GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
June Phillips appeals from a denial of her motion to intervene, both individually and on behalf of a class, in this litigation concerning the desegregation of the Caddo Parish school system. We agree with the district court that Ms. Phillips’ motion failed to satisfy a prerequisite for intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24; accordingly, we affirm the denial of her petition.
[208]*208PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action began in 1965 when seven black school children and their parents filed a complaint alleging that the Caddo Parish public schools were operated on a biracial basis, in violation of the rights secured to them under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiffs sought to represent themselves and a class of “Negro children and their parents in Caddo Parish,” pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as then in effect (the 1938 version).1 The district court, per Judge Dawkins, enjoined the operation of the dual school system and ordered the Caddo Parish School Board to prepare a desegregation plan. Following the submission of the School Board’s proposal, the United States moved to intervene as a party plaintiff pursuant to Title IX of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2.2 The district court adopted the School Board’s desegregation scheme and denied intervention by the United States; both of these actions were reversed by our decision in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.1966), aff’d with modifications, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840, 88 S.Ct. 77, 19 L.Ed.2d 104 (1967). The United States has been an active participant in this litigation since the decision in Jefferson County.
Subsequent desegregation plans adopted in Caddo Parish were disapproved by this Court in Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904, 90 S.Ct. 218, 24 L.Ed.2d 180 (1969) (rejecting a freedom of choice plan), and Jones v. Caddo Parish School Board, 421 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.1970) (reversing the district court’s approval of a plan submitted by the School Board and remanding for consideration of Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032, 90 S.Ct. 611, 24 L.Ed.2d 698 (1970) ).
In February 1972, plaintiffs filed a petition for further relief which requested the elimination of racially identifiable schools and professional staffs, and a judgment declaring the apportionment scheme for School Board elections to be unconstitutional. The petition was signed by Arthur Thompson of the law firm of Stone & Thompson. Nine days later, an amended motion for further relief was filed. This motion, after acknowledging the prior request, focused on the School Board’s failure to dismantle “schools with substantially disproportionate racial compositions” and sought the elimination of the remaining vestiges of the dual school system. The attorney who signed the amended motion was Margrett Ford. In previous filings Ms. Ford had been listed in association with Jack Greenberg and Norman Chachkin of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in New York City; however, she had recently notified the district court of her new address in Shreveport, Louisiana. While these motions were pending, Judge Dawkins recused himself from the case and Judge Scott took the helm.
[209]*209In March 1973, the United States responded to the motions for relief by requesting that the court appoint a biracial committee of citizens of Caddo Parish (the “Committee”) to assess the progress of the existing desegregation scheme and to develop alternate proposals. Judge Scott ordered the establishment of such Committee, which presented its report and desegregation plan on June 1,1973. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs — through Margrett Ford— filed their objections to the pupil assignment portion of the Committee’s proposed method of desegregation. Ms. Ford also moved to add additional parties as plaintiffs. The United States objected to the Committee plan because it permitted the continued operation of thirty-four one-race or predominately one-race schools.
Prior to the disposition of these objections, Jesse Stone (of Stone & Thompson), plaintiffs’ original retained counsel, moved to strike Arthur Thompson, Margrett Ford, Jack Greenberg, and Norman Chachkin as counsel for plaintiffs and to substitute in their place Murphy Bell. Attached to this motion was the affidavit of Reverend E. Edward Jones, one of the original named plaintiffs in the action, stating that Arthur Thompson had been elected to the Caddo Parish School Board and, hence, must withdraw as plaintiffs’ representative, and that the lawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund were being dismissed “because of the objections [they] filed to the Court Appointed Citizens Committee Desegregation Plan.”3 The motion to substitute counsel was signed by Judge Scott on July 13, 1973. A few days later, Judge Scott denied the motion to add additional party plaintiffs.4 Newly appointed plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Bell, then filed a motion seeking to strike the objections to the Committee’s desegregation plan that had previously been lodged by Ms. Ford.5 The objections were deleted by an order of the district court dated July 20, 1973. That same day, the court adopted the Committee’s desegregation plan and directed that it be implemented in time for the start of the 1973-74 school year.
