SMITH, Judge.
.. . Appellant.,bus appealed the .rejection of' 3.product and ,8 process claims in his application 1 fqr patent, on certain polymers- and processes,for the production thereof. The rejection is based on appellant’s,British Patent which issued more than one-year prior to the filing date of the appealed application., 35 U.S.C. .§ 102(b).. The primary-issue infhisqa.se arises .under 35 U.S.C. §, 120 and requires a determination of whether, the present application is entitled tp the benefit of the fil[279]*279ing date of an earlier D-S- application2 fop patent -filed,bj^pppellant, thq filing dat.eof .which,is parly enough,to,^vpi(l -the. .statutory par ,of,,.,35-ilU:S.C..,§ 10fi(fi).
’1 History of Present
Proceedings'5'
The rather...complicated, fact sityation,: presented,by the, two .consolidated, appeals may be summarized as,follows, ,
“1. Appellant, .Szvyarc, on Sept. 19, 1947, filed a British applica- ' “ ‘ ;tioh which relates to the same • ’’ *' subject hiatter as the presently appealed application.-
*;“2. -A Ú.S. application,' Ser. No. „ , . 4$,339,/identical. with „ said . , British, application,. was, filch,,, ...on Sept. 8, .1948. ^ '.(¡hereafter /' termed the “parent” application). , , V"... .V.’.,,
On rMar„ .7,. 1951 the.reference . .... • British, ¡patent, .No,. 65.0,947,-was; issued on. .the said British, ■ .application. , .-.-iir-, ‘3..
The’ présent applicátion, -'Sem v No:'’306,:-9’40, wáé filed on Aug. • 1 -28,1952, as a ‘continuation-in-^- * - part* of what 'appellaritASsérts1 ’ ; to - be-"his- parent'application, ■ Ser. No. 48,039. U ’ "• — - s' “4.
' Claims ¿2-47; 49,'5(j and 52 of" ,' the’ ‘parent’ TJ.'S.",application,: ' ’ ' Sef.''No.'48,039/^6^6’finally ’’ rejected "‘by’‘the* exairfinei'' as...../ ' /■’' ‘laclcihg utilityíhesé ¿laims ' "were amended" after'filial" he-/ " j‘ectioniri'ficcordahce'with!Rule 1 116 of the Rules of "Practice '' .of, -the U.S-, Patent Office and became claims 54 (a process i - claim) and 55-- .-(a-- product ‘‘ : "'claim),'which Wére'appe'a’íed'tb’ ." /.-' the 1)oard of Appeals., :‘5."
■“'6.1 The'Board- "of 'Appeaiá/'rélyinfi ’ // . rfi a/,. /¡Brn^neL 2J6,, i: - ■: - 37 GCPA,-i032,-affirmed'.the - examiner?S- rejection-'oPeláimá» /“h'¿"án'd''56'‘ Sf'the ‘pareiit’ ap^cation,, ' •.vhrA/'' ¡“(Cfil'',11)
After the Board had' .affirmed : the examinerfs rejection of said yclaimshá and 55, a civil action ..-against the. Commissioner un- ■ der 35 -U.S.C. §, 145 was filed by Petrocarbon Ltd., the then , assignee of;appellant! Szwarc. The. District,-Court, D. C., in . an unreported,.'-Memorandum -, Decision, ruled in favor of the . Patent Office, Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson.
“8. The District-Court’s decision 1 'in Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson was affirmed by the-Court of Appeals, D. C., 101 U.S.App. D.C. 214, 247 F.2d 800. (Cerif tiprari denied, 355 U.S. 955, 78 , S.Ct. 540, 2 L.Ed.2d 531; Petition for rehearing denied, 356 U.S. 978, 78 S.Ct. 1134, 2 L.Ed.2d 1146).
