the position that its complete implementation “will provide a unitary school system in Caddo Parish.” Later the same year, several other black parents and students sought to intervene, individually and as representatives of a class or subclass of black students and parents, to attack the 1973 plan on the ground that it maintained too many “racially identifiable and one-race schools.” They alleged that the plaintiffs did not adequately represent their interests and the United States did not either. In August 1974 we reversed the district court’s denial of the requested intervention, holding that the applicants “are entitled to an evidentiary hearing on their motion to intervene.” Jones v. Caddo Parish School Board, 499 F.2d 914, 917 (5th Cir.1974) (per curiam). The attempted intervention, however, was never pursued thereafter. The school district continued to operate under the 1973 plan until 1981, and the case remained largely inactive. After August 1974 the plaintiffs took no action whatever in the case, except for filing a memorandum in January 1977 taking the position that the 1973 plan had not been entirely complied with and should be “continued in effect until fully implemented.”
On June 3, 1980, following a status conference the previous day attended only by attorneys for the School Board and the United States, the district court entered a minute order providing that counsel should contact the court within thirty days if “plaintiffs still have a viable interest in this [926]*926case.”3 Copies of this order were sent all counsel who had ever appeared in the case, including those representing the 1973 intervention applicants, and none ever made any affirmative response. Thereafter, the United States and the School Board entered into widely publicized negotiations, which lasted nearly a year, and culminated on May 5, 1981 when they executed a proposed two-party Consent Decree, which the district court entered on May 7, 1981. Pursuant to the court’s directions, the decree was publicized and a ten-day period allowed for objections. Ms. Phillips, though she timely filed objections of a limited nature, now essentially abandoned, did not seek to intervene until May 22, 1981, four days after the expiration of the period for filing objections. The United States and the School Board opposed her intervention, among other grounds, as being untimely. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied intervention on that basis. It also ruled that Ms. Phillips’ interests were adequately represented by the United States.
The complaint which Ms. Phillips seeks to make by her intervention is that the Consent Decree will leave too many one-race or predominantly one-race schools attended by too high a proportion of the district’s black students. This is essentially the same complaint made by the 1973 intervention applicants concerning the 1973 plan. Concededly, however, the Consent Decree provides a material improvement in those respects from the 1973 plan, which the United States had not previously opposed and which the plaintiffs regarded as providing a unitary system.
Under the unchallenged facts here, Ms. Phillips, and those she sought to represent, knew, or at the very least should have known, of their interests in the case some six years or more before they sought intervention. Indeed, these same interests were reflected in the 1973 attempted intervention, sought on the basis that neither the plaintiffs nor the United States adequately represented those interests. That intervention was not pursued after 1974, and the school system continued to operate under the 1973 plan, with the blessing of the plaintiffs and without challenge by the United States, until the 1981 Consent Decree. That decree, an unquestioned material improvement over the 1973 plan from the point of view of the 1973 and 1981 applicants for intervention, violates no express or implied assurances to the would-be intervenors and represents no change of position adverse to their interests. Nor are they parties to it or bound by it. It was arrived at after an arduous and well-publicized settlement process lasting nearly a year, of which Ms. Phillips and the interests she seeks to represent were indisputably aware. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that intervention sought after the time for filing objections to the decree was untimely. No hearing was necessary because the matters apparent of record support the district court’s determination, there being neither challenge to them nor proffered facts to justify or explain the evident untimeliness which they reflect. Indeed, the lack of a hearing, as such, is not the focus of Ms. Phillips’ appeal.