Four months later, lawyers Greenberg, Chachkin, and Ford filed a motion to intervene on behalf of several black school children and their parents who resided in Cad-do Parish.6 The application for intervention stated that the named individuals sought to represent a “class of present and future black public school children who are or will be eligible to attend the public schools of Caddo Parish.” Appended to the application for intervention was the complaint of plaintiffs-intervenors, which assailed the constitutionality of the Committee’s pupil assignment plan for its retention of one-race schools within the parish. Finding that the original plaintiffs adequately represented the class and that the motion to intervene was untimely, the district court denied the application for intervention. That decision was vacated by this Court and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the motion to intervene. Jones v. Caddo Parish School Board, 499 F.2d 914 (5th Cir.1974). [210]*210On remand, the district court was instructed to “determine the class and who properly represents it.” Id. at 917. However, the record reflects no further development on the application for intervention; on remand, no hearing was sought or held.
For approximately the next two years, the Caddo Parish school system operated under the Committee’s desegregation plan without further legal proceedings. On July 20, 1976, the Citizens Advisory Committee, a group appointed to oversee the implementation of the 1973 plan, filed a report with the district court indicating several areas in which the parish had not met the requirements established by the plan. That report recommended a one-year extension of the court order directing compliance with the 1973 Committee desegregation scheme. After examining data on the system’s progress submitted by the School Board, Judge Scott appointed a Special Master “for the specific purpose of investigating, examining and producing evidence to enable the Court to determine the degree of conformity achieved by the Caddo Parish School Board in satisfying the conditions and provisions of the [1973] plan . . .. ”
In September 1976, the School Board filed a motion with the district court asking for a declaration that the Caddo Parish school system was unitary and for dismissal of this action. Opposing this motion, the United States stated that any declaration of unitary status prior to the completion of the Special Master’s duties would be premature. Deposition testimony was taken before the Special Master on November 8 and 9, 1976. The plaintiffs — through counsel William Jefferson — also filed a memorandum in opposition to the School Board’s motion.7 On December 30, 1977, Judge Scott found that the “former state-imposed dual system has been completely eradicated” and declared the Caddo Parish school system “a unitary system.” The judgment rendered that day dismissed the suit.
Neither the United States nor the private plaintiffs appealed from this decision, but on January 11,1978, the government moved to amend the district court’s judgment and findings, claiming procedural irregularities in the proceedings held by the Special Master and substantive deficiencies in the determination that a unitary status had been achieved. Significantly, none of the original plaintiffs indicated any opposition to the finding that the system was unitary or to the dismissal of the action. In July 1978, the School Board requested that the district court lift the requirement of a faculty ratio of 50 percent white and 50 percent black.8 Again, only the United States filed in opposition to the School Board’s request for partial relief.
On August 16, 1979, Judge Scott recused himself and the case was transferred to its third district judge, Judge Stagg.
On June 3, 1980, following a status conference held the previous day, Judge Stagg entered a minute order which provided in part:
“If the original plaintiffs still have a viable interest in this case, their counsel should contact the court, in writing, within thirty (30) days of this order. If the plaintiffs’ counsel does not respond, this court will consider that the plaintiffs acquiesce in having their interests represented by the United States as plaintiff - intervenor.”
Copies of this notice were mailed to all past and present attorneys of record, including Jesse Stone, Margrett Ford, Murphy Bell, and William Jefferson. While responses were received, in one form or another, from several former plaintiffs’ representatives, none came forward to indicate a viable interest in the case or to object to proceeding [211]*211with the United States as plaintiff-intervenor.9
At this point, the United States and the Caddo Parish School Board entered into negotiations in an attempt to arrive at a settlement. At no point in the course of these negotiations, which lasted for almost a year, did any of the plaintiffs or their counsel attempt to participate. In February, March, and April 1981, numerous public meetings were held throughout the community to inform the citizens about various desegregation approaches and to obtain community input.10 Representatives of the Justice Department met with numerous black civic leaders and received input from black citizen and parent groups. The negotiation process culminated on May 5, 1981, with the signing of a settlement agreement between the United States and the School Board. Two days later, pursuant to a joint motion of the parties, the district court entered a consent degree which embodied that agreement.
Judge Stagg’s order approving the consent decree directed the clerk of the court to provide for public notice of the terms of the decree. The consent decree was published in its entirety in both local newspapers and was covered by the three local television stations. The district court also set aside a ten-day period in which “interested parties” could file written objections to the decree. Within the specified time period, the court received thirteen objections, one of which was filed by June Phillips, appellant herein. The objection Ms. Phillips raised was confined to the failure of the decree to provide “enrichment programs” for black students at many of the district’s elementary schools.