“9., The.claims of the present ap- . .plication stand rejected under /3’5 U.'S.Cir!‘§; 102(b) as being ’ 'bkffed tíy the sáid British Pat"ent '65fi;947 issued to Szwarc ->. ¡ more than a year prior to Aug. : • 28; 1952; the'filing date of the ! - presently-appealed application. Benefit of the filing date-of the ,.,, 3 .‘parent’ .application, under 35 1LS.C. ,§ J(20 was denied by the . examiner, whiph action was af- ,,,,... firmed, b.y„ the. jfioord of Ap,i;(. 'Pqals,, <o- Ijn a(id,ecisiofi upon re- ,, j:. |cpn.sideriition,. the, board held - a.„,.thes, decision . in/.Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson to be res judi- • :'eatic on'the ¡question'1’of wheth- // ér .the parent Apphcfition '"disf 1 ¿closed the ..invention ,ag,<ren, - quired'-by-the- first-paragraph 'of '35.’ U,S.C.; § 112, and held' .fhoL-jhis preyemtefi appelifipt, irbimavoiding the ¡present iré1-s‘11'/"/jectioñ/by‘f écfiürse'tov35, U/S/ ,..-v,V-<A;.Í, ,A -..I- «w1 - •’,<• "■ 'll' .¡í,: x :í
“lOl"5 -1 In bur-ifiíti'ár fionSidefatibih' óf' ,, .¡....¡tfijs^.ca^^.in Appeal. N/o, f/4 f,i' íV'rWKÍ í í¡ . 'i iii *>■ ......... [280]*2806462, we noted that while the appealed decision was based on res judicata, the record did not disclose the necessary identity or privity of parties between the present appellant Szwarc and Petrocarbon Ltd., the party in interest in the prior litigation. We therefore remanded the ease to the Patent Office ‘for a factual determination as to the relationship, if any, between the parties involved in the Petrocarbon case and the party in interest here involved’. In re Szwarc, 280 F.2d 436, 47 CCPA 1167.
“11. The Board of Appeals, in a decision dated Oct. 13, 1961, set forth facts of record in the Patent Office which it found sufficient to show identity or privity of the parties Szwarc and Petrocarbon Ltd. and denied appellant’s requested remand to the primary examiner. Szwarc’s Request for Reconsideration and his Petition to the Commissioner were both denied.
“12. The board decision dated Oct. 13, 1961 was appealed and became our Appeal No. PA 7000. We granted Szwarc’s Petition for Rehearing in PA 6462 and both appeals were consolidated for reargumént and decision.”
PA 6Í62
The issue presented by PA 6462 is. whether under 35 U.S.C. § 120 the present application is entitled to the benefit, of the filing date of appellant’s earlier U.S. application. It is the position of the board and solicitor that the decision in Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson, supra, is res judicata on this issue.
The Parties
The first requirement of res judicata is that the second suit must involve the same parties or their privies. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898. In the case at bar, we obviously do not have the same parties as those before the court in Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson,, supra. Since the record in PA 6462 was silent as to any relationship' establishing privity between the parties, we remanded the same to the board for a factual determination of the relationship upon which the finding of res judicata could properly be based. In re Szwarc, 280 F.2d 436, 47 CCPA 1167. While there still remains some doubt as to whether the information presented by the Board; of Appeals on Remand sufficiently establishes privity of the parties,3 Petrocarbon Ltd. and Szwarc, which warrants application of res judicata, we need not here pass, on this matter in view of the concession made at oral argument by appellant’s attorney that the M. W. Kellogg Company was the party in interest in Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson, supra, and is the party in interest here.
[281]*281
The Issues
The second requirement of res judicata is identity of issues. If the second action between the same parties or privies is upon the same claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an absolute bar to relitigation not only of those matters actually determined in •the prior suit but also any other matter which might have been acted upon in the prior suit. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195. This aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, sometimes ■called res judicata by bar or merger, differs from the second aspect of res judicata, estoppel by judgment. If the second action is upon a different claim or ■demand, an estoppel by judgment, more limited in its scope than res judicata by bar, operates as an estoppel only as to those matters upon which a determination or final verdict was actually rendered. Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra. Because the distinction between res judicata by bar and estoppel by judgment is often a source of confusion, the definitive statements of the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra, 333 U.S. at pages 597-598, 68 S.Ct. at page 719 are here quoted at some length:
“It is first necessary to understand something of the recognized meaning and scope of res judicata, a doctrine judicial in origin. The general rule of res judicata applies to repetitious suits involving the same cause of action. It rests upon considerations of economy of judicial time and public policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations. The rule provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound ‘not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.’ * * *
“But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different cause or demand, the principle of res judicata is applied much more narrowly. In this situation, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel, not as to matters which might have been litigated and determined, but ‘only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.’ Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra, [94 U.S.] 353. And see Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606 [24 L.Ed. 214]; Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48 [18 S. Ct. 18, 42 L.Ed. 355]; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent [Inv.] Co., 320 U.S. 661, 671 [64 S.Ct. 268, 88 L.Ed. 376]. Since the cause of action involved in the second proceeding is not swallowed by the judgment in the prior suit, the parties are free to litigate points which were not at issue in the first proceeding, even though such points might have been tendered and decided at that time. But matters which were actually litigated and determined in the first proceeding cannot later be relitigated. Once a party has fought out a matter in litigation with the other party, he cannot later renew that duel. In this sense, res judicata is usually and more accurately referred to as estoppel by judgment, or collateral estoppel. # * *»
Having in mind the above stated distinctions between res judicata by bar and estoppel by judgment or collateral estoppel and applying it to the present case, we find that the present record presents a different cause or demand than the cause or demand litigated in the Petroearbon case.
