Savloff v. Continental Bank (In Re Savloff)

4 B.R. 285, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 56, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5121, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 349
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 16, 1980
Docket19-10662
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 4 B.R. 285 (Savloff v. Continental Bank (In Re Savloff)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Savloff v. Continental Bank (In Re Savloff), 4 B.R. 285, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 56, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5121, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 349 (Pa. 1980).

Opinion

OPINION

EMIL F. GOLDHABER, Bankruptcy Judge:

While the ostensible purpose of the complaint presently at bench is for a “determination (under § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code) of the secured státus” of the existing liens against the debtors’ residence, 1 the real thrust of the debtors’ action is to determine the value of the collateral held by said lien creditors so that the debtors may decide whether to relinquish it or keep it and make arrangements to repay those secured creditors who have realizable security interests. 2 *286 We determine that the value of the debtors’ residence is $207,500.00.

The facts are as follows: 3 The debtors filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on October 10, 1979. Listed in their schedules is their residence, located at 504 Waldron Park Drive, Haverford, Pennsylvania, which they had purchased one year earlier for $172,500. 4 Having added $35,000.00 worth of improvements, 5 one might conclude (in this inflationary era) that the property would be worth at least $207,-500.00. However, debtors, in said schedules, valued their property at only $140,-000.00.

Section 506(a) of the Code provides that the value of collateral security shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition of the property. 6 Since we are unable to find any precedent interpreting this new section, we will look to cases under Section 57(h) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93(h) 7 which, of course, was repealed when the Bankruptcy Code was enacted. We should, at this point, note that, in the legislative debate which accompanied the passage of § 506(a) of the Code, consideration was given to the meaning of the word “value.”

“Value” does not necessarily contemplate forced sale. or liquidation value of the collateral; nor does it always imply a full going concern value. Courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the competing interests in the case.
House Report No. 95-595 at p. 356, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6312.

At the trial of this issue, the debtors sought to introduce testimony to show what this property would bring at a sheriff’s sale in a foreclosure proceeding. But the argument against the use of liquidation value as a measure of the worth of an item of collateral is well presented in In re American Kitchen Foods, 2 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 715 (N.D. Me., 1976). There, the court adopted a standard of commercial reasonableness for valuation of collateral which standard it borrowed from Section 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code. 8 The standard rec *287 ommended was that amount which would be obtained from “the most commercially reasonable disposition practicable under the circumstances.” 9 In discussing the use of liquidation value in appraising collateral, the American Kitchen court stated:

The customary practice in bankruptcy courts has been to use forced sale valuations for all appraisals, without sufficient regard to the nature of the proceedings. But the bankruptcy court is neither constitutionally nor otherwise required to reject more commercially reasonable collateral conversion methods in preference for forced sales at levels which substantially worsen the losses of all parties to the proceedings, including the secured party.
The competitive chill generated by forced sales is notorious and relentless. Forced-sale valuations should be confined to use in cases where the circumstances of the debtor and the nature and condition of the collateral and its marketplace leave no commercially reasonable alternative. Where there is no practicable alternative except to submit to the influence of bargain basement buyers, sanguine in the knowledge that salvage recoveries will reward their wait, “judicial sales” may be appropriately associated with forced-sale or liquidation recoveries, which is commonly the case in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings where collateral must be disposed of almost immediately, “as is” and at minimal expense.

Id. at 722.

In In re Pennyrich, Inc. of Dallas, 473 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), the court addressed the problem of appraising collateral which had declined substantially in value in the hands of the secured party. Since no guidance had been set forth in the Bankruptcy Act, the court held that the only reasonable interpretation of Section 57(h) would be to value the collateral by “applying the norm that a prudent businessman would employ to dispose of an asset.” 10

We are persuaded by the rationale of the Fifth Circuit that the value of collateral security should be determined by the amount which would be obtained from the most commercially reasonable disposition practicable under the circumstances. We conclude that, only in the rarest of circumstances, where other methods of disposition are precluded, should the property be valued at what it would bring at forced sale.

At the trial of this issue both the debtors and the junior lienor, West Wholesale Drug Company, presented expert testimony as to the fair market value of the property. The debtors’ expert testified that the fair market value was $180,000. 11 On the other hand, West Wholesale Drug Company’s expert testified that the property would be worth $200,000 even if no improvements had been made. Since $35,000 of improvements had been made, he testified that the property could sell for an amount in excess of $235,000, provided that the property was properly advertised and the right buyer was found. 12

Since we must evaluate the property “in light of the purpose of the valuation,” 13 and since that purpose, in the instant case, is (as the debtors concede in their brief) to determine whether they want to repurchase the property, we give little credence to the debtors’ scheduled evaluation of $140,-000.00.

Furthermore, we find the figure of $180,-000, submitted by the debtors’ appraiser, to be too low in light of the fact that the property was purchased just twenty months ago for $172,500 and had improvements of $35,000 added to it. On the other side of *288

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
4 B.R. 285, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 56, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5121, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 349, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/savloff-v-continental-bank-in-re-savloff-paeb-1980.