On May 22, 1981, four days after the period for filing objections had expired, Ms. Phillips filed a motion to intervene individually and on behalf of a class of black children in the Caddo Parish school system and their parents. Her petition alleged numerous deficiencies in the pupil assignment plan contained in the consent decree and requested the district court to set aside the decree. On May 27, Ms. Phillips filed a first supplemental motion to intervene. On June 8, she filed her second supplemental motion to intervene. That same day the United States and the School Board separately filed responses to the objections to the consent decree, and memoranda opposing Ms. Phillips’ attempt to intervene.
On June 17, 1981, the district court entered a memorandum ruling denying Ms. Phillips’ motion to intervene. Judge Stagg found her proposed intervention both untimely and without new issues that had not previously been considered by the School Board and the United States. On July 2, the district court overruled all objections to the consent decree. Ms. Phillips appeals from the denial of her intervention and the rejection of her objection to the consent decree.
A PRELIMINARY ISSUE: THE PARTIES TO THE CONSENT DECREE
According to the district court, Ms. Phillips sought intervenor status both individually and as a representative of a class for the purpose of setting aside a consent decree negotiated by and agreed upon by only two parties, the United States and the Cad-do Parish School Board. In its memorandum ruling denying Ms. Phillips’ interven[212]*212tion, the court found that “this action, in its present posture, is not in fact a class action.” 11 The court reasoned that the action brought by the private plaintiffs, despite allegations of a “class” status, had never been certified as a class action, that prior to June 1980 the original plaintiffs had not taken an “active role in this litigation for some time,” and that none of these plaintiffs or their counsel responded within the prescribed time period to the minute entry of June 3, 1980. The uncertain nature of the private plaintiffs’ role in the later years of this litigation, highlighted by a complete failure to reestablish their participation through the order of June 3, resulted in a dismissal of the claims of the class members. Therefore, the settlement negotiations and the resulting consent decree were the efforts of two parties, the School Board on one side and the United States — pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 — on the other.
The district court correctly viewed this action as one involving only two parties, and not as a class action, after July 3, 1980.12 From the outset of this litigation, the status of the private plaintiffs as representatives of a class was uncertain. Although the original complaint contained allegations made on behalf of a class pursuant to former Rule 23(a)(3), it was just over a year later that Rule 23 was amended to include a mandatory requirement of class certification.13 Rule 23(c)(1), effective July 1,1966, provided that “[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained,” and the order of the Supreme Court accompanying the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explained that the amendments
“shall govern all proceedings in actions brought [after July 1,1966] and also in all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action then pending would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies.” 383 U.S. 1031 (1966).
This Court has held amended Rule 23 to apply to actions that were filed before the effective date of the amendments, Alvarez v. Pan American Life Insurance Company, 375 F.2d 992, 993 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827, 88 S.Ct. 74, 19 L.Ed.2d 82 (1967), and we have stated more generally “that to the maximum extent possible, the amended Rules should be given retroactive application.” Atlantis Development Corporation v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir.[213]*2131967). Despite the general retroactive applicability of the amendments to Rule 23, the record in this case indicates that no class certification in accordance with Rule 23(c)(1) was ever requested or ordered. Thus, the true nature of the class was never judicially ascertained.
A series of actions in the early 1970’s further depicted the unsettled nature of the purported class. In 1973, an apparent “split” developed between the interests and goals of the named representatives and those of the lawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. This divergence of interests ultimately led to the named plaintiffs’ withdrawing the NAACP lawyers as counsel and to the withdrawal of objections to the 1973 Committee plan previously filed by one of those lawyers. Yet, contemporaneously, Margrett Ford (one of the NAACP lawyers) moved the district court to add additional parents and children in Caddo Parish as party plaintiffs. In denying this latter motion, the district court took note that Ms. Ford was the only attorney sponsoring the motion, and the judge warned that “[ajdequate and proper representation of plaintiffs cannot be assured by divided counsel.”