As stated in the Memorandum Decision of the District Court in the Petrocarbon case, “The sole issue is whether the specification meets the requirements of Section 112 of Title 35 for a written description of the manner of using the invention.” The “invention” in the above quoted statement is the invention defined [282]*282in claims 54 and 55 of thé parent application, No. 48,'339.
Stated another way, the “cause, or demand” presented for adjudication in Petrocarbon was whether 'the applicant was entitled in the application there in’issue to the allowance of claims 54 and 55. In the present appeal, PA 6462, this issue is not before us. The sole issue here is whether the present, application is entitled under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to the benefit of the filing date of the parent application. The “cause or demand” presented here is whether the eleven appealed claims4 of the present application should be allowed. The issue, cause or demand of the present case thus is not the same issue, cause or demand which was litigated in the Petrocarbon case. See In re Fried, 312 F.2d 930, 50 CCPA 954. Therefore, we hold that res judicata by bar does not apply. We must therefore determine here whether the second aspect of res judicata, estoppel by judgment or collateral estoppel, is applicable.
Where, as here, the second action between the same parties is upon a different cause or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only to those matters in issue upon which a determination or verdict, was rendered. Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra. The determination of precisely what matters were actually decided in the Petrocarbon case gives real meaning to the observation ox the Supreme Court in Last Chance Mining Company v. Tyler Mining Company, 157 U.S. 683, 687, 15 S.Ct. 733, 734, 39 L.Ed. 859, that:
“ * * * The jaw jn respect to estop-' pel by judgment is well' settled, and the only difficulty lies in the application of the law to the facts. * ■* *
The specific issue under 35 U.S.C. § 120 which requires decision in this appeal is whether the invention claimed in the present appealed claims is “ * * * disclosed in the manner provided by the first paragraph of Section 112 of this title in an application previously filed in the United States by the same inventor * * *” so as to allow the present application to have the benefit,of the filing date of the previously filed, parent application which was the application-tn issue,in,the Petrocarbon case. It is -the .position of the Board of Appeals and-the, solicitor here that this question must-fie .angered in the negative because the Petrocarbon case finally determined that the invention claimed therein was not “disclosed in ¡the manner provided by the first paragraph of Section 112.” , , :' ¡
As we recently held in the case'of’In re Fried, supra, the position of the Patént Office requires us to determine, by comparing the appealed claims and the claims rejected in the parent case, whether “the invention” of the appealed claims is the same or is different from “the invention” in the prior rejected claims. Only after such a comparison can- it be decided if estoppel by judgment-or collateral estoppel prevents us from making a'determination of whether, under 35 U.S.C. § 120, the appealed claims are entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the earlier filed parent application. As pointed out in In re Fried, supra, the summary application of collateral estoppel, without such an analysis and comparison, can lead to the improper denial to an applicant of the benefit of an earlier filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 120.
Claim 54 rejected in the parent case-was a process claim while claim 55 was a, product claim for “The solid polymer produced by the process of claim 54.” Of the-eleven claims in the present application on appeal, claims 36, 38 and 39 are product claims of varying scope and the remainder are process claims.
The product of claim 55 is produced by the process of claim 54 which is as follows :
“54. A process for the production of a solid polymer of high thermal stability which is resistant to sulfui-ic acid and insoluble in many organic solvents, which comprises heating hydrocarbon vapors consisting essentially of paraxylene at a temper[283]*283■ature of about 860° C for a period of from about, 0.3 to 0.4 second and under a pressure of from about 8 to 10- mm. of mercury, cooling the resulting vapors to a temperature at which a solid polymer is deposited which does not soften . even . when heated to about 270° C, and recovering the said solid polymer.”.