By the express terms of Rule 24, Fed.R.Civ.P., it is apparent that timeliness is a prerequisite for intervention additional to all the other necessary conditions for that relief (including, as to intervention of right, lack of adequate representation by any existing party). And, it has been uniformly held that the district court’s determination of whether the requested intervention is timely may be reversed only for abuse of discretion. As the Supreme Court stated in NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 93 S.Ct. 2591, 37 L.Ed.2d 648 (1973):
[927]*927the application must be ‘timely.’ If it is untimely, intervention must be denied. Thus, the court where the action is pending must first be satisfied as to timeliness. Although the point to which the suit has progressed is one factor in the determination of timeliness, it is not solely dispositive. Timeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances. And it is to be determined by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that discretion is abused, the court’s ruling will not be disturbed on review.” Id. at 365-66, 93 S.Ct. at 2603 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).4
And, where facts justifying the conclusion that the application is untimely are undisputed and apparent on the face of the record, intervention may be denied on this ground without a hearing, as we expressly held in United States v. Louisiana, 669 F.2d 314, 315 (5th Cir.1982).
NAACP v. New York, supra, is particularly instructive. There, New York sued the United States in December 1971 for declaratory judgment that literacy tests in certain New York counties had not abridged the right to vote on account of race, and hence were not proscribed by the Voting Rights Act’s prohibition of such tests in political subdivisions, such as the counties concerned, where less than half those of age voted in the 1968 presidential election. On March 10, 1972 the United States filed its answer stating it was without information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of New York’s allegations, and on March 17 New York moved for summary judgment, which the United States consented to on April 3. The NAACP and black voters and elected officials in one of the counties moved to intervene on April 7. The United States did not oppose the intervention. On April 13 the district court granted the summary judgment and denied the intervention. Affidavits, which the Supreme Court accepted arguendo as accurate, showed that interve-nors first learned of the suit on March 21 and of the United States’ consent to the motion for summary judgment on April 5; that on March 23 a Justice Department attorney had advised the NAACP’s counsel “that papers were being prepared in opposition to New York’s motion for summary judgment”; and that during the last two weeks in March “attorneys in the Department of Justice thrice had represented to appellants’ counsel that the United States would oppose New York’s motion for summary judgment.” Id. 413 U.S. at 361-62, 93 S.Ct. at 2600-01. Intervenors also alleged that the Justice Department inadequately investigated the case and that evidence was available, precluding summary judgment, that in the counties concerned education afforded nonwhite children by New York was substantially inferior to that afforded whites with resulting lower literacy rates for nonwhites otherwise eligible to vote. Id. at 362-64, 93 S.Ct. at 2601-02.
The Supreme Court held that “because of the motion’s untimeliness” the district court’s denial of intervention was “not an abuse of the court’s discretion.” Id. at 366, 93 S.Ct. at 2603. The Court initially observed that the district court could reasonably have concluded that the intervention applicants “should have known of the pendency” of the action as early as February because, among other things, of a New York Times newspaper article and “public [928]*928comment by community leaders.” Id. It went on to hold that, in any event, the answer of the United States “revealed that it was without information with which it could oppose the motion for summary judgment,” and it was hence “incumbent upon the appellants ... to take immediate affirmative steps to protect their interests either by supplying the Department of Justice with any information they possessed ... or ... by way of an immediate motion to intervene,” rather than relying “on representations said to have been made by Department of Justice attorneys during the course of telephone conversations.” Id. at 367-68, 93 S.Ct. at 2604. Because of its conclusion that the motion was untimely, the Court expressly declined “to consider whether other conditions for intervention under Rule 24 were satisfied.” Id. at 369, 93 S.Ct. at 2605.