It became apparent that this “rift” was more than a disagreement among counsel when many of the same school children and their parents who had sought to become additional party plaintiffs filed a motion to intervene in November 1973. The complaint attached to the motion for intervention alleged that the 1973 Committee desegregation plan — not objected to by the original plaintiffs — was unconstitutional because it maintained one-race schools within the parish. Although intervention was denied by the district court, this Court vacated that judgment and expressly directed the district court on remand to “determine the class and who properly represents it.” Jones v. Caddo Parish School Board, 499 F.2d at 917. The uncertain nature of the class prompted this Court to state:
“Thus we have an unusual contest between black groups represented by different counsel, some of whom were originally associated together when this suit was first filed, and we cannot determine on the record before us who most properly represents the rights of the black community in Caddo Parish.” Id.
Despite this indication of concern over the undefined group of plaintiffs loosely constituting the “class,” class certification, or definition, was not pursued when the case was remanded to the district court.
From the date of our 1974 opinion in Jones v. Caddo Parish School Board, supra, until the filing of the objections to the 1981 consent decree — a period of over six years— the black citizens of Caddo Parish were heard from, either through the original named plaintiffs or otherwise, only once.14 Ms. Phillips acknowledges this in her petition for intervention when she states, “From July 20, 1973 to July 3, 1980, The Class which plaintiff seeks to represent was virtually unrepresented in these proceedings.” When Judge Scott entered his order finding the school system unitary, the plaintiffs did not file an appeal or attempt to have that finding amended by the district court. Moreover, they did not join in the government’s motion to amend the findings and set aside the declaration of unitary status. Similarly, the plaintiffs did not oppose the School Board’s motion for relief from the faculty racial percentage requirements, nor did they join the motion of the United States, which sought to postpone consideration of this issue.
When this case was assigned to Judge Stagg in August 1979, the only plaintiff who had actively participated over the previous two and one-half years was the United States. In June 1980, following a status conference which included a discussion of “the present status of the plaintiffs and their proper representation,” the court entered the following minute order, a copy of which was sent to all counsel of record, past and present:
[214]*214“If the original plaintiffs still have a viable interest in this case, their counsel should contact the court, in writing, within thirty (30) days of this order. If the plaintiffs’ counsel does not respond, this court will consider that the plaintiffs acquiesce in having their interests represented by the United States as plaintiff - intervenor.”
None of the plaintiffs or their counsel expressed an interest in participating in any further proceedings in this action. In addition, no objections were lodged to proceeding with the United States as plaintiff-intervenor.
The failure of the plaintiffs and their counsel to affirmatively assert an interest in this action within the prescribed time period, combined with the uncertainty surrounding the “class” aspect of the suit over the preceding six years and the lack of any class certification, warranted the district court’s dismissal of the claims of the class for failure to prosecute. It is well-recognized that a district court has inherent power to order, sua sponte, the dismissal of an action for want of prosecution. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-33, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734, 737-38 (1962); Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 319-20 (5th Cir.1982); see 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §§ 2369-70 (1971). Although infrequent, dismissals for failure to prosecute of suits denominated as class actions are proper in the federal courts. See Partridge v. St. Louis Joint Stock Land Bank, 130 F.2d 281 (8th Cir.1942); National Hairdressers’ & Cosmetologists’Ass’n v. Philad Co., 4 F.R.D. 106 (D.Del.1944). Here, the record strongly supports the district court’s determination that the plaintiffs had lost interest in pursuing this litigation, and that they had no objection to the United States, as plaintiffintervenor, seeking further desegregation of the parish schools.
On appeal, Ms. Phillips asserts that the district court failed to comply with the requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) that notice of the proposed dismissal of a class action be provided to all members of the class.15 In the present circumstances, no such notice was required. Rule 23(e) was enacted “to assure that any person whose rights would be affected by a dismissal or compromise has the opportunity to contest the proposed action.” 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1797 at 234 (1972). However, the special prophylactic function of Rule 23(e) is not applicable to all forms of dismissal. For example, when the dismissal is involuntary — as it was here — and it “could not involve collusion or benefit the representative plaintiffs at the expense of the remaining class members, the protection afforded by giving notice to the absentees is not required.” Id. at 235; see Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 91 F.R.D. 208, 210 (E.D.Mo.1981) (Rule 23(e) does not apply to involuntary dismissal of an uncertified class action). In Partridge v. St. Louis Joint Stock Land Bank, supra, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a class action for failure to prosecute, even though notice of the dismissal was not provided to the nonparty class members. The suit in Partridge had been pending on the district court’s docket for nine years, with the plaintiffs receiving a long series of continuances. When the court ordered the action set for trial — giving plaintiffs full notice thereof — counsel for the named plaintiff again moved orally for a continuance. The suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute, even though the named party was the representative of a large “class of persons.” 130 F.2d at 286. The Eighth Circuit noted that “the court has the duty to see to it that even a class suit shall be prosecuted with due diligence,” and concluded that Rule 23(c), the predecessor to current Rule 23(e), was “not applicable to dismissal for failure to prosecute under the circumstances here presented.” Id.