'The District Court, in its Memorandum Decision,5 made no distinction- between the process- and the product- claims but merely stated that thé’ -sole issue whswhether the specification meets the re-quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. In finding that claims 54 and 55 were properly, rejected, Judge McGuire- quoted from In re Bremner et al., 182 F.2d 216, 37 CCPA 1032, upon which the board had relied. In the decision in the Court of Appeals, D.C., 101 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 247 F.2d 800, appellant took the position that- the .specification did in fact meet the-requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 within-the “rule ■of In re Bremner” because the application stated how to make a film from the ■solid polymers and mentioned its thermal stability and resistance to various sol-vents of the polymers. In rejecting the appellant’s argument that the word “film” itself was a sufficient indication to a person of ordinary skill in the art of how to use the invention,.the court stated:
“ * * * Although the specification does say that the ‘polymers obtained in the above examples were useful’ because they had great thermal stability and resisted various fluids, it is not apparent from the face of the ■specification how utility could in fact be'achieved. The examples indicate that the polymer forms a ‘film’; but they do not indicate whether or not this’ film adheres to the object on which it forms, whether'it falls off in-the form of a p.qwder, whether it is . detachable -in. the .form of a. film-like ■ substance .(similar perhaps tq cellophane,),, whether the film of .polymer is useful as such, whether it,would, have to be subjected to further proc- ■ essing before it could form a useful object or fluid, and so on. Some such further indication, it seems to us, should have been, given to enable readers of the application to understand how the product is to. be used. If the specification, had indicated,a particular use for the film, and if "the question before us was wbefher the language used was sufficient to explain this use to one skilled in the art,' then testimony of experts might well have been received. But the present specification, while indicating useful properties of the new polymers (heat and acid resistance), makes no such statement as to the film, or explains how the film is to be used. Since the word “film” by [284]*284itself does not connote a particular use, the specification is defective as a matter of law.”
Thus, the question decided in the Petrocarbon case, as related to product claim 55, was that the specification was not sufficient under 35 U.S.C. § 112 to teach a person of ordinary skill in the art how to use 6 the invention so defined.
In comparing the product defined in claim 55 with the three product claims in the present application, we note that appealed claim 39 calls for “the solid polymerization product of the pyrolyzed vapors of para-xylene * * * having a crystal structure, having a softening point about 300° C, and being insoluble in many organic solvents at ordinary temperatures.” This polymer as defined in claim 39 is made from the identical starting material, para-xylene, as the polymer product called for in rejected claim 55 of the parent application. Being the same polymer in each case, the description of its properties in the claims does not distinguish the polymers of claim 39 from the polymers of said claim 55. Appealed claim 38 specifies that the starting material be 1,4-dimethyl naphthalene (instead of para-xylene as in claim 39). Appealed claim 36 states that the starting materials are “selected from the class consisting of polymethyl benzenes and poly-methyl naphthalenes having from 2 to 6 methyl groups substituted in the nucleus with two of the methyl groups being in the 1,4-positions of one ring.” While claims 36 and 38 are broader in scope than rejected claim 55 of the parent application in that they define a larger group of products from which to select the starting materials, the resultant polymers are inclusive of the product of said rejected claim 55. Therefore, the prior adjudication in the Petrocarbon case that the specification of the parent application-did not satisfy the first paragraph of 35-U.S.C. § 112, decided the identical question which must be here resolved in determining whether the products of claims-36, 38 and 39 were “disclosed in the manner provided by the first paragraph of' Section 112 of this title” in the parent application in order to get the benefit of the earlier filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 120. We think that the principle of collateral estoppel prevents our independent, determination of this issue as to the appealed product claims 36, 38 and 39, However, as indicated in In re Nelson and'. Shabica, 280 F.2d 172, 47 CCPA 1031, we-disagree on the merits with the result, reached in Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson, In thus affirming the rejection of product claims 36, 38 and 39, we do so not on the merits but solely and only for the reason that we feel bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel not to permit relitigation of this issue.7
As previously pointed out, the District Court and the Court of Appeals, D. C.,. made no distinction between the rejected* product claim 55 and the rejected process claim 54 in finding that the specification-was insufficient under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Implicit in this finding is the reliance by both courts on the decision of this court in In re Bremner, supra. The Bremner decision has been frequently relied upon, by the Patent Office as support for the position that unless the specification discloses the “utility” of the product required by 35 U.S.C. § 101 and tells “how to-use” the product under 35 U.S.C. § 112, a process for making the disclosed product must be rejected on both statutory bases, [285]*285This position appears to have been derived from this court’s statement in Bremner that:
“It was never intended that a patent be granted upon a product, or a process producing a product, unless such product be useful.” [Emphasis added.]
