Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedMarch 31, 2021
Docket2:65-cv-15556
StatusUnknown

This text of Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board (Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, (E.D. La. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

M. C. MOORE, ET AL CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 65-15556

TANGIPAHOA PARISH SCHOOL SECTION: “B”(1) BOARD, ET AL

OPINION

When this case began in 1965, race-based separation of students, teachers and facilities was the result of a de jure system of racial segregation. The groundbreaking Brown v. Board of Education unanimous decision in , 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), and its progeny supplied the framework for rooting out racial isolation and the accompanying pernicious effects it has on children, parents, educators, and the at-large society. The significant and sensitive issues in the pending motion for provisional unitary status, viewed as a proposed modification of existing desegregation decrees, are clearly and adequately addressed by movants and opponents. Rec. Doc. 1630. We proceed and join in remembrance with Circuit Judge

Carl Stewart’s cautionary observations in a concurring Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Madison Cty. opinion in , 517 F.3d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 2008). While the record [as here] provides a detailed account of the many obstacles that prevent the existence of fully integrated schools—such as the confluence of the geography and demography in the district—the cruel irony is that racial isolation, de jure albeit not as the product of segregation, largely remains as foreboding and potentially deleterious as it was when federal court supervision began. Of course, this case is only the latest indication that despite the societal progress that has been made in dismantling systems of segregation, Brown many of the concerns highlighted in still remain as viable today as when that opinion was first authored.

Id . at 306 (emphasis added)

The ultimate inquiry in determining whether a school district is unitary is whether (1) the school district has complied in good faith with desegregation orders for a reasonable amount of time, and (2) the school district de jure has eliminated the vestiges of prior segregation Hull v. Quitman County Bd. of to the extent practicable. Educ., 1 F.3d 1450, 1454 (5th Cir.1993); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492, 498, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992). This standard applies in assessing whether the school district is unitary in the remaining areas relative to employment practices, student assignment, and facilities. Unitary status was previously declared in

other areas. In evaluating unitary status, “a court should give particular attention to the school system’s record of compliance.” The record of good faith compliance must be Fletcher v. Miss., et al, “consistent”. See CA#16-60722 ( 5th Cir. 02/06/2018). For at least three years, the district court should retain jurisdiction and require the

school board to file reports with the court. The court then must hold a hearing to consider whether the district should be considered unitary; plaintiffs must receive notice of the hearing and an opportunity to show why the

system is not unitary and why continued judicial supervision is necessary. Only after these procedures are followed may a district court be sufficiently certain See that a school system is unitary and dismiss the case. Monteilh v. St. Landry Par. Sch. Bd., 848 F.2d 625, 629 (5th Cir. 1988). It must be emphasized that a provisional declaration of unitary status will neither vacate prior decrees nor dismiss this action. It would set forth modifications that credit current successes arising from

relevant good faith actions of parties over a reasonable period of time. Moreover, additional circumstances as infra discussed must be weighed in determining present and future conditions within the Tangipahoa Parish School System (“TPSS”). Freeman v. Pitts In , 503 U.S. 467, 491-492, 498 (1992), the Supreme Court stated: “Among the factors which must inform the sound discretion of the court . . . are the following: whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn;

whether retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the school system; and whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its

good-faith commitment to the whole of the court’s decree and to those provisions of the law and the Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first instance.”

Federal courts have broad equitable powers to fashion remedial measures designed to eliminate school Milliken v. Bradley segregation. , 433 U.S. 267, 279–80, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977). The district court may “adjust remedies in a feasible and practical way to eliminate the conditions or redress the injuries caused Freeman v. Pitts by unlawful action.” , 503 U.S. 467, 487, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992). If injunctive relief is “to be enforced with fairness and precision,” Id. it must be flexible. Accordingly, “sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, since arisen.” 427 U.S. 424, 437, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976).

A school district, though, is “entitled to a rather precise statement of its obligations under a Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City desegregation decree.” Pub. Schs. v. Dowell , 498 U.S. 237, 246, 111 S.Ct. 630, Moore v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991); Bd. , 864 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2017). First, consent decrees are contractual in nature, so parties may fairly expect such orders to be enforced as Frew ex rel. Frew both a contract and a judicial decree. v. Hawkins , 540 U.S. 431, 437, 124 S.Ct. 899, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004). As a judicial decree, such injunctions are “subject to the rules generally applicable to other See id judgments and decrees,” including modification. . 540 U.S. at 441. Further, individuals and entities subject to injunctions must have fair notice of the terms of the injunction and any modifications that take place. W. Water Mgmt., Inc. v. Brown See , 40 F.3d 105, 109 (5th Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, Cir. 1994); 617 F.2d 385, 387–88 (5th Cir. 1980). Upon proper notice, the sua district court may modify the terms of an injunction sponte W. Water Mgmt. . , 40 F.3d at 109. Litigation Counsel for plaintiffs filed on December 5, 2019 an opposition memorandum which concluded at page 8 that “The motion for unitary status and approval of the proposed settlement agreement (found at Rec. Doc. 1581 - filed on Sept. 26, 2019) should be dismissed without prejudice, subject to re-submission after addressing the concerns expressed by the court at the November 20, 2019

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Related

Anderson v. School Board of Madison County
517 F.3d 292 (Fifth Circuit, 2008)
NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval County School
273 F.3d 960 (Eleventh Circuit, 2001)
Shernika Holton v. City of Thomasville School
425 F.3d 1325 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)
Brown v. Board of Education
347 U.S. 483 (Supreme Court, 1954)
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County
391 U.S. 430 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler
427 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Milliken v. Bradley
433 U.S. 267 (Supreme Court, 1977)
Freeman v. Pitts
503 U.S. 467 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Missouri v. Jenkins
515 U.S. 70 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Frew Ex Rel. Frew v. Hawkins
540 U.S. 431 (Supreme Court, 2004)
M. Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board
843 F.3d 198 (Fifth Circuit, 2016)

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