[215]*215While the Partridge decision has been criticized for not recognizing that the failure to prosecute may indicate a lack of interest only by the named representatives, see, e.g., 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1797 at 236; Comment, Involuntary Dismissals of Class Actions, 40 U.Chi.L.Rev. 783, 791-92 (1973), the concerns expressed by the commentators are ameliorated by two factors present here. First, the United States was actively participating in the litigation as a party plaintiff. Thus, even a complete and final dismissal of all private plaintiffs would not mean that school desegregation would no longer be pursued in Caddo Parish. As the district court recognized, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 empowers the United States to intervene and to seek “the same relief as if it had instituted the action.” This authorization continues even though the private plaintiffs to the action have been removed, “so long as [the government’s] participation serves the statutory purpose.”16 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 2702, 49 L.Ed.2d 599, 605 (1976).
More importantly, we believe that the district court’s dismissal of the claims of the private plaintiffs, despite being predicated on a failure to prosecute, was not an adjudication on the merits. Therefore, the failure of the district court to notify all members of the class of the proposed dismissal did not altow the named representatives to sacrifice or unduly compromise the interests of the unnamed class members. While Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) presumptively makes an involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute an adjudication upon the merits, see Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 795, 798-99 (5th Cir.1970) (en banc), that same rule provides that the district court may direct otherwise in its order of dismissal.17 Here, however, no formal order of dismissal was filed. Thus, where we are confronted with the dismissal of a class suit without the entry of an order of dismissal, we decline to merely automatically imply the severe penalty of a dismissal with prejudice, and, rather, believe it necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding the termination of the class action, as well as the pertinent orders and rulings of the district court, to determine whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.18 [216]*216The necessity for this inquiry is particularly acute in this situation where, in addition to the above factors, the nature of the class has gone undefined throughout the course of the litigation.
Several factors lead to our conclusion that this dismissal was without prejudice. First, the minute entry of June 3, 1980, did not inform counsel that a failure to respond would result in an adjudication on the merits; to the contrary, the only penalty indicated was that the private parties would accede to the United States pursuing the action as plaintiff-intervenor. Instead of indicating a dismissal prejudicial to the filing of future desegregation actions, this order suggests that the plaintiffs were given thirty days to continue or withdraw from this action only. The June 3 order did not even hint that the district court was contemplating permanently removing an ambiguously defined class of private plaintiffs from the filing of further desegregation suits in Caddo Parish. Second, the district court’s memorandum ruling denying Ms. Phillips’ motion to intervene was similarly devoid of any suggestion that the dismissal of the class suit was with prejudice.
The circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the private plaintiffs also indicate a dismissal without prejudice. The prejudicial dismissal for failure to prosecute of a purported class action, particularly one involving issues of system-wide school desegregation, should only follow an inquiry into the relationship between the class representatives and the unnamed class members. Here, the class itself was never defined with any particularity, making a determination of the significance of the failure to prosecute problematic at best. In fact, we note that under the former Rule 23(a)(3), the basis for the class allegations in the original complaint, a judgment was binding on only the parties of record. See 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 23.10[7] (1982). Thus, if the class allegations here are treated as having been made pursuant to that Rule, the district court’s dismissal would only bind the named parties to this action.