In our recent decision in In re Wilke and Pfohl, 314 F.2d 558, 50 CCPA 964, we had occasion to review the above quoted “rule of Bremner” and concluded that there was no statutory basis for such a rule. In the Wilke and Pfohl ease, we held that, under the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, it was sufficient if the specification disclosed to a person of ordinary skill in the art the steps of how to carry out the claimed process. Thus, the so-called “rule of Bremner” as applied to process claims, no longer exists in this court.
We are therefore faced with a situation in which we are asked to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the appealed process claims because the Petroearbon decision refused process claim 54 in the parent case by reliance upon the so-called “rule of Bremner” which has - now been overruled by this court in its application to process claims.
A similar problem was resolved by the Supreme Court in Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 7, 57 S.Ct. 330, 81 L.Ed. 465. There, a prior adjudication had held that the 1923 income of a trust was taxable income to the petitioner since, under state law, the trust was a spendthrift trust. Later a state court held the trust not to be a spendthrift trust. In a second proceeding, covering tax years 1924 through 1929, the Commissioner argued that the judgment relating to income in 1923 “is conclusive in this proceeding as res judicata.” 8 In refusing to apply collateral estoppel in this situation where the law upon which the prior adjudication rested had been changed, the court stated:
“It is not necessary to review the respective contentions upon this point, as we think that the ruling in the Tait case is not applicable. That ruling and the reasoning which underlies it apply where in the subsequent proceeding, although relating to a different tax year, the questions presented upon the facts and the law are essentially the same. Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., supra [289 U.S. 620], pp. 624, 626 [53 S.Ct. 706, 77 L.Ed. 1405]. Here, after the decision in the first proceeding, the opinion and decree of the state court created a new situation. The determination of petitioner’s liability for the year 1923 had been rested entirely upon the local law. Commissioner v. Blair [7 Cir.], 60 F. (2d) 340, 342, 344. The supervening decision of the state court interpreting that law in direct relation to this trust cannot justly be ignored in the present proceeding so far as it is found that the local law is determinative of any material point in controversy. Compare Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 [54 S.Ct. 308, 78 L.Ed. 634]; Hubbell v. Helvering [8 Cir.], 70 F. (2d) 668.”
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, supra, the Supreme Court again warned against the application of collateral estoppel where there had been a modification of the legal principles which had controlled the decision in the prior suit. The Court stated:
“ * * * A taxpayer may secure a judicial determination of a particular tax matter, a matter which may recur without substantial variation for some years thereafter. But a subsequent modification of the significant facts or a change or development in the controlling legal principles may make that determination obsolete or [286]*286erroneous, at least for fixture purposes. If such a, determination is thqn perpetuated each succeeding year as to the taxpayer involved in the original litigation, he is accorded á tax treatment' different’ from. that given to other taxpayers of the same class. As a result, there are inequalities ‘ in the administration of the revenue . laws, discriminatory distinctiohs in tax liability, and a. fertile basis for litigious confusion. Compare United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 235-236 [47 S.Ct. .616, 71 L.Ed. 1013] . Such consequences, however, are neither necessitated nor justified by the principle of collateral' estoppel. That principle is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits,.over, matters which have once been decided and which have remained substantially static, factually and legally. It is not meant to create vested rights in decisions that have become obsolete or erroneous with time, thereby causing inequities among taxpayers. [Emphasis added.]
* * * But the intervening decision need not necessarily be that of a state court, as it was in the Blair ■case. While such a state court decision may be considered as having •changed the facts for federal tax litigation purposes, a modification or growth in legal principles as enunciated in intervening decisions of this Court may also effect a significant change in the situation. Tax inequality can result as readily from neglecting legal modulations by this Court as from disregarding factual changes wrought by state courts. In either event, the supervening decision cannot justly be ignored by blind reliance upon the rule of collateral estoppel. ***”..
