Matter of Arpaia

143 B.R. 587, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1253, 1992 WL 200564
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedAugust 10, 1992
Docket19-50149
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 143 B.R. 587 (Matter of Arpaia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Arpaia, 143 B.R. 587, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1253, 1992 WL 200564 (Conn. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DETERMINE VALUE OF SECURITY

ROBERT L. KRECHEVSKY, Chief Judge.

I.

Issue

At issue in this proceeding, commenced by a Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3012 motion, 1 *588 is the standard for determining value of property where the purpose of the valuation is to decide the extent of a “strip down” 2 of secured creditors’ liens encumbering a chapter 13 debtor’s residence. The matter has been submitted upon the pleadings, a stipulation of facts and briefs.

II.

Background

Nicholas E. Arpaia, III, the debtor, filed a chapter 13 petition on November 27, 1991, following the holding of a mortgage-foreclosure public auction of his home located at 191 Cream Pot Road, Durham, Connecticut (the property). The highest price bid at the November 16, 1991 auction was $83,000.00. The auction, pursuant to a Connecticut court order, had been advertised in the local papers twice during the prior two weeks, and a “for sale” sign had been posted on the property. The parties have submitted appraisals disclosing the property value to be $155,000.00, were the court to utilize a comparable sales, non-forced liquidation, appraisal approach. The property is an eight-room, single-family home on 3.07 acres of land with a town assessment of $132,370.00.

The debtor’s pleadings aver, that as of the bankruptcy petition date, the balances due on four claims secured by encumbrances on the debtor’s property were as follows: (1) first mortgage held by Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford (Dime) (the foreclosing mortgagee) $80,578.09; (2) second mortgage held by Fleet Bank, N.A. (Fleet) $60,000.00; (3) third mortgage held by Colony Savings Bank (Colony) $40,-000.00; (4) attachment lien held by Connecticut National Bank (CNB) $5,100.00. 3

The debtor’s Third Amended Chapter 13 Plan (the plan) proposes that the debtor shall retain his property and decelerate the defaulted Dime mortgage by paying ar-rearages of $11,271.00 through the plan. The plan further provides that $2,421.91 of the Fleet claim will be treated as a secured claim payable over the plan’s five-year term. The balance of the Fleet claim ($57,-578.09) and the entire Colony and CNB claims will be treated as unsecured claims, to be paid a dividend of approximately one percent. The debtor proposes to make 60 monthly payments of $450.00 each to the chapter 13 trustee to fund the plan.

In order to make the plan feasible, the debtor contends the court should determine the value of his property to be $83,000.00, 4 established by the bidding at the mortgage-foreclosure auction. Fleet and Colony 5 argue that the court should set the fair market value of the property at $155,000.00, its appraisal value in a non-forced sale context. At the auction sale, a total of six bids from three bidders were received — Dime making the opening bid of $72,500.00 and Colony making the final bid of $83,000.00.

III.

Discussion

Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) provides the framework for the resolution of the issue here presented.

§ 506. Determination of Secured Status.
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is *589 a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest or the amount subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.

The § 506(a) legislative history further explicates the valuation process:

Subsection (a) of this section separates an undersecured creditor’s claim into two parts — he has a secured claim to the extent of the value of his collateral; he has an undersecured claim for the balance of his claim. “Value” does not necessarily contemplate forced sale or liquidation value of the collateral; nor does it imply a full going concern value. Courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the competing interests in the case.

H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6312.

It is readily apparent from the foregoing that Congress intended that the purpose and the circumstances of each proceeding be the prime determinants on the standard of valuation adopted by the court. The purpose of the debtor seeking a determination of value in this proceeding is to strip down the liens encumbering his property and thereafter to retain title and remain in possession. His plan essentially calls for the payment only of claims to the extent they are secured by the property.

The Second Circuit, in In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.1992), has held, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dewsnup v. Timm, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992) that a chapter 7 debtor may not void the unsecured portion of a secured creditor’s lien, that in a chapter 13 reorganization the debtor may apply strip down to encumbrances on the debtor’s residence. The parties in Bellamy having stipulated to the value of the debtor’s property, Bellamy contains no discussion on the standard of valuation of the involved property. Neither the parties nor the court have located case authority directly on point on the issue of the standard of valuation in a chapter 13 strip down involving a residence. There is, however, analogous authority which supports the use of a non-forced sale standard of valuation under the stipulated-to circumstances in this case.

A leading treatise, 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 11506.04 at 506-31 to -32 (15th Ed. 1992), during its discussion of § 506(a) states that “[i]f retention and use by the debtor of the collateral is proposed, there is generally no reason to assume for purposes of valuation that the collateral will be disposed of on a ‘forced sale’ basis. Although circumstances may be imagined under which a forced sale would be a commercially reasonable disposition, such circumstances would be highly unusual with respect to property which the debtor desires to retain and use.” Crouch v. Pioneer Federal Savings Bank (In re Crouch), 80 B.R. 364 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1987) involved chapter 7 debtors’ use of § 506(d) to reduce the amount of lien indebtedness on the debtors’ residence (obviously prior to the Dewsnup

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
143 B.R. 587, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1253, 1992 WL 200564, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-arpaia-ctb-1992.