Further, the law in this Circuit in regard to dismissals with prejudice for failure to prosecute has been well-settled on one point: such dismissals are reserved for only the most egregious of cases, where there is “ ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff,’ ... and where lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.” Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d at 320 (citations omitted); see Gray v. Fidelity Acceptance Corp., 634 F.2d 226, 227 (5th Cir.1981); Boazman v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir.1976). The conduct of the named plaintiffs here, although clearly pointing to a lack of interest in the prosecution of the action, hardly rises to the level of contumacious or egregious conduct. Moreover, sanctions less severe than a dismissal with prejudice were plainly available and desirable in this instance. We believe the district court, fully cognizant of the extreme cir[217]*217cumstances required to enter a dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute, opted for just such a less severe remedy in the form of a dismissal of the class action without prejudice. Given the hesitancy of this Court to endorse prejudicial dismissals for failure to prosecute and the circumstances under which this dismissal occurred, this interpretation of the district court’s action is appropriate. We hold that the dismissal of the class action was without prejudice.19
This resolution clarifies the disposition of Ms. Phillips’ claim that the district court failed to provide notice of the settlement between the United States and the School Board to the affected nonparty class members. Since the district court had dismissed the class action as of July 3, 1980, there was no class to notify when the settlement was reached on May 5, 1981. Once properly dismissed, the members of a former class suit no longer fall under the umbrella of the Rule 23(e) notice requirement. See Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 1508, 47 L.Ed.2d 762 (1976) (after determination that class action is improper under Rule 23(c)(1), notice requirements of Rule 23(e) do not apply). Furthermore, notice of the consent decree was provided, and it was precisely that notice and opportunity to file written objections which brought Ms. Phillips into this dispute. In this type of class action, the “mechanics of the notice process are left to the discretion of the district court subject only to the broad ‘reasonableness’ standards imposed by due process.” Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir.1979).20 Ms. Phillips identifies no shortcomings in the method of notice employed by the district court; her general, conclusionary allegations will not suffice.
To complete the picture, we again note that Ms. Phillips attempted to intervene to set aside a consent decree negotiated and agreed upon by the only two parties to the suit, the United States and the Caddo Parish School Board. Neither Ms. Phillips nor her fellow citizens of Caddo Parish were parties to the decree entered in 1981. It is therefore axiomatic that Ms. Phillips— not having been a party to the decree — is not bound by res judicata to the terms of the decree. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 845 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1684, 48 L.Ed.2d 187 (1976); Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 65 (5th Cir.1974), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977); United States v. Louisiana, 90 F.R.D. 358, 362-63 (E.D.La.1981) (three-judge court), aff’d, 669 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Board of Education, 88 F.R.D. 679, 683 and n. 6 (N.D.Ill.1981).
THE MOTION TO INTERVENE
Ms. Phillips sought intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), intervention of right, and in the alternative under Rule 24(b)(2), permissive intervention.21 The denial of a mo[218]*218tion to intervene of right is appealable, Weiser v. White, 505 F.2d 912, 916-18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 993, 95 S.Ct. 1998, 44 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); however, the denial of a motion for permissive intervention is not appealable unless there is an abuse of discretion. Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 684 F.2d 324 (5th Cir.1982). Accordingly, we must review the merits of the claim of intervention to determine whether or not the district court’s order denying intervention is appealable. Weiser, 505 F.2d at 916.
The district court found Ms. Phillips’ motion to intervene deficient because it was untimely and because it failed to raise new issues that had not previously been considered by the parties to the consent decree. An application for intervention under either Rule 24(a) or Rule 24(b) must be “timely.” NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366, 93 S.Ct. 2591, 2603, 37 L.Ed.2d 648 (1973); Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir.1977). Timeliness “is not a word of exactitude or of precisely measurable dimensions,” McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir.1970); instead, it is a measure “to be determined from all the circumstances.” NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. at 366, 93 S.Ct. at 2603. As such, its determination in any given case is an exercise committed to the sound discretion of the district court, subject to reversal by an appellate court only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 366, 93 S.Ct. at 2603; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232, 1235 (5th Cir.1977). In United States v. Marion County School District, 590 F.2d 146, 148-49 (5th Cir.1979), we discussed the elements of the timeliness requirement within the context of a school desegregation action:
“Timeliness is a function of the relative prejudice to the existing parties and the would-be intervenor. The district court, in exercising its discretion to weigh the relative prejudice to each, must put into the balance against the movant its prior opportunities to assert its position and its protection through representation by the existing parties. In weighing possible prejudice to the existing parties the court must consider what has happened as a result of the movant’s failure to apply for intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in the case.”
See also Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264-66.