Similarly instructive is this Court’s decision in United States v. Louisiana, 669 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.1982), affirming the district court’s denial without a hearing of requested intervention. That case involved an action commenced in March 1974 by the United States against the State of Louisiana and state higher education agencies seeking the dismantling of an allegedly unlawful dual system of higher education based on race. Subsequently, the district court denied without a hearing a motion to intervene by the NAACP and its state president, and in December 1976 this Court remanded with instructions that a hearing be held on the motion. United States v. Louisiana, 543 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir.1976). Thereafter, for several years little activity ensued in the case. Then, as reflected by the district court’s opinion, 90 F.R.D. 358, 361 (E.D.La.1981), in 1981 those who had “monitored” the case as counsel for the NAACP filed a motion to intervene “not in the name of the NAACP but in the names of Trevor Brown, other identified proposed intervenors, and the class the named inter-venors seek to represent.” The class consisted of Louisiana black teachers, students and prospective students and their parents, and the district court stated “there can be no doubt that [the applicants] ... have a sincere and legitimate interest in the subject matter of this litigation.” Id. at 360-61 & n. 1. However, it noted that the Louisiana NAACP president had publicly stated that he and “his organization” had “nothing to do with” the proposed interve-nors. Id. at 361. On appeal, this Court observed “it was not clear that the proposed intervenors were the same as those who [had] moved for intervention in 1974.” 669 F.2d at 315. Sustaining the denial of intervention, we went on to state:
“As a general proposition, the timeliness of an application for intervention is an issue that addresses the discretion of the district court ____ We cannot say, in view of the NAACP’s great and undisputed delay — over four years — in advancing the second motion that the order denying it was such an abuse. Nor was a hearing needed in such circumstances.” Id. (emphasis added).
We also described the four-year delay in seeking intervention following the earlier appeal as “itself an adequate and sufficient ground for its denial.” Id.
The parallels to the case at bar are striking. Though this action had then been pending and sporadically active for some seven years, we can for present purposes begin our detailed consideration of its procedural history in 1972 when plaintiffs filed a motion and an amended motion for further relief directed to the School Board’s desegregation plan, which the district court had approved in February 1970, and especially requesting elimination of schools having a student “racial composition substantially disproportionate to the system-wide racial composition.” In response, the United States moved that the district court appoint an eleven-person biracial Citizens Committee to develop a new desegregation plan. On March 20,1973 the court, signing the form of order submitted by the United States, appointed such a committee, designating the same members and chairman suggested by the United States (five blacks, five whites, and a white chairman, voting only in case of a tie), and directing it [929]*929to conduct an investigation and develop a desegregation plan.
The Committee, among other things, held seven public hearings and twenty-one private meetings, and reviewed plans submitted by the School Board, the plaintiffs, various neighborhood groups, PTAs, and others. Its unanimous report, filed in June 1973, proposed a three-year plan, to be monitored by a court-appointed biracial Advisory Committee, whose full implementation “will bring about the conversion of the school district to a unitary system.”
Plaintiffs ultimately moved that the Committee plan be approved, advising that “if implemented in toto, [it] will provide a unitary school system in Caddo Parish,” and that although thirty-four one-race or predominantly one-race schools would remain, the “plaintiffs ... have concluded that there are sufficient facts extant and stated within the plan to fully justify the continued existence of these schools____” 5 The United States in its “response” stated that “the Committee’s recommendations should be implemented at the commencement of the 1973-74 school year.” Although this response observed that. “the plan provides for effective desegregation in certain formerly one-race or predominantly one-race schools,” it went on to state:
“However, the student desegregation plan also proposes the continued operation of 34 one-race or predominantly one-race schools. With regard to these schools, the plan does not, as required by the March 20, 1973 order, state the facts relied upon to justify their continued operation, provide options to fully desegregate them, or state the feasibility of implementing all or parts of desegregation plans for these schools on record in this case. Of course, facts tending to demonstrate that the composition of a school is the result of de facto segregation unrelated to Board actions, or that desegregation of one-race schools can only be achieved through new school construction, or other facts may be relevant to the determination of whether desegregation steps are required in regard to such schools. Absent these determinations, we are unable to respond at this time to the question whether the plan in regard to these schools conforms with constitutional standards.”
In essence, then, the United States’ “response” was that the plan implementation should commence and, reminiscent of NAACP v. New York, that the plan might or might not be adequate but the United States did not have enough information to form a belief as to whether it actually was or was not adequate.
Approximately a week later, on July 20, 1973, the district court entered an order that the Committee plan “is hereby approved and made the order of this Court,” and directed its implementation, commencing with the opening of the 1973-74 school year. At the foot of this order the United States made the following endorsement: “The present posture of this lawsuit considered, the United States ... interjects no objection to ordering implementation of this plan, as is more fully set out in its response filed herein.”
