In Re Davis

14 B.R. 226, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 381, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2896
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maine
DecidedSeptember 28, 1981
Docket16-10360
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 14 B.R. 226 (In Re Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Davis, 14 B.R. 226, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 381, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2896 (Me. 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CONRAD K. CYR, Bankruptcy Judge.

Houlton Trust Company [HTC] seeks a determination as to the value of its security interest in various vehicles 1 retained by the debtor in possession [debtor] for use in its continuing operations. 2 The debtor continued to make payments to HTC after the commencement of these chapter 11 proceedings, until the creditors’ committee objected on the ground that the payments included postpetition interest. The objection is predicated on Bankruptcy Code § 506(b), 3 which permits postpetition interest only if the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the claim.

The HTC claim is an allowed secured claim to the extent of the value of the HTC interest in the debtor’s interest in these vehicles, by virtue of Bankruptcy Code § 506(a), 4 which directs the court to consider the purpose of the valuation and the proposed use or disposition of the property, but prescribes no other statutory valuation standards.

The purpose of the present valuation is to arrive at a dollar equivalent of the economic worth of the “interest” of HTC in the estate’s interest in the vehicles, in order to assure adequate protection of HTC’s interest in accordance with Bankruptcy Code § 363(e). 5 The “interest” to be protected is the net economic benefit recoverable by HTC upon a post-default disposition of its collateral pursuant to the provisions of its contract and of applicable law.

HTC takes the position that each collateral unit is worth more than the amount due against it. 6 The court must therefore ascribe to each unit of collateral the dollar equivalent of its economic worth.

The confirmed reorganization plan contemplates that the collateral be used by the debtor in its ongoing wholesale food distribution business. In these circumstances, subsection 506(a) seems to envision an archetypical valuation premised on a simulat *228 ed conversion of the collateral into cash in the most commercially reasonable manner practicable in the circumstances. See H.Rep.No.95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), at 356; S.Rep.No.95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), at 68, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, 5787. Cf. In re Jones, 5 B.R. 736, 6 B.C.D. 965, 967 (E.D.Va.B.J. 1980) [chapter 13]; In re Savloff, 4 B.R. 285, 6 B.C.D. 349, 350 (E.D.Pa.B.J.1980) [chapter 7]; In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 B.C.D. 715, 722 (D.Me.B.J.1976) [Chapter XI collateral valuation].

Where a confirmed chapter 11 reorganization plan contemplates retention of the collateral by the debtor for use in its ongoing business operations, collateral of the type involved in this case should be ascribed its fair market value. The present record contains uncontroverted evidence that the net recovery from a private sale conducted on reasonable [60-day] notice, after deducting all reasonable costs of sale, would exceed the amount due HTC on each item of collateral, with the exception of the 1972 GMC truck. 7

HTC contends that its collateral could command a premium at either public or private sale, 8 due to its ability as a lender to offer purchase-money funding to prospective buyers. The fundamental assumption underlying any commercially reasonable collateral disposition must be that it would proceed as an arms-length transaction, whose putative traits [e. g. whether a forced, liquidation or going-concern sale] will have been prescribed by the court in accordance with the broad legislative guidelines contained in Bankruptcy Code § 506(a). Were it assumed instead that the putative purchaser would pay more (or less) than the collateral is worth, for whatever reason, the sale could not be considered an arms-length transaction. It cannot be presumed that a reasonable seller would dispose of its collateral, in whatever marketplace, for less than the market would bear. Cf. In re Pennyrich International Inc. of Dallas, 473 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973) [prudent-man test]. As in any arms-length commercial transaction, it must be presumed that the seller, in disposing of the collateral, has endeavored, by all reasonable means practicable in the circumstances, to realize its full economic worth. Nor will it be presumed that the seller would willingly part with other value, such as purchase-money financing, for less than its actual worth, in order to sell the collateral at a premium. The legerdemain of labeling as part of the sale price what is in reality a portion of the financing cost, may disguise, but cannot alter, the true market value of the collateral.

The net fair market values of the estate’s interest in each unit of collateral, for the *229 purposes of the present controversy, 9 are found to be as follows:

Net F.M.V.
1974 Great Dane trailer and Thermo King refrigerator unit $ 9,000
1974 Freuhauf trailers (2) with Thermo King refrigerator units 18,000
1974 International truck and 1972 Strick trailer 16,000
1972 GMC truck 7,500

The ultimate determination contemplated by Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) & (b) requires an evaluation of the secured party’s interest in the estate’s interest in the collateral. Upon disposition of the collateral following default, the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus net proceeds over and above the secured indebtedness. Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 11, §§ 9-502(2) 10 & 9-504(2) 11 (1980-81 Supp.). In the words of subsection 506(a), the secured party must be provided adequate protection of its “interest in the estate’s interest in such property.” The “interest” of the secured party entitled to protection is therefore limited under the Uniform Commercial Code by the requirement of an accounting to the debtor. There is no entitlement in these circumstances to adequate protection of the so-called collateral “cushion” of the secured party, except as may be mandated by Bankruptcy Code § 506(b). 12

The Uniform Commercial Code entitles the debtor to redeem 13 or purchase 14 collateral after default. These rights must be taken into account in any attempt to evaluate the economic worth of the interest of the secured party

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Bluebook (online)
14 B.R. 226, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 381, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2896, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-davis-meb-1981.