An assessment of these factors in this case leads to the conclusion that Ms. Phillips’ proposed intervention was untimely on its face. From the filing of this action in 1965 until May 22, 1981, the date of her motion to intervene, Ms. Phillips made no effort to intervene to assert either her views or those of a purported class. Although her petition to intervene asserts the inadequacy of “most of the actions of [the district court] since the original filings of this suit,” she remained conspicuously silent through almost sixteen years of legal proceedings and negotiations. Ms. Phillips also assails the 1973 Committee desegregation plan for failing to benefit the class which she seeks to represent, yet she waited eight years to voice this objection. Similarly, when the district court declared the Cad-do Parish school system unitary in 1977, Ms. Phillips neither attempted to intervene nor did she make any effort to join the United States in seeking to amend the judgment. During the early months of 1981, when community meetings were held throughout the parish to discuss desegregation proposals, the record again reflects no attempt to intervene. It was not until May 22, 1981, fifteen days after the formal entry of the consent decree and four days after the expiration of the period for filing objections to the decree, that Ms. Phillips moved to intervene in an effort to set aside the consent decree.
[219]*219Under circumstances evincing comparable delays in seeking intervention, this Court has found such applications untimely. In United States v. Marion County School District, supra, a school desegregation action originally brought by the United States in 1967, we affirmed the denial of two motions to intervene made by an organization of parents, the first of which was filed in 1977. In finding the 1977 petition for intervention to be untimely, we noted that
“[the organization’s] initial motion seeking the return of grades 7-12 to the Improve school was filed ten years after the commencement of Marion County’s school litigation, seven years after the court-ordered removal of grades 9-12 from Improve, and four years after implementation of the modified plan removing grades 7 and 8.” 590 F.2d at 149.
More recently, we held untimely an attempt to intervene by the NAACP seven years after the United States initiated litigation against the State of Louisiana over the desegregation of its higher education system. United States v. Louisiana, supra. There, the NAACP initially moved to intervene only two years into the suit and, aftep the motion had been denied by the district court, we remanded the case for a hearing on the motion to intervene, United States v. Louisiana, 543 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir.1976). On remand, the intervention question was not pursued, the NAACP having chosen instead to participate as amicus curiae. However, in 1981 the NAACP again moved to intervene, and this motion was denied because, inter alia, the NAACP had failed to satisfy the timeliness requirement of Rule 24. “We cannot say, in view of the NAACP’s great and undisputed delay — over four years — in advancing the second motion that the order denying it was [an abuse of discretion].” 669 F.2d at 315. See also United States v. Carroll County Board of Education, 427 F.2d 141, 142 (5th Cir.1970).
Ms. Phillips’ inordinate delay in seeking intervenor status is even less understandable when we recognize that her role in the community probably kept her apprised of many of the developments in this action. The record indicates that the United States subpoenaed Ms. Phillips to appear “as a witness to assist the Government at counsel table during the taking of various depositions” during the proceedings held by the Special Master in 1976. Thus, Ms. Phillips was present during testimony and proceedings addressed to the question of the School Board’s compliance with the 1973 Committee desegregation plan and, although she now objects to that plan, she did not intervene either to modify that plan or to question the School Board’s fulfillment of its objectives. Moreover, prior to these hearings the School Board had moved for a declaration of unitary status, yet Ms. Phillips also did not intervene to oppose that motion. Furthermore, movant’s first supplemental motion to intervene acknowledges that she had contact with one of the Justice Department lawyers representing the United States in the settlement negotiations with the School Board. Her motion states that this lawyer “obtained input” from her and that he “held meetings in the Black community to obtain input from the Black community.” Thus, it appears likely that to an extent Ms. Phillips was apprised of the settlement efforts well before the entry of the consent decree; yet, she made no effort to intervene at that point.22
[220]*220The issue of timeliness, according to Ms. Phillips, “is at least partially linked to the question of adequate representation,” Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011, 101 S.Ct. 568, 66 L.Ed.2d 469 (1980), and, she argues, must be determined here from the date the consent degree was signed. In her original motion to intervene (and in her second supplemental and amended motion), Ms. Phillips offers no explanation whatever for her failure to seek intervention earlier. In her first supplemental motion to intervene, she states that she did not learn of “the contents of the Consent Decree until the week of May 11 to May 15,1981.”23 She also states that she had “presumed that the United States would represent the best interest” of herself and the class she seeks to represent, but that it did not in that the consent decree’s terms were not what she says they should have been. She offers no other reason for not seeking intervention sooner. She does not allege, directly or inferentially, that the United States or anyone else misled her or members of the class she seeks to represent in any way, or that she (or the “class”) was led to believe, or even did believe, that the consent decree would contain some particular provision which it omitted, or that it would not include some particular provision which it did in fact contain. She does not allege that she, or the class she seeks to represent, was unaware of either the prolonged settlement negotiations, lasting for almost a year, leading up to the consent decree, or of the numerous public meetings, held during February, March, and April 1981, in reference thereto, or that she, or the “class,” was ever unaware of the status of the litigation and the conditions in the schools since a time well before 1973.