The 1973-74 school year thus opened under the Committee plan, and a ten- or twelve-person biracial Advisory Committee, as provided for in the plan, was appointed [930]*930and commenced functioning with equal white and black membership, one of the latter being chairman.
In November 1973 several black parents and students (the same persons who had earlier sought to be made additional named plaintiffs, see note 5, supra) sought to intervene as plaintiffs individually and as representatives of a class or subclass of black students and parents. Their tendered complaint attacked the Committee plan approved by the court “because it maintains (without legal, educational or practical justification) racially identifiable and one-race schools within Caddo Parish.” The motion to intervene acknowledged a difference of opinion in the black community and alleged:
“Applicants for intervention and the class or subclass they represent are not adequately represented by the original plaintiffs herein. Nor are their interests protected by the United States of America ... which acceded to the approval and implementation of the current plan of operation____ There is no relationship, contractual or otherwise, between applicants for intervention or the said class or subclasses which applicants represent and the United States, except a statutory relationship pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 ... which authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to commence such litigation at his discretion. Applicants for intervention and the class or subclasses whom they represent have no control, in law or in fact, over the course of such litigation except insofar as the Attorney General or his representative chooses to hear, respect and act upon the wishes of applicants for intervention and the class.” (Emphasis added.)
The district court denied the intervention without a hearing. The applicants appealed to this Court, where they were actively opposed by the plaintiffs. The United States took no position respecting the appeal. In August 1974 we reversed, holding “appellants are entitled to an evidentiary hearing on their motion to intervene.” Jones v. Caddo Parish School Board, 499 F.2d 914 at 917.
No hearing was sought by the intervention applicants or anyone on behalf of the class or subclass they sought to represent, and for the next some two years the case was inactive and the school system continued to operate under the Committee’s plan. In July 1976 the biracial Advisory Committee reported to the court that the School Board, though it had made definite progress, had not yet fully complied with the three-year desegregation plan established by the July 1973 order, and recommended a one-year extension of the plan to July 1977. In August 1976 the district court ordered the magistrate to take evidence respecting the School Board’s compliance with the 1973 order. The School Board then filed a motion alleging that it had fully complied with the 1973 order and seeking a declaration of unitary status and dismissal of the suit. In November the United States filed its response to the School Board’s motion, urging that dismissal should not be ruled on until it was determined whether the 1973 plan had been fully complied with. Later that month proceedings were held before the magistrate, and the record was forwarded to the district court.6
In January 1977 the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the School Board’s motion to dismiss, urging that “the plan to date has not been complied with. Therefore, the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be rejected and the plan continued in effect until fully implemented.” This was the first action in the case by plaintiffs since August 1974; it is also the last time that plaintiffs have taken any action in the suit. Also in January 1977 the United States filed a memorandum contending that the School Board had not fully complied with the 1973 plan and that it [931]*931should be required to file a report by March 13, 1977 showing its progress to that date “and any plans that it will implement in the future to meet the requirements of the July 20, 1973 order.”
Nearly another year passed without any activity until, on December 30, 1977, the district court entered a memorandum ruling, finding that the Board had fully complied with the 1973 plan and that the district was unitary.7 A judgment dismissing the suit was entered the same day. No appeal was taken from the order or judgment, and the plaintiffs filed no objection to either. However, on January 11, 1978 the United States moved to amend the court’s judgment and findings on the ground that the only matter referred to the magistrate, and to which the parties had directed their evidence, was whether the Board had complied with the 1973 plan, so that the government did not have “adequate notice or opportunity for a hearing on the issue of dismissal” or of unitary status. It also contended that “the record is void of evidence on which this Court could base a finding” of unitary status. It accordingly prayed that the court “set an appropriate schedule for discovery and a hearing on the issue of whether the defendants’ current operation meets constitutional requirements.” Similarly to its response to the 1973 plan itself, this motion of the United States did not take a position one way or the other as to whether, in actual fact, the 1973 plan, as implemented to January 1978, was or was not constitutionally adequate.
