Arnette v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Arnette)

156 B.R. 366, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 795, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1040, 1993 WL 281844
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJuly 26, 1993
Docket19-30123
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 156 B.R. 366 (Arnette v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Arnette)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arnette v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Arnette), 156 B.R. 366, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 795, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1040, 1993 WL 281844 (Conn. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF SECURED STATUS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)

ALAN H.W. SHIFF, Bankruptcy Judge.

On July 6, 1992, the chapter 13 debtors filed the instant motion under 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1993) to determine the value of their 1988 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer which is collateral for a claim held by General *367 Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”). See Rule 3012 Fed.R.Bankr.P. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the vehicle must be assessed at its fair market value, i.e. the price the debtors could get for it in a free and open market, and that GMAC’s allowed secured claim is fixed at that amount.

BACKGROUND

On March 2, 1992, the debtors commenced a case under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code which they converted to chapter 13 on July 6, 1992. At the commencement of this case they owed GMAC $9,729.13, which was secured by a first priority security interest in their 1988 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer. The debtors propose to retain that vehicle and pay the allowed amount of GMAC’s secured claim through a three year chapter 13 plan. 1

DISCUSSION

1.

Code § 506(a) provides in relevant part:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.

Most courts have determined the value of a vehicle to be retained by a chapter 13 debtor from the perspective of what the holder of a claim secured by that vehicle could get by selling it. See e.g., In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 303, 121 L.Ed.2d 226 (1992) (value set at the National Automobile Dealers’ Association (“NADA”) guidebook wholesale or trade-in value because that is what the creditor could obtain for it); In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1981) (value set at the price the creditor could obtain through a commercially reasonable sale of the vehicle). However, “[sjubsection (a) of § 506 provides that a claim is secured only to the extent of the value of the property on which the lien is fixed.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 239, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1029, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1988) (dictum). The phrase “value of such creditor’s interest” has been defined as “the value of the collateral.” United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 484 U.S. 365, 372, 108 S.Ct. 626, 630, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) (dictum). Therefore the term “collateral,” as used in Timbers, means the property which serves as security for the creditor’s loan. “It would run contrary to Timbers to hold that the value of an underseeured creditor’s lien interest is some amount less than the full value of the collateral.” In re Green, 151 B.R. 501, 505-6 (Bankr.D.Minn.1993).

The parties adhere to this reasoning by arguing that the vehicle should be valued from the perspective of what the debtors could obtain by selling it. The debtors assert that they could obtain only the NADA wholesale value because the vehicle would have to be reconditioned and under a warranty to attain the NADA retail value. GMAC, on the other hand, argues that no discount from the NADA retail value is appropriate because of the excellent condition of this vehicle and because a dealer would get the NADA retail value plus the value of a warranty on resale of the vehicle.

In Matter of Arpaia, 143 B.R. 587, 588 (Bankr.D.Conn.1992), the debtor argued that the value of his residence should be set at $83,000, which was the high bid obtained at a prepetition foreclosure sale. Two junior secured creditors argued that the value of the residence should be set at its fair market value which was established as $155,000. Id. The court reasoned that, in valuing property pursuant to § 506(a), the value of the property should be deter *368 mined by the relevant facts of that case. Id. at 589. That included the debtor’s proposal to void liens encumbering his residence to the extent they exceeded its value, pay the allowed amount of adjusted secured claims over the period of his plan, and retain possession. 2 Id. Under those circumstances, the value of the property was the price obtainable in a free and open market, i.e. its “fair market value as established under non-forced sale circumstances.” Id. at 590. As the court in Matter of Crockett, 3 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1980) artfully noted, where debtors propose to retain property pursuant to a chapter 13 plan they “cannot eat with the hounds and run with the hares. Seeking retention of the property, they cannot insist on liquidation values to be paid to the creditor.” See In re Johnson, 145 B.R. 108, 115-16 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1992) (property that is to be retained pursuant to a chapter 13 plan is not to be valued assuming that the secured creditor will dispose of it); cf., In re Bellamy, 122 B.R. 856, 862 (Bankr.D.Conn.) (disposal costs a secured creditor would have to pay if allowed to foreclose on property are not deducted from the fair market value of the property where the debtor plans to retain the property), aff'd, 132 B.R. 810 (D.Conn.1991), aff'd, 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 124 L.Ed.2d 228 (1993).

I adopt the Arpaia analysis and conclude that in a § 506(a) determination, an asset to be retained by a debtor under a chapter 13 plan should be valued at the price the debtor could get for it in a free and open market, i.e. its fair market value. I further conclude that this determination should be made as of the time of the valuation hearing because, although under 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (West 1993) a secured creditor must receive the value of the collateral “as of the effective date of the plan,”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Cook
415 B.R. 529 (D. Kansas, 2009)
In Re Valenti
105 F.3d 55 (Second Circuit, 1997)
In Re Chrapliwy
207 B.R. 469 (M.D. North Carolina, 1996)
In Re Byington
197 B.R. 130 (D. Kansas, 1996)
Matter of Maddox
194 B.R. 762 (D. New Jersey, 1996)
Wood v. La Bank (In Re Wood)
190 B.R. 788 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1996)
In Re Marshall
181 B.R. 599 (N.D. Alabama, 1995)
In Re Kennedy
177 B.R. 967 (S.D. Alabama, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
156 B.R. 366, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 795, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1040, 1993 WL 281844, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arnette-v-general-motors-acceptance-corp-in-re-arnette-ctb-1993.