As applied to these circumstances it seems clear that Ms. Phillips “knew or reasonably should have known of [her] interest in the case” long before she filed her petition to intervene. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264. As established in Stallworth, id., and Marion County, 590 F.2d at 149, the relevant time period for gauging the timeliness of an application for intervention begins when the proposed intervenor knew or should have known of his or her interest in the case; actual knowledge is not required. The premise of her position — that the 1981 decree was the first indication that her interests were not represented by any existing party and that she then became aware of her interest in the case — is not supported by the record. The 1973 Committee desegregation plan, which Ms. Phillips claims failed to eliminate the remnants of the dual school system, has been in operation since the start of the 1973-74 school year. This scheme, an allegedly unconstitutional plan, was in place for eight years prior to the 1981 consent decree, without objection from the original plaintiffs (or Ms. Phillips). During this period, Ms. Phillips surely knew of her interest in the case and, moreover, she should have known that the interest she now asserts as applicant for intervention— the further desegregation of the parish schools — was not represented by the private [221]*221plaintiffs. In addition, the United States was also a party during the eight-year period, basically acceding to the implementation and continued operation of the 1973 scheme.24
Ms. Phillips further withheld from seeking intervention during the almost yearlong negotiations between the United States and the School Board, even though the negotiations received publicity in the community, and meetings were held throughout the parish to discuss various desegregation proposals. We find it difficult to reconcile Ms. Phillips’ attempted intervention after the parties had negotiated a settlement and the district court had entered a consent decree with any proper regard for the settlement process itself. We fully recognize that “school desegregation is one of the areas in which voluntary resolution is preferable to full litigation because the spirit of cooperation inherent in good faith settlement is essential to the true long-range success of any desegregation remedy.” Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 318 (7th Cir.1980); see United States v. Board of Education, 88 F.R.D. at 685. This statement is particularly meaningful in the context of this seventeen-year litigation, which, after several trips to this Court and the gradual exodus of the private parties, has culminated in a consent decree agreed upon by the remaining parties and approved by the district court. “Intervention after entry of a consent decree is reserved for exceptional cases.” Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837, 99 S.Ct. 123, 58 L.Ed.2d 134 (1978). If Ms. Phillips is permitted to intervene at this late date to interpose her views, we see little to prevent other nonparties from similarly coming forward to voice objections to the decree. More importantly, should Ms. Phillips’ protests be accounted for, and the consent decree accordingly reformed, what would then preclude Ms. Smith or Mr. Jones or any other resident of the parish from intervening in opposition to the new decree?
Under these circumstances, then, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Ms. Phillips’ request for intervention was untimely.25
[222]*222A HEARING ON THE MOTION TO INTERVENE
The district court denied Ms. Phillips’ motion to intervene without holding an evidentiary hearing, despite a request for such a hearing in her original motion.26 This Court has indicated generally that due process requires that proposed intervenors be provided a hearing prior to a ruling on their motions to intervene. See Adams v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 628 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir.1980); Jones v. Caddo Parish School Board, 499 F.2d at 917; Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680, 683 (5th Cir. 1973). We do not retreat from that position today. We do, however, believe that on the record before the district court Ms. Phillips’ intervention was prima facie untimely, and as she tendered to the district court no factual allegations which, if true, would establish the contrary, the district court was not obliged to hold an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Louisiana, 669 F.2d at 315; United States v. Perry County Board of Education, 567 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir.1978).
CONCLUSION
Under the law of this Circuit, where intervention of right is properly denied and permissive intervention is denied without an abuse of discretion, the decision of the district court is not appealable and we must dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Weiser, 505 F.2d at 916; 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1923 at 629 (1972).
APPEAL DISMISSED.