It is clear to us that there has been “a modification of, the controlling legal principles” as to the proper interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112 as applied to process claims since the Bremner decision in 1950.9 It is equally clear that the courts in Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson, (1) in making no.distinction betw.een the process and product’claims, insofar as the rer quirements of 35 U.S.C.,§ 112 are concerm ed, (2) in citing and quoting the Bremner case, and (3) in limiting their discussions to -the lack of. disclosed .utility for the product, (the film of the solid polymers), relied on the “rule of Bremner” to find that the process claim 54 was properly rejected. .. Therefore, the situation- before us.as tq the,.appealed.,process claims presents .a .recognized .exception to. ,the.doctrine of- collateral estoppel. Blair v. Commissioner, supra, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, supra, Mandel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 Cir., 229 F.2d 382; Henricksen v. Seward et al., 9 Cir., 135 F.2d 986, 150 A.L.R. 10> We are, therefore, free to proceed to a determination on the merits of the issue as to whether the present application, insofar as the process claims are concerned, is entitled under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to the benefit of the filing date of the parent application.
As stated in In re Wilke and Pfohl, supra, a specification which teaches those skilled in the art how to use the process, i. e., by disclosing the manipulative steps of the process, the required operating conditions and the starting materials so that the process may be used by a person skilled in the art, meets the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. It is not necessary to specify the intended uses for the product produced therein. It is our [287]*287opinion that thé specification'of the parent application here' does in fact sufficiently disclose the invention of the appealed process claims so that a person skilled in the art could -use-or follow the claimed process. ■ -
Appealed process claims 1 and 2 are.the broadest in specifying that the .starting materials be selected from a class consisting of (1). polyméthyl benzenes arid (2) polymethyl naphthalenes, each having from two to six methyl groups substituted in the n.ucleus with two of these groups in the 1,4 positions in one" ring. As support in the parent specification, we find the following:
“(1) The invention consists in a process for the production of a polymer in which the vapour of an aromatic hydrocarbon consisting of from 1 to 4 benzene nuclei with two methyl groups substituted in the para positions of one benzene nucleus * * *»
and
“(2) The invention also consists of a process for the production of a polymer in which the vapour of 1,4 dimethyl naphthalene is pyrolysed * * *»
Appealed process claims 3, 4, 5 and 13 specify the starting material to be “1,4 dimethyl naphthalene”. Appealed process claim 9 specifies “p-xylene” as the starting material. All these starting materials are specifically disclosed in the parent specification.
All of the appealed process claims specify reaction temperatures within the ranges of 700-1000°C: This limitation is clearly shown in the parent specification. All the appealed claims specify the reaction time to be “not more than one second” which is also disclosed in the specification of the parent application. We also find the claimed pressure ranges and temperatures at which the solid polymers are cooled for deposit to be disclosed in the parent specification.
' All of thé above constitutes á disclosure in 'the'parent cáse’of thé1 process'in'the manner required by the first paragraph of-35 U.S.C: ■§■ 112. -,It is our conclusion, therefore, that the process cláims L-3, 5, 6, 9, 13 and 14 of the present-appeal were disclosed- in thei earliér filed application “in:-the manner provided by the. first paragraph of ¡Section- 412” -of .Title 35 of the-■U.S.Code -and -that applicant is therefore ■entitled¡to -the, benefit-,of the,-filing date of the parent application under the proyi.sions of 35 U;S.C: §-120. Therefore, the effective date of filing- the application on the. process claims is the filing date of the parent application.. 'This avoids the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and there j ection of the process claims by the-Board of Appeals is reversed.
PA 7000
The remaining question raised by appellánt in PA 7000 arises from the refusal of the Board'of Appeals and the Commissioner to remand the case to the Primary Exarniner for his consideration after it was remanded by'this court for the purposes stated in our prior opinion,. In re Szwarc, supra. We think it is entirely within the discretion of the Board' of Appeals and the Commissioner to determine the proper tribunal within the Patent Office to make the determination requested. See In re Jewett et al., 247 F.2d 953, 45 CCPA 714.
In summary, we affirm the rejection of product claims 36, 38 and 39, but reverse-the rejection of process claims 1-3, 5,, 6, 9, 13 and 14.
Modified.