Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedJanuary 6, 2023
Docket2:65-cv-15556
StatusUnknown

This text of Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board (Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, (E.D. La. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA JOYCE MARIE MOORE, ET AL CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 65-15556 TANGIPAHOA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD SECTION: “B”(1)

OPINION Plaintiff Taj Mikhail Jackson is a student within the Tangipahoa Parish Public Schools system. He seeks equitable relief, including a temporary restraining order. The relief sought essentially amounts to a court declaration that his school- approved Majority to Minority (“M&M”) transfer from Hammond High School to Ponchatoula High School should not prevent his participation in athletic sports, specifically basketball.1 That declaration would entail modifying the current desegregation order by deleting a provision within same entitled “Athletic Eligibility”. It reads thusly: Athletic eligibility for students attending a school outside the attendance zone in which they reside shall be subject to the rules of the Louisiana High School Athletic Association. Student athletic eligibility for students returning to their attendance zone school form a transfer school shall be subject to the rules of the Louisiana High School Athletic Association. Rec. Doc. 1630-1 at 6.

1 M&M or Diversity Transfers generally speaking for purposes here include transfers of minority students from a minority school to a majority school. See also Rec. Doc. 1661. As acknowledged by the parties, this court still maintains jurisdiction over Student Assignments, including M&M or Diversity Transfers. Before a Court may issue a temporary restraining order, the moving party must show: (1) a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that

irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the granting of the injunction will serve the public interest. Wexler v. City of New Orleans, No. 03- 990, 2003 WL 1903294 at *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6561 at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 2003) (Duval, J.) (citing Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987)); see also Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“The standards for a temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction.”). Cf. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987); Hope Med. Grp. for Women v. LeBlanc, No. CV 06-9176, 2006 WL 8460106, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2006), aff'd, 259 F. App'x

626 (5th Cir. 2007). The prerequisites for granting injunctive relief were set out in Canal Authority of the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.1974), which held that such extraordinary relief would issue only where (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits; (2) there is a substantial threat that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) the granting of the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Id. at 572–73. The party seeking such relief must satisfy a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated before a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction can be granted. Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline,

760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir.1985). The athletic eligibility provision if allowed to stand would and has a chilling effect upon achieving student assignment improvements and final unitary status, especially upon transfers by student and aspiring student athletes. It allows a third party, the Louisiana High School Athletic Association (“LHSAA”), to be the final arbiter of this black student’s eligibility to play basketball pursuant to a federal court desegregation order involving M&M or Diversity Transfers. The constitutional authority of federal courts to ultimately determine the proper means towards unitary status in a desegregation case cannot be supplanted by or

given away to anyone or any entity. The conditional grant of unitary status is not final until the Court determines in a final decree that discrimination in the subject areas, e.g. student assignments, has been eliminated in all aspects and affects. See Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 921 F.3d 545, 547-49 (5th Cir. 2019), aff’g 2017 WL 3116483. That process includes examination and correction, as needed here, of part of the decree that un-expectantly resulted with a policy decision of an external body that adversely impacts the school system reaching unconditional unitary status. See Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 864 F.3d 401, 406-07 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Taylor v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 965 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763-64 (W.D. La.

2013). It is important to state that plaintiff-student’s M&M transfer from Hammond High School to Ponchatoula High School was approved on June 13, 2022, (Rec. Doc. 1712-3). He received the Official LHSAA Eligibility Response Form on October 20, 2022, stating that he was “ineligible for varsity & sub-varsity [sports.]” See Rec. Doc. 1712-6. The principal of Ponchatoula High School sought an appeal on October 26, 2022, but plaintiff does not indicate any outcome. See Rec. Doc. 1712-5. The basketball season started on November 15, 2022, and plaintiff filed the motion for a TRO on December 11, after eleven games had passed. See Rec. Doc. 1712. Plaintiff’s counsel on the subject motion appears

therefore to have had ample time to request a TRO prior to now. There is no allegation that after missing two-thirds of the season that the student would even be afforded the opportunity to play in one of the remaining games. Further, moving counsel for the student either misread or overlooked the restrictive provision at issue in the subject desegregation agreement prior to its adoption by the court. See Rec. Doc. 1630-1 at 6.2 Moving counsel relies on LHSAA Rule 1.13.3, which states: Transfers Within the Athletic Attendance Zone: If at any time a student transfers from one-member school to another member school in the same attendance zone, the student shall become immediately ineligible for a period of one calendar year from the date of enrollment/attendance in the second school. The student may be eligible at his/her school of first choice in the attendance zone. A transfer student will be ineligible for a period of one calendar year at the new school unless he/she transfers under one of the following exceptions: 1. Majority to Minority Transfer as written into a federal court desegregation order.

Rec. Doc. 1712-5 at 1. While plaintiff argues that the above exception applied to his circumstance, the LHSAA argues that the M&M transfer from Hammond High School to Ponchatoula High School was a transfer outside his athletic attendance zone and LHSAA Rule 1.13.4 applies instead of LHSAA Rule 1.13.3. See id.; Rec. Doc. 1717 at 3-5. LHSAA Rule 1.13.4 states: Outside the Athletic Attendance Zone: Any student who attends a school outside his/her athletic attendance zone shall be ineligible to participate in interscholastic athletics at that school for a period of one calendar year from his/her first day of attendance unless he/she transfers under one of the following exceptions: 1.

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Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-tangipahoa-parish-school-board-laed-2023.