No action was taken on this motion of the United States, and the system continued to be operated under the 1973 plan. Nothing further transpired in the case for nearly two and a half years more until the above-mentioned June 2, 1980 status conference before Judge Stagg.8
Thereafter, the United States and the Board entered into widely publicized settlement negotiations lasting nearly a year, which led up to the execution of the Consent Decree in May 1981. Numerous public meetings (twenty-eight are listed in the papers filed by the Board below) were held throughout the community, principally in February, March and April 1981, to inform the citizens about various desegregation approaches and to obtain community input. Representatives of the Justice Department met with black civic leaders, and also received input from black citizen and parent groups.9
[932]*932The Consent Decree was adequately publicized,10 and Ms. Phillips (along with approximately fourteen other objectors and groups of objectors) timely filed her objection. This was wholly limited to claimed inadequacy in remedial programs for black preschool and elementary students, listed specific remedial programs for elementary and preschool black children which should be provided, and stated she “reserves the right to intervene ... on behalf of a class of Black persons whose children will need the [remedial] programs described above.”
After expiration of the period for filing objections, Ms. Phillips filed her motion to intervene, later twice supplemented, in which her ultimate complaint is that the Consent Decree leaves too many predominantly one-race schools attended by too high a proportion of the black students. She alleged “that the United States has not represented the best interests of The Class” which she sought to represent.
Ms. Phillips specifically addressed the issue of timeliness in her motions to intervene, stating, “Mover shows that this intervention is timely because Mover presumed that the United States would represent the best interest of Mover and The Class which she seeks to represent” until she learned of the contents of the Consent Decree. But, as the district court stated in denying Ms. Phillips’ motion, “The public had been kept well-informed of the progress of the parties’ negotiations and were given every opportunity to voice their opinions in public meetings held in all parts of the parish.” Moreover, Ms. Phillips, who had been a participant in the November 1976 hearings, a School Board member thereafter and a parent of one or more children in the school system for several years, obviously was, or should have been, aware for many years not only of the mere pendency of the case but of her interest in it, and this is likewise obviously true of the class she seeks to represent. Indeed, Ms. Phillips has never denied this, either in the district court or on appeal.11 Moreover, her claim is not that she was unaware of the prolonged, well-publicized settlement process, but rather that she did not know the United States would agree to this decree which she claims left too many predominantly one-race schools attended by too many black students. As her counsel candidly stated on oral argument, “She knew negotiations were going on. Sure. But she had no idea to what the United States was going to agree to until she saw the Consent Decree.”
It is important to understand that the record clearly indicates, and Ms. Phillips has never disputed and indeed concedes, that the Consent Decree at the least materially reduces the number of predominantly one-race schools and of black students attending them as compared to the previously existing situation and the 1973 decree. It is unquestioned that the Consent Decree is a real improvement from the point of view of Ms. Phillips and the class she seeks to represent. Her point is that it is not [933]*933enough of an improvement. Further, Ms. Phillips does not claim, and never has claimed, that the United States ever informed her or the class, directly or indirectly, that the United States would insist on a greater level of integration than that provided by the Consent Decree or that the United States changed from positions it had previously taken, publicly or otherwise, or in any sense switched directions, adversely to the interests she seeks to represent. Nor does the record suggest any such change in position or direction.
As the record clearly reflects, the 1973 plan was the product of a unanimous biracial Citizens Committee, arrived at after numerous public meetings, the Committee itself having been appointed and each of its members individually having been selected on the motion of the United States. The United States approved implementation of the 1973 plan, over the objections of those in the black community having the same viewpoint and concerns as Ms. Phillips, and until the Consent Decree, some eight years later, never did anything to attempt to bring about a level of integration beyond that of the 1973 plan. While it is true that the United States refused to agree that the 1973 plan was necessarily the last word, its consistent position in this respect was merely that the plan had not been proven to establish a unitary system rather than that it actually did not do so or could not be shown to. This, of course, was recognized by the previous applicants for intervention, whose pleadings averred that “their interests [are not] protected by the United States of America.”12 In essence, the United States from 1973 to 1980 accepted the 1973 plan. If it has made any change in direction it is only that in 1981 it ceased to leave things on “dead center” and actually moved the school system to a materially more integrated condition.
