Attic Tent, Inc. v. Copeland

627 F. Supp. 2d 635, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102114, 2008 WL 5146543
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedDecember 8, 2008
DocketCivil Case 3:06cv066
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 627 F. Supp. 2d 635 (Attic Tent, Inc. v. Copeland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Attic Tent, Inc. v. Copeland, 627 F. Supp. 2d 635, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102114, 2008 WL 5146543 (W.D.N.C. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

MARTIN REIDINGER, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the parties’ respective motions for the construction of certain claim language used in U.S. Reissue Patent No. Re. 36,975 (issued Dec. 5, 2000) (“the '975 Patent”) [Doc. 180-6].

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiff The Attic Tent, Inc. (“Plaintiff’) filed this action on February 16, 2006 against the Defendants Jerry L. Copeland and Progressive Energy Solutions, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging patent infringement of the '975 Patent, as well as a claim for unfair competition in violation of North Carolina law. [Doc. 1], The Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction, which the Court denied on March 28, 2006, 2006 WL 839085. [Doc. 27], In their answer, the Defendants asserted, among other defenses, the defenses of non-infringement and invalidity and further asserted counterclaims for false marking in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 292, patent misuse, and unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of North Carolina law, as well as a declaratory judgment for non-infringement and/or unenforceability. [Doc. 18].

The parties engaged in a period of discovery, which resulted in the filing of multiple motions to compel [Docs. 36, 54, 82, 98, 107], motions to disqualify counsel [Docs. 43, 49, 139], and motions for protective order [Docs. 96,128], leading the Magistrate Judge assigned to this matter to declare that this case was “perhaps the most contentious case [he] has handled in over fourteen years on the bench.” [Doc. 132 at 1]. On September 18, 2007, this matter was reassigned to the undersigned. On November 28, 2007, the Court entered an Amended Pretrial Order and Case *638 Management Plan [Doc. 174], extending certain scheduling deadlines and establishing a Markman 1 proceeding schedule. The parties have filed their respective briefs in accordance with that schedule, and subsequently communicated to the Court that, because the issue of claim construction could be resolved upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, a claim construction hearing was not required. [Doc. 183]. Having received and reviewed all of the parties’ briefs and supporting documentation, the Court deems the issue of claim construction now ripe for disposition.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The invention claimed in the '975 Patent is for an insulated attic hatchway cover. The inventor filed the original patent application on November 16, 1994. During the examination process, the patent examiner located conflicting prior art that was a barrier to patentability of the invention as claimed. The application subsequently was amended so as to limit Claim 1, which at the time was the only independent claim of the application, by adding the limitation that each of the walls be “of a rigid construction.” The amended application was allowed and issued as U.S. Patent No. 5,481,833 (“the '833 Patent”).

Nearly two years after the original patent was issued, the inventor filed an application seeking to expand the scope of the '833 Patent. This application went through the examination process, with a series of rejections and amendments, and ultimately was issued as Reissue Patent No. 36,975. The '975 Patent includes twelve claims, of which only Claims 1-4, 7, and 8 are asserted in the present case. Of these asserted claims, only Claims 1 and 7 are independent claims, with the other asserted claims depending either directly or indirectly from Claim l. 2

III. PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

“The determination of infringement is a two-step process. First, the court construes the claims to correctly determine the scope of the claims. Second, it compares the properly construed claims to the accused device.” Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed.Cir.2001). The first step in this process, the construction of claims, is a question of law for the Court. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc). The second step, the comparison of the properly construed claims to the accused device, is typically a question of fact for the jury. See Bell Atlantic, 262 F.3d at 1267.

“It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (citation omitted). The Court should give the disputed claim terms “their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by *639 one of ordinary skill in the art.” Bell Atlantic, 262 F.3d at 1267.

As the Federal Circuit has stated:

In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words. In such circumstances, general purpose dictionaries may be helpful. In many cases that give rise to litigation, however, determining the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim requires examination of terms that have a particular meaning in a field of art. Because the meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is often not immediately apparent, and because patentees frequently use terms idiosyncratically, the court looks to those sources available to the public to show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean. Those sources include the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed.Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170, 126 S.Ct. 1332, 164 L.Ed.2d 49 (2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

To begin with, the claims of the patent “themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular terms.”

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627 F. Supp. 2d 635, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102114, 2008 WL 5146543, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/attic-tent-inc-v-copeland-ncwd-2008.