In these undisputed circumstances, nothing in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977), Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.1977), or Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Piambino v. Sylva, 449 U.S. 1011, 101 S.Ct. 568, 66 L.Ed.2d 469 (1980), suggests that Ms. Phillips’ intervention was timely, or that the district court lacked discretion to determine it was untimely.
Stallworth, in addition to considering the factors of relative prejudice and unusual circumstances, to be addressed below, emphasizes the distinction, for purposes of determining when the timeliness clock starts to run, between “the date on which the would-be intervenor became aware of the pendency of the action” and “the date on which he learned of his interest in the case.” Id. at 264.
The nature and purpose of such a distinction is aptly illustrated by the facts of Stallworth. That was a Title VII suit by black employees against their employer, and the would-be intervenors (appellants) were white employees. A partial consent decree was entered March 7 which provided for abolition of departmental seniority. The employer had been engaged in a “rollback” since February, but prior to March 17 appellants had either been told by their employer they would not be rolled back or had retained their jobs while others were rolled back. Commencing March 17, however, by virtue of the Consent Decree, appellants (who claimed contract rights in their seniority) were rolled back while other employees, white as well as black, with less departmental seniority were not. Within three weeks appellants sought to intervene. They asserted that the Consent Decree was “unnecessarily broad” because its “abolition of the departmental seniority system enabled some white employees who [934]*934were not members of the class affected by racial discrimination to pass the appellants on the seniority ladder.” Id. at 262 (emphasis added). Ultimately, they complained of the decree not “insofar as it affected the rights of black employees, but only insofar as it affected the comparative seniority status of white employees.” Id. We held the evidence showed “appellants did not know that their interests might be affected by a lawsuit until March 7.” Id. at 267 (emphasis added). Naturally, the white employees had no reason to think their interests vis-a-vis other whites would be adversely affected by a racial discrimination suit filed by black employees. By contrast, it was surely many years before May 1981 when Ms. Phillips realized or should have realized that the interests she sought to advance by her intervention “might be affected by” this lawsuit.
The test we announced in Stallworth for this first factor was “[t]he length of time during which the would-be intervenor actually knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case.” Id. at 264. We arrived at this conclusion after reviewing NAACP v. New York and United Airlines, and we equated knowledge of “an interest in the case” with knowledge of an interest which “might be affected by” the outcome of the case. Nothing in Stall-worth suggests that knowledge of the actual outcome of a case is necessary. And, while Stallworth holds that knowledge of mere pendency is not necessarily or inevitably knowledge of one’s interest in the case, as it was not under the facts in Stall-worth, nevertheless it recognizes that knowledge of the suit may indeed be “tantamount to knowledge” of one’s interest in it. Id. at 264.13 The widespread publicity concerning and involvement of the black community with matters relating to this lawsuit, commencing in 1973 and also in respect to the many months of settlement negotiations, amply demonstrate the untimeliness of the May 1981 attempted intervention under this first Stallworth factor.14
United Airlines and Piambino are each plainly inapposite here. Each involved a sudden, complete reversal of position by the representative, which, absent the allowance of intervention, would have legally bound the would-be intervenors.
In United Airlines the intervenor’s rights would have been barred by limitations, since avoidance of the bar depended on maintenance of the class action. The would-be intervenor had no notice of any impending settlement. The putative class representatives had previously attempted to appeal the denial of class certification, but the appeal was held premature since prior to final judgment. The Supreme Court noted that because of this “there was no reason for the respondent [would-be intervenor] to suppose that they [the putative class representatives] would not later take an appeal,” 432 U.S. at 394, 97 S.Ct. at 2469, and hence intervention for the sole purpose of obtaining appellate review of the denial of class certification, id. at 392, 97 S.Ct. at 2468, was timely when sought within the period for notice of appeal (and virtually at the earliest time the sole purpose of the intervention, taking such an appeal, could be acted on).
Similarly, in Piambino a wholly meritorious appeal which had been undertaken with “a sterling brief” by parties on whom the would-be intervenor relied was suddenly wholly abandoned without warning despite [935]*935previous assurances “that they were prosecuting the appeal diligently and in good faith,” 610 F.2d at 1325, and a settlement which “utterly destroyed” the would-be in-tervenor’s rights was entered into without notice or opportunity to participate in its formulation.
Here, by contrast, the well-publicized settlement process dragged out over a year, and the ultimate result, which does not bind the would-be intervenors, involves no violation of assurances or reversal of position adverse to them. Cf. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (11th Cir.1983) (distinguishing United Airlines on similar grounds in analogous case); Garrity v. Gallen, 697 F.2d 452, 458 (1st Cir.1983) (distinguishing United Airlines on similar grounds).
The second Stallworth factor is prejudice to the existing parties. Prejudice to the United States and the School Board is apparent. After nearly a year’s negotiations they have finally arrived at a complex, interrelated settlement and consent decree disposing of the lawsuit between the two of them. If, as she requests, Ms. Phillips is made a party, there can be no consent decree without her agreement. Had Ms. Phillips intervened when she should have, she could have contributed to the settlement process, and quite possibly an agreement — surely different, and not necessarily only in ways favorable to Ms. Phillips’ view, than the present one — could have been reached. To do so now, after positions have hardened, concessions here have been traded for those there, persons, groups, and institutions have “gone on the line” publicly, and months of effort and mobilization of community and citizen involvement have been expended, may be impossible. Whether impossible or not, all the time, effort, and meetings will have been wasted, and the lengthy and difficult process will have to begin all over again, from “square one” or worse.15 The settlement here took longer and doubtless more effort than a trial would. Certainly having to retry a case is recognized as prejudicial. Cf. Piambino, 610 F.2d at 1325 (“nor is it a case where more hearings must be held in the lower court”); McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Company, 430 F.2d 1065, 1071-73 (5th Cir.1970) (emphasizing that intervention being considered would not reopen litigation). Is not having to go through yet another, now perhaps futile, multimonth settlement negotiation and community meeting process prejudicial? We have plainly recognized this character of prejudice to existing parties in sustaining denial of intervention on grounds of untimeliness. See, e.g., United States by Bell v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 553 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. United Steelworkers Justice Committee v. United States, 435 U.S. 914, 98 S.Ct. 1467, 55 L.Ed.2d 505 (1978) (“Intervention now for the purpose of challenging the consent agreement will prejudice the appellees by jeopardizing months of negotiations, causing substantial litigation expenses ____ To allow the applicants to intervene now would disrupt carefully considered proceedings.”). So have other courts. See e.g., United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1517 (11th Cir.1983) (intervention “would plainly have prejudiced the existing parties, since it would have nullified these negotiations ... ”); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir.1980) (“... prevent last minute disruption of painstaking work by the parties and the court”); Garrity v. Gallen, 697 F.2d at 458 (same). As stated in Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom., Beaver v. Alaniz, 439 U.S. 837, 99 S.Ct. 123, 58 L.Ed.2d 134 (1978):
“Intervention after entry of a consent decree is reserved for exceptional cases.
u
“Appellants sought intervention two and one-half years after suit was filed; they either knew or should have known [936]*936of the continuing negotiations. The crux of appellants’ argument is that they did not know the settlement decree would be to their detriment. But surely they knew the risks. To protect their interests, appellants should have joined the negotiations before the suit was settled. Appellants have not proved fraudulent concealment. It is too late to reopen this action.” (Footnote omitted.)
See also Garrity v. Gallen, supra at 455 (citing Alaniz).
The third Stallworth factor is prejudice to the would-be intervenor. Neither Ms. Phillips nor the class she seeks to represent is bound by the Consent Decree, and she is free to file suit seeking further desegregation in the Caddo Parish school system, a matter which neither the United States nor the Board has disputed.16 It is also important to realize in this connection that, so far as concerns the constitutional desegregation rights of Ms. Phillips and the class she seeks to represent, the Consent Decree is a floor, not a ceiling. It neither commands action claimed to violate the constitutional rights of Ms. Phillips or the class, nor forbids action to which Ms. Phillips or the class claim constitutional [937]*937entitlement. In this regard, the decree is materially different, with respect to the would-be intervenor, than the decree in cases such as Stallworth or Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied sub nom. Ashley v. City of Jackson, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 255, 78 L.Ed.2d 241 (1983).17 See United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147, 1151-53 (5th Cir.1975) (denying intervention to minority employees to challenge employment discrimination consent decree between United States and employer where decree did not limit minority employees’ rights); Ross v. Houston Independent School District, 699 F.2d 218, 229-30 (5th Cir.1983). Compare United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1518-19 (11th Cir.1983) (denying intervention to white employees to challenge consent decree on grounds of reverse discrimination, since would-be intervenors were not bound). Moreover, in these circumstances, it is proper to “put into the balance against the movant its prior opportunities to assert its position.” United States v. Marion County School District, 590 F.2d 146, 148 (5th Cir.1979).
The fourth and final Stallworth factor is “unusual circumstances.” Stallworth provides two examples. First is the example of a would-be intervenor who, though “he failed to apply for intervention promptly after he became aware of his interest in the case,” nevertheless makes a “convincing” showing “that for reasons other than lack of knowledge he was unable to intervene sooner.” Id. at 266 (emphasis added). The second example is provided by the facts of Stallworth itself, where the district court, at the black plaintiffs’ request, refused to allow the defendant employer to notify its white employees of the pendency and potential impact of the suit, which we characterized as “an unusual circumstance which tilts the scales toward a finding that the appellants’ application was timely.” Id. at 267. Nothing remotely comparable to either of these factors is present here.
It is true that the black community, as such, did not have in-court representation in the later phases of this case. This circumstance may be unusual in a statistical sense, but it does not militate strongly in favor of intervention where, as here, it is so plainly the result of free, deliberate choice. The black community has not been excluded. There is nothing secret or sudden about what has gone on. The black community has been involved and aware, this record reflects, at least since the biracial Citizens Committee was appointed and held public meetings in 1973. From that time until 1981 the biracial Advisory Committee monitored implementation of the 1973 plan. While the black community, as such, has not participated in the suit itself since January 1977 (and except for once then, not since 1974), that has plainly been its own free and deliberate choice. That choice does not justify one person coming along after all this time and attendant publicity and seeking to upset a settlement so long and so publicly in the making. If there is dissatisfaction, the courts remain open for another suit to seek additional desegregation, which is certainly not forbidden by the present decree.
While we focus on Ms. Phillips’ situation and her obvious long-standing relation to this case, it is plain that she seeks intervention not to advance any uniquely individual claim, but rather to assert essentially the viewpoint of that segment of the black community for whom the 1973 would-be intervenors sought to speak. It cannot be gainsaid that that segment of the black community has for many years known its interests were at stake, and that there might be no more desegregation than that provided for in the 1973 decree, which is why they sought to intervene then. The plaintiffs, and “their” segment of the black community, approved the 1973 decree; [938]*938they have not challenged the Consent Decree and their desegregative interests are not adversely affected since the Consent Decree, as all admit, is significantly more desegregative than the 1973 decree.
Ms. Phillips does not seek limited purpose intervention. What she in effect asked of the district court, as she has of us, is full intervention and a completely new start. On the undisputed facts here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her request. She timely submitted her objections to the decree — which she has now essentially abandoned — and these were considered and ruled on by the district court. It is now simply too late to require her intervention. Under the circumstances, the time has come for the United States and the Board to be allowed to settle their suit.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Ms. Phillips’ application to intervene was untimely, and it accordingly did not err in denying her leave to intervene. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of intervention as of right and DISMISS the appeal from the denial